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Previous	   work	   in	   the	   field	   of	   the	   clinician-­‐patient	   relationship	   has	   relied	   on	   a	  generalized	  understanding	  of	  the	  ethical	  structure	  of	  the	  clinical	  relationship.	  	  This	  thesis	   seeks	   to	   rebut	   that	   presumption,	   by	   claiming	   that	   differing	   clinical	  relationships	  raise	  diverse	  ethical	  issues	  that	  call	  for	  specific	  ethical	  solutions.	  	  By	  looking	   closely	   at	   the	   primary	   dental	   care	   relationship	   this	   thesis	   will	   propose	  three	   specific	   instances	   where	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship	   faces	   unique	  challenges.	   	   The	   thesis	   will	   also	   go	   on	   to	   establish	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   current	  reliance	   on	   a	   rational	   notion	   of	   autonomy;	   one	   that	   is	   firmly	   attached	   to	   the	  consent	   process,	   is	   unable	   to	   theoretically	   address	   and	   adequately	   support	   the	  issues	  raised	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationship.	  	  	  	  This	   work	   considers,	   through	   philosophical	   enquiry,	   a	   number	   of	   theoretical	  alternatives	   and	   examines	   in	   detail	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   an	   alternative	   way	   of	  understanding	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship	   might	   be	   more	   effective	   in	  addressing	   the	  matters	  of	  ethical	   concern	  raised	  and,	  as	  a	   consequence,	  be	  more	  ethically	  robust.	  	  The	   thesis	   concludes	   that	   a	   separation	  between	  our	  understanding	  of	  promoting	  and	   protecting	   autonomy	   enables	   us	   to	   re-­‐visit	   and	   develop	   a	  more	   appropriate	  model	  of	  autonomy	  for	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationship	  that	  relies	  on	  a	  moderated,	  negative	  libertarian	  view.	  	  This	  transforms	  and	  simplifies	  obligations	  to	  the	  patient	  by	  providing	  an	  account	   that	  operates	   as	   a	   constraint	   in	   the	   clinical	   setting	  with	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our	  wish	  to	  promote	  autonomy	  being	  understood	  as	  the	  action	  of	  restoring	  health	  itself.	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Overview	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  unravel	  and	  re-­‐construct	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  ethical	   underpinnings	   and	   consequent	   duties	   in	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship.	  	  Although	  this	  thesis	  will	  consider	  several	  theoretical	  frameworks	  it	  is	  the	  intention	  of	   this	   work	   to	   take	   an	   applied	   approach	   that	   is	   able	   to	   inform	   professional	  practice	  in	  dentistry.	  	  The	  thesis	  starts	  from	  the	  premise	  that	  previous	  work	  in	  the	  field	   of	   the	   clinician-­‐patient	   relationship	   has	   often	   relied	   upon	   a	   generalized	  understanding	   of	   the	   ethical	   structure	   of	   the	   clinical	   relationship.	   	   This	   has	  resulted	  in	  a	  somewhat	  homogenous	  view	  of	  the	  challenges	  faced	  by	  clinicians	  as	  well	   as	   naturally	   resulting	   in	   broad-­‐brush	   solutions	   to	   the	   ethical	   dilemmas	   and	  the	  associated	  theoretical	  frameworks	  relied	  upon	  to	  address	  these	  concerns.	  	  	  So	  why	  is	  this	  question	  important	  and	  of	  concern?	  	  This	  thesis	  relies	  on	  three	  basic	  premises:	  that	  dentistry	  is	  a	  profession;	  that	  professional	  relationships	  are	  subject	  to	  special	  duties	  required	  of	  the	  professional;	  and	  that	  one	  of	  the	  central	  duties	  in	  clinical	   relationships	   is	   the	   requirement	   to	   respect	   patients	   by	   respecting	  autonomy.	  	  This	   thesis	   starts	   from	   the	   premise	   that	   dentistry	   is	   a	   profession.	   	   Although	  professionalism	  has	  its	  own	  debates	  and	  difficulties	  with	  clear	  definition,	  one	  of	  its	  key	   characteristics	   is	   that	   certain	   additional	   rights	   and	   duties	   flow	   from	  relationships	  formed	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  that	  professional	  relationship.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	   that	   someone	   engaging	   the	   services	   of	   a	   member	   of	   a	   profession	   might	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reasonably	   expect	   a	   differing	   standard	   of	   behaviour	   than	   someone	   engaging	   a	  tradesman.	  	  Some	  evidence	  of	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  Law’s	  recognition	  of	  the	  duty	  of	   care	   relationship	   that	   exists	   between	   patients	   and	   their	   clinicians.	   	   It	   is	   a	  patient’s	  right	  to	  expect	  that	  a	  clinician	  must	  exercise	  reasonable	  care	  and	  skill	  in	  any	   interaction	   that	  occurs	  between	   them	  (Bolam	  v	  Friern	  Hospital	  Management	  Committee	  (1957).	  	  	  	  How	  we	  interpret	  those	  rights	  and	  duties	  has	  a	  key	  bearing	  on	  how	  we	  might	  wish	  to	   justify	   the	  existence	  of	  any	  profession	  and	  the	  extent	   to	  which	  we	  ought	   to	  be	  concerned	  about	  the	  relationship.	  	  In	  the	  clinical	  professions	  there	  has	  been	  much	  discussion	   about	   the	  way	   in	  which	   clinicians	  ought	   to	   interact	  with	  patients	   and	  what	  duties	  are	  owed	  to	  patients	  as	  part	  of	  that	  relationship.	  	  The	  current	  general	  consensus	   being	   that	   a	   clinician	   is	   required	   to	   observe	   a	   respect	   for	   persons	  approach.	  	  This	  approach	  is	  based	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  respect	  for	  autonomy	  coupled	  with	   a	   duty	   to	   protect	   those	   unable	   to	   be	   self-­‐determining	   (U.S	   Department	   of	  Health	   and	   Human	   Sciences,	   1979).	   	   Further,	   respect	   for	   autonomy	   is	   largely	  understood	   to	  mean	   respect	   for	   a	   person	  who	   is	   able	   to	   self-­‐legislate	   or	   able	   to	  make	  a	  judgment	  based	  on	  their	  own	  set	  of	  values	  or	  beliefs.	  	  
Overview	  of	  chapters	  This	   thesis	   seeks	   to	   query	   and	   examine	   this	   ‘blanket’	   approach	   to	   the	   clinical	  relationship	  and	  to	  argue	  that	  dentistry	  has	  its	  own	  unique	  ethical	  challenges	  and	  as	  such,	  requires	   its	  own,	  perhaps	  unique,	  solutions.	   	   In	  Chapter	  One,	  this	  will	  be	  achieved	   by	   looking	   closely	   at	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship	   and	   considering	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three	  specific	  instances	  where	  dentistry	  faces	  particular	  difficulties.	  	  It	  is	  hoped	  by	  doing	  so	  that	  an	  argument	  for	  a	  separate	  model	  of	  ethical	  interaction	  may	  be	  made	  as	  well	  as	  identifying	  what	  matters	  any	  future	  model	  must	  be	  able	  to	  address.	  	  Chapter	  One	  begins	  with	  an	  assertion	  that	  in	  the	  clinical	  professions	  the	  clinician-­‐patient	   relationship	   and	   the	   resulting	   duties	   that	   this	   relationship	   creates	   are	  understood	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   general	   and	   ill-­‐defined	   account	   of	   personal	   autonomy.	  	  Further,	  that	  a	  clinician’s	  duties,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  what	  is	  required	  of	  them,	  are	  heavily	  dependent	   and	   stem	   from	  a	   requirement	   to	   respect	   a	  patient’s	   autonomy	  during	  the	  course	  of	  that	  relationship.	  The	  starting	  point	  for	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  claim	  that	  greater	   clarity	   is	   needed	   in	   order	   to	   adequately	   define	   the	   pursuant	   duties	   that	  flow	  from	  the	  clinical	  relationship,	  and	  that	  the	  current	  general	  reliance	  on	  an	  ill-­‐defined	  concept	  of	  patient	  autonomy	  is	  insufficient.	   	  This	  chapter	  claims	  that	  lack	  of	   clarity	   may	   lead	   to	   such	   duties	   being	   inadequately	   applied,	   too	   broad	   to	   be	  deliverable	  or	  in	  the	  worst	  cases	  circumvented.	  	  	  Chapter	  One	  sets	  out	  to	  develop	  this	  claim	  by	  considering	  three	  hypothetical	  case	  studies	   that	   are	   central	   to	   the	   delivery	   of	   primary	   dental	   care;	   those	   being	   the	  challenges	  faced	  by	  delivering	  NHS	  and	  private	  treatment	  in	  the	  same	  setting;	  the	  challenges	  of	  cosmetic	  dentistry;	  and	  the	  challenges	  posed	  by	  the	  use	  of	  skill	  mix	  (differing	   dental	   professionals	   delivering	   treatment	   in	   the	   same	   context).	   	   Each	  case	   study	  considers	   the	   challenges	   in	  detail	   and	  proposes	   issues	   that	  may	  be	  of	  moral	   concern.	   	   The	   chapter	   claims	   that	   these	   almost	   unique	   challenges	   raise	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important	  issues	  that	  must	  be	  addressed	  in	  order	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  ethical	  duties	  of	  a	  dentist	  are	  adequately	  discharged	  in	  relation	  to	  patients.	  	  	  The	   chapter	   concludes	   by	   identifying	   a	   set	   of	   concerns	   that	   are	   of	   particular	  interest	   and	   significance	   to	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship.	   	   These	   concerns	   are	  the	   use	   of	   deception	   in	   the	  dentist-­‐patient	   relationship,	   the	   ability	   to	   draw	   clear	  limits	   to	   any	   duties	   required	   of	   dentists,	   the	   ability	   to	   correctly	   prioritise	   a	  patient’s	   reasonable	  wishes	  and	  adequate	  emphasis	  on	   the	  process	  of	  healthcare	  (as	   well	   as	   the	   outcome	   of	   treatment).	   	   Finally	   the	   chapter	   concludes	   by	  questioning	   to	  what	  extent	  our	  current	  understanding	  of	   respecting	  patients	  and	  our	  use	  of	  autonomy	  can	  adequately	  address	  these	  issues.	  	  Chapter	  Two	  considers	  a	   case	   study,	  The	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  in	  order	   to	  provide	   legitimate	   professional	   context	   and	   to	   expose	   the	   normative	   claims	  prioritized	  by	  those	  considering	  the	   issues	  at	  hand.	   	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	   is	   to	  gain	  insight	  into	  how	  we	  currently	  construct	  the	  clinician-­‐patient	  relationship	  and	  its	  duties.	  	  This	  will	  be	  achieved	  by	  examining	  how	  ethical	  issues	  are	  explained	  in	  the	  report	  as	  well	  as	  what	  solutions	  are	  provided.	  	  This	  chapter	  will	  go	  on	  to	  claim	  that	   we	   generally	   understand	   and	   discharge	   ethical	   duties	   by	   relying	   on	   a	  hierarchical	  model	  of	  autonomy.	  	  Hierarchical	  models	  of	  autonomy	  view	  autonomy	  as	  a	  capacity	  rather	  than	  feature	  of	  persons.	  	  This	  requires	  an	  authentic	  reflective	  process	  to	  endorse	  those	  desires.	  	  A	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  that	  our	  understanding	  relies	  heavily	  on	  the	  transactional	  aspect	  of	  the	  clinical	  relationship.	  	  This	  might	  be	  expressed	   as	   the	   authorization	   of	   treatment	   through	   the	   consent	   process.	   	   The	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thesis	  will	  also	  consider	  the	  limitations	  of	  this	  approach	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  such	  an	  approach	  meets	  the	  needs	  identified	  in	  Chapter	  One.	  	  Chapter	   Two,	   in	   meeting	   its	   aims,	   exposes	   two	   key	   components	   of	   the	   way	   in	  which	  we	  understand	  respecting	  patients.	   	  First;	   the	   link	  between	  consent	  taking	  and	  autonomy	  and	  second;	  our	  reliance	  on	  the	  transactional	  aspects	  of	  consent	  to	  claim	   that	  we	   have	   effectively	   discharged	   our	   duty	   to	   respect	   patients	   and	   their	  autonomy.	  	  First	   the	   chapter	   considers	   the	   important	   link	   between	   consent	   taking	   and	  respecting	  autonomy.	   	  The	  chapter	  quickly	  deals	  with	  current	  understanding	  that	  the	   requirement	   to	   take	   consent	   is	   underpinned	   by	   a	   duty	   to	   both	   protect	   and	  promote	   patient	   autonomy.	   	   It	   is	   the	   position	   in	   this	   chapter	   that	   this	   is	   a	   non-­‐contentious	  claim	  noting	   that	  even	   for	   those	  who	  are	   sceptical	  as	   to	   the	  value	  of	  respecting	   patients	   through	   the	   reliance	   on	   autonomy,	   recognize	   that	   consent	   is	  the	  method	  by	  which	  this	  is	  largely	  delivered.	  	  Chapter	  Two	   then	   goes	  on	   to	   examine	   in	  detail	  The	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001).	  	  
The	   Redfern	   Report	   (DoH,	   2001)	   is	   important	   because	   it	   demonstrates	   how	   a	  breakdown	   in	   the	   clinician-­‐patient	   relationship	   led	   to	   huge	   public	   controversy	  over	  the	  way	  patients	  were	  treated	  in	  the	  NHS.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  examination	  is	  to	  expose	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  a	  breakdown	  in	  the	  clinician-­‐patient	  relationship	  is	  understood.	   	   By	   critically	   examining	   the	   report	   we	   will	   be	   able	   to	   explore	   the	  normative	  beliefs	  that	  underpin	  the	  considerations	  of	  what	  led	  to	  the	  breakdown	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in	   the	   relationship.	   	   The	   chapter	   seeks	   to	   claim	   that	   The	   Redfern	   Report	   (DoH,	  2001)	  understands	  offences	  against	  patients	  (or	   in	  this	  case	  their	  close	  relatives)	  through	  deprivation	  of	  choice.	  	  The	  offences	  caused	  are	  seen	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  high-­‐handed	   paternalistic	   approach	   that	   deprives	   the	   patient	   from	   taking	   part	  adequately	  in	  the	  consent	  transaction.	  	  Further	  the	  chapter	  goes	  on	  to	  reveal	  that	  the	   solution	   to	   this	   deprivation	   of	   choice	   is	   viewed	   in	   the	   report	   as	   being	   an	  
improvement	   in	   the	   consent	   process	   with	   increased	   information	   as	   part	   of	   the	  transactional	  consent	  process.	  	  Chapter	   Two	   concludes	   that	   this	   reveals	   that	   our	   current	   understanding	   of	  autonomy	   in	   the	  clinical	   setting	   relates	   closely	   to	  autonomous	  choosing	  and	   that	  we	   understand	   promoting	   and	   protecting	   autonomy	   through	   successful	  engagement	   in	   the	   consent	   process.	   	   Chapter	   Two	   concludes	   that	   we	   may	   be	  relying	  on	  a	  hierarchical	  model	  of	  autonomy	  to	  underpin	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  duty	  to	  respect	  patients.	   	  Further,	  Chapter	  Two	  queries	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  might	  be	  an	  adequate	  model	  by	  which	  to	  address	  the	  concerns	  raised	  in	  Chapter	  One.	  	  In	  Chapter	  Three	  we	  move	  on	   to	   consider	  how	  hierarchical	  models	  of	   autonomy	  operate	  and	  to	  what	  degree	  they	  can	  adequately	  address	  the	  concerns	  raised	  in	  the	  preceding	   chapter.	   	  We	   look	   at	   the	   pitfalls	   of	   understanding	   respect	   for	   persons	  and	  autonomy	  in	  this	  way	  and	  consider	  if	  it	  is	  an	  adequate	  approach	  at	  all.	  	  The	   aim	   of	   Chapter	   Three	   is	   to	   consider	   to	   what	   extent	   hierarchical	   models	   of	  autonomy	  can	  provide	  an	  adequate	  account	  of	  the	  ethical	  challenges	  raised	  in	  the	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dentist-­‐patient	   relationship.	   	   This	   is	   achieved	   by	   careful	   exposition	   of	   the	  theoretical	  models	  as	  proposed	  by	  Frankfurt	  and	  Dworkin	  and	   later	  modified	  by	  others.	  	  	  The	   chapter	   commences	   by	   drawing	   the	   initial	   link	   between	   a	   hierarchical	  approach	  to	  autonomy	  and	  the	  use	  of	  consent	  in	  the	  clinical	  relationship.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  considering	  both	  consent	  and	  the	  hierarchical	  model	  of	  autonomy	  rely	  heavily	  on	   the	   act	   of	   choosing	   in	   order	   to	   describe,	   protect	   or	   promote	   autonomy.	   	   By	  doing	  so,	  the	  chapter	  claims,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  our	  understanding	  of	  autonomy	  in	  the	  clinical	   setting	   is	   most	   closely	   related	   to	   this	   construction	   of	   autonomy	   and	  therefore	  justifies	  looking	  at	  this	  form	  of	  modelling	  autonomy	  in	  more	  detail.	  	  Chapter	   Three	   begins	   by	   considering	   some	   of	   the	   benefits	   of	   understanding	  autonomy	   in	   this	   way	   and	   outlines	   in	   detail	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   this	   model	  operates.	   	  The	   chapter	  notes	   that	   this	   approach	  may	  well	  be	  viewed	  as	  useful	   in	  that	  it	   is	  operational	  in	  construction	  and	  as	  such	  enables	  us	  to	  view	  autonomy	  as	  an	  ability	  of	  person.	   	  Taking	  such	  an	  approach	  may	  help	  us	   in	  an	  applied	  context	  such	  as	  the	  dental	  clinic,	  to	  identify	  those	  who	  might	  lack	  such	  an	  ability	  or	  feature	  of	  person,	  and	  therefore	  draw	  limits	  around	  a	  clinician’s	  duty	  towards	  patients	  to	  respect	   autonomy.	   	   This	   may	   appropriately	   prompt	   us	   to	   consider	   alternative	  models	  of	  respecting	  patients	  where	  a	  patient	  is	  defective	  in	  their	  action	  of	  making	  a	  choice.	   	  The	  chapter	  notes	  how	  this	  practical	  approach	  to	  some	  extent	  makes	  it	  attractive	  in	  an	  applied	  context.	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However	   the	   chapter	   also	   notes	   that	   the	   model	   suffers	   from	   some	   theoretical	  difficulties.	   	  The	  chapter,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  exposition,	  considers	  in	  detail	  the	  model’s	  difficulties	  with	  manipulation,	  infinite	  regress	  and	  authority.	  	  The	  chapter	  explores	  the	   extent	   to	   which	   these	   difficulties	   might	   frustrate	   the	   claim	   that	   this	  understanding	  of	  autonomy	  is	  the	  most	  suitable	  way	  of	  respecting	  patients	  in	  the	  clinical	  setting	  and	  in	  particular	  in	  dentistry.	  	  The	  chapter	  concludes	  that	  understanding	  respect	  for	  patients	  in	  this	  way	  suffers	  from	  fatal	  flaws	  in	  that	  it	  is	  unable	  to	  adequately	  account	  for	  the	  matters	  raised	  in	  Chapter	  One.	  	  The	  chapter	  claims	  that	  the	  model	  cannot	  sufficiently	  account	  for	  the	  dangers	  of	  deception	  raised	   in	   the	  hypothetical	  case	  studies.	   	  Further,	  as	   it	  relies	  heavily	   on	   defining	   autonomy	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   act	   of	   choosing	   this	   leads	   us	   to	  focus	   on	   respecting	   patients	   by	   relying	   on	   how	   they	   engage	   in	   the	   transactional	  aspects	   (consent	   process)	   of	   the	   clinician-­‐patient	   relationship.	   	   Chapter	   Three	  considers	  that	  perhaps	  autonomy	  is	  not	  the	  appropriate	  way	  in	  which	  to	  meet	  the	  concerns	  of	   Chapter	  One	   and	   therefore	   adequately	   respect	  patients.	   	   It	   does	   this	  because	   its	  construction	  causes	  us	  to	  be	  too	  narrow	  in	  our	  application	  of	  respect	  for	   persons	   focusing	   on	   the	   treatment	   transaction	   rather	   than	   looking	   more	  broadly	  at	  the	  process.	  	  Further,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  hierarchical	  approach	  cannot	  adequately	  account	  for	  concerns	  with	  deception	  and	  manipulation;	  one	  of	  the	  key	  concerns	  raised	  in	  the	  hypothetical	  case	  studies	  in	  Chapter	  One.	  	  This,	  the	  chapter	  proposes,	  may	  cause	  us	  to	  look	  at	  other	  approaches	  to	  respecting	  patients	  that	  may	  address	  these	  concerns	  in	  a	  more	  adequate	  manner.	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In	  Chapter	  Four,	  the	  thesis	  then	  considers	  if	  there	  are	  any	  alternative	  models	  that	  might	  provide	  a	  more	  appropriate	   approach	   to	   autonomy	   that	   are	  better	   able	   to	  address	   the	   concerns	   raised	   in	   Chapter	   One.	   	   First	   the	   thesis	   will	   look	   at	   ‘best	  interests’	   and	   examine	   how	   a	   ‘best	   interests’	   approach	  might	   operate.	   	   This	  will	  enable	   us	   to	   conclude	   to	   what	   extent	   a	   ‘best	   interests’	   approach	   might	   provide	  solutions	  and	  what,	  if	  any,	  aspects	  of	  the	  model	  might	  be	  of	  concern.	  	  The	  aim	  of	  Chapter	  Four	   is	   to	   test	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   ‘best	   interests’,	   otherwise	  understood	  as	  paternalism	  which	  often	  acts	  as	  an	  alternative	   to	  autonomy	  might	  potentially	   address	   the	   concerns	   raised	   in	   Chapter	   One.	   	   This	   involves	   looking	  closely	   at	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   a	   ‘best	   interests’	   approach	   might	   work	   and	  examining	   the	   key	   principles	   that	   underpin	   that	   approach,	   those	   being	   non-­‐maleficence	  and	  beneficence.	  	  The	  chapter	  commences	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  theoretical	  rationale	  for	  ‘best	  interests’	  and	   paternalism	   by	   examining	   the	   principle	   of	   beneficence	   that	   generates	   a	  paternalistic	   approach	   and	   provides	   its	   moral	   rationale.	   	   The	   chapter	   notes	   the	  attraction	  to	  beneficence	  is	  that	  it	  may	  well	  broaden	  our	  area	  of	  focus	  addressing	  the	   concern	   raised	  previously	   that	   the	   current	   construction	   is	   overly	   focused	   on	  the	  consent	   transaction	  and	   fails	   to	  encourage	  us	   to	   look	  more	  widely	  at	  what	   is	  ‘best’	  overall.	  	  	  	  The	  chapter	  however	  also	  raises	  some	  concern	  over	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  ‘best’	  is	  defined	   and	   the	   historical	   difficulties	   with	   taking	   a	   paternalistic	   approach.	   	   The	  
10	  	  
chapter	  attempts	  to	  consider	  to	  what	  extent	  these	  concerns	  can	  be	  addressed	  and	  whether	  a	  strong	  or	  weak	  account	  of	  paternalism	  and	  ‘best	  interests’	  may	  go	  some	  way	   to	  allay	   fears	   that	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   ‘best’	   is	  determined	  may	  provide	  an	  adequate	  account	  of	   ethical	   interaction	   for	   the	   clinical	   setting.	   	  The	   fact	   that	   this	  approach	   may	   even	   be	   compatible	   with	   some	   conception	   of	   autonomy	   is	   also	  considered.	  	  In	   Chapter	   Five	  we	  move	   on	   to	   consider	   a	   new	   account	   for	   the	   clinician-­‐patient	  relationship	  proposed	  by	  O’Neill.	  	  The	  chapter	  considers	  O’Neill’s	  proposal	  that	  the	  clinical	  relationship	  would	  be	  better	  served	  by	  relying	  on	  a	  principled	  account	  of	  autonomy.	   	  The	  chapter	  considers	  O’Neill’s	  criticisms	  of	   the	  highly	   individualised	  accounts	  to	  which	  we	  currently	  appeal.	  	  By	  considering	  O’Neill’s	  initial	  position	  the	  chapter	  attempts	   to	  expose	   the	  change	  of	   focus	   that	  O’Neill	   is	  proposing	  and	  her	  rationale	  for	  developing	  a	  new	  model	  of	  clinician-­‐patient	  interaction.	  	  The	  chapter	  proceeds	  to	  consider	  O’Neill’s	  proposition	  of	  principled	  autonomy	  in	  substitute	  for	  a	  highly	   individualized	  account.	   	  O’Neill	  presents	   five	  main	  benefits	   to	   taking	  her	  new	  approach	  and	  the	  chapter	  considers	  each	  of	  these	  with	  particularly	  focus	  and	  concern	   for	   the	  move	   away	   from	   rights	   to	   obligations	   as	  well	   as	  O’Neill’s	   claims	  about	   the	   role	   of	   ‘authenticity’	   and	   patient	   responsibility.	   	   	   	   Concerns	   are	   raised	  about	  the	  role	  of	  ‘obligations’	  in	  the	  clinical	  relationship	  and	  how	  this	  might	  repeat	  the	   concerns	   raised	   in	  earlier	   chapters	  about	   the	  highly	  medicalized	  and	  narrow	  nature	  of	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationship.	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One	  of	  the	  central	  obligations	  of	  the	  new	  model	  O’Neill	  propos	  is	  a	  commitment	  to	  be	   trustworthy	   and	   the	   chapter	   considers	   the	   implications	   of	   this.	   	   This	   is	  particularly	   relevant	   as	   an	   obligation	   to	   be	   trustworthy,	   O’Neill	   claims,	  means	   a	  duty	   to	   reject	   deception.	   	   As	   deception	   has	   been	   one	   of	   the	   key	   concerns	   of	  preceding	   chapters,	   Chapter	   Five	   considers	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   O’Neill’s	  proposition	  is	  adequate	  for	  the	  problems	  raised	  in	  Chapter	  One.	  	  The	  Chapter	   concludes	   that	  O’Neill’s	  defence	  against	  deception	   is	   too	  narrow	   for	  our	  purposes	  and	  cannot	   legitimately	  be	  widened	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  dentistry.	  	  Further	   that	   a	   reliance	  on	  obligations	   rather	   than	   rights	  naturally	   gives	   rise	   to	   a	  highly	  narrow	  and	  medicalized	  relationship	  which	  may	  fail	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  broader	  concerns	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  Finally	   the	   thesis	   will	   conclude	   that	   autonomy	   does	   indeed	   provide	   our	   best	  framework	  by	  which	  we	  can	  meet	   the	  concerns	  raised	   in	  Chapter	  One	  but	   that	  a	  much	  wider	  and	  less	  transactional	  model	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  specific	  needs	  of	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationship.	   	  This	  chapter	  will	  consider	  a	  moderated	  negative	   libertarian	   account	   as	   a	   possible	   alternative	   construction	   of	   autonomy	  and	  examines	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   this	  account	  may	  go	  some	  way	  to	  meeting	  our	  needs.	  	  	  	  The	  aim	  of	  Chapter	  Six	  is	  to	  propose	  an	  alternative	  approach	  to	  respecting	  patients	  that	   more	   adequately	   meets	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship.	   	   The	  chapter	  works	  on	  a	  review	  of	  some	  of	  the	  key	  points	  and	  themes	  raised	  during	  the	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proceeding	   chapters	   in	   order	   to	   set	   the	   scene	   for	   proposing	   an	   alternative	  approach.	  	  	  	  The	  chapter	  claims	  that	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  transactional	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship;	  the	  consent	   process;	   and	   work	   on	   perfecting	   that	   process	   (through	   augmented	  information)	  fails	  to	  encapsulate	  some	  of	  the	  matters	  that	  ought	  to	  concern	  us	   in	  the	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship.	   	   Chapter	   Six	   reviews	   some	   of	   the	   difficulties	   of	  understanding	   clinical	   interaction	   in	   this	  way	  and	  how	   this	   fails	   to	  prioritise	   the	  important	  aspects	  of	  healthcare	  as	  an	  ethical	  endeavour.	  	  	  	  Working	  on	  the	  premises	  raised	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter,	  Chapter	  Six	  then	  moves	  on	  to	  propose	  a	  different	  account	  of	  autonomy	  as	  a	  potentially	  suitable	  model	  for	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	   relationship.	   	   The	   chapter	   then	   proceeds	   to	   go	   through	   the	  proposed	  benefits	  of	   taking	  such	  a	  different	  approach	  and	  concludes	  by	  claiming	  that	  the	  proposed	  account	  of	  autonomy	  enables	  us	  to	  re-­‐focus	  our	  understanding	  respect	   for	   persons	   away	   from	   a	   treatment	   model,	   toward	   a	   broader	   approach.	  	  The	   chapter	   also	   seeks	   to	   consider	   to	   what	   extent	   such	   an	   approach	   can	   deal	  adequately	  with	  our	  concerns	  with	  deception	  and	  manipulation.	  	  Chapter	  Seven	   reviews	   the	   thesis	   and	  proposes	   recommendations	   for	   the	   future.	  	  The	   chapter	   begins	   with	   summarising	   the	   thesis’s	   contribution	   to	   dentistry.	   	   It	  does	  so	  by	  recalling	  the	  progression	  of	  the	  preceding	  chapters	  and	  briefly	  outlining	  the	   findings	   of	   each.	   	   Chapter	   Seven	   then	   goes	   on	   to	   consider	   some	   of	   the	  limitations	  of	  the	  research.	  	  The	  chapter	  considers	  that	  the	  thesis	  does	  not	  seek	  to	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cover	   the	   practical	   and	   general	   professional	   arguments	   of	   dentistry	   and	   takes	   a	  normative	   approach.	   	   This	  may	   give	   rise	   to	   questions	   about	  whether	   or	   not	   the	  findings	   of	   the	   thesis	   can	   be	   applied.	   	   However	   it	   is	   concluded	   that	   a	   normative	  approach	  gives	   important	  distance	  and	  an	  opportunity	   to	   critique	   the	  profession	  without	   being	   subject	   to	   professional	   bias	   or	   institutional	   constraints,	   an	  important	  feature	  of	  a	  rational	  approach.	  	  It	  is	  argued	  here	  that	  this	  is	  an	  important	  if	   not	   vital	   ‘first-­‐step’	   on	   the	   road	   to	   examining	   the	   complexities	   of	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship	   and	   the	   development	   of	   a	   rational	   response.	   	   Finally	   the	  chapter	  considers	  recommendations	  for	  future	  work.	  	  Future	  work,	  it	  is	  concluded,	  lies	  with	  generating	  empirical	  evidence	  and	  facilitating	  stakeholder	  consultation	  in	  order	   for	  application	   to	  be	  possible.	   	   It	   is	  only	  by	  marrying	   the	  normative	   to	   the	  empirical	   that	   the	   findings	   of	   the	   thesis	   may	   then	   be	   translated	   into	   clinical	  practice.	  	   	  
14	  	  
Chapter	  One	  –	  Introduction	  	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  claim	  that	  autonomy	  is	  the	  primary	  principle	  that	  the	  clinical	  professions	   appeal	   to	   when	   they	   claim	   to	   respect	   patients.	   	   I	   will	   state	   that	  autonomy	  can	  be	   a	  difficult	   concept	   and	   that	   the	   clinical	  professions	  have	  yet	   to	  settle	  on	  a	  clear	  definition.	  	  Lack	  of	  clarity	  naturally	  leads	  to	  difficulties	  in	  accurate	  and	  meaningful	   application	   in	   the	   clinical	   setting	   and	   it	   is	   for	   that	   reason,	   I	  will	  propose,	   that	   we	   may	   need	   specific	   theoretical	   models	   to	   account	   for	   differing	  clinical	  encounters.	  	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  establish	  this	  claim	  by	  looking	  at	  some	  of	  the	  specific	   challenges	   encountered	   in	  primary	  dental	   care	  using	   a	  hypothetical	   case	  study	  approach.	  	  It	  is	  hoped	  by	  doing	  so	  that	  I	  will	  be	  able	  to	  identify	  some	  of	  the	  issues	   raised	   by	   these	   case	   studies	   and	   conclude	  what	   any	   adequate	   theoretical	  model	   must	   be	   able	   to	   deliver	   in	   order	   to	   address	   the	   specific	   ethical	   needs	   of	  primary	  dental	  care.	  	  Autonomy	  has	  established	   itself	   over	   the	   last	   few	  decades	  as	  one	  of	   the	  primary	  principles	   that	   ethically	   underpins	   the	   clinician-­‐patient	   relationship.	   	   It	   is	   the	  principle	   that	   some	   regard	   as	   the	   first	   amongst	   equals	   (Gillon,	   2003).	   	   The	  paternalism	  of	  the	  past	  has	  been	  rejected	  in	  favour	  of	  an	  approach	  that	  recognises	  rights	   and	   gives	   authoritative	  weight	   to	   the	   voice	   of	   the	   patient.	   	   In	   principle	   it	  affords	  patients	  the	  right	  to	  choose	  and	  manage	  their	  own	  healthcare	  experience.	  	  There	   is	  much	   to	   recommend	   it.	   	  Autonomy	  helps	  us	   to	  understand	  and	  express	  our	  dissatisfaction	  with	  paternalistic	  models	  of	  the	  past	  relied	  on	  in	  medicine	  and	  dentistry	  and	  provides	  an	  alternative.	   	   It	   is	  no	  longer	  acceptable	  for	  a	  clinician	  to	  make	  decisions	  for	  patients	  based	  on	  what	  they	  perceive	  to	  be	  in	  the	  patient’s	  ‘best	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interests’.	   	   Patients	   are	   now	   afforded	   the	   right	   to	   make	   such	   decisions	   for	  themselves,	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  these	  decisions	  appear	  to	  be	  of	  some	  benefit	  to	  them.	  	  This	  is	  in	  recognition	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  as	  individuals	  it	  is	  more	  important	  to	  recognise	   our	   individuality	   than	   it	   is	   to	   derive	   some	   measurable	   benefit.	  	  Particularly	  when	  our	  definition	   is	  based	  on	  an	  expert’s	  perspective	  of	  what	   that	  benefit	  is.	  	  In	  recent	  times	  however,	  autonomy	  has	  also	  been	  subject	  to	  criticism.	   	   It	   is	  often	  viewed	  as	   a	   slippery	  principle	   that	   can	  be	   interpreted	   in	  many	  ways.	   	   It	   is	  not	   a	  term	  used	  commonly	  and	  indeed	  from	  a	  practical	  perspective	  many	  clinicians	  are	  unsure	  of	  what	  it	  means.	   	  There	  is	  no	  real	  agreement	  in	  moral	  philosophy	  either.	  	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  autonomy	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  acquired	  skill	  where	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  reflective	  capacity	  is	  necessary;	  a	  ‘capacity	  of	  persons’	  or	  it	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  inalienable	  right	  to	  individuality;	  that	  is	  to	  say	  a	  type	  of	  personal	  sovereignty.	  	  This	  presents	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  clinical	  relationship.	   	  Medicine	  although	  supportive	  of	  autonomy	  in	  principle,	  has	  yet	   to	  settle	  on	  a	   firm	  definition	  of	  what	   it	   is	  and	  this	  inevitably	  leads	  to	  difficulties	  in	  translating	  the	  principle	  into	  the	  clinician-­‐patient	  relationship.	   	   Without	   a	   clear	   definition	   we	   are	   unable	   to	   draw	   any	   limits.	  	  Depending	  on	  what	  view	  is	  taken	  of	  the	  principle,	  whether	  it	  be	  one	  of	  capacity,	  or	  a	  matter	  of	  individual	  sovereignty,	  this	  can	  dramatically	  affect	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  clinical	  relationship	  is	  defined.	  	  Questions	  arise	  concerning	  when	  a	  patient	  may	  be	   viewed	   as	   not	   autonomous	   and	   therefore	   to	  what	   degree	   decisions	  might	   be	  made	  on	   their	  behalf.	   	  A	  clear	  view	  of	  autonomy	   is	  necessary	   in	  order	   to	  discern	  the	  rights	  of	  children	  or	  the	  mentally	  incapacitated	  and	  to	  adequately	  respect	  those	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groups.	  This	   lack	  of	  clear	  professional	  and	  philosophical	  agreement	  on	  autonomy	  has	  caused	  some	  to	   look	  for	  alternatives	  rather	  than	  address	  the	  tangled	  mass	  of	  differing	   models.	   	   This	   is	   understandable	   in	   the	   circumstances	   as	   any	   principle	  used	   as	   the	   ethical	   basis	   of	   a	   functioning	   relationship	   needs	   to	   be	   capable	   of	  practical	  application	  as	  well	  as	  being	  philosophically	  robust	  in	  order	  to	  be	  worthy	  of	  use.	  O’Neill	   (2002)	  has	  pursued	  a	   route	   for	  example,	   that	   involves	  exchanging	  the	  use	  of	  autonomy	  as	  the	  founding	  principle	  of	  the	  clinical	  relationship	  for	  one	  of	  trust1.	   	  O’Neill	  (2002)	  asserts	  that	  this	   is	  because	  the	  concept	  of	  trust	   is	  far	  more	  appealing	   on	   a	   practical	   level	   in	   that	  most	   people	   have	   a	   clear	   understanding	   of	  what	   the	   concept	  of	   trust	   is	  whilst	   it	   still	   addresses	   the	   ethical	   challenges	  of	   the	  clinical	  relationship.	   	  As	  we	  will	  see	  later	  though,	  the	  concept	  of	  trust	  also	  has	  its	  limitations.	  	  Trust	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  adequately	  account	  for	  situations	  where	  the	  issue	  of	  moral	  concern	  involves,	   for	  example	  deception,	  which	  occurs	  outside	  the	  confines	   of	   the	   clinical	   relationship.	   	   Nor	   can	   trust	   sufficiently	   account	   for	  situations	  where	  we	  would	  like	  to	  give	  the	  patient’s	  voice	  authority	  in	  the	  context	  of	  encounters	  where	  the	  clinician	  and	  patient	  disagree	  or	  indeed	  where	  the	  patient	  got	  what	  they	  wanted	  or	  needed	  but	  were	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  method	  by	  which	  it	  was	   delivered.	   	   O’Neill’s	   (2002)	   attraction	   to	   trust	   as	   a	   concept	   is	   based	   on	   her	  belief	   that	   clinicians	   intuitively	   understand	   trust	   as	   a	   concept	   making	   trust	   an	  attractive	   prospect	   in	   an	   applied	   professional	   setting.	   	   Attractive	   though	   it	   is	   to	  focus	  on	  the	  practical,	  any	  ethical	  model	  of	  patient-­‐clinician	  interaction	  needs	  to	  be	  able	  to	  account	  adequately	  for	  the	  challenges	  that	  occur	  within	  that	  environment.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Note	  that	  this	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  her	  proposing	  a	  change	  to	  principled	  autonomy.	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In	  this	  thesis	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  for	  any	  model	  of	  the	  clinician-­‐patient	  relationship	  to	  be	  either	  ethical	  defensible	  or	  practically	  applicable	  it	  must	  relate	  to	  the	  challenges	  faced	  in	  daily	  practice	  and	  provide	  robust	  answers.	  	  Many	  forms	  of	  autonomy	  and	  alternative	   ethical	  models	   for	   the	   clinical	   relationships	   have	   been	   proposed,	   but	  few,	  if	  any,	  consider	  the	  specific	  challenges	  faced	  by	  differing	  clinical	  relationships.	  	  The	   presumption	   has	   usually	   been	   that	   most	   clinical	   relationships	   experience	  similar	   ethical	   challenges	   and	   that	   the	   basic	   tenets	   of	   consent	   taking	   and	  confidentiality	  are	  adequately	  met	  by	  adhering	  to	  a	  ‘blanket	  standard’	  of	  autonomy	  (or	   an	   alternative)	   that	   applies	   to	   all	   clinical	   disciplines.	   	   Such	   ‘universality’	   of	  approach	  may	   fail	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   differing	   position	   that	   both	   clinician	   and	  patient	   may	   find	   themselves	   in.	   	   Indeed,	   it	   may	   fail	   to	   prioritise	   or	   worse	   take	  account	  of	  differing	  ethical	  challenges	  that	  each	  clinical	  role	  presents.	  	  In	  this	  thesis	  it	   will	   be	   argued	   that	   greater	   precision	   is	   needed	   in	   order	   to	   be	   certain	   that	   a	  model	   is	   adequate.	   	   There	   can	   of	   course	   be	   some	   degree	   of	   commonality	   so,	   for	  instance	   a	   general	   agreement	   that	   autonomy	   is	   the	   underpinning	   value	   in	   the	  clinical	  relationship.	   	  However,	   in	  addition	  to	  this	   it	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  a	  specific	  model	   of	   autonomy	   may	   be	   necessary	   to	   meet	   specific	   challenges	   that	   certain	  disciplines	   regularly	   face.	   	   Further	   by	   taking	   this	  more	   focused	   approach	   it	   also	  challenges	  proponents	  of	  autonomy	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  effective	  model	  or	  apply	  a	  more	  suitable	  model	  where	  autonomy	  appears	  not	  to	  provide	  answers	  to	  specific	  challenges	  but	  has	  historically	  been	  a	  point	  of	  ethical	  reference.	   	  Therefore,	   if	  we	  are	  to	  consider	  clarifying	  the	  use	  of	  autonomy	  in	  the	  clinical	  context	  we	  should	  aim	  to	  enable	  professionals	  to	  confidently	  draw	  limits	  around	  the	  concept	  and	  when	  it	  
18	  	  
applies	   as	   well	   as	   making	   any	   model	   more	   responsive	   and	   reflective	   of	   patient	  need.	  	  
	  Why	  primary	  care	  dentistry?	  Primary	  care	  dentistry	  may	  provide	  one	  such	  example	  of	  where	  a	  discipline	  may	  need	   to	   consider	   its	   own	   challenges.	   Dentistry,	   in	   particular	   provides	   a	   unique	  environment	   for	   the	   clinician-­‐patient	   relationship.	   	   This	   unique	   environment	   is	  perhaps	   most	   apparent	   in	   the	   primary	   care	   setting	   where	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	  dental	  care	  is	  provided.	  	  The	  boundaries	  of	  dental	  care	  are	  much	  less	  well-­‐defined	  than	  those	   found	   in	  primary	  care	   in	  general	  medicine.	   	  The	  reason	   for	   this	   is	   the	  relationship	   faces	   greater	   fluctuation	   than	   primary	   care	   medicine	   with	   the	  potential	  for	  a	  change	  in	  role	  for	  both	  practitioner	  and	  patient.	  	  This	  change	  can	  be	  seen	   perhaps	  most	   distinctly	   in	   three	   particular	   cases	   that	   are	   largely	   unique	   to	  dentistry	   in	   a	   primary	   care	   setting	   in	   the	   UK.	   	   Those	   are,	   the	   use	   of	   cosmetic	  treatment	  alongside	   therapeutic	   treatment,	   the	  delivery	  of	  both	  private	  and	  NHS	  care	  concurrently	  and	  finally	  the	  use	  of	  skill	  mix.	  	  Skill	  mix	  is	  perhaps	  not	  unique	  to	  dentistry	  within	   primary	   care	   but	   certainly	   here	   it	   is	  much	   less	  well	   defined	   as	  compared	  to	  medicine.	  This	  as	  we	  will	  see	   later,	  presents	  certain	  challenges.	   	  We	  will	   now	   consider	   each	   of	   these	   cases	   in	   detail,	   considering	   their	   specific	  challenges	   and	   what	   this	   tells	   us	   about	   the	   ethical	   requisites	   of	   the	   dental	  relationship.	  	  Dentistry	  stands	  apart	  from	  many	  of	  the	  other	  clinical	  healthcare	  disciplines	  in	  that	  it	   routinely	   offers	   and	   provides	   both	   therapeutic	   and	   cosmetic	   treatments	   in	   a	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primary	   care	   setting.	   	   Treatments	   such	   as	   tooth	   whitening,	   veneers,	   cosmetic	  crowns	  and	  orthodontic	  work	  may	  be	  prescribed	  and	  delivered	  as	  part	  of	  a	  general	  dental	  practitioner’s	  daily	  work	  in	  his	  high	  street	  surgery.	  	  	  The	  fact	  that	  we	  draw	  a	  distinction	   between	   two	   types	   of	   treatment	   causes	   us	   to	   contemplate	   what	   the	  differences	   are	   between	   them	   and	   subsequently	   to	   consider	   if	   these	   differences	  have	  any	  ethical	  implications.	  	  At	  first	  instance	  the	  distinction	  seems	  to	  reveal	  three	  main	  areas	  of	  ethical	  concern.	  	  These	   areas	   of	   concern	   are	   that;	   there	   are	   practical	   difficulties	   for	   the	   patient	  moving	   from	   a	   healthcare	   rubric	   to	   one	   of	   commercial	   transaction;	   cosmetic	  treatment	   relies	   more	   heavily	   on	   a	   subjective	   assessment	   of	   ‘clinical	   need’	   and	  finally	   a	   dentist	  may	   quite	   understandably	  want	   to	   do	   something	   ‘nice’	   for	   their	  patient.	  	  Considering	  our	  first	  concern,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  when	  a	  patient	  moves	  from	  therapeutic	   treatment	   to	   cosmetic	   treatment	   that	   there	   is	   a	   shift	   in	   the	   ethical	  duties	  of	  the	  dentist	  toward	  the	  patient.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  a	  patient	  has	  moved	  from	  a	  healthcare	   rubric	   to	   one	   of	   commercial	   interaction.	   	   This	   is	   because	   the	   ethical	  underpinnings	  of	   each	   treatment	  differ	   from	  one	  another.	   	  Therapeutic	  dentistry	  might	  be	  described	  as	  procedures	   that	  address	   conditions	   that	  arise	   from	  dental	  disease,	  trauma	  or	  inherent	  physiology	  that	  affect	  a	  patient’s	  ability	  to	  function	  and	  may	  be	  also	  causing	  them	  discomfort.	   	  We	  may	  also	  want	  to	  include	  prophylactic	  treatments	  in	  the	  therapeutic	  group	  where	  treatment	  is	  used	  to	  prevent	  conditions	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resulting	   from	  disease,	   trauma	   or	   inherent	   physiology,	   as	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   these	  two	  forms	  of	  treatment	  share	  the	  same	  root	  characteristics.	  	  Cosmetic	  treatment	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  is	  not	  related	  to	  arresting	  disease,	  repairing	  trauma	   (for	   the	   purposes	   of	   regaining	   function)	   or	   treating	   an	   inherent	  physiological	  problem	  that	   is	  affecting	  a	  patient’s	  ability	  to	   function	  or	   is	  causing	  pain.	   	   It	   is	   a	   treatment	   where	   the	   focus	   lies	   on	   changing	   the	   appearance	   of	   a	  patient’s	  teeth.	  	  As	  such	  then	  therapeutic	  treatment	  easily	  falls	  within	  the	  remit	  of	  a	  healthcare	  endeavour	   (to	  promote	  good	   through	   the	  restoration	  of	  health)	  and	  all	  the	  ethical	  duties	  that	  entails	  whereas	  cosmetic	  treatment	  does	  not.	  	  Perhaps	  in	  the	  most	  simplistic	  terms	  this	   is	  because	  therapeutic	  treatment	  seeks	  to	  promote	  good	   through	   the	   restoration	   of	   health	   where	   health	   is	   the	   prerequisite	   of	  accessing	  other	  goods.	   	  As	  a	  result,	  good	  health	  attracts	  more	  ethical	   importance	  than	  cosmetic	  treatment	  which	  seeks	  to	  merely	  to	  augment	  social	  inclusion.2	  	  This	  might	   lead	  us	   to	  argue	   that	  maybe	  a	  dentist	  does	  not	  owe	   the	  same	  duty	  of	  care	   in	   a	   cosmetic	   case?	   	   Attractive	   though	   this	   is	   it	   seems	   hard	   to	   argue	   this	  adequately.	   	   From	   a	   practical	   perspective	   a	   patient	   is	   unlikely	   to	   be	   able	   to	  distinguish	  when	  a	   change	   in	  underlying	  duty	  of	   care	   is	  happening.	   	  Therapeutic	  and	   cosmetic	   care	   are	   often	   delivered	   within	   the	   same	   setting	   by	   the	   same	  practitioner	  in	  the	  same	  surgery	  as	  part	  of	  the	  same	  treatment	  plan.	  	  Dentists	  also	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  A	  distinction	  here	  could	  be	  drawn	  between	  want	  and	  need.	   	  That	   is	   to	  say	  that	   individuals	  need	  health	  to	  operate	  in	  society	  but	  may	  want	  cosmetic	  treatment.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  good	  health	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  accessing	  certain	  other	  goods	  such	  as	  education	  whereas	  good	  looks	  may	  give	  one	  an	   advantage	   but	   are	   not	   essential	   to	   accessing	   other	   basic	   goods.	   	   I	   do	   not	  wish	   to	   expand	   this	  argument	  too	  much	  here	  but	  rather	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  basic	  distinction	  in	  ethical	  terms	  between	  the	  two	  treatment	  endeavours.	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benefit	   from	   their	   status	   as	   medical	   practitioners	   when	   offering	   cosmetic	  treatment	  in	  that	  patients	  assume	  that	  they	  are	  being	  treated	  under	  the	  same	  duty	  of	  care	  as	   if	   the	  treatment	  was	  therapeutic.	   	  Even	  if	  a	  dentist	  made	  the	  change	  in	  role	  explicit,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  their	  professional	  status	  and	  the	  surgery	  context	  would	  still	  exert	  ‘undue’	  influence.	  	  Increased	  trust	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  patient	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  dentist’s	  advice	  would	  be	  a	  breeding	  ground	  for,	  at	  best,	  unintended	  coercion	  on	  the	  dentist’s	  part3.	  	  Owing	  to	  this	  professional	  status	  then,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  that	  a	  dentist	  would	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  offer	  a	  cosmetic	  treatment	  to	  a	  patient	  that	  might	   be	   dangerous	   or	   the	   cause	   of	   later	   ill-­‐health.	   	   When	   a	   patient	   is	   so	  vulnerable,	   regardless	   of	   the	   treatment	   they	   are	   undergoing,	   it	   seems	   counter-­‐intuitive	   to	   surrender	   them	   to	   the	  maxim	   caveat-­‐emptor	   (let	   the	   buyer	   beware)	  simply	  because	   the	   treatment	   is	  purely	   cosmetic.	   	   Further,	   a	  dentist’s	   suggestion	  that	  a	  treatment	  be	  done	  carries	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  weight	  because	  of	  the	  duty	  of	  care	  patients	   believe	   lies	   between	   them,	   so	   to	   remove	   that	   duty	   of	   care	   it	   at	   certain	  times	   seems	   indefensible.	   	   	   	   What	   does	   this	   then	   mean	   for	   the	   patient?	   	   By	  attempting	  to	  argue	  against	  a	  change	  in	  the	  relationship	  and	  the	  duty	  of	  care	  of	  the	  dentist	   toward	   the	   patient	   in	   cosmetic	   treatment	  my	   point	   of	   concern	   is	   one	   of	  deception.	   	   I	   am	   concerned	   that	   patients	   may	   find	   themselves	   under	   a	  misapprehension	   concerning	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   dentist	   and	  patient.	  	  This	  deception	  may	  result	  in	  a	  dentist	  being	  able	  to	  exert	  undue	  influence	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Interestingly	   although	   the	   legal	   basis	   for	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship	   changes	   depending	   on	  whether	   the	   treatment	   is	   private	   or	   NHS	   that	   is	   to	   say	   that	   it	   is	   either	   governed	   by	   the	   law	   of	  contract	   or	   law	  of	   tort	   the	   standard	  of	   the	  duty	  of	   care	   remains	   the	   same.	   	   Contractual	  dentistry	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  contract	   is	  the	  only	  measure	  of	  what	   is	  expected	  of	  the	  dentist.	   	  A	  dentist	  cannot	   legally	   limit	  the	  care	  he	  owes	  a	  patient	  no	  matter	  what	  waiver	  he	  puts	   in	  the	  contract	  nor	  may	  a	  patient	  sign	  away	  his	  right	  to	  claim	  for	  negligence.	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on	   the	  patient	  either	   intentionally	  or	  unintentionally.	   	  This	  seems	  to	  run	  entirely	  counter	  to	  the	  patient’s	  belief	  the	  dentist	  will	  always	  act	  in	  their	  best	  interests	  and,	  of	  course,	  this	  further	  increases	  the	  deception.	  	  The	  challenges	  for	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationships	  are	  further	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  not	  always	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  what	  constitutes	  clinical	  need	  and	   what	   may	   be	   considered	   cosmetic	   desire.	   	   Clinical	   need	   in	   dentistry	   relies	  heavily	  on	  a	  subjective	  assessment	  by	  both	  dentist	  and	  patient.	   	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  particularly	  in	  the	  clinical	  assessment	  of	  orthodontic	  need,	  which	  for	  the	  most	  part	  relates	  to	  adjusting	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  patient’s	  teeth	  and	  no	  more.	  	  Ideas	  around	  needs	   assessment	   are	   complex	   issues	   and	   it	   is	   not	   the	   intention	  of	   this	   thesis	   to	  explore	  those	  in	  great	  depth	  but	  merely	  to	  contend	  that	  one	  patient’s	  assessment	  or	  indeed	  one	  dentist’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  ‘need’	  to	  straighten	  someone’s	  teeth	  may	  be	  different	  from	  another’s	  (despite	  the	  introduction	  of	  IOTN	  scoring).	   	  The	  main	  ethical	  problem	  occurs	  no	  matter	  if	  the	  parties	  are	  in	  agreement	  with	  each	  other	  or	  not.	   	  As	  the	  assessment	  of	  need	  is	  subjective	  does	  that	  mean	  that	  a	  reduced	  duty	  could	   be	   imposed	   from	   outside	   the	   relationship	   even	   if	   both	   parties	   were	   in	  agreement	   that	   this	  was	   indeed	   a	   healthcare	   rather	   commercial	   relationship?	   	   If	  the	   parties	   disagree	   on	   this	  matter	  whose	   voice	   is	   authoritative?	   	   Can	   a	   patient	  prove	   need	   and	   therefore	   impose	   differing	   duties	   merely	   because	   of	   his	  preconceptions	  before	  treatment?	  Again	  it	  seems	  some	  of	  the	  preceding	  problems	  occur	   here:	   that	   a	   shifting	   relationship	   (between	   healthcare	   and	   cosmetic	  treatment)	  carrying	  differing	  duties	  is	  difficult	  to	  manage	  and	  ethically	  challenging.	  	  The	   consequence	   of	   this	   is	   again	   one	   of	   deception.	   	   A	   patient	   is	   prevented	   from	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managing	   the	   relationship	   if	   he	  or	   she	   is	  uncertain	  of	   its	   structure	  and	   this	   then	  apportions	  greater	  weight	  to	  a	  dentist’s	  advice	  than	  might	  be	  due.	  	  Finally,	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  scenario	  it	  must	  be	  considered	  that	  the	  dentist	  can	  also	  face	   the	   temptation	   to	   do	   ‘something	   nice’	   for	   patients.	   	   Dentists	   are,	   after	   all,	  skilled	   professionals	   whose	   skill,	   capabilities	   and	   sometimes	   resources	   extend	  beyond	  clinical	  need.	  	  It	  is	  not	  unreasonable	  to	  suppose	  dentists	  in	  their	  desire	  to	  do	   their	   best	   for	   their	   patients	   may	   persuasively	   suggest	   treatments	   that	   are	  beyond	   healthcare.	   	   Again	   similar	   concerns	   arise	   about	   the	   medical	   context	   in	  which	  a	  patient	  may	   find	   themselves.	   	  Their	   ability	   to	  discern	  either	  a	   change	   in	  relationship	  or	   the	   reduced	  ethical	   underpinnings	   and	   therefore	   the	  weight	   they	  should	  give	  to	  any	  ‘clinical’	  advice	  may	  be	  impaired.	  	  After	  all	  these	  changes	  in	  the	  relationship	   are	   subtle	   and	   less	   than	   obvious	   and	   it	   is	   the	   uncertainty	   of	   the	  relationship	   status	   then	   that	   gives	   rise	   to	   a	   concern	   about	   deception.	   	   We	   will	  consider	  in	  due	  course	  our	  concerns	  with	  deception.	  	  The	   difficulty	   appears	   to	   be	   then	   that	   there	   is	   some	   justification	   for	   regarding	  cosmetic	  treatment	  as	  outside	  the	  traditional	  healthcare	  relationship.	   	  It	  does	  not	  seek	   to	   restore	  health.	   	   For	   this	   reason	   cosmetic	   dentistry	   could	  be,	   some	  might	  argue,	  delivered	  as	  part	  of	  a	  commercial	  rather	  than	  a	  healthcare	  relationship.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  this	  could	  be	  problematic.	  	  Owing	  to	  the	  clinical	  setting	  in	  which	  this	  kind	   of	   treatment	   is	   delivered	   and	   as	   part	   of	   a	   relationship	   with	   a	   healthcare	  professional	  we	  have	   considered	   that	   a	  patient	  may	  be	   vulnerable	   to	   the	  dentist	  exerting	  undue	  influence	  on	  them.	   	  This	  could	  result	   in	  the	  patient	  giving	  greater	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weight	  to	  the	  dentist’s	  advice	  than	  is	  reasonable.	  	  The	  outcome	  then	  must	  be	  that	  the	   patient	   is	   deceived;	   they	   are	  making	   decisions	   not	   based	   on	   reality	   and	   are	  deprived	   of	   being	   able	   to	   make	   a	   decision	   based	   on	   a	   true	   perception	   of	   the	  situation	  before	  them.	  	  It	  is	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  special	  healthcare	  relationship	  that	  we	  recognise	  a	  patient	  is	  not	  on	  his	  guard,	  there	  is	  an	  inequality	  of	  power	  and	  as	  such	  this	  creates	  an	  ethical	  dilemma.	  	  We	  will	  consider	  in	  Chapter	  Two	  to	  what	  extent	  our	  current	  model	  of	  autonomy	  helps	  us	  to	  account	  for	  our	  concerns	  here.	  	  Before	  we	  do	  this	  however	  we	  will	  consider	  some	  more	  problematic	  cases.	  	  The	   provision	   of	   cosmetic	   dentistry	   in	   the	   same	   primary	   care	   context	   is	   not	   the	  only	   challenge	   that	   the	   primary	   dental	   care	   practitioner	   faces	   in	   the	   clinician-­‐patient	  relationship:	  modern	  primary	  dental	  care	  is	  now	  also	  offered	  not	  simply	  by	  dentists.	  	  Primary	  dental	  care	  such	  as	  scale	  and	  polish,	  simple	  restorations,	  simple	  extractions	   and	   other	   straightforward	   procedures	  may	   also	   be	   performed,	   albeit	  under	  the	  dentist’s	  instruction,	  by	  hygienists	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  scale	  and	  polish)	  and	  therapists	   (scale	   and	   polish,	   restorations	   and	   simple	   extractions).	   This	   is	   a	  relatively	   new	   development	   for	   general	   dental	   services	   although	   the	   use	   of	  therapists	   has	   been	   a	   long-­‐standing	   arrangement	   within	   the	   community	   dental	  service.	   	   A	   consequence	   of	   this	   is,	   from	   a	   patient	   perspective,	   that	   a	   patient	  attending	   a	   general	   dental	   surgery	   for	   treatment	   may	   be	   treated	   by	   different	  professionals	  with	   differing	   levels	   of	   qualification	   or	   training	   and	   differing	   roles	  and	  status.	  	  This	  has	  more	  recently	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  use	  of	  skill	  mix	  (Buchan	  and	  Dal	  Poz,	  2002).	   	  Initially,	  a	  patient	  attending	  a	  surgery	  will	  be	  examined	  by	  a	  dentist	  who	  will	  then	  decide	  on	  a	  diagnosis	  and	  prescribe	  a	  course	  of	  treatment	  as	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appropriate.	   	   It	   may	   be	   then	   that	   a	   hygienist	   or	   therapist,	   depending	   on	   the	  prescription,	  carries	  out	  that	  treatment	  according	  to	  the	  dentist’s	  assessment	  and	  instruction.	   	   Prima	   facie	   this	   seems	   to	   present	   no	   real	   ethical	   difficulty	   on	   two	  fronts.	  	  First,	  skill	  mix	  is	  also	  commonly	  used	  in	  general	  medical	  services	  and	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  present	  any	  real	  problem.	  Second,	  the	  patient	  is	  getting	  the	  care	  they	  need,	  in	  fact	  even	  to	  the	  degree	  that	  it	   is	  what	  their	  own	  dentist	  recommends.	   	  Is	  this	   really	   the	   case?	   	   I	  will	   consider	   these	   two	  points	   and	  attempt	   to	   conclude	   if	  indeed	  there	  are	  any	  ethical	  difficulties	  here.	  	  First,	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   use	   of	   skill	   mix	   in	   medicine;	   today	   practice	   nurses,	  physiotherapists	   and	   other	   medical	   care	   professionals	   also	   work	   routinely	  alongside	  doctors	  in	  the	  primary	  care	  setting.	  	  These	  roles	  are	  familiar	  to	  patients	  and	  such	  professionals	  often	  have	  their	  own	  consulting	  rooms	  within	  a	  practice.	  	  A	  doctor	  will	   often	   go	   through	   a	   process	   of	   assessing	   a	   patient	   and	   then	   referring	  them	  to	  the	  relevant	  profession	  for	  further	  treatment.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  although	  other	  professionals	   still	  work	  under	   the	   recommendation	  of	   the	  doctor,	   they	  are	  often	   bringing	   their	   own	   skill	   and	   training	   to	   bear	   on	   a	  medical	   problem	   rather	  than	  merely	   applying	   a	   ‘dilute’	   form	   of	  medicine	   to	   the	   patient.	   	   Clear	   divisions	  between	   professionals	   in	   the	  medical	   setting	   are	   visible	   to	   the	   patient	   and	   it	   is	  contended	   that	   on	   the	   whole	   the	   patient	   is	   aware	   of	   the	   status	   and	   role	   of	   the	  person	  treating	  him.	   	  Perhaps	  this	  could	  be	  best	  described	  as	  viewing	  the	  role	  of	  the	  GP	  as	  a	  ‘gatekeeper’	  who	  refers	  patients	  to	  other	  primary	  care	  specialists.	  	  This	  model	  of	  delivery	  in	  primary	  medical	  care	  by	  the	  use	  of	  established	  primary	  care	  specialisation	  is	  one	  that	  patients	  recognise	  and	  are	  familiar	  with	  (Buchan,	  1990).	  
26	  	  
	  Recent	   research	   has	   shown	   that	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case	   in	   dentistry.	   	  Not	   only	   have	  dental	  patients	  been	  shown	  not	   to	  know	   the	  qualifications	  or	  general	   role	  of	   the	  person	  who	   is	   treating	   them,	  but	   they	   also	   are	   generally	  unaware	   that	   there	   are	  differing	  roles	  in	  dentistry	  and	  that	  other	  dental	  professionals	  exist,	  who	  are	  able	  to	  treat	  them	  (Dyer	  &	  Robinson	  2008a;b).	   	  Of	  those	  patients	  who	  responded	  to	  a	  national	  questionnaire	  who	  did	  claim	  to	  know	  and	  be	  able	  to	  identify	  the	  differing	  roles	   in	   dentistry	   the	  majority	  made	   inaccurate	   or	   wholly	   incorrect	   distinctions	  (Dyer	  &	  Robinson	  2008b).	   	   Perhaps	   of	   further	   concern	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  when	   the	  roles	  of	  therapists	  and	  hygienists	  were	  explained	  to	  interviewees	  most	  expressed	  concern	  and	  said	  they	  would	  be	  unhappy	  to	  be	  treated	  by	  such	  individuals.	  	  	  	  This	   clearly	   presents	   an	   ethical	   problem.	   Patients	   are	   being	   treated	   in	   a	   context	  where	   they	   are	   under	   a	   mistaken	   belief	   that	   they	   are	   aware	   of	   the	   role	   of	   the	  person	   treating	   them.	   Further,	   this	   is	   not	   merely	   a	   rebuttable	   supposition	   that	  patients	  may	  be	  unhappy	  to	  be	  treated	  using	  skill	  mix	  or	  indeed	  that	  we	  are	  under	  the	  mistaken	  belief	  that	  they	  do	  not	  understand	  it.	  	  Rather,	  we	  have	  clear	  evidence	  that	  patients	  are	  unfamiliar	  with	  the	  use	  of	  skill	  mix	  in	  primary	  dental	  care,	  when	  aware	   of	   its	   use	   they	   are	   unaware	   of	   what	   that	   means	   with	   regard	   to	   their	  treatment.	  	  Worse	  still	  when	  they	  are	  made	  aware	  of	  these	  facts	  they	  are	  opposed,	  in	  the	  main,	  to	  the	  use	  of	  skill	  mix.	  	  Clearly	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  here	  in	  that	  patients	  are	  not	  clear	  on	  who	  is	  treating	  them	  and	  that	  they	  feel	  that	  this	  is	  unacceptable.	  	  This	   problem	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   symptomatic	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   dentistry,	   in	   a	   primary	  care	  setting,	  has	  a	  less	  established	  model	  of	  specialisation.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  fact	  that	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therapists	  work	  much	  more	  closely	  under	  the	  dentist’s	  prescription	  and	  therefore	  supervision	   than	   other	   professionals	   in	   the	   medical	   context	   may	   make	   them	  appear	  to	  be	  less	  qualified	  dentists	  rather	  than	  primary	  care	  specialists.	  	  This	  may	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  therapists	  and	  hygienists	  often	  carry	  out	  procedures	  that	  are	   routinely	  also	  done	  by	  dentists.	   	  This,	   it	   is	   suggested,	   casts	   the	  dentist	   in	   the	  role	   of	   supervisor,	   unlike	   his	   medical	   peers,	   who	   act	   as	   gatekeepers.	   	   This	  highlights	  two	  problems	  one	  ethical	  and	  one	  practical.	  	  First,	  patients	  are	  unable	  to	  distinguish	   dental	   roles,	   which	   in	   turn	   diminishes	   their	   (the	   patients’)	   ability	   to	  make	  decisions	   for	   themselves.	   	  Second,	  patients	  are	  currently	  unhappy	  with	   the	  use	  of	  therapists	  in	  a	  primary	  care	  setting.	  	  Is	  this	  really	  a	  problem	  though?	  	  Does	  it	  matter	  that	  patients	  are	  unaware	  of	  who	  is	  treating	  them?	  	  This	  leads	  us	  on	  to	  a	  related	  point;	  we	  could	  argue	  that	  patients	  are	  after	  all	  getting	  the	   care	   they	  need.	   	  As	   this	   is	   the	   reason	   that	  patients	   are	  attending	   the	  dentist,	  surely	   the	  outcome	  of	   their	  attendance	  should	  be	   the	   issue	  of	  ethical	   importance	  here?	  	  From	  research	  into	  the	  patients’	  perspective	  we	  can	  see	  from	  the	  research	  this	   is	   clearly	   not	   their	   view	   and	   that	   something	   more	   complex	   than	   simple	  treatment	  is	  occurring	  (Dyer	  and	  Robinson,	  2008a;b).	  	  Perhaps	  it	   is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  patient	  feels	  they	  are	  being	  deceived	  into	  accepting	  something	   that	   is	   rather	   less	   than	   that	   which	   they	   were	   expecting	   even	   if	   the	  outcome	  is	  the	  same.	  	  It	  is	  suggested	  that	  this	  feeling	  of	  deception	  in	  some	  way	  is	  contrary	   to	   a	   patient’s	   expectations	   of	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship	   in	   that	   it	  damages	   their	   belief	   that	   the	   dentist	   is	   in	   some	   way	   providing	   care	   as	   well	   as	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treatment;	   we	   will	   address	   the	   distinction	   between	   a	   healthcare	   model	   and	   a	  treatment	  focused	  model	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Six,	  however	  for	  the	  moment	  I	  simply	  wish	  to	  claim	  as	  part	  of	  the	  case	  study	  that	  clearly	  the	  process	  of	  treatment	  has	  an	  ethical	  significance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  Following	   this	   line	   of	   thought,	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship	   also	   differs	   in	   a	  unique	  way	   from	  medicine	   in	   that	   regardless	  of	  whether	   the	  care	   is	  provided	  on	  the	  NHS	  or	  privately	  it	  is	  paid	  for	  at	  source.	  	  This	  means	  that	  every	  time	  the	  patient	  attends	  the	  surgery	  they	  are	  directly	  billed	  for	  the	  treatment.	  	  Following	  Dyer	  and	  Robinson’s	  (2008a;b)	  research	  we	  can	  see	  that	  there	  is	  some	  belief	  by	  patients	  that	  if	  they	  are	  paying	  for	  their	  care	  but	  the	  care	  is	  delivered	  by	  someone	  less	  qualified	  than	  a	  dentist	  then	  it	  may	  be	  reasonable	  to	  suppose	  that	  they	  should	  pay	  less	  for	  their	   treatment.	   	  Many	   patients	   expressed	   dissatisfaction	  with	   the	   fact	   that	   they	  were	   being	   charged	   the	   same	  whoever	   treated	   them.	   	   Again	   it	   is	   the	   same	   issue	  that	  patients	  feel	  they	  are	  in	  some	  way	  being	  deceived.	  	  We	  can	  see	  from	  considering	  this	  example	  that	  clearly	  patients	  are	  unhappy	  with	  the	  situation	  that	  they	  find	  themselves	  in.	  	  This	  feeling	  of	  deception	  means	  that	  in	  real	  terms	  patients	  believe	  they	  are	  being	  manipulated	  during	  their	  treatment	  into	  complying	  with	  care	  that	  is	  contrary	  to	  that	  which	  they	  would	  have	  agreed	  to	  had	  they	   been	   aware	   of	   skill	   mix.	   	   Perhaps	   we	   can	   go	   further	   and	   say	   that	   it	   is	   the	  deception	  that	   is	  more	  of	  a	  problem	  than	  the	  skill	  mix	   itself.	   	   It	   is	  suggested	  that	  patients	  might	  still	  feel	  aggrieved	  if	  they	  were	  treated	  under	  a	  misconception	  that	  they	  were	  being	  treated	  by	  a	  dentist	  when	  in	  actual	  fact	  they	  were	  being	  treated	  by	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a	  therapist	  even	  if	  they	  would	  have	  happily	  agreed	  to	  the	  therapist	  performing	  the	  treatment.	   	   It	   is	   clear	   then	   that	   the	   conduct	   of	   the	   relationship	   has	   some	  significance.	   	  That	   is	   to	  say	  that	   the	  treatment	  process	  has	  an	  ethical	  significance	  that	  cannot	  be	  assuaged	  via	  effective	  treatment.	  	  	  	  	  The	   final	   challenge	   we	   are	   going	   to	   consider	   that	   is	   specific	   to	   dentistry	   is	   the	  provision	   of	   primary	   care	   from	   the	  NHS	   and	   the	   private	   sector.	   	   Although	  many	  clinical	   treatments	   are	   offered	   both	   under	   the	   auspices	   of	   the	  NHS	   or	   in	   private	  practice	   in	   relation	   to	  medicine,	   dentistry	   is	   unusual	   in	   that	   both	   NHS	   care	   and	  private	  practice	  may	  be	  offered	  often	   in	  the	  same	  surgery	  by	  the	  same	  dentist	  as	  part	   of	   the	   same	   appointment.	   	   This	   can	  make	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	   two	  types	  of	   provision	  difficult	   for	   the	  patient.	   	  Distinction	  between	   the	   two	   is	  made	  even	  more	  difficult	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  division	  does	  not	  necessarily	  fall	  between	  therapeutic	   treatments	  and	  cosmetic	  ones.	   	  Many	  routine	   therapeutic	   treatments	  (posterior	   and	   some	   anterior	   composite	   restorations)	   are	   offered	   exclusively	   as	  part	   of	   private	   practice.	   	   Further	   some	   types	   of	   treatment,	   such	   as	   anterior	  composite	  restorations	  may	  be	  provided	  on	  the	  NHS	  in	  certain	  circumstances.	  	  This	  further	  complicates	  matters	  from	  a	  patient	  perspective	  since	  it	  falls	  to	  the	  dentist	  to	   decide	  whether	   the	   condition	   presenting	   is	   one	   that	  would	   qualify	   under	   the	  rules	  of	  NHS	  provision.	  	  This	  inevitably	  means	  that	  depending	  on	  which	  dentist	  you	  see	   you	   may	   get	   the	   same	   treatment	   but	   one	   would	   only	   treat	   you	   privately	  (despite	   being	   an	   NHS	   dentist)	   whereas	   the	   other	   might	   offer	   you	   the	   same	  treatment	  on	  the	  NHS.	  	  This	  can	  be	  challenging	  for	  dentists	  particularly	  when	  they	  find	   themselves	  under	  commercial	  as	  well	  as	  professional	  pressures.	   	  A	  patient’s	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interests	   are	   easily	   obscured	   when	   such	   a	   situation	   presents	   itself.	   	   	   Further	  difficulties	  arise	  for	  patients	  who	  may	  find	  they	  are	  paying	  for	  both	  NHS	  treatment	  and	   private	   treatment	   at	   the	   surgery.	   	   Therefore,	   unlike	   primary	   medical	   care	  where	  treatment	  is	  free	  at	  source	  (so	  anything	  paid	  for	  must	  be	  private),	  patients	  in	   dentistry	   pay	   for	   their	   NHS	   and	   private	   care	   at	   point	   of	   delivery.	   	   	   For	  many	  patients	  it	  is	  beyond	  their	  experience	  and	  unreasonable	  to	  expect	  them	  to	  be	  able	  to	  know	  how	  much	  certain	  procedures	  cost	  (or	  bands	  of	  treatment)	  and	  therefore	  whether	   or	   not	   the	   bill	   they	   receive	   is	   reflective	   of	   private	   or	   NHS	   care	   or	   a	  combination	   of	   both.	   	   In	   fact	   this	   is	   why	   the	   system	  was	   simplified	   into	   simple	  ‘bands	  of	  treatment’	  or	  units	  of	  dental	  activity	  (Steele,	  2009,	  pp.63-­‐72).	  	  	  	  Situations	  where	  the	  patient	  was	  deceived	  or	  persuaded	  (perhaps	  with	  the	  best	  of	  intentions)	  into	  consenting	  to	  a	  particular	  treatment	  unaware	  that	  they	  would	  be	  facing	   a	   big	   bill	   at	   the	   end	   is	   easily	   identifiable	   as	   problematic.	   	   Although	   the	  proposed	  treatment	  is	  agreed,	  the	  patient	  remains	  ignorant	  of	  the	  eventual	  cost,	  an	  aspect	   of	   that	   treatment	   that	   would	   very	   likely	   form	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   their	  decision.	   	  It	  would	  not	  be	  difficult	  to	  claim	  then	  that	  the	  patient	  had	  in	  some	  way	  been	   deprived	   of	   sufficient	   information	   and	   therefore	   had	   consequently	   been	  deprived	  of	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  for	  themselves	  whilst	  fully	  cogniscent	  of	  the	   facts.	   	   Here	   the	   dentist	   is	   deciding	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   patient	   that	   their	   (the	  patient’s)	   clinical	   treatment	   is	   paramount	   and	   that	   the	   cost	   of	   it	   is	   of	   lesser	  importance:	  the	  patient	  is	  precluded	  from	  making	  that	  decision	  for	  themselves.	  	  As	  it	   is	   the	   patient	   who	   will	   be	   bearing	   the	   burden	   of	   that	   cost	   it	   seems	   counter	  intuitive	   to	   attempt	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   cost	   will	   be	   of	   no	   consequence	   to	   them.	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However,	  would	  our	  assessment	  of	  the	  situation	  differ	  if	  indeed	  the	  patient	  would	  have	  agreed	  to	  the	  cost	  had	  they	  known	  about	  it?	  	  After	  all	  in	  this	  case	  the	  outcome	  for	   the	   patient	   would	   be	   exactly	   the	   same?	   	   	   Again	   it	   seems	   unlikely	   that	   most	  patients	   who	   found	   themselves	   in	   such	   a	   situation	   would	   be	   satisfied	   with	   the	  argument	  that	  they	  got	  what	  they	  would	  have	  agreed	  to	  in	  any	  case.	  	  This	  seems	  to	  place	  no	  value	  or	  weight	  on	  a	  patient’s	  right	  to	  make	  that	  decision	  for	  themselves	  and	   further	   prioritises	   the	   patient’s	   needs	   in	   a	   way	   that	   does	   not	   involve	   the	  patient’s	  influence	  or	  endorsement.	  	  
Deception	  as	  a	  problem	  in	  clinical	  dentistry	  It	  seems	  then	  that	  all	  these	  case	  studies	  highlight	  an	  objection	  to	  deception	  as	  part	  of	   the	   clinical	   relationship.	   	   The	   cosmetic	   versus	   therapeutic	   example	   highlights	  difficulties	   with	   the	   changing	   patient	   role.	   	   The	   clinical	   context	   makes	   a	  transformation	  from	  patient	  to	  consumer	  ethically	  problematic.	  	  The	  complexity	  of	  the	  treatment	  context	  makes	  it	  difficult	  for	  patients	  to	  adjust	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  exchange	  and	  advice	  given	  by	  a	  healthcare	  professional	  transforms	  from	  what	  may	   be	   deemed	   desirable	   for	   health	   (however	   health	   is	   defined)	   to	   one	   that	   is	  merely	   what	   is	   cosmetically	   possible.	   	   Deception	   here	   may	   not	   be	   deliberate;	  dentists	  may	  well	  be	  explicit	  about	  that	  change	  but	  still,	  owing	  to	  their	  training	  and	  profession,	  are	  able	  to	  exert	  undue	  influence.	  	  This	  influence	  may	  be	  intentional	  or	  otherwise,	   but	   it	   potentially	   leads	   to	   the	   patient	   feeling	   deceived.	   	   Even	   if	   the	  change	   in	   the	   duty	   of	   care	   is	   legitimate	   from	   a	   practical	   perspective	   it	   seems	  unworkable.	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Returning	   to	   our	   example	   considering	   the	   use	   of	   skill	  mix	   in	   dentistry	  we	   know	  from	   a	   patient	   perspective	   that	   outcome	   is	   not	   the	   only	   indicator	   of	   satisfaction	  with	   the	   service	   received	   nor	   is	   it	   cost	   per	   se.	   	   Rather,	   the	   manner	   in	   which	  healthcare	  is	  delivered	  and	  the	  role	  that	  the	  patient	  expects	  to	  take	  in	  that	  delivery	  is	   somewhat	   greater	   than	   being	   the	   mere	   recipient	   of	   competent	   treatment.	  	  Deception	  in	  these	  cases	  seems	  to	  relate,	  not	  to	  what	  the	  patient	  was	  expecting	  to	  get,	   but	   by	   whom	   and	   by	   what	   method.	   	   Further,	   the	   use	   of	   deception	   either	  deliberate	  or	  accidental	  falls	  outside	  a	  patient’s	  expectations	  of	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationship.	  	  Considering	  our	  final	  example;	  examining	  the	  challenges	  of	  delivering	  both	  private	  and	  NHS	  care	  in	  the	  same	  context	  by	  the	  same	  practitioner,	  again	  the	  problem	  of	  deception	  arises.	  	  It	  seems	  insufficient	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  deception	  or	  confusion	  on	  the	   part	   of	   the	   patient	   as	   to	   context	   (private	   or	   NHS)	   can	   be	   justified	   on	   the	  grounds	  of	   clinical	   indication	  or	   the	   fact	   that	  a	  patient	  would	  have	  agreed	   to	   the	  treatment	  anyway	  had	  they	  known	  the	  distinction.	  	  Concerns	  about	  deception	  tell	  us	   that	   again	   the	   patient	   does	   not	   expect	   deception	   to	   form	   part	   of	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	  relationship.	  	  Are	  dental	  patients	  really	  any	  different	  from	  other	  patients	  though?	  	  Do	  they	  need	  a	  special	  model	  of	  interaction?	  	  Dental	  patients	  are,	  after	  all,	  the	  same	  patients	  who	  go	   to	   the	   doctor	   or	   therapist.	   	   The	   unique	   aspect	   of	   dentistry	   does	   not	   stem	  necessarily	  from	  the	  patients	  that	  are	  seen	  in	  dental	  clinics	  but	  rather	  the	  manner	  in	  which	   the	  delivery	  of	   care	   is	   constructed.	   	  Unusually	   for	  primary	   care	   several	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quite	   separate	   types	   of	   care	   are	   offered	   in	   the	   same	   context	   often	   on	   the	   same	  patient	  at	   the	  same	  time,	  cosmetic	  and	   therapeutic,	  private	  and	  NHS	  and	  being	  a	  dentist	   or	   a	   dental	   care	   professional.	   	   This	   fluctuating	   environment	   with	   its	  potential	   for	   deception	   is	   of	   key	   concern.	   	   It	   is	   for	   this	   reason	   that	   a	   model	   of	  patient	  interaction	  needs	  to	  be	  developed	  to	  reflect	  these	  challenges.	  	  What,	   then	  does	  deception	   tell	   us	   about	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   an	   ethical	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship	   should	   be	   conducted?	   What	   concepts	   does	   the	   use	   of	  deception	   offend?	   	   The	   problem	   with	   deception	   is	   that	   it	   prevents	   the	   patient	  taking	   part	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   of	   healthcare;	   it	   diminishes	   if	   not	  eradicates	   the	  authoritative	  weight	   that	  a	  patient’s	  voice	  might	  carry.	   	  Deception	  deprives	  the	  patient	  from	  being	  able	  to	  follow	  their	  own	  moral	  policy	  and	  be	  self-­‐governing.	   	   It	   is	   clearly	   important	   to	   patients	   that	   they	   not	   only	   receive	   the	  treatment	   they	   need	   but	   also	   that	   they	   receive	   it	   in	   the	  manner	   that	   they	   deem	  appropriate.	  	  Clearly	  from	  a	  patient’s	  perspective	  healthcare	  is	  as	  much	  about	  the	  relationship	  and	  a	  patient’s	  position	  in	  it	  as	  it	  is	  about	  the	  treatment	  they	  receive.	  	  There	  are	  clear	  indications	  that	  patients	  believe	  that	  deception	  should	  not	  form	  a	  justified	   part	   of	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship.	   	   Therefore	   it	   is	   not	   simply	   the	  outcome	  that	  is	  important	  to	  patients	  from	  an	  ethical	  perspective	  but	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  care	  is	  delivered.	  	  	  This	  is	  a	  similar	  finding	  to	  our	  cosmetic	  example	  above,	  except	   that	   this	   time	   the	   deception	   is	   a	   product	   or	   consequence	   of	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship	   rather	   than	   potentially	   a	   characteristic	   of	   the	   patient	  embarking	   on	   the	   relationship.	   	   In	   order	   to	   address	   both	   types	   of	   deception	  we	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need	   to	   develop	   a	   model	   specific	   to	   dentistry	   that	   can	   account	   for	   deception	  occurring	  from	  both	  outside	  and	  inside	  the	  relationship.	  	  A	   common	   theme	   shared	   by	   all	   the	   case	   studies	   seems	   to	   be	   one	   of	   deception.	  	  When	  considering	  the	  cosmetic	  versus	  therapeutic	  treatment	  scenario	  a	  difficulty	  in	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationship	  occurs	  when	  there	  is	  a	  shift	  from	  a	  therapeutic	  relationship	   to	   a	   commercial	   one.	   	   Let	   us	   be	   clear	   it	   is	   not	   because	   commercial	  relationships	  are	  prima	  facie	  problematic	  in	  relation	  to	  deception,	  in	  fact	  one	  might	  argue	   that	   this	   is	   a	   core	   feature	   of	   commercial	   interaction	   (hence	   the	   maxim,	  
caveat	  emptor,	   let	   the	  buyer	  beware).	   	   It	   is	   rather	   that	   in	   the	   clinical	   context	   the	  relationship	  between	  dentist	  and	  patient	   is	   so	  unequal	  as	   to	  cause	  concern.	   	   It	   is	  contended	  that	  the	  medical	  environment	  and	  the	  professional	  status	  of	  the	  dentist	  can	  cause	  patients	  to	  give	  undue	  weight	  to	  a	  dentist’s	  recommendation	  in	  relation	  to	  cosmetic	   treatments.	   	  A	  patient	  may	  believe	  that	   the	  dentist	  continues	  to	  have	  their	   best	   clinical	   interests	   at	   heart	   (in	   the	   same	  way	   as	   they	   ought	   to	   during	   a	  therapeutic	  treatment)	  but	  being	  deceived	  as	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  dentist	  may	  now	  be	  legitimately	  considering	  the	  commercial	  benefits	  to	  himself,	  to	  some	  degree	  in	  preference	  to	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  After	  all,	  commercial	  transactions	  are	  perhaps	  defined	  by	  the	  parties	  considering	  the	  benefit	  to	  themselves;	  and	  duty	  of	  care	   transactions	   (therapeutic	   treatments	   for	   example)	   are	   defined	   by	   the	  more	  powerful	  party	  considering	  the	  benefit	  to	  the	  weaker.	  	  It	  is	  argued	  then	  that	  as	  the	  patient	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	   the	  weaker	  party	  at	   least	   in	   so	   far	   as	   they	  are	  not	   the	  clinical	   experts	   the	   consequence	   is	   that	   this	   type	   of	   transaction	   is	   not	   truly	  commercial.	  	  To	  view	  cosmetic	  treatment	  as	  a	  commercial	  relationship	  would	  need	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us	   to	  believe	   that	   the	  patient	   is	  now	  on	   their	   guard	  and	   treats	   any	  advice	   that	   a	  dentist	   gives	   them	   in	   this	   context	   as	   a	   ‘sales	   pitch’	   that	   they	   should	   treat	   with	  scepticism.	  	  It	  is	  the	  professional	  status	  of	  the	  dentist	  that	  enables	  him	  to	  exert	  this	  influence	  even	  if	  he	  explicitly	  states	  his	  or	  her	  commercial	  intentions	  and	  for	  that	  reason	  we	  become	  concerned	  as	   to	  his	  or	  her	  ability	   to	  exploit	   that	  status	   to	   the	  detriment	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  The	   delivery	   of	   NHS	   and	   private	   dental	   care	   also	   raises	   some	   of	   the	   problems	  highlighted	  by	  cosmetic	  and	  therapeutic	  treatment.	  	  Here	  again	  there	  is	  a	  changing	  rubric	  of	  healthcare	  delivery	  from	  one	  that	  is	  funded	  by	  the	  NHS	  to	  one	  that	  is	  paid	  for	  wholly	  by	  the	  patient.	   	  It	   is	  doubly	  frustrated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  NHS	  dental	  care	  for	   the	   most	   part	   is	   not	   free	   to	   patients	   and	   requires	   a	   form	   of	   part	   payment	  making	  it	  even	  less	  clear	  which	  scheme	  they	  are	  being	  treated	  under.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  patients	  often	  do	  not	  know	  which	  scheme	  their	  treatment	  falls	  under	  and	  can	  be	  faced	  with	  a	  large	  bill	  at	  the	  end.	  	  Dentists	  are	  not	  always	  explicit	  and	  this	  quite	  rightly	  leaves	  the	  patient	  feeling	  deceived;	  in	  that	  they	  agreed	  to	  the	  treatment	  but	  did	  not	   realize	   that	   the	   one	   they	   chose	  had	   a	   large	  price	   tag	   attached.	   	   Yet	   even	  where	  it	  can	  be	  shown	  however	  that	  had	  a	  patient	  known	  of	  the	  cost	  they	  would	  have	  agreed	  to	  it	  there	  still	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  problem	  of	  deception.	  	  This	  gives	  us	  an	  important	  clue	  as	  to	  what	  qualities	  a	  good	  model	  of	  interaction	  should	  have.	  	  The	  outcome	   of	   the	   treatment	   is	   not	   the	   sole	   focus	   from	   the	   patient	   perspective	   but	  also	   how	   they	  were	   treated.	   	   Interaction	  where	   deception	   is	   used	   but	  where	   the	  outcome	  is	  what	  the	  patient	  wanted	  can	  still	  fall	  short	  of	  what	  we	  would	  expect	  in	  a	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationship	  from	  the	  patient’s	  perspective.	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This	  point	   is	   raised	  again	  when	   looking	  at	   the	  use	  of	   skill	  mix.	   	  Patients	   seem	   to	  object	   to	   the	   use	   of	   skill	  mix	   on	   several	   grounds	   all	   of	  which	   highlight	   different	  objections	   to	   the	   use	   of	   deception.	   	   The	   primary	   objection	   to	   skill	   mix	   usually	  involves	  the	  patient	  being	  unaware	  of	  the	  professional’s	  status.	  	  This	  would	  lead	  us	  to	   conclude	   that	   patients	   have	   a	   certain	   expectation	   of	   their	   involvement	   in	  treatment	  and	  that	  they	  expect	  to	  be	  rather	  more	  than	  recipients	  of	  care.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  patients	  expect	  to	  take	  part	  in	  their	  treatment	  beyond	  merely	  understanding	  the	  treatment	  proposed.	   	  This	  will	  be	  an	  important	  point	   later.	   	  Objections	  to	  the	  use	  of	  skill	  mix	  together	  with	  the	  use	  of	  private	  and	  NHS	  care	  show	  us	  that	  from	  a	  patient	  perspective	  choosing	  their	  treatment	  from	  within	  a	  range	  of	  options	  is	  not	  sufficient.	   	   Patients	   expect	   to	   have	   further	   knowledge	   that	   tells	   them	   about	   the	  context	   in	  which	   they	   are	   treated	   and	   not	  merely	  what	   form	   the	   treatment	  will	  take4.	  	  Anything	  less	  leaves	  them	  feeling	  deceived.	  	  
Deception	  defined	  Clearly	  then,	  patients	  are	  raising	  objections	  to	  the	  use	  or	  existence	  of	  deception	  in	  their	  relationship	  with	  a	  dentist.	   	  What	  do	  patients	  mean	  then	  when	  they	  refer	  to	  deception?	   	  Novak	   et	   al.	   (1989,	   p.2982),	   from	   research	   into	  physicians’	   attitudes	  towards	   deception,	   defined	   it	   as	   “to	   make	   another	   believe	   what	   is	   not	   true,	   to	  mislead”.	   	   The	   Oxford	   English	   Dictionary	   also	   defines	   deception	   as	   “to	   cause	  someone	   to	   believe	   something	   that	   is	   not	   true,	   typically	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  This	  point	  will	  be	  covered	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Six.	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personal	   advantage”	   (ODE,	  2001).	   	  But	   as	  we	   shall	   see,	  deception	   is	  not	  quite	   as	  simple	  as	  this.	  According	  to	  these	  definitions	  deception’s	  key	  characteristic	  is	  that	  one	  party	  sets	  out	  to	  deceive	  the	  other	  by	  giving	  them	  misleading	  or	  incorrect	  information.	  	  There	  is	   an	   implication	   of	   wrongdoing	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   deceiver	   following	   these	  definitions.	   	   The	   deceiver	   gives	   some	   kind	   of	   misinformation	   to	   gain	   an	   unfair	  advantage	  over	  the	  deceived.	  	  We	  might	  then	  wish	  to	  assert	  that	  the	  ‘wrong’	  might	  be	  found	  in	  that	  someone	  has	  potentially	  gained	  something	  to	  which	  they	  were	  not	  entitled	   by	   dint	   of	   deceiving	   someone	   else.	   	   Following	   this	   line	   of	   thinking	   our	  objection	   to	   deception	   could	   (along	   with	   other	   methods)	   be	   satisfactorily	  explained	  with	   reference	   to	   some	  element	  of	   intent	  on	   the	  part	   of	   the	  deceiver5.	  	  The	  cases	  presented	  thus	  far	  appear	  to	  be	  more	  complex	  than	  this	  in	  that	  no	  clear	  advantage	   may	   always	   be	   discerned	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   deceiver,	   nor	   may	   the	  outcome	   of	   the	   exchange	   in	   material	   terms	   be	   explained	   always	   by	   a	   material	  disadvantage	   to	   the	   deceived.	   	   Further,	   it	   is	   not	   always	   the	   case	   that	   there	   is	  deliberate	  deception	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  deceiver	  or	  indeed	  even	  a	  desire	  to	  deceive	  at	   all.	   	   This	   perhaps	  may	   be	   explained	   by	   considering,	   first,	   that	   deception	  may	  have	  a	  much	  broader	  definition	  and	  may	  occur	  by	  not	  giving	  sufficient	  information	  particularly	  that	  which	  is	  viewed	  as	  relevant	  by	  the	  patient.	  	  Second,	  that	  the	  act	  of	  deception	   for	   this	   purpose	   cannot	   be	   adequately	   explained	   by	   considering	   the	  outcome	  for	  the	  patient.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Notably	  this	  definition	  may	  be	  entirely	  appropriate	  for	  commercial	  transactions.	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If	   the	  dentist	   is	  not	  setting	  out	   to	   tell	   the	  patient	  something	   that	   is	  not	   true	   then	  can	  the	  patient	  be	  deceived?	  	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  important	  in	  this	  case	  to	  treat	  this	  as	  a	  question	   of	   fact	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   patient.	   	   It	   is	   not	   necessarily	   important	   that	   a	  dentist’s	  motives	  are	  ones	  of	  deception	  in	  order	  for	  deception	  to	  occur.	   	  Different	  levels	  of	  familiarity	  with	  the	  medical	  context	  and	  inequality	  in	  the	  relationship	  in	  relation	   to	   medical	   expertise	   all	   create	   an	   environment	   where	   patients	   are	  vulnerable	   to	  deception.	   	  The	   increased	  power	   that	  a	  dentist	  holds	  as	  a	   result	  of	  their	   professional	   standing	   and	   clinical	   context	   means	   that	   a	   patient	   may	   be	  deceived	  when	   a	   dentist	   has	  withheld	   information	   that	   he	  ought	   to	   have	   known	  was	  relevant	  to	  the	  patient.	   	  A	  patient	   is	  deceived	  when	  they	  are	  prevented	  from	  knowing	  something	  they	  deem	  to	  be	  important.	  	  This	  deprivation	  can	  occur	  either	  by	  deliberate	  misrepresentation	  or	  by	  lack	  of	  information.	  	  The	   situation	   is	   more	   complex,	   however.	   	   Proposing	   to	   widen	   the	   definition	   of	  deception	  shows	  that	  deception	  is	   linked	  to	  the	  second	  point;	  that	  from	  a	  patient	  perspective	   focusing	   on	   outcome	   is	   insufficient	   when	   attempting	   to	   identify	  whether	  or	  not	  deception	  has	  occurred.	  	  Clearly	  where	  a	  patient	  believes	  that	  they	  do	  not	  have	  full	  knowledge	  of	  the	  facts	  that	  they	  deem	  important	  to	  them	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  that	  has	  full	  authority.	  	   	  This	  is	  because,	  it	  is	  proposed,	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  decision	  is	  made	  has	  a	  bearing	  on	  the	  decision’s	  authority.	  	  A	  decision	  made	  in	  full	  knowledge	  has	  greater	  authoritative	  weight	  than	  one	  made	  under	  a	  misapprehension	  even	  though	  both	  decisions	  are	  ostensibly	  the	  same.	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A	   second	   point	   contends	   that	   deception	   can	   still	   exist	   in	   situations	   where	   the	  outcome	  would	  be	  the	  same	  if	  there	  had	  been	  no	  deception.	  	  Korsgaard	  states	  that:	  “It	   doesn’t	   matter	   whether	   that	   would	   be	   all	   right	   with	   her	   if	   she	   knew	  about	  it.	  	  What	  matters	  is	  that	  she	  never	  gets	  the	  chance	  to	  choose	  the	  end,	  not	   knowing	   that	   it	   is	   to	   be	   the	   consequence	   of	   her	   action.”	   (Korsgaard,	  1986,	  p.333)	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  existence	  of	  deception	  and	  consequently	  the	  misinterpretation	  of	   the	   facts	   by	   the	   patient	   means	   that	   they	   are	   prevented	   from	   giving	   any	   real	  assent	  to	  the	  action.	  	  	  Further,	  Korsgaard	  states:	  “The	  sense	  in	  which	  a	  good	  end	  is	  an	  object	  for	  everyone	  is	  that	  a	  good	  end	  is	   in	   effect	   one	   that	   everyone,	   in	   principle,	   and	   especially	   everyone	   who	  contributes	  to	  it,	  gets	  to	  cast	  a	  vote	  on.”	  (Korsgaard,	  1986,	  p.334)	  	  Therefore,	  deception	  for	  our	  purposes	  occurs	  when	  a	  patient	  is	  either	  mislead	  or	  is	  given	   insufficient	   information	   to	   be	   able	   to	   give	   their	   full	   consent.	   	   Either	   case	  occurs	  when	  the	  patient	  believes	  that	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  play	  an	  appropriate	  role	  in	   care	   as	   they	   were	   prevented	   from	   making	   an	   accurate	   assessment	   of	   the	  situation.	  	  Deception,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  our	  definition	  can	  occur	  independently	  of	  outcome.	  	  A	  good	  or	  desired	  treatment	  outcome	  for	  the	  patient	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  have	  not	  been	  deceived.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  from	  a	  patient’s	  perspective	  that	  their	  need	  to	  take	  part	  in	  their	  own	  care	  extends	  beyond	  the	  projected	  treatment	  outcome	  or,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  our	  skill	  mix	  example,	  even	  choice	  and	  knowledge	  of	  treatment.	  	  Clearly,	   context	   and	   the	   identity	   of	   those	   treating	   also	   are	   important	   in	   avoiding	  deception	  and	  providing	  an	  adequate	  patient	  experience.	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Although	  deception	  appears	  to	  be	  problematic	  to	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationship,	  perhaps	   it	   is	   not	   the	   entire	   problem?	   	   After	   all	   there	  may	   be	   occasions	  where	   a	  clinician	  is	  clearly	  explicit	  about	  the	  nature	  and	  changes	  in	  a	  relationship	  and	  their	  identity	   and	   status.	   	   It	  would	  be	  hard	   then	   to	  assert	   that	   the	  problem	  rests	  with	  deception,	   especially	   when	   the	   patient	   is	   fully	   informed.	   	   As	   I	   have	   previously	  claimed	   though,	   even	  when	   a	   patient	   has	   been	   fully	   informed	  we	  might	  want	   to	  raise	   concerns	   about	   the	   reliance	   on	   a	   commercial	   relationship;	   a	   commercial	  relationship	  being	  defined	  by	   each	  party	  being	   largely	   responsible	   for	   their	   own	  satisfaction	  and	  outcomes.	  	  This	  is	  because	  despite	  the	  dentist	  being	  explicit	  about	  the	   changing	   nature	   of	   the	   relationship	   they	   may	   still	   be	   able	   to	   exert	   undue	  influence	  over	  the	  patient	  owing	  to	  their	  clinical	  status	  and	  the	  surgery	  context	  in	  which	   a	   patient	   finds	   themselves;	   what	   we	   might	   like	   to	   describe	   as	   offering	  treatment	  that	  is,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  commercially	  motivated	  and	  ‘under	  the	  cloak	  of	  medicine’.	  	  Perhaps	  then	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  dentist	  and	  patient	  is	  different	   from	  other	   types	  of	  relationship?	   	  Owing	  to	   the	  changing	  context	  and	  status	  of	  the	  dentist	  this	  might	  require	  us	  to	  consider	  if	  a	  completely	  commercial	  relationship	  in	  our	  examples	  is	  either	  justified	  or	  achievable.	  	  What	  principle	  then	  can	  we	  appeal	  to	  in	  order	  to	  comprehend	  a	  patient’s	  objection	  to	  the	  problems	  we	  have	  raised?	  	  One	  obvious	  principle	  that	  would	  help	  us	  explain	  these	  specific	  but	  not	  necessarily	  new	  concerns	  of	  deception	  might	  be	  autonomy.	  	  Autonomy	  is	  in	  basic	  terms	  a	  principle	  which	  confers	  the	  right	  or	  ability	  to	  be	  self-­‐determining	   or	   self-­‐governing	   and	   deception	   clearly	   interfere	  with	   that	   process.	  	  However	  as	  we	  have	  alluded	  to	  earlier,	   the	  way	  in	  which	  autonomy	  operates	  can	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be	  seen	  in	  many	  contexts	  such	  as	  self-­‐governance,	  liberty	  rights,	  privacy,	  individual	  choice,	  freedom	  of	  will,	  causing	  one’s	  own	  behaviour	  and	  being	  one’s	  own	  person	  and	   this	   can	   lead	   to	   confusion	   and	   differing	   emphasis	   on	   key	   components	   of	  autonomy.	  	  Despite	  diverse	  interpretations	  virtually	  all	  definitions	  agree	  that	  there	  are	   two	   conditions	   essential	   for	   autonomy,	   those	   being	   liberty	   (that	   is	   to	   say	  freedom	  from	  controlling	  influences)	  and	  agency	  (capacity	  for	  intentional	  action);	  disagreements	  usually	  occur	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  those	  conditions.	  	  	  	  We	   can	   see	   clearly	   difficulties	   with	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	  relationship	   is	   constructed	   and	   observations	   by	   patients	   where	   they	   deem	  deception	   to	   occur.	   	   However,	   we	   must	   consider	   why	   this	   is	   a	   problem.	   	   What	  exactly	   are	  patients	   objecting	   to	  when	   they	  object	   to	  deception?	   	   It	  would	   seem,	  that	  the	  occurrence	  of	  deception	  in	  some	  way	  interferes	  with	  a	  patient’s	  ability	  to	  take	   part	   in	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship.	   	   The	   use	   of	   deception	   prevents	   a	  patient	  from	  making	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  key	  facts	  (as	  they	  interpret	  them)	  before	  them.	   	   Patients	   who	   do	   not	   have	   full	   knowledge	   or	   are	  mislead	   in	   any	  way	   are	  unable	  to	  make	  authoritative	  decisions	  and	  may	  feel	  that	  this	  in	  some	  way	  reduces	  them.	   	   A	   key	   aspect	   of	   deception	   in	   this	   relationship	   also	   means	   that	   it	   is	   not	  reduced,	  as	  we	  have	  discussed,	  by	  the	  patient	  achieving	  their	  desired	  outcome	  nor	  is	  deception	  assuaged	  by	   the	  patient	   taking	  part	  and	  being	  knowledgeable	  about	  the	  proposed	  procedure.	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Identifying	   the	  needs	  of	  a	   contemporary	  model	  of	  autonomy	   for	  healthcare	  
encounters	  Can	  autonomy	  or	  indeed	  any	  other	  model	  adequately	  account	  in	  specific	  terms	  for	  the	  concerns	  we	  raise	  here?	  In	  order	  to	  make	  a	  clear	  and	  robust	  assessment	  of	  any	  model	  either	  current	  or	  proposed	  we	  need	  to	  both	  clearly	  identify	  our	  needs,	  as	  we	  have	  outlined	   in	   the	  preceding	   case	   studies	   and	   address	   the	  need	   to	  produce	   an	  ethically	   robust,	  but	  also	  practical	  model.	   	   I	  would	   like	   to	  propose	   that	   there	  are	  several	  key	  components	  that	  any	  adequate	  model	  will	  need	  to	  encompass.	   	  Those	  are;	  the	  model	  must	  respect	  the	  individual;	  be	  able	  to	  draw	  limits	  around	  the	  duty	  of	   care	   relationship;	   be	   able	   to	   adequately	   defend	   against	   deception;	   be	   able	   to	  correctly	   prioritise	   a	   patient’s	   reasonable	  wishes;	   it	  must	   adequately	   emphasise	  the	  process	  of	  healthcare	  as	  well	  as	  adequate	  outcome.	  	  We	  will	  now	  consider	  each	  of	  those	  needs	  in	  turn	  in	  order	  to	  be	  clear	  on	  our	  aim.	  	  It	   would	   not	   be	   contentious	   to	   claim	   that	   any	   modern	   model	   of	   healthcare	  interaction	  must	  start	  from	  the	  basic	  tenet	  of	  respecting	  the	  individual.	  	  Few	  if	  any	  today	  would	   attempt	   to	   argue	   that	   healthcare	   can	   claim	   to	   discharge	   its	   ethical	  duty	  by	  relying	  on	  a	  principle	  that	  enables	  sacrifice	  of	  the	  few	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  many	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  healthcare	  treatment.	  	  As	  Manson	  and	  O’Neill	  (2007,	  p.2)	  claim	   this	   may	   well	   be	   a	   result	   of	   the	   positive	   rejection	   of	   Second	   World	   War	  atrocities,	  none	  the	  less	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  post	  war	  years	  that	  our	  understanding	  of	  healthcare	  ethics	  whether	  that	  be	  through	  the	  paternalism	  of	  the	  past,	  current	  reliance	  on	  autonomy	  today	  or	  indeed	  proposals	  for	  the	  future	  involving	  trust;	  all	  models	   share	   the	   same	   core	   characteristic,	   that	   of	   respect	   for	   the	   individual.	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Primary	   care	   dentistry	   is	   particularly	   suitable	   for	   this	   approach	   in	   that	   the	  relationship	  between	  clinician	  and	  patient	  is	  extremely	  close.	  What	  is	  of	  concern	  to	  us	  here	  is	  not	  to	  successfully	  argue	  for	  an	  individualized	  approach,	  I	  would	  wish	  to	  take	  that	  as	  read,	  but	  to	  ask	  the	  question,	  how	  do	  we	  manage	  that	  relationship	  and	  respect	   the	   individual	  (here	  the	  patient)	   in	   the	  right	  way?	   	   If	  we	  wish	  to	  address	  the	  issues	  that	  concern	  a	  very	  close	  and	  individualised	  relationship,	  the	  exchange	  at	  the	  chair-­‐side	  between	  two	  parties,	  we	  need	  to	  consider	  a	  model	  that	  addresses	  that	  exchange	  in	  an	  individualized	  manner.	  	  In	  order	   for	  any	  model	   to	  have	  a	  practical	  application	  we	  will	  need	   to	  be	  able	   to	  draw	  limits	  around	  the	  duty	  that	  is	  owed	  by	  the	  clinician	  to	  the	  patient.	   	  A	  model	  that	  is	  very	  general	  and	  perhaps	  more	  indicative	  of	  an	  overall	  approach	  can	  create	  difficulties	  in	  application:	  it	  may	  be	  hard	  to	  see	  when	  the	  duties	  arising	  from	  that	  model	  cease	  to	  apply	  or	  are	  wholly	  inappropriate.	  	  A	  clear	  and	  precise	  definition	  of	  any	  model	   and	   clear	   parameters	   should	   prevent	   this	   from	   being	   the	   case.	   	   This	  supports	  my	  wish	  to	  claim	  that	  a	  specialized	  model	  for	  the	  challenges	  that	  differing	  medical	   relationships	   face	   is	   necessary	   and	   that	   a	   blanket	   standard	   may	   be	  insufficient	   to	   adequately	   account	   for	   the	   challenges	   of	   differing	   relationships	   as	  well	  as	  frustrating	  the	  need	  to	  confidently	  draw	  limits.	  	  A	  more	  precise	  model	  that	  relates	  and	  addresses	  issues	  that	  relate	  specifically	  to	  a	  particular	  relationship	  and	  which	  is	  better	  able	  to	  draw	  a	   line	  around	  or	   identify	  the	  matters	  that	  the	  model	  necessarily	   claims	   to	   address.	   	   Greater	   precision	  may	   help	   clinicians	   to	   identify	  with	   confidence	   those	   areas	   that	   fall	   outside	   the	   confines	   of	   that	   special	   and	  ethically	   defined	   relationship;	   it	   might	   be	   drawn	   for	   example	   where	   patients’	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desires	   go	   beyond	   that	   which	   we	   might	   reasonably	   expect	   to	   form	   part	   of	   the	  patient-­‐clinician	  relationship.	   	  We	   therefore	  might	  enable	  clinicians	   to	   limit	   their	  obligation	  without	  running	  the	  risk	  of	  failing	  to	  discharge	  their	  ethical	  duty.	  	  	  	  The	   third	   key	   aspect	   we	   wish	   to	   address	   is	   to	   develop	   a	   model	   that	   helps	   to	  correctly	  prioritise	  patient’s	  reasonable	  wishes	  or	  desires.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  clearly	  patients	   attending	   an	   appointment	   would	   wish	   to	   have	   their	   medical	   needs	  addressed	  efficiently.	  	  After	  all	  we	  might	  argue	  that,	  this	  is	  the	  reason	  that	  they	  are	  attending.	   	  However,	  care	  must	  be	  taken	  not	  to	  view	  those	  needs	  in	  isolation	  and	  presume	   that	   as	   the	   business	   before	   us	   is	   medical	   in	   nature	   that	   only	   medical	  issues	   will	   be	   of	   relevance	   and	   therefore	   only	   medical	   information	   is	   of	   any	  significance.	   	  We	  have	  seen	  from	  our	  preceding	  examples	  that	  issues	  such	  as	  cost	  and	   the	   status	   or	   role	   of	   the	   practitioner	   also	   have	   a	   bearing	   on	   how	   a	   patient	  might	  wish	  to	  consent	  to	  his	  or	  her	  treatment.	  	  If	  we	  wish	  to	  claim	  that	  our	  model	  must	  respect	  the	  individual	  then	  it	  seems	  counterintuitive	  to	  conclude	  that	  we	  do	  not	   pay	   attention	   to	   matters	   that	   are	   of	   relevance	   to	   the	   exchange	   but	   do	   not	  directly	   relate	   to	   treatment.	   	   We	   will	   need	   to	   avoid	   models	   that,	   by	   their	  construction,	  tend	  to	  lend	  themselves	  more	  comfortably	  or	  inevitably	  to	  an	  overly	  medicalized	  construction	  of	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	  interaction.	  	  Finally,	   any	   theoretical	  model	  must	  be	  able	   to	  adequately	  account	   for	  a	  patient’s	  concerns	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   process	   of	   healthcare	   and	   its	   ethical	   significance	   as	  well	   as	   the	  outcome	  of	   treatment.	   	  That	   is	   to	   say	  we	  may	  wish	   to	  avoid	   theories	  where	  the	  end	  justifies	  the	  means	  and	  that	  effective	  treatment	  rather	  than	  effective	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care	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  assess	  the	  quality	  of	  dentistry6.	   	  This	  point	  is	  closely	  related	   to	   the	   preceding	   point	   that	   any	   model	   must	   adequately	   emphasise	   a	  patient’s	   reasonable	   wishes	   but	   it	   also	   reflective	   of	   the	   concerns	   that	   we	   have	  raised	  earlier	  in	  relation	  to	  deception.	  	  What	  deception	  and	  the	  patient’s	  objection	  to	  it	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  clinical	  relationship	  is	  that	  equity	  or	  quality	  of	  process	  is	  as	  important	   to	  respecting	  a	  patient	   in	  the	  right	  way	  as	  a	  good	  clinical	  outcome.	   	   In	  short	  we	  cannot	  claim	  to	  have	  respected	  a	  patient	   in	  the	  right	  way	  simply	  by	  the	  patient	  getting	  what	  they	  came	  for.	  	  The	  manner	  in	  which	  patients	  are	  treated	  (for	  instance	   knowing	   the	   status	   of	   the	   person	   treating	   them	   or	   the	   origin	   of	   the	  treatment,	  private	  of	  NHS)	   forms	  an	   integral	  part	  of	  our	  wish	   to	  respect	  patients	  and	  as	  such	  any	  model	  of	  interaction	  must	  effectively	  reflect	  that.	  	  We	   have	   considered	   earlier	   that	   current	   medical	   practice	   claims	   to	   rely	   on	   the	  principle	  of	  autonomy	  in	  order	  to	  respect	  patients.	   	  We	  will	  now	  turn	  to	  consider	  how	   autonomy	   and	   hence	   respect	   for	   patients	   appears	   to	   operate	   in	   the	   clinical	  setting.	  	  By	  doing	  so	  we	  should	  then	  be	  able	  to	  conclude	  to	  what	  degree	  the	  current	  model	  is	  able	  to	  account	  for	  some	  of	  the	  concerns	  I	  have	  raised	  here	  or	  if	  we	  will	  need	   to	   look	  elsewhere	   for	  a	  suitable	  model	   that	   is	  both	  ethically	  and	  practically	  suitable	  for	  primary	  care	  dentistry.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  terms	  health	  care	  and	  quality	  treatment	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive.	  	  However,	  I	  am	  using	  the	  term	  treatment	  to	  express	  situations	  where	  the	  treatment	  outcome	  is	  the	  measure	   of	   a	   successful	   interaction	   between	   dentist	   and	   patient.	   	   	   Whereas,	   I	   use	   the	   term	  
healthcare	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  successful	  process	  plus	  an	  adequate	  treatment	  outcome.	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Chapter	  Two	  –	  Autonomy	  in	  Context	   	  
As	   we	   have	   considered	   in	   Chapter	   One,	   there	   is	   strong	   agreement	   that	   patient	  autonomy	   underpins	   the	   clinical	   relationship	   as	   its	   moral	   compass	   and	   guiding	  principle.	   	   In	   this	  chapter,	   I	  wish	   to	  expose	  where	   this	   slippery	  concept	  operates	  and	   by	   doing	   so,	   what	   it	   reveals	   about	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   we	   construct	   the	  principle	  in	  the	  clinical	  setting.	   	  I	  will	  consider	  that	  the	  clinical	  relationship	  relies	  heavily	  on	  a	  consent-­‐based	  approach	  to	  form	  the	  primary	  way	  that	  the	  autonomy	  of	  patients	  and	  therefore	  their	  interests	  are	  protected	  and	  promoted.	  	  I	  will	  then	  go	  on	  to	  consider	  and	  analyse	  the	  The	  Royal	  Liverpool	  Children’s	  Inquiry	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	   (hereafter	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   Redfern	   Report),	   the	   official	   investigation	  relating	   to	   the	   Alder	   Hey	   Scandal.	   	   In	   this	   report	   key	   aspects	   of	   the	   manner	   in	  which	  we	  respect	  patients	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  understand	  our	  failures	  to	  do	  so	   are	   considered.	   	   My	   purpose	   in	   conducting	   this	   analysis	   is	   to	   enable	   the	  identification	  of	  the	  theoretical	  model	  of	  autonomy	  the	  clinical	  professions	  use	  as	  their	  point	  of	  reference.	  	  This	  will	  further	  enable	  me	  to	  consider	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  current	  professional	   construction	  of	   autonomy	  and	   therefore	   respecting	  patients	  adequately	  meets	  the	  problems	  and	  goals	  put	  forward	  in	  Chapter	  One.	  	  	  	  First	  I	  wish	  to	  establish	  the	  link	  between	  informed	  consent	  and	  autonomy.	   	  I	  will	  then	  go	  on	  to	  claim	  that	  one	  of	  the	  areas	  where	  the	  reliance	  on	  autonomy	  is	  most	  prominent	   in	   the	  clinical	   relationship	   is	   consent	   to	   treatment.	   	   I	  wish	   to	  contend	  that	   consent	   accounts	   for	   a	   large	   proportion	   of	   how	   autonomy	   is	   understood	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within	  current	  clinical	  practice.	   	   I	  would	  also	  like	  to	  consider	  the	  effect	  of	  this	  on	  how	  we	  understand	  patient	  autonomy.	  	  
The	  link	  between	  consent	  and	  autonomy	  	  From	  a	  practical	  and	  professional	  perspective	  consent	  serves	  to	  legitimate	  actions	  that	   would	   otherwise	   be	   unacceptable	   and	   in	   doing	   so	   recognizes,	   in	   the	   most	  simplistic	  terms,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  the	  right	  of	  the	  individual	  to	  bodily	  integrity	  and	  the	  idea	  that	  no	  one	  should	  trespass	  upon	  any	  individual’s	  person	  (body)	  without	  their	   prior	   agreement.	   	   As	   such,	   consent	   is	   one	   of	   the	   cornerstones	   of	   modern	  ethics	  in	  medical	  and	  dental	  practice.	  	  The	  concept	  of	  consent	  can	  be	  dated	  back	  to	  the	  great	  debates	  of	  the	  European	  Enlightenment	  and	  beyond.	   	  It	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  tradition,	  that	   is	  to	  say	  the	  moderating	  of	  personal	   liberties	   in	  order	   to	  gain	   some	  benefit.	   	  This	   can	  be	   compared	  with	  giving	  up	   total	  personal	  freedom	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  state	  by,	  for	  example,	  observing	  the	  speed	  limit.	  	  A	   freely	   given	   consent	   can	   legitimate	   actions	   that	   would	   otherwise	   be	  unacceptable	   (for	   example	   medical	   treatment).	   	   This	   debate	   has	   been	   re-­‐invigorated	  over	   the	   last	   thirty	   years	   in	  biomedical	   ethics	   to	   such	   an	   extent	   that	  informed	   consent	   is	   the	  most	   discussed	   theme	   in	   this	   context	   (Sugarman	   et	   al.,	  1999).	   	   In	   fact	   the	   concept	   of	   consent	   is	   so	   entrenched	   in	   our	   understanding	   of	  biomedical	  ethics	  that	  its	  presence	  today	  is	  rarely	  questioned.	  	  	  	  For	  many,	  the	  basis	  of	  consent	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  autonomy.	  	  In	  fact	  this	  has	  largely	  become	   a	   presumption	  within	   the	   field	   of	   biomedical	   ethics.	   	   In	  Beauchamp	  and	  Childress’s	   (2001)	  work	  on	  biomedical	   ethics,	  Principles	  of	  Biomedical	  Ethics,	   the	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debate	   about	   the	   justifications	   that	   underline	   informed	   consent	   are	   only	   briefly	  discussed.	  	  They	  described	  the	  justification	  of	  informed	  consent	  as	  being:	  “…to	  protect	  autonomous	  choice,	  a	  loosely	  defined	  goal	  that	  is	  often	  buried	  in	   broad	   discussion	   of	   protecting	   patients	   and	   research	   subjects.	  	  Historically	   we	   can	   claim	   little	   beyond	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   general,	   inchoate	  societal	   demand	  has	   emerged	   for	   the	  protection	  of	   patients’	   and	   subjects’	  rights,	   particularly	   their	   autonomy	   rights.”	   (Beauchamp	   and	   Childress,	  2001,	  p.77)	  	  Beyond	  this	  there	  is	  no	  further	  discussion	  in	  their	  chapter	  on	  Respect	  for	  Autonomy	  (Beauchamp	   and	   Childress,	   2001,	   pp.57-­‐112)	   as	   to	   whether	   or	   not	   autonomy	  should	   be	   viewed	   as	   the	   justification	   of	   consent	   (despite	   there	   being	   a	   further	  thirty-­‐five	  pages	  discussing	  informed	  consent	  itself),	  such	  is	  the	  presumption.	  	  It	  is	  clearly	   accepted	   that	   whilst	   there	   may	   be	   discussion	   in	   some	   quarters	   as	   to	  whether	   this	   should	   be	   the	   case	   (Gunderson,	   1990)	   it	   is	   largely	   accepted	   that	  informed	  consent	  is	  justified	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  autonomy.	  	  Other	  thinkers	  such	  as	  Dworkin	  (1988)	  largely	  agree,	  also	  claiming	  that	  autonomy	  is	   generally	   viewed	   as	   the	   justification	   of	   informed	   consent.	   	   Despite	   Dworkin’s	  interest	  in	  the	  principle	  of	  informed	  consent	  being	  a	  moral	  one,	  many	  of	  Dworkin’s	  examples	   of	   this	   presumption	   come	   from	   a	   legal	   context	   because	   for	   Dworkin	  consent	  is	  a	  creature	  of	  law	  rather	  than	  ethics.	  “In	   our	   view,	   the	   patient’s	   right	   to	   self-­‐decision	   shapes	   the	   boundaries	   of	  the	  duty	   to	  reveal…and	  to	  safeguard	  the	  patient’s	   interest	   in	  achieving	  his	  own	   determination	   on	   treatment,	   the	   law	  must	   itself	   set	   the	   standard	   of	  adequate	   disclosure.”	   	   (Canterbury	   v.	   Spence	   (1972)	   as	   cited	   in	   Dworkin,	  1988,	  p.101)	  	  And:	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“The	   constitutional	   right	   of	   privacy	   includes	   the	   right	   of	   a	   mature	  competent	   adult	   to	   refuse	   or	   accept	   medical	   recommendations	   that	   may	  prolong	  one’s	  life	  and	  which,	  to	  a	  third	  person	  at	  least,	  appear	  to	  be	  in	  his	  best	   interests…	  Anglo-­‐American	   law	   starts	  with	   the	   premise	   of	   thorough-­‐going	   self-­‐determination.	   	   It	   follows	   that	   each	   man	   is	   considered	   to	   be	  master	  of	  his	  own	  body,	  and	  may,	  if	  he	  be	  of	  sound	  mind,	  expressly	  prohibit	  the	  performance	  of	  life-­‐saving	  surgery.”	  	  (Dworkin,	  1988,	  p.101)	  	  This	  view	  is	  shared	  by	  Meisel	  (1979):	  “The	  purpose	  of	   requiring	   the	  patient’s	   consent	   to	   treatment	   is	   to	  protect	  his	   physical	   and	   psychic	   integrity	   against	   unwanted	   invasions,	   and	   to	  permit	   the	   patient	   to	   act	   as	   an	   autonomous,	   self-­‐determining	   being.”	  	  (Meisel,	  1979,	  p.420)	  	  	  For	   Dworkin	   informed	   consent	   is	   a	   legal	   construct	   that	   the	   Law	   has	   devised	   in	  order	   to	   facilitate	   a	   moral	   principle;	   a	   patient’s	   right	   to	   be	   self-­‐determining	   or	  governing	   without	   interference;	   that	   is	   to	   say	   individually	   autonomous.	   	   In	   fact	  even	  those	  scholars	  who	  have	  chosen	  to	  challenge	  autonomy	  as	  the	  justification	  of	  consent	  accept	  that	  this	  is	  the	  most	  widely	  held	  view.	  	  Gunderson	   (1990)	  wished	   to	   argue	   for	   a	  more	   consequentialist	   approach	   as	   the	  underlying	  justification	  for	  informed	  consent.	   	  However	  when	  examining	  how	  we	  deal	  with	  exceptions	  to	  informed	  consent,	  he	  acknowledged	  that	  we	  identify	  how	  these	   disputes	   might	   be	   settled	   by	   referring	   to	   how	   the	   principle	   of	   consent	   is	  justified.	  	  Stating:	  “Most	  judges	  and	  scholars	  have	  found	  its	  [informed	  consent]	  justification	  in	  the	  right	  of	  individual	  autonomy.”	  	  (Gunderson,	  1990,	  p.251)	  	  More	   recently	   Manson	   and	   O’Neil	   (2007)	   tried	   to	   provide	   an	   alternative	  justification	  for	  consent.	  They	  argued	  that	  many	  important	  elements	  of	  consent	  are	  sidelined	   because	   of	   our	   preoccupation	   with	   autonomy	   as	   the	   justification	   but	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recognise	  that	  it	  is	  largely	  accepted	  within	  the	  biomedical	  ethical	  community	  that	  autonomy	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  justification	  for	  this	  principle.	  “Contemporary	   discussions	   insist	   that	   informed	   consent	   should	   play	   a	  wider	  role	  in	  biomedicine	  than	  was	  envisaged	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Nuremberg	  code…the	   justifications	   being	   given	   for	   requiring	   informed	   consent	   have	  supposedly	   been	   strengthened	   by	   appeals	   to	   various	   conceptions	   of	  autonomy.”	  	  (Manson	  and	  O'Neil,	  2007,	  p.4)	  	  It	  would	  seem	  therefore	  even	  for	  those	  who	  raise	  concerns	  in	  relation	  to	  autonomy	  that	  the	  consensus	  is	  largely	  that	  autonomy	  is	  the	  underlying	  principle	  of	  informed	  consent.	   	   However,	   consent	   is	  more	   complex	   today	   than	   a	   simple	   agreement	   or	  permission	  given	  by	  the	  patient.	  Consent	  today	  can	  only	  be	  regarded	  as	  valid	  if	  it	  is	  fully	   informed	   (World	   Medical	   Association,	   2008	   and	   Council	   for	   International	  Organizations	  of	  Medical	  Sciences,	  2002).	  	  This,	  I	  wish	  to	  contend,	  alters	  the	  way	  in	  which	   a	   patient	   and	   clinician	   interact.	   	   The	   patient	   is	   not	   merely	   agreeing	   or	  disagreeing	  with	  a	  simple	  yes	  or	  no	  when	  the	  clinician	  proposes	  a	  treatment	  but	  is	  required	  to	  consider	  options	  and	  digest	   information	  delivered	  by	  the	  clinician.	   	  A	  patient	  must	  weigh	  in	  the	  balance	  what	  the	  clinician	  is	  proposing	  before	  consent	  is	  given.	   	  The	  patient’s	  role	  has	  developed	  then	  from	  being	  a	  consenting	  recipient	  of	  treatment	   who	   merely	   acquiesces	   or	   resists	   what	   is	   proposed	   to	   a	   consenting	  
participant	  who	  must	  take	  part	  in	  the	  medical	  decision	  making.	   	  This	  in	  turn	  may	  reveal	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  both	  construct	  autonomy	  (as	  the	  underlying	  principle	  relating	  to	  consent)	  and	  identify	  what	  the	  clinical	  professions	  are	  trying	  to	  do	  with	  autonomy	  (protect	  or	  promote	  the	  principle).	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Consent	  and	  autonomy	  in	  the	  Redfern	  Report	  This	   acknowledged	   link	   between	   autonomy	   and	   consent	  may	  well	   be	   helpful	   in	  examining	  our	  current	  understanding	  of	  patient	  autonomy	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  such	  an	  understanding	  is	  adequate	  for	  the	  concerns	  raised	  in	  Chapter	  One.	  	  One	  of	  the	  clearest	  ways	  we	  can	  gain	  insight	  into	  how	  we	  construct	  autonomy	  in	  medicine	  and	   dentistry	   is	   by	   looking	   at	   cases	   where	   this	   particular	   relationship	   between	  consent	  and	  the	  subtext	  of	  autonomy	  are	  considered.	  	  One	  such	  case	  is	  the	  report	  that	   resulted	   from	   the	   Alder	   Hey	   Scandal.	   	   The	   extent	   and	   degree	   to	   which	  information	   forms	   a	   key	   role	   in	   promoting	   autonomy	   was	   considered	   in	   great	  depth	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  Alder	  Hey	  Scandal.	  	  These	  considerations	  may	  shed	  some	  important	   light	  onto	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   information	  giving	   forms	  a	  key	  role	   in	  the	  consent	  exchange	  as	  well	  as	  how	  autonomy	  is	  understood	  in	  medicine.	   	   I	  will	  now	   turn	   to	   consider	  what	  was	   revealed	   in	   the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	   2001)	  and	  how	  this	  might	  expose	  how	  the	  clinical	  sciences	  understand	  consent	  and	  autonomy	  in	  the	  patient-­‐clinician	  relationship.	  	  
Redfern	  Report:	  findings	  The	  procedures	   relating	   to	   the	   removal	   and	   retention	  of	   organs	  primarily	   at	   the	  Alder	  Hey	  Hospital	  was	  subject	  to	  an	  official	  inquiry,	  The	  Royal	  Liverpool	  Children’s	  
Inquiry	   (DoH,	   2001)	   more	   commonly	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   Redfern	   Report	   (DoH,	  2001).	   	  In	  order	  to	  give	  us	  greater	  insight	  into	  the	  issues	  involved	  in	  the	  ‘scandal’	  and	  to	  attempt	  to	  gain	  some	  understanding	  of	  the	  issues	  of	  moral	  concern	  we	  now	  turn	   to	   examine	   the	   findings	   of	   the	  Redfern	  Report	   (DoH,	   2001)	   in	   some	   detail.	  	  This	  report	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  us	  as	  it	  focuses	  heavily	  on	  consent-­‐taking.	  	  As	  
52	  	  
I	   have	   previously	   discussed,	   there	   is	   a	   clear	   link	   between	   our	   understanding	   of	  consent	  and	  our	  understanding	  of	  autonomy.	  	  It	  is	  hoped	  by	  examining	  the	  report	  and	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   the	   matters	   are	   discussed	   that	   we	   might	   gain	   some	  insight	  into	  medicine’s	  construction	  of	  patient	  autonomy.	  	  The	   inquiry	   focused	   on	   the	   harvesting	   of	   organs	   and	   tissue,	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	  research,	   from	   children	   who	   died	   at	   the	   Alder	   Hey	   Hospital	   between	   1948	   and	  1988	   and	   subsequently	   (and	  most	   controversially),	  what	  was	   known	   as	   the	   van	  Velzen	  years,	  between	  1988	  and	  1995.	  The	  inquiry	  examined	  the	  procedures	  used	  in	   the	   removal,	   retention	   and	   disposal	   of	   human	   tissue	   and	   organs	   following	  coroners’	   and	   hospital	   post	  mortem	   examinations.	   	   The	   legality	   of	   these	   actions	  was	  assessed	  by	  examining	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  Human	  Tissues	  Act	  1961	  had	  been	   complied	  with.	   	   This	   involved	   the	   examination	  of	   professional	  practice	   and	  management	  action	  and	  systems,	  including	  what	  information,	  if	  any,	  was	  given	  to	  parents	   of	   deceased	   children	   relating	   to	   organ	   or	   tissue	   removal,	   retention	   and	  disposal.	  	  The	  requirement	  of	  Section	  1(2)	  of	  the	  Human	  Tissue	  Act	  (1961)	  was	  to	  ascertain	  if,	   having	   made	   such	   reasonable	   enquiry	   as	   may	   be	   practicable;	   he	   or	   she	   [the	  clinician]	   has	   no	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   any	   surviving	   relatives	   of	   the	   deceased	  child	  object	  to	  the	  body	  being	  used	  for	  therapeutic	  purposes;	  medical	  education;	  or	  research.	  	  The	  starting	  point	  must	  be	  that	  the	  clinicians	  do	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	   parents	   might	   object.	   	   The	   scope	   of	   the	   inquiry,	   according	   to	   the	   Redfern	  
Report	  (DoH,	  2001),	  must	  be:	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“…that	  at	  the	  end	  of	  it	  the	  clinician	  can	  truly	  say	  he	  has	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  there	  might	  be	  an	  objection.”	  	  (DoH,	  2001,	  p.3)	  	  The	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  found	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Alder	  Hey	  there	  was:	  “…abundant	  evidence	  of	   failure	  on	   the	  part	  of	   clinicians	   to	  make	  requisite	  enquires	  of	  parents	   to	   see	   if	   they	  objected.	   	  There	   is	  no	  evidence	   that	   the	  medical	   profession	   ever	   attempted	   to	   construe	   the	   HTA…However	  clinicians	   did	   acknowledge	   in	   evidence	   the	   difficulties	   in	   reconciling	   their	  ‘paternalistic	   attitude’	   to	   the	   wording	   of	   the	   HTA.	   	   They	   conceded	   that	  parents	  should	  have	  been	  asked,	  for	  instance,	  about	  the	  retention	  of	  hearts.	  	  Consequently	   the	   paternalistic	   attitude	   cannot	   be	   sustained	   as	   an	  explanation	   of	   what	   occurred.	   	   The	   bald	   fact	   is	   that	   on	   the	   evidence	   the	  medical	   profession	   did	   not	   properly	   consider	   the	   HTA	   in	   the	   first	  place.”(DoH,	  2001,	  p.3)	  	  The	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  found	  that	  the	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  Human	  Tissue	  Act	  (1961)	  and	  the	  enormity	  of	  what	  happened	   in	   the	  eyes	  of	   the	  parents	  could	  be	  summed	  up	  with	  the	  following	  question:	  “Would	  any	  parent	  not	  have	  objected	  if	  told	  that	  every	  organ	  of	  their	  child	  would	  be	  taken	  and	  in	  most	  cases	  left	  untouched	  for	  years	  without	  even	  an	  attempt	  at	  clinical	  histology	  examination?”(DoH,	  2001,	  p9	  )	  	  The	   Redfern	   Report	   (DoH,	   2001)	   then	   goes	   on	   to	   outline	   the	   extent	   and	  management	  of	   the	   collections	  of	   organs	   and	   tissue	   at	   various	  hospital	   sites	   and	  discusses	  the	  management	  breakdown	  and	  incompetence	  of	  Professor	  van	  Velzen.	  	  After	  this	  summary	  of	  the	  procedures	  at	  the	  Alder	  Hey	  Hospital	  the	  report	  turns	  to	  examine	  the	  harm	  caused	  to	  the	  parents.	  	  The	   report	   states	   that	   throughout	   the	   inquiry	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   parents	   have	  remained	   of	   paramount	   concern.	   	   The	   essence	   of	   the	   parents’	   complaints,	   the	  report	  alleged,	  is	  that	  they	  [the	  parents]	  believe	  they	  were:	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“Deliberately	  mislead	   into	   thinking	   that	   they	  were	  burying	   their	  deceased	  children	  intact,	  when	  in	  fact	  each	  child	  had	  been	  systematically	  stripped	  of	  his	   or	   her	   organs,	   a	   large	  majority	   of	  which	   remained	   stored	   and	   unused	  from	  1988-­‐1999.”(DoH,	  2001,	  p12)	  	  The	  Report	  states	  that	  the	  inadequate	  handling	  strategy	  adopted	  by	  Alder	  Hey	  only	  served	  to	  aggravate	  the	  situation.	  	  The	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  make	  its	  recommendations	  for	  the	  future.	   	   One	   section	   of	   these	   recommendations,	   which	   differs	   from	   the	   mainly	  procedural	   changes	   proposed,	   is	   a	   new	   approach	   to	   consent	   taking.	   	   The	   report	  states	   that	   a	   fully	   informed	   consent	   is	   always	   required	   in	   circumstances	   such	   as	  this	  and	  “nothing	  less”(DoH,	  2001,	  p.21	  ).	  	  Fully	  informed	  consent	  must	  be	  “freely	  given	  without	   imposition	   of	   pressure.	   	   It	   is	   the	   application	   of	   basic	   principles	   of	  respect	  for	  person,	  their	  welfare	  and	  wishes.”(DoH,	  2001,	  p.21)	  	  The	   report	   interprets	   fully	   informed	   consent	   to	   mean	   that	   parents	   must	   be	  informed	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  each	  organ	  to	  be	  retained	  and	  the	  purpose	  for	  which	  it	  is	   used.	   	   “Blanket	   consent	   is	   inadequate	   for	   organs	   but	   is	   worthy	   of	   further	  consideration	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   retention	  of	   small	   tissue	   samples	   for	  diagnostic	  purposes,	  medical	  education	  and	  research.”(DoH,	  2001,	  p.22)	  	  For	   the	  Redfern	  Report	   (DoH,	  2001),	   fully	   informed	  consent	  means	   that	  a	  person	  must	  have	  all	  the	  information	  required	  to	  form	  a	  final	  decision.	  	  It	  is	  not	  enough	  for	  a	   clinician	   to	   request	   to	   examine	   a	   body	   after	   death	   indicating	   that	   they	  may	   or	  may	  not	  take	  some	  tissue.	  	  The	  next	  of	  kin	  need	  to	  understand	  what	  is	  involved	  in	  a	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post	   mortem	   no	   matter	   how	   distasteful	   giving	   this	   information	   may	   be	   for	   the	  clinician.	  	  The	  Report	  goes	  on	  to	  develop	  a	  test	  for	  the	  level	  of	  detail	  a	  clinician	  must	  give	  in	  order	   that	  a	   fully	   informed	  consent	  can	  be	  deemed	  to	  have	  been	  taken.	   	  The	   test	  being	  “…whether	  any	  significant	  detail	  not	  mentioned	  could	  have	  led	  to	  a	  different	  decision	  by	  the	  next	  of	  kin.	  	  If	  so,	  then	  the	  test	  for	  fully	  informed	  consent	  will	  not	  have	  been	  met.”(DoH,	  2001,	  p.22)	  	  The	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  is	  as	  explicit	  both	  in	  its	  rejection	  of	  the	  model	  of	  paternalism	  as	  it	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  respect	  for	  persons	  and	  in	  its	  emphasis	   on	   the	   requirement	   of	   a	   fully	   informed	   consent.	   	   The	   report	   does	  acknowledge	   that	  consent	   forms	  were	  used	   in	   the	  process	  of	  organ	  retrieval	  and	  retention	  at	  Alder	  Hey.	  	  This	  would	  lead	  us	  to	  believe	  that	  some	  attempt	  at	  consent	  taking	  was	  made.	   	  However,	   the	  report	  concluded	  that	  the	  consent	  forms	  used	  at	  Alder	  Hey	  were	  inadequate,	  not	  clearly	  defining	  the	  terms	  ‘organ’	  and	  ‘tissue’.	  	  The	  report	   also	   examined	   a	   model	   consent	   form	   published	   in	   The	   Royal	   College	   of	  Pathologists	   in	   March	   2000	   entitled	   Guidelines	   for	   the	   Retention	   of	   Tissues	   and	  
Organs	  at	  Post	  Mortem	  Examination.	   	   They	   found	   that	   this	  model	  was	   too	   formal	  and	  complex.	  	  The	  report	  concluded	  that	  none	  of	  the	  forms	  provided	  the	  “basis	  for	  clinicians	  to	  obtain	  a	  fully	  informed	  consent	  and	  properly	  to	  set	  out	  and	  record	  the	  decision.”(DoH,	  2001,	  p23)	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The	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  suggested	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  consent	  taking.	  	  This	  would	   rely	   heavily	   on	   a	   new	   form	   of	   consent	   form	   laid	   out	   in	   a	   question	   and	  answer	   format.	   	   It	   should	  be	   completed	   jointly	  with	   the	   clinician,	   a	  bereavement	  adviser	  and	   the	  next	  of	  kin.	   	  The	  emphasis	   from	   the	   report	   is	   for	   the	   form	   to	  be	  longer	   and	  more	   detailed.	   	   The	   focus	   of	   which	   being	   that	   only	   explicit	   detail	   is	  sufficient	  enough	  to	  result	  in	  a	  fully	  informed	  consent	  as	  previously	  defined	  by	  the	  report.	   	  The	  report	  does	  make	  clear	  again,	  however,	   that	   “a	  more	   liberal	  attitude	  [to	   consent]	   should	   be	   considered	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   retention	   of	   tissue,	  particularly	  in	  the	  form	  of	  wax	  blocks	  and	  slides.”(DoH,	  2001,	  p.24)	  	  The	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  appears	  to	  have	  two	  main	  findings.	  	  First,	  that	  the	  clinicians	  involved	  in	  the	  Alder	  Hey	  Scandal	  did	  not	  take	  adequate	  consents	  for	  the	  purposes	   of	   the	   Human	   Tissue	   Act	   (1961).	   	   Second,	   that	   as	   this	   practice	   was	  widespread	   across	   the	   NHS;	   many	   consents	   taken	   were	   too	   paternalistic	   and	  therefore	  ethically	  redundant.	  	  Any	  consent,	  according	  to	  the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001),	  in	  order	  to	  be	  valid	  has	  to	  be	  fully	  informed.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  this,	  the	  report	  concludes,	  is	  that	  we	  must	  adhere	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  respect	  for	  persons	  which	  is	  interpreted	  as	  meaning	  that	   individuals	  are	  enabled	  to	  make	  their	  own	  decisions	  and	  be	  self-­‐governing.	  	  Therefore,	  although	  consents	  were	  taken	  per	  se,	  they	  were	  insufficient	  to	  be	  of	  merit	  and	  did	  not	  adhere	  to	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  respect	  for	  persons.	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The	  Redfern	  Report:	  interpretation	  The	   findings	  of	   the	  Redfern	  Report	   (DoH,	  2001)	  give	  us	  an	  opportunity	   to	  expose	  the	   normative	   values	   that	   inform	   the	   concept	   of	   respect	   for	   persons	   (commonly	  accepted	  as	  patient	  autonomy)	  in	  the	  clinical	  setting.	   	  The	  key	  components	  in	  the	  report	  that	  I	  wish	  to	  consider	  are	  the	  emphasis	  on	  information	  giving	  and	  how	  that	  informs	  our	  understanding	  of	  patient	   autonomy.	   	   Followed	  by	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	  distinction	  made	  in	  the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  between	  what	  was	  described	  in	  the	  report	  as	  the	  ‘van	  Velzen	  years’	  and	  general	  medical	  practice	  at	  that	  time	  (all	  be	   they	  both	  viewed	  as	   inadequate	  by	  the	  report)	   to	  see	   if	   that	  distinction	  yields	  any	  further	  insights.	  	  	  	  The	  media,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Alder	  Hey	  Scandal,	  reported	  the	  events	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  doctors	   involved	   having	   repeatedly	   harvested	   organs	   and	   tissue	   of	   deceased	  children	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  children’s	  parents.	  	  “The	  organs	  were	  stripped	  without	   permission	   from	   babies	   who	   died	   at	   the	   hospital	   between	   1988	  [and]1996.”	  	  (BBC,	  2001)	  	  	   “The	  scandal	  first	  broke	  in	  1999	  when	  it	  emerged	  that	  the	  hearts	  and	  other	  organs	  of	  170	  children	  who	  died	  at	  Bristol	  Royal	   Infirmary	  had	  been	  kept	  without	   their	   consent.	   The	   scandal	   at	   Alder	   Hey	   emerged	   soon	   after.	   It	  became	   clear	   that	   organ	   harvesting	   at	   the	   hospital	   went	   back	   decades.”	  (Batty	  and	  Perrone,	  2001)	  	  This	  reporting	  differs	  slightly	  from	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001).	  	  In	   the	  vast	  majority	  of	  cases	  consent	  had	  been	  sought	   from	  either	  the	  parents	  or	  another	  appropriate	  relative.	   	  The	   finding	  of	   the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  was	  that	   although	   consent	   was	   sought,	   it	   was	   inadequate	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	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Human	   Tissue	   Act	   (1961).	   	   Clinicians	   had	   made	   insufficient	   enquiries	   of	   the	  parents	   and	   were	   therefore	   unable	   to	   be	   certain	   that	   the	   parents	   had	   no	   real	  objection	  to	  what	  was	  proposed.	  	  Further,	   the	  Redfern	  Report	   (DoH,	   1961)	   interprets	   the	  Human	  Tissue	  Act	   (DoH,	  1961)	  to	  have	  a	  much	  higher	  standard	  of	  information	  giving	  necessary	  to	  consent	  than	   that	  which	  was	   required	   at	   common	   law	  at	   that	   time.	   	   For	   the	  purposes	   of	  common	  law,	  clinicians	  acting	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  Prof.	  van	  Velzen,	  had	  for	  the	  most	  part	  gained	  ‘valid’	  legal	  consent.	  	  They	  had	  asked	  patients,	  in	  accordance	  with	  common	  practice	  at	   that	   time,	   for	  permission	   to	   remove	   tissue	  or	  organs	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   research	  or	  medical	   education	   (Bolam	  v	  Friern	  Hospital	  Management	  Committee,	   (1957).	   	   Indeed	   the	   Redfern	   Report	   discusses	   the	   inadequacy	   of	   the	  consent	   forms	   (because	   they	   lacked	   information)	  used	  acknowledging	   that	   some	  attempt	  at	  consent	  taking	  was	  made	  (DoH,	  2001,	  p.23).	  	  Common	  law	  states	  that	  as	  long	  as	  a	  practitioner	  acted	  (in	  this	  case	  gave	  sufficient	  information)	  in	  accordance	  with	  common	  practice	  (i.e.	  what	  any	  other	  reasonable	  practitioner	  would	  do	  in	  the	  same	  circumstances	  at	  the	  time)	  he	  has	  discharged	  his	  common	  law	  duty	  (Bolam	  v	  Friern	   Hospital	   Management	   Committee,	   (1957).	   	   In	   fact,	   of	   the	   four	   doctors	  involved	   in	   the	   scandal	   who	   were	   called	   to	   the	   General	   Medical	   Council	   (GMC)	  under	   charges	  of	  professional	  misconduct	   all	   but	  one	  were	  exonerated	   (Hawkes,	  2001).	  	  This	  leads	  us	  to	  consider	  why	  the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  interpreted	  the	   Human	   Tissue	   Act	   (1961)	   in	   this	   way?	   	   After	   all,	   the	   principle	   of	   informed	  consent	   in	  the	  Human	  Tissue	  Act	  (1961)	   is	  an	   incorporation	  of	  common	  law	  into	  statute.	   	  One	  could	  reasonably	  suppose	  that	  the	  Human	  Tissue	  Act	  (1961)	  should	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be	  interpreted	  in	  line	  with	  other	  law	  in	  that	  area.	  	  However	  this	  perhaps	  goes	  some	  way	  to	  exposing	  our	  understanding	  of	  patient	  autonomy	  in	  the	  clinical	  setting.	  	  In	  attempting	   to	   give	   a	   voice	   to	   patients	   concerns	   about	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   they	  have	   been	   treated	   the	   report	   contends	   that	   information	   and	   a	   fully	   informed	  consent	  form	  a	  vital	  part	  of	  respecting	  patients.	  	  This	  is	  where	  we	  begin	  to	  see	  an	  expansion	   of	   the	   consent	   process.	   	   Information	   in	   relation	   to	   consent	   must	   be	  sufficient	   enough	   for	   the	   patient	   to	   go	   through	   some	   form	   of	   reflective	   decision	  making	   rather	   than	  adequate	  enough	   to	  merely	   identify	   the	  options	   (rather	   than	  understand	  them)	  and	  opt	  for	  one.	  	  Patient	  autonomy	  is	  clearly	  understood	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  patient	  choice	  and	  importantly	  the	  action	  of	  choosing.	  	  We	  will	  return	  to	  this	  point	  in	  a	  moment	  but	  first	  I	  wish	  to	  consider	  the	  van	  Velzen	  years.	  	  Perhaps	   significantly,	   the	   report	   focuses	   on	   the	   van	   Velzen	   years	   despite	   their	  remit	  being	  the	  years	  1948-­‐1995	  (DoH,	  2001,	  pp.129-­‐320).	  	  I	  now	  wish	  to	  consider	  if	  this	  distinction	  between	  common	  medical	  practice	  of	  the	  time	  and	  the	  van	  Velzen	  years	   reveals	  anything	  else	  about	  medicine’s	   interpretation	  of	  patient	  autonomy.	  	  The	  retention	  and	  retrieval	  of	  organs	  at	  Alder	  Hey	  was,	  according	  to	  the	  report,	  in	  contravention	   with	   the	   Human	   Tissue	   Act	   (1961)	   (only	   thirteen	   years	   after	   the	  start	  of	   the	  period	  of	   investigation).	   	  However	  as	  we	  have	  briefly	  considered	  this	  was	  a	  wide	  spread	  practice	  at	  the	  time	  across	  most	  NHS	  hospitals.	   	  In	  this	  regard	  Alder	   Hey	   does	   not	   distinguish	   itself.	   	   Consents,	   all	   be	   they	   ‘blanket’,	   were	   no	  different	   from	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   medical	   profession	   and	   therefore	   were	   largely	  regarded	   as	   adequate	   (in	   a	   legal	   sense	   the	   test	   being	   the	   reasonable	   man	   and	  therefore	   what	   is	   commonly	   done	   in	   the	   profession,	   (Bolam	   v	   Friern	   Hospital	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Management	   Committee,	   (1957).	   	   Although	   the	   Redfern	   Report	   (DoH,	   2001)	  expresses	   concerns	   about	   this	   practice	   and	   attempts	   to	   allege	   this	   is	   in	  contravention	  of	   the	  Human	  Tissue	  Act	   (1961)	  notably	  no	  one	  solely	   involved	   in	  that	  process	  was	  successfully	  disciplined	  or	  prosecuted	  (Hawkes,	  2001).	  	  It	  is	  only	  when	   van	   Velzen	   is	   appointed	   that	   the	   procedures	   at	   Alder	   Hey	   diverge	   from	  common	   medical	   practice.	   	   Interestingly	   though	   this	   is	   not	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   consent	  was	   taken	  but	   rather	   the	  outcome;	  what	   subsequently	  happened	   to	   the	   organs	   or	   tissue	   after	   retrieval.	   	   The	   van	   Velzen	   years	   show	   a	  wholesale	   gathering	   of	   organs	   for	   no	   specific	   purpose	   that	   were	   inadequately	  stored	   and	   allowed	   to	   deteriorate	   and	   therefore	   put	   to	   no	   useful	   purpose.	   	   The	  
Redfern	  Report	   (DoH,	   2001)	   distinguishes	   the	   van	   Velzen	   years	   in	   that	   it	   claims	  that	   the	   offence	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   waste	   of	   material	   occurred	   because	   consents	  were	  given	  on	  the	  presumed	  understanding	  of	  the	  parents	  that	  the	  material	  would	  at	  least	  be	  put	  to	  some	  useful	  purpose	  and	  it	  is	  that	  waste	  and	  breach	  of	  trust	  that	  has	  caused	  the	  offence.	  	  	  	  Despite	   this	   the	   report	   interprets	   the	   offence	   here	   as	   lack	   of	   information	   and	  therefore	   a	   resulting	   inadequate	   consent	   which	   deprived	   the	   parents	   of	   choice	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  retention	  of	   their	  children’s	  organs.	   	  The	  report	   interprets	  the	  offence	   to	   the	   parents’	   autonomy	   in	   terms	   of	   them	   ‘not	   knowing’	   what	   would	  happen	  to	  their	  children’s	  organs	  rather	  than	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  blatant	  disregard	  to	  the	  sanctity	  of	  the	  items	  retained.	  	  This	  seems	  counter-­‐intuitive,	  clearly,	  no	  parent	  would	  consent	   to	  retrieval	  and	  retention	  of	  organs	  of	  a	  deceased	  child	   treated	   in	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  at	  Alder	  Hey	  but	  it	  does	  tell	  us	  something	  about	  the	  manner	  in	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which	  we	  understand	  autonomy	   in	   the	   clinical	   setting.	   	  Autonomy	  appears	   to	  be	  measured	   in	   terms	  of	   how	  patients	   (or	   parents	   as	   consent	   givers)	   engage	   in	   the	  clinical	  process	  and	   to	  what	  extent	   that	  engagement	   is	  effective.	   	  This	   is	   the	   first	  sight	   of	   an	   emergence	   of	   a	   narrow	   interpretation	   of	   consent	   in	   that	   necessary	  information	  as	  understood	  by	  the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  really	  relates	  only	  to	  the	  medical	   choice	   before	   them	   and	   as	   such	   has	   very	   narrow	   parameters.	   	   The	  permissions	   given	   and	   the	  way	  we	  understand	   the	  offence	  here	   relates	   solely	   to	  the	  medical	  business	  at	  hand,	  (here	  the	  retention	  of	  organs),	  and	  the	  technicalities	  of	  that	  process	  rather	  than	  a	  wider	  consideration	  of	  what	  issues	  might	  be	  broadly	  of	  concern	  to	  the	  patient.	  	  The	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  interprets	  the	  offence	  as	  a	  lack	  of	  procedural	  accuracy	  and	  a	  dysfunctional	  choice	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  parents.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  had	  the	  parents	  been	  given	  a	  more	  accurate	  or	  informed	  choice	  they	  would	   never	   have	   agreed	   to	   the	   retention	   of	   their	   children’s	   organs	   in	   this	  manner.	  	  	  	  This	   brings	   into	   question	   the	   information-­‐based	   approach	   of	   health	   care	   and	  consent	  as	  proposed	  by	  the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001).	  	  We	  may	  wish	  to	  consider	  to	   what	   extent	   the	   difference	   in	   the	   level	   of	   information	   is	   an	   appropriate	  explanation	   that	  help	  us	  distinguish	   the	  van	  Velzen	  years	   from	   the	   remainder	  of	  the	  medical	  practice	  at	  the	  Royal	  Alder	  Hey	  Hospital	  (and	  beyond)	  and	  whether	  we	  believe	   it	   adequately	   reflects	   the	   importance	   attached	   to	   the	   donation	   by	   the	  parents.	  	  Indeed	  we	  will	  explore	  this	  point	  more	  thoroughly	  in	  Chapter	  Six.	  	  For	  the	  moment	  my	  main	  aim	  is	  to	  expose	  our	  current	  construction	  of	  patient	  autonomy	  in	  the	  clinical	  setting	  and	  to	  claim	  that	  action	  of	  choice;	  that	  reflective	  process	  is	  how	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we	   understand,	   respect	   and	   promote	   a	   patient’s	   autonomy:	   more	   information	  leads	  to	  better	  choosing	  and	  better	  choosing	  leads	  to	  better	  autonomy.	  	  The	  actual	  choice	  itself	  is	  merely	  the	  by-­‐product	  of	  that	  autonomous	  process	  and	  by	  no	  means	  can	  account	  for	  our	  requirement	  to	  respect	  autonomy	  by	  itself.	  	  The	   Redfern	   Report	   (DoH,	   2001)	   clearly	   focuses	   its	   attention	   on	   the	   concept	   of	  consent	  and	  finds	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  consent	  taking	  at	  Alder	  Hey	  to	  be	  the	  issue	  of	  concern.	  	  For	  the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  the	  purpose	  of	  consent	  is	  to	  protect	  the	   principle	   of	   respect	   for	   persons	   interpreted	   as	   being	   the	   right	   to	   have	   your	  “...welfare	   and	  wishes	   considered”	   (DoH,	  2001,	   p.21).	   	   The	   report	   concludes	   that	  the	   offence	   caused	   was	   that	   parents	   would	   not	   have	   given	   their	   consent	   to	   the	  retention	  and	  retrieval	  of	  organs	  had	  they	  know	  that	  the	  material	  would	  be	  treated	  so	   poorly.	   	   One	   could	   interpret	   this	   as	   the	   parents	   being	   deprived	   of	   their	  autonomy	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  consent	  taken.	  	  They	  were	  unaware	  of	  a	  fact	  that	  would	  have	   significantly	   changed	   their	   decision	   to	   consent	   had	   they	   been	   aware	   of	   it.	  	  However	  one	  must	  ask	   the	  question	  would	  the	  same	  offence	  have	  been	  caused	   if	  the	   organs	   had	   been	   used	   carefully?	   	   Would	   parents	   then	   have	   felt	   that	   their	  autonomy	  was	   reduced	   because	   they	   were	   not	   sufficiently	   informed	   as	   to	   what	  purpose	  the	  organs	  would	  be	  put	  to	   if	   the	  organs	  had	  been	  treated	  with	  respect?	  	  After	  all,	  the	  organs	  could	  have	  been	  integral	  in	  finding	  a	  cure	  for	  childhood	  cancer,	  but	   the	  parents	  might	  have	  been	  wholly	  unaware	   that	   this	  was	   the	  purpose	   they	  were	  being	  used	  for.	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What	  offence	  did	  the	  parents,	  according	  to	  the	  Redfern	  Report	   (DoH,	  2001),	  seem	  to	   feel	   had	   occurred?	   	   According	   to	   the	   report	   the	   offence	   the	   parents	   felt	   had	  taken	  place	  was	  that	  they	  had	  been.	  “Deliberately	   mislead	   into	   thinking	   they	   were	   burying	   deceased	   children	  intact,	   when	   in	   fact	   each	   child	   had	   been	   systematically	   stripped	   of	   their	  organs,	  a	  majority	  of	  which	  had	  been	  stored	  unused	  from	  1988-­‐1995.”(DoH,	  2001,	  p.12)	  	  We	   have	   briefly	   considered	   the	   possibility	   that	   had	   the	   organs	   had	   been	   put	  towards	  medical	  research	  or	  teaching	  and	  used	  in	  an	  appropriate	  manner	  the	  same	  offence	  may	  or	  may	  not	  have	  been	  caused.	   	  Both	  situations	  would	  have	  however	  involved	   a	   lack	   of	   information	   giving	   to	   parents	   who,	   at	   least	   by	   the	   Redfern	  
Report’s	   (DoH,	   2001)	   standards,	   would	   have	   been	   regarded	   as	   insufficiently	  informed	   to	   give	   an	   informed	   consent.	   	   This	   would	   mean	   under	   the	   Redfern	  
Report’s	  (DoH,	  2001)	  interpretation	  that	  their	  right	  to	  have	  their	  wishes	  respected	  (for	   our	   purposes	   their	   autonomy)	   would	   have	   been	   reduced	   if	   not	   entirely	  frustrated.	   	  Perhaps	   the	  proposed	  symbiotic	   relationship	  between	  autonomy	  and	  consent	  is	  self-­‐defeating	  in	  that	  the	  developments	  in	  consent	  taking	  as	  proposed	  by	  the	   report	   attempt	   to	   try	   to	   give	   voice	   to	   broad	   concerns	   by	   improving	   patient	  autonomy;	   by	   respecting	  patients	   better	   by	   improving	   the	   ‘quality’	   of	   a	   patient’s	  choice.	  	  If	  autonomy	  and	  its	  protection	  are	  understood	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  information	  giving	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  explain	  the	  offences	  caused	  by	  the	  mistreatment	  of	  the	  material	  adequately.	  	  	  	  Despite	  these	  inconsistencies	  the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  felt	  that	  the	  offences	  caused	   to	   the	   parents	   were	   best	   addressed	   through	   a	   new	   model	   of	   informed	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consent.	   	   It	   is	   this	   new	   model	   that	   reveals	   how	   we	   understand	   consent	   and	  autonomy	   in	  medicine.	   	  Both	   the	  new	  Human	  Tissue	  Act	   (2004)	  and	   the	  Redfern	  
Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  make	  it	  explicitly	  clear	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  consent	  is	  to	  enable	  individuals	   to	  be	   self-­‐determining	   rather	   than	   simply	   to	   give	  permission	   for	   acts	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  viewed	  as	  illegitimate.	  It	  may	  be	  deduced	  that	  the	  findings	  of	   the	   report	   and	   subsequent	   legislation	   felt	   it	   necessary	   to	   make	   clear	   to	   the	  medical	   profession	   the	   purpose	   of	   consent;	   that	   being	   that	   the	   legal	   basis	   of	  consent	  is	  to	  promote	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  Further	  that	  by	  the	  act	  of	  giving	  medical	   information	   and	   thus	   promoting	   patient	   autonomy	   it	   shows	   that	   we	  understand	  the	  autonomy	  of	  patients	  largely	  through	  the	  action	  of	  choosing	  rather	  than	  the	  choices	  they	  make	  during	  the	  consent	  process.	  	  More	  information	  means	  better	  choices	  and	  increased	  autonomy.	  	  If	  nothing	  else	  it	  would	  be	  arguable	  that	  in	  the	  view	  of	  the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  and	  later	  legislators	  the	  moral	  concern	  at	   issue	   as	   a	   result	   of	   Alder	   Hey	   was	   inadequate	   consent	   that	   resulted	   in	   an	  unjustifiable	  reduction	  of	  individual	  autonomy.	  	  	  	  
The	  Redfern	  Report	  –	  normative	  considerations	  We	  have	  previously	  argued	  that	  autonomy	  is	   largely	  regarded	  as	  the	  cornerstone	  and	   ethical	   basis	   of	   the	   clinical	   relationship.	   	   Further,	  we	  have	   seen	   through	   the	  analysis	  of	  the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  that	  autonomy	  and	  consent	  are	  linked	  through	   the	   process	   of	   giving	   full	   information	   to	   patients	   about	   the	   clinical	  decision	  before	  them.	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Clearly	  at	  first	   instance	  there	  has	  been	  a	  moving	  away,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  from	  the	  
Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001),	  from	  the	  paternalistic	  attitudes	  of	  the	  past	  and	  a	  move	  towards	  autonomy.	  	  In	  this	  sense	  we	  might	  contend	  that	  this	  ascribes	  greater	  value	  to	   the	   patient	   voice.	   	   It	   would	   seem	   reasonable	   to	   conclude	   then	   that	   to	   some	  extent	   at	   least	   the	   aim	   of	   medicine	   and	   dentistry	   to	   construct	   the	   concept	   of	  ‘respect	  for	  persons’	  by	  relying	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  autonomy	  through	  the	  use	  of	  the	  consent	   process	   does	   to	   some	   degree	   give	   additional	   value	   and	   weight	   to	   the	  patient	   as	   an	   individual.	   	   However,	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   this	   is	   achieved	   is	   by	  relying	  on	  information	  giving	  as	  the	  way	  to	  gain	  valid	  consent.	  	  It	  is	  suggested	  that	  this	   reliance	   on	   information	   giving	   as	   the	   method	   by	   which	   that	   voice	   is	   given	  weight	   or	   value	  may	   present	   some	   difficulties.	   	   These	   difficulties	   might	   be	   best	  divided	   into	   two	   areas,	   one	   is	   about	   the	   focus	   on	   information	   and	   how	   that	  prioritises	  the	  clinical	  agenda	  and	  second	  is	  that	  it	  relies	  on	  the	  presumption	  that	  information	  promotes	   autonomy	  and	   to	   some	  degree	   is	   a	  necessary	   condition	  of	  autonomy.	  	  The	  first	  difficulty	  that	  arises	  is	  the	  focus	  on	  the	  clinician	  to	  deliver	  information	  to	  the	  patient	  about	  the	  procedure.	  	  It	  is	  the	  clinician	  who	  is	  the	  arbiter	  of	  which	  facts	  are	  pertinent	  and	  the	  focus	  of	  information	  is	  on	  adequately	  informing	  the	  patient	  about	   what	   is	   proposed	   in	   medical	   terms.	   	   As	   the	   information	   duty	   falls	   to	   the	  clinician,	   who	   is	   the	   expert,	   it	   is	   inevitable	   that	   the	   treatment	   or	   procedure	  proposed	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  consent.	  	  Further,	  as	  we	  are	  not	  attempting	  to	  promote	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  clinician	  in	  the	  exchange,	  the	  information	  is	  (for	  the	  purposes	  of	  satisfying	  consent)	  only	  required	  to	  flow	  in	  one	  direction	  from	  clinician	  to	  patient.	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This	   inevitably	   means	   that	   the	   process	   can	   fail	   to	   prioritise	   those	   matters	   of	  concern	  to	  the	  patient,	  ironically	  the	  very	  one	  whose	  autonomy	  we	  are	  seeking	  to	  protect	  or	  promote.	  	  We	  have	  seen	  from	  our	  case	  studies	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapter	  that	  this	  can	  present	  some	  problems	  for	  patients.	  	  One	  clear	  example	  of	  this	  would	  be	   skill	  mix	  where	   patients	   quite	   validly	   consent	   to	   treatment	   by	   having	   all	   the	  options	   explained	   to	   them	   as	   required	   and	   are	   enabled	   to	   make	   an	   ‘informed	  choice’.	   	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   clinician	   the	   patient	   is	   given	   all	   the	  information	  that	  they	  need	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  treatment	  decision	  but	  still	  patients	  report	   dissatisfaction	   when	   they	   learn	   that	   the	   treatment	   was	   delivered	   by	  someone	  who,	  despite	  being	  duly	  qualified,	  was	  not	  a	  dentist.	  	  From	  a	  professional	  perspective	   the	   patient’s	   autonomy	   has	   been	   respected	   (by	   asking	   their	  permission)	  and	  promoted	   (by	  giving	   them	   information)	  but	   still	  patients	   report	  concern.	   	   This	   is	   perhaps	   because	   from	   a	   patient	   perspective	   the	   priority	   is	  incorrectly	  focused	  on	  the	  treatment	  and	  fails	  to	  take	  account	  of	  other	  factors	  that	  the	  patient	  may	  feel	  are	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  their	  autonomy.	  	  Similar	  criticisms	  can	  also	  be	  raised	  in	  relation	  to	  cosmetic	  versus	  therapeutic	  treatment	  and	  NHS	  versus	  private	   treatment.	   	   Can	   autonomy	   then	   as	   it	   is	   construed	   here,	   (in	   that	   it	   is	  promoted	  by	  information	  giving)	  help	  us	  to	  distinguish	  between	  those	  actions	  that	  might	   be	   of	   central	   importance	   to	   the	   patient?	   	   For	   example,	   considering	   the	  reliance	  on	  information	  in	  the	  negative	  for	  a	  moment,	  the	  reliance	  on	  information	  giving	   (or	   lack	   thereof)	  may	  make	   it	  difficult	   to	  normatively	  distinguish	  between	  the	  retention	  of	  the	  organs	  of	  a	  child	  and	  what	  then	  subsequently	  happens	  to	  those	  organs	  and	  the	  retention	  of	  a	  cancerous	  mole	  for	  research	  purposes.	   	  Reliance	  on	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information	   giving	   and	   consent	   might	   lead	   to	   conclude	   that	   for	   normative	  purposes	  autonomy	  of	  the	  patient	  (or	  parent)	  is	  similarly	  reduced	  in	  both	  cases.	  	  It	  is	  not	  suggested	  that	  this	  is	  a	  fatal	  blow	  for	  autonomy	  per	  se	  but	  does	  highlight	  the	  practical	  difficulties	  in	  its	  application.	  	  If	  you	  are	  the	  holder	  of	  the	  information,	  but	  are	  not	  the	  subject	  of	  moral	  concern	  to	  whom	  the	  information	  relates,	  it	  can	  be	  difficult	   to	  affect	   the	   information	  exchange	   in	  an	  effective	  manner	   to	  support	   the	  recipient’s	  autonomy.	  	  The	  second	  point	  is	  more	  problematic	  and	  relates	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  autonomy	  itself	   and	   our	   requirement	   or	   desire	   to	   promote	   good.	   	   The	   difficulties	   in	  promoting	   good	   are	   again	   subdivided	   into	   two	   aspects.	   	   The	   first	   aspect	   is	  straightforward	   the	   question	   does	   information	   always	   promote	   good?	   	   Consider	  again	  our	  example	  of	  the	  retention	  of	  organs	  against	  the	  retention	  of	  a	  mole.	  	  If	  we	  work	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  increased	  information	  promotes	  autonomy	  and	  that	  we	  work	   from	   the	  perspective	   that	   autonomy	   is	   a	   good,	   this	  may	   then	   require	  us	   to	  increase	   autonomy	  whenever	   possible	   (perhaps	  with	   some	   limitations	   on	   duties	  required	  of	  us	  as	  appropriate	  to	  the	  relationship).	  	  If	  we	  follow	  this	  logic,	  then	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  contend	  that	  further	  detailed	  description	  and	  extended	  permissions	  for	  each	  procedure	  performed	  on	  a	  retained	  organ	  increase	  and	  better	  respect	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  person	  who	  gave	  the	  initial	  permission	  for	  retention.	  	  This	  seems	  counter-­‐intuitive,	   there	  must	   be	   some	   point	   at	  which	   the	   requirement	   to	   obtain	  repeated	  permissions	  could	  cause	  distress	   to	   the	  donor	  and	  that	   this	  harm	  could	  not	  be	   re-­‐interpreted	  as	  a	  good	  on	   the	  basis	   that	   it	   increases	  autonomy.	   	   In	   fact,	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this	  point	  is	  considered	  in	  the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  but	  not	  explored	  except	  to	  say	  that	   less	   information	  may	  be	  permissible	   in	  cases	   involving	  “…small	   tissue	  samples	   for	   diagnostic	   purposes,	   medical	   education	   and	   research.”	   (DoH,	   2001,	  p.22)	  	  As	  we	  will	  consider	  next	   in	  Chapter	  Three,	  hierarchical	  models	  of	  autonomy	  rely	  heavily	  on	   the	  process	  of	  decision-­‐making	  and	   the	  way	   in	  which	  a	  patient	  would	  order	  their	  preferences.	  	  These	  models	  do	  not	  require	  however	  vast	  knowledge	  but	  merely	  the	  ability.	  	  Does	  this	  mean	  then	  that	  someone	  with	  less	  medical	  knowledge	  is	   less	   able	   to	   prioritise	   than	   someone	   who	   is	   more	   knowledgeable?	   	   Perhaps	  consent	  to	  treatment	  not	  only	  fails	  to	  prioritise	  what	  is	   important	  to	  patients	  but	  also	  relies	  on	  the	  misapprehension	  that	  information	  is	  important	  to	  autonomy.	  	  As	  we	   will	   see	   a	   patient	   may	   be	   able	   to	   make	   an	   autonomous	   decision	   that	  legitimately	  orders	  their	  priorities	  knowing	  very	  little	  about	  the	  procedure.	  	  Does	  autonomy	   require	   that	   a	   patient	   becomes	   a	  medical	   expert	   in	   the	   field	   and	   can	  express	   their	   expertise	   and	   if	   so	   to	  what	   extent?	   	   Consider	   an	   example	  where	   a	  patient	   is	   experiencing	   some	   severe	   symptoms	   and	   visits	   his	   dentist	   for	   a	  diagnosis.	   	   The	   dentist	   suspects	   oral	   cancer	   and	   wishes	   to	   take	   a	   biopsy.	   	   	   The	  patient	  agrees	  and	  understands	  all	  the	  implications	  that	  such	  a	  biopsy	  may	  have	  as	  well	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   it	  will	   be	   taken.	   	   The	   patient	   does	   however	   have	   one	  proviso	  that	  should	  cancer	  be	  diagnosed	  that	  the	  clinician	  does	  not	  disclose	  this	  to	  the	  patient.	  	  The	  patient’s	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  he	  has	  a	  mortal	  fear	  of	  cancer	  and	  believes	   that	   should	   he	   receive	   such	   a	   diagnosis	   he	   will	   not	   attend	   for	   the	   life	  saving	  treatment	  that	  he	  needs;	  instead	  he	  exercises	  his	  autonomy	  that	  will	  enable	  
69	  	  
him	  to	  access	  the	  treatment	  he	  needs	  and	  declines	  a	  diagnosis.	   	  When	  the	  dentist	  returns	   it	   is	   as	   feared	   but	   the	   patient	   declines	   information	   of	   any	   kind	   and	   but	  consents	   to	   the	   treatment.	   	   According	   to	   the	   Redfern	   Report	   (DoH,	   2001)	   if	  information	  is	  the	  key	  to	  promoting	  autonomy,	  one	  must	  conclude	  that	  this	  patient	  is	   less	   autonomous	   than	   his	   neighbour	   who	   consented	   with	   full	   information	  despite	  both	  being	  self-­‐determining.	  	  	  	  Full	  information	  may	  also	  suffer	  from	  practical	  difficulties	  as	  well	  as	  our	  normative	  concerns.	   	   How	   do	   we	   decide	   on	   a	   practical	   level	   what	   amounts	   to	   ‘full-­‐information’	  particularly	  if	  that	  aim	  to	  give	  full	  information	  is	  not	  anchored	  by	  any	  other	  aim	  or	  principle	  that	  would	  help	  us	  to	  establish	  robust	  parameters?	  	  When	  is	  full	   or	   even	   sufficient	   information	   full	   or	   sufficient?	   	   Again	   the	   legal	   answer	   is	  ‘reasonableness’	  but	  this	  may	  fail	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  individual	  nature	  and	  value	  we	   seek	   to	   recognise.	   	   If	  we	   could	   agree	  on	   a	   ‘full-­‐information’	   approach	   (which	  has	   certainly	   been	   attempted	   from	   a	   legal	   perspective),	   does	   this	   satisfy	   the	  matters	  raised	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  in	  relation	  to	  deception?	  	  Does	  a	  patient	  want	  or	  need	   to	   know	   everything	   to	   feel	   that	   their	   autonomy	  has	   been	   respected	   and	   in	  what	  ways	  does	  telling	  a	  patient	  everything	  address	  the	  apparent	  inequality	  in	  the	  relationship?	  	   If	   one	   of	   the	   tenets	   of	   autonomy	   is	   to	   give	   individuals	   a	   personal	  value	  how	  does	   full	   information	   recognise	   that	   value?	   	   Is	   not	   the	  delivery	  of	   full	  information	  merely	  an	  attempt	  to	  mould	  the	  patient	  into	  a	  micro-­‐dentist	  that	  is	  to	  say	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  bring	  the	  patient	  up	  to	  the	  level	  of	  the	  dentist	  so	  that	  they	  are	  not	  deceived?	  	   It	  does	  nothing	  to	  recognise	  them	  as	   individuals	  with	  their	  own	  set	  of	  personal	   priorities	   or	   expertise.	  	   It	   implies	   that	   in	   order	   to	   be	   an	   equal	   in	   the	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dentist-­‐patient	   relationship	   the	   impetus	   is	   on	   the	   patient	   to	   transform	   into	   a	  clinician	  only	  then	  will	  we	  be	  able	  to	  claim	  that	  their	  autonomy	  is	  being	  respected	  or	  perhaps	  more	  worryingly	  that	  they	  are	  even	  autonomous	  at	  all.	  	  Further	   difficulties	   arise	   however	   from	   the	   relationship	   between	   autonomy	   and	  information.	   	   As	   we	   have	   previously	   considered	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  patient	  and	  clinician	  is	  in	  some	  respect	  unequal.	  	  Although	  there	  is	  much	  debate	  as	  to	  whether	  this	  is	  a	  meeting	  of	  experts	  or	  bares	  the	  features	  of	  an	  unequal	  or	  more	  properly	   fiduciary	   relationship	   to	   some	  degree	   the	   exchange	  of	   information	  may	  have	   an	   important	   role	   to	   play	   in	   promoting	   good.	   	   It	  would	   be	   a	   dis-­‐service	   to	  patients	  to	  conclude	  from	  our	  previous	  criticisms	  that	  information	  is	  not	  important	  to	  patients	  or	  that	  they	  are	  not	  interested	  in	  receiving	  it.	  	   	  The	  question	  is	  can	  we	  claim	  that	  the	  good	  promoted	  relates	  to	  the	  patient’s	  autonomy	  or	  are	  there	  other	  principles	   that	  would	  better	   explain	   the	   importance	  of	   that	   exchange	  perhaps	   in	  line	  with	  a	  weaker	  construction	  of	  autonomy?	  	  It	  seems	  that	  there	  are	  several	  points	  here	  we	  will	  need	  to	  consider	  if	  we	  are	  able	  to	   robustly	   draw	   any	   conclusions	   about	   the	   suitability	   of	   autonomy	   as	   an	  underpinning	   of	   the	   ethical	   relationship.	   We	   have	   considered	   some	   of	   the	  challenges	  on	  how	  best	  to	  prioritise	  the	  wishes	  of	  patient	  and	  how	  we	  distinguish	  between	  matters	  or	  importance	  and	  matters	  that	  are	  unimportant.	  	  We	  also	  raised	  concerns	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  information	  is	  the	  key	  to	  understanding	  this?	  	  	  Our	  overall	  aim	  has	  to	  be	  far	  more	  global	  than	  this	  however	  if	  we	  are	  in	  the	  business	  of	  health	   care	   and	   we	   accept	   that	   health	   care	   by	   its	   very	   nature	   is	   an	   ethical	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endeavour	  how	  then	  do	  we	  best	  care	  for	  patients?	  	  Is	  treatment	  our	  only	  focus	  and	  is	   it	   the	   focus	  on	   treatment	   that	  necessitates	   the	   reliance	  however	   ineffective	  on	  autonomy?	   	   If	   we	   changed	   our	   approach	   to	   respecting	   patients	   to	   encompass	   a	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  care	  overall	  and	  reduced	  our	  reliance	  on	  a	  treatment	  model	  could	  we	   then	  consider	  other	  ethical	   approaches	   such	  as	  paternalism	  or	   trust	   as	  legitimate	  ways	  in	  which	  to	  respect	  the	  individual?	  	  Before	  we	  turn	  to	  alternative	  models	  however,	  I	  wish	  to	  consider	  in	  detail	  a	  model	  of	   autonomy	   that	   is	   closely	   linked	   to	   that	  which	   the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	   2001)	  seeks	   to	  promote;	   the	  hierarchical	  models	  of	  autonomy.	   	  By	  careful	  exposition	  of	  this	   approach	   to	   autonomy	   we	   can	   consider	   if	   our	   current	   understanding	   and	  manner	   in	   which	   we	   deliver	   autonomy	   can	   account	   for	   the	   concerns	   raised	   in	  Chapter	   One	   that	   are	   specific	   to	   dentistry	   or	   indeed	   if	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	  relationship	   needs	   an	   alternative	   model	   to	   adequately	   protect	   and	   promote	  respect	  for	  patients.	  	  
Conclusions	  The	   Redfern	   Report	   (DoH,	   2001)	   perhaps	   exposes	   two	   key	   elements	   that	   are	   of	  importance	  here.	   	  First	  that	  where	  an	  offence,	  such	  as	  this,	  occurs	  we	  turn	  to	  the	  consent	   process	   to	   explain	   our	   concerns.	   	   As	   we	   acknowledge	   that	   consent	   is	  underpinned	   by	   the	   principle	   of	   autonomy	   (consent	   itself	   being	   the	   conduit	  through	  which	  we	   respect	   autonomy)	   this	   shows	   us	   that	  we	   largely	   understand	  autonomy	  to	  be	  an	  issue	  of	  self-­‐determination	  through	  choice	  making.	  	  The	  ‘lack	  of	  respect’	  parents	  were	  shown	  in	  this	  case	  is	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  deprivation	  of	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choice	  rather	  than,	  for	  example,	  breach	  of	  trust,	  breach	  of	  best	  interests	  or	  indeed	  deprivation	  of	  liberty.	  	  The	  response	  to	  the	  Alder	  Hey	  cases	  shows	  us	  that	  not	  only	  do	   we	   see	   autonomy	   as	   the	   rationale	   for	   consent	   taking	   but	   also	   we	   interpret	  offences	  to	  patients	  in	  terms	  of	  lack	  of	  adequate	  consent.	  	  This	  cyclical	  relationship	  between	  consent	  and	  autonomy	  shows	  us	  the	  importance	  of	  choice.	  	  Choice	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  respect	  patients	  and	  lack	  of	  choice	  is	  how	  we	  understand	  lack	  of	  respect	  for	  patients.	  	  	  	  The	  Redfern	  Report	  also	  reveals	  that	  information	  giving	  has	  become	  central	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  an	  adequate	  consent.	   	   It	   is	  not	  sufficient,	  according	   the	  Redfern	  
Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  to	  give	  patients	  a	  choice;	  a	  patient	  is	  entitled	  to	  have	  enough	  information	   to	   weigh	   in	   the	   balance	   their	   options	   and	   be	   able	   to	   consider	   the	  merits	  of	  the	  options	  in	  front	  of	  them.	  	  It	  is	  only	  then	  that	  their	  autonomy	  has	  been	  adequately	   respected.	   	   To	   not	   offer	   full	   information	   is	   to	   deprive	   the	   patient	   of	  their	   right	   to	   fully	   consider	   the	  options.	   	   For	   consent	   to	  be	  valid	   it	  must	  be	   fully	  informed;	  a	  patient	  is	  not	  autonomous	  merely	  by	  being	  self-­‐determining	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  choices	  a	  patients	  is	  autonomous	  through	  the	  action	  of	  knowing	  what	  they	  are	  choosing.	   	  To	  summarise	  autonomy	   for	   the	  Redfern	  Report	   is	  weighing	   in	   the	  balance	  (the	  action)	  plus	  choice	  rather	  than	  blind	  choice	  alone.	  	  This	  leads	  us	  to	  consider	  what	  model	  of	  autonomy,	  where	  the	  action	  of	  choosing	  is	  central,	   might	   we	   be	   emulating	   in	   the	   clinical	   setting?	   	   One	   model	   that	   places	  reflective	  practice	  at	  its	  centre	  is	  the	  hierarchical	  model	  of	  autonomy.	   	  As	  we	  will	  see	   in	   the	   following	   chapter	   hierarchical	   models	   of	   autonomy	   understand	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autonomy	   through	   the	   process	   of	   the	   ordering	   of	   our	   preferences	   where	   we	  identify	  those	  of	  primary	  importance	  that	  ought	  to	  direct	  us	  to	  act	  (or	  not	  act)	   in	  particular	   ways.	   	   As	   we	   certainly	   appear	   to	   place	   significant	   importance	   on	   the	  action	   of	   choosing	  when	  we	   respect	   patients	   careful	   analysis	   of	   the	   hierarchical	  models	  may	  well	  help	  us	  indentify	  a	  suitable	  model	  for	  the	  concerns	  we	  raised	  in	  Chapter	  One	  in	  relation	  to	  our	  hypothetical	  case	  studies.	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Chapter	  Three	  –	  Hierarchical	  Models	  of	  Autonomy	  
In	  Chapter	  One	  we	  have	  considered	  three	  clinical	  contexts	  in	  which	  specific	  issues	  have	   arisen,	   those	   being	   the	   use	   of	   the	   cosmetic	   alongside	   the	   therapeutic	   in	   a	  primary	   care	   setting,	   the	   use	   of	   both	   NHS	   and	   private	   care	   in	   a	   primary	   care	  context	  and	  the	  use	  of	  skill	  mix.	   	  A	  common	  theme	  that	  has	  arisen	  from	  all	   three	  case	  studies	  has	  been	  a	  problem	  of	  deception.	  	  We	  have	  also	  considered	  briefly	  that	  any	  objection	  to	  the	  use	  of	  deception	   in	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationship	  might	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  appealing	  to	  autonomy.	  	  In	  Chapter	  Two	  we	  have	  considered	  the	   importance	   placed	   in	   current	  medicine	   on	   respecting	   autonomy	   through	   the	  process	  of	   consent.	   	   In	  order	   to	  assess	   the	  adequacy	  of	  our	  current	  approach	  we	  have	  considered	  the	  report	  (Redfern	  Report,	  DoH,	  2001)	  relating	  to	  the	  Alder	  Hey	  Hospital	  Scandal.	  	  By	  close	  examination	  of	  the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  we	  have	  exposed	   the	   reliance	   on	   the	   use	   of	   consent	   as	   the	  manner	   in	   which	   we	   respect	  patient	   autonomy.	   	   We	   have	   also	   exposed	   reliance	   on	   a	   claim	   that	   the	   lack	   of	  consent	  explains	  matters	  where	  we	  believe	  a	  patient	  has	  not	  been	  duly	  respected	  including	  where	  we	  believe	  they	  have	  been	  deceived.	  	  The	  findings	  of	  the	  Redfern	  
Report	   (DoH,	   2001)	   emphasise	   the	   importance	   of	   information	   in	   the	   process	   of	  consent-­‐taking	   and	   this	   has	   led	   us	   to	   conclude	   that	   for	  medicine	   the	   process	   or	  action	  of	   consent	   is	   the	  way	   in	  which	  we	  understand	  patient	  autonomy	  and	   that	  the	   lack	   of	   information	   accounts	   for	   our	   concerns.	   	   As	   I	   have	  mentioned	   earlier,	  models	   where	   the	   action	   of	   considering	   options	   is	   integral	   to	   defining	   and	  identifying	   autonomy	   are	   commonly	   referred	   to	   as	   hierarchical	   models	   of	  autonomy.	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The	  aim	  of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   consider	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  understanding	  patient	  autonomy	  in	  this	  way	  gives	  us	  an	  adequate	  account	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	   relationship.	   	   We	   will	   do	   this	   by	   first	   reminding	   ourselves	   of	   some	   of	  concerns	  with	  regard	  to	  deception	  in	  the	  dental	  context	  raised	  in	  Chapter	  One.	  	  By	  doing	   so,	   it	   is	  hoped,	  we	  can	  be	  clear	  what	   types	  of	  deception	  we	  are	   concerned	  with.	  	  I	  will	  then	  go	  on	  to	  consider	  in	  detail	  the	  hierarchical	  accounts	  of	  autonomy.	  Particular	  attention	  will	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  these	  models	  operate	  and	  most	   importantly	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   hierarchical	   models	   can	   account	   for	   our	  concerns	  with	  deception.	   	   Finally	  we	  will	   return	   to	   the	   case	   studies	  proposed	   in	  Chapter	  One	  and	  consider	  whether	  or	  not	  indeed	  the	  hierarchical	  approach	  is	  the	  most	  appropriate	  way	  to	  account	  for	  our	  concerns.	  	  
Defining	  deception	  for	  the	  dental	  context	  We	  have	  considered	  in	  the	  Chapter	  One	  that	  patients	  regard	  any	  form	  of	  deception	  in	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship	   as	   problematic.	   	   Deception	   is	   not	   merely	  confined	  to	  a	  deliberate	  act	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  dentist.	  	  Deception	  can	  occur,	  from	  a	  patient	  perspective,	  when	  they	  do	  not	  know	  of	  something	  that	  they	  feel	  they	  ought	  to	   have	   known,	   even	   if	   it	   would	   not	   have	   materially	   affected	   their	   decision.	  	  Deception	  can	  occur,	   for	  example,	  when	  a	  patient	   is	  treated	  privately	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  NHS	  even	  if	  they	  would	  have	  agreed	  to	  the	  fee	  anyway.	  	  Further,	  it	  may	  also	  occur	  where	   the	   treatment	   is	   delivered	   by	   a	   professional	  with	   a	   different	   status	  than	  the	  patient	  thought	  despite	  the	  treatment	  being	  identical.	  	  The	  expectations	  of	  patients	  seem	  not	  to	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  outcome	  of	  treatment	  but	  also	  on	  mode	  of	   delivery,	   and	   even	  more	   obtusely	   not	   even	   on	   the	  method	   of	   delivery	   but	   on	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their	   role	   as	   a	   fully	   informed	   adult	   in	   that	   delivery	   at	   every	   stage.	   	   Therefore	   it	  seems	  important	  to	  patients	  that	  they	  are	  fully	  cognisant	  of	  all	  the	  facts	  as	  they	  see	  fit	  during	  treatment	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  we	  might	  wish	  to	  describe	  as	  a	  partnership	  approach	  (that	  is	  to	  say	  they	  are	  as	  equal	  partners	  as	  possible	  in	  the	  relationship)	  rather	   than	   recipients	  with	   the	   power	   to	  make	   key	   decisions.	   	   It	   appears	   that	   it	  does	  not	  matter	  that	  some	  of	  that	  information	  may	  not	  be	  material	  to	  the	  patient	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  health.	  	  It	   seems	   if	   we	   are	   to	   address	   patient	   concerns	   we	   need	   to	   consider	   re-­‐defining	  deception	   in	   a	   very	   broad	   sense	   and	   removing	   the	   element	   that	   necessarily	  requires	  some	  form	  of	  moral	  culpability.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  for	  our	  purposes	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  define	  deception	  as	  someone	  actively	  choosing	  to	  gain	  an	  unfair	  advantage.	  	  For	   us	   deception	   can	   also	   occur	   as	   an	   effect	   of	   incompetence	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	  deceiver.	   	   That	   is	   to	   say	   that,	   looking	   at	   our	   case	   studies,	   a	   patient	   may	   feel	  deceived	  even	  when	  the	  dentist	  in	  no	  way	  set	  out	  to	  deceive	  them	  nor	  derives	  any	  real	   benefit	   from	   the	   deception.	   	   Deceit	  may	   occur	  with	   a	   deliberate	   agenda	   on	  behalf	   of	   the	   deceiver,	   but	   rather	   here	   it	   is	   not	   a	   necessary	   component.	   	   If	   we	  accept	  that	  the	  definition	  is	  much	  broader	  we	  will	  need	  to	  explain	  and	  understand	  deceit	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  principle	  it	  offends	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  patient	  rather	  than	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  moral	  culpability	  of	  the	  dentist.	  	  We	  will	  also	  need	  to	  consider	  the	  effect	  of	  manipulation	  as	  a	  form	  of	  deception.	  	  As	  we	   have	   seen	   in	   the	   Chapter	   One	   manipulation	   type	   deception	   relates	   to	   the	  influence.	   	   The	   effect	   of	   different	   influences	   need	   not	   relate	   to	   concealment	   of	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information	   in	   the	   way	   ordinary	   deception	   does,	   but	   rather	   non-­‐persuasively	  influences	  an	  individual	  into	  making	  choices	  they	  would	  not	  have	  otherwise	  made.	  	  In	   clinical	   relationships	   when	   medical	   authority	   is	   being	   exerted	   over	   patients,	  manipulation	   can	   easily	   operate.	   	   Patients	   may	   find	   themselves	   adopting	   the	  priorities	  of	  their	  dentist	  or	  giving	  undue	  weight	  to	  their	  advice	  contrary	  to	  their	  own	  (the	  patient’s)	  values	  and	  priorities.	  	  We	  have	  seen	  from	  the	  case	  studies	  that	  the	   recommendation	  or	  offer	  of	   cosmetic	   treatment	  may	  be	  one	  such	  example;	   a	  dentist	   may	   generate	   a	   desire	   in	   a	   patient	   to	   have	   their	   teeth	   ‘fixed’	   where	  previously	  they	  had	  not	  perceived	  a	  problem.	  	  As	  we	  have	  already	  alluded	  to,	  the	  principle	  of	  autonomy	  would	  seem	  an	  obvious	  port	  of	  call	   in	  attempting	   to	  resolve	   this	  much	  broader	  definition	  of	  deception	   in	  the	   clinical	   relationship.	   	   It	   is	   a	   principle	   that	   certainly	   has	   been	   in	   recent	   years	  regarded	  as	  a	  founding	  principle	  of	  the	  clinical	  relationship.	  	  As	  we	  have	  previously	  seen,	  autonomy	  in	  its	  most	  basic	  terms	  is	  regarded	  as	  the	  right	  or	  ability	  to	  be	  self-­‐governing,	  ascribing	  a	  personal	  value	  to	  the	  individual	  and	  not	  treating	  people	  as	  a	  means	   to	  an	  end.	   	  Any	  act	   therefore	   that	  might	   interfere	  with	  a	  person’s	  right	  or	  ability	   to	   be	   self-­‐governing	   might	   be	   prima	   facie	   viewed	   as	   an	   offence	   against	  autonomy.	   	   This	   might	   go	   some	   way	   then	   to	   explaining	   our	   concerns	   with	  deception.	  	  Might	  autonomy	  be	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  can	  explain	  our	  concerns	  and	  defend	  against	  them?	  	  If	  we	  are	  to	  successfully	  make	  this	  claim	  we	  must	  go	  beyond	  the	  basic	  consensus	  and	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  autonomy	  operates	  or	  is	  respected	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to	  see	  if	  it	  is	  suitable	  for	  our	  purposes.	  	  There	  is	  much	  disagreement	  concerning	  an	  actual	  definition	  beyond	  a	  broad	  consensus	  that	  two	  conditions	  are	  necessary	  for	  autonomy	  to	  operate	  successfully,	  liberty	  (that	  is	  to	  say	  freedom	  from	  controlling	  influences)	   and	   agency	   (capacity	   for	   intentional	   action).	   	   Beyond	   this	   lie	   many	  models	  of	  autonomy.	  	  We	  will	  look	  at	  one	  perspective	  in	  particular,	  the	  hierarchical	  models.	   	   Our	   focus	   on	   this	   particular	   model	   is	   a	   consequence	   of	   our	   current	  construction	  of	   consent	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	   the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001)	  and	  therefore	  autonomy	  in	  clinical	  practice.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  Two,	  consent	  is	   not	   only	   underpinned	  by	   autonomy	  but	   is	   also	   the	  method	   through	  which	  we	  largely	   understand	   respect	   for	   patients	   (and	   in	   the	   negative	   appeal	   to	   consent	  when	   we	   believe	   patients	   have	   not	   been	   duly	   respected).	   	   Both	   consent	   and	  hierarchical	   models	   of	   autonomy	   rely	   on	   the	   action	   of	   choosing	   as	   the	   key	   to	  understanding	   autonomy	   and	   therefore	   how	   it	   might	   best	   be	   protected	   and	  promoted.	   	   It	   seems	   likely	   then	   that	   as	   we	   rely	   heavily	   on	   this	   construction	   of	  
action	   of	   choosing	   in	   the	   clinical	   setting	   that	   we	   are	   appealing	   to	   hierarchical	  accounts	  of	  autonomy	  when	  we	  respect	  patients.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  hoped	  by	  having	  a	  relatively	  in-­‐depth	  assessment	  of	  hierarchical	  accounts	  of	  autonomy	  we	  can	  see	  what	   merits	   they	   have	   in	   relation	   to	   our	   case	   studies	   and	   the	   concerns	   they	  highlight	   and	   whether	   this	   might	   be	   an	   adequate	   model	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationship.	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The	  notion	  of	  autonomy	  as	  a	  capacity	  in	  modern	  times	  is	  largely	  the	  result	  of	  work	  done	   in	   the	   early	  1970’s	  by	  Harry	  Frankfurt,	  Gerald	  Dworkin	   and	  Wright	  Neely7	  who	  developed	  a	  ‘hierarchical’	  account	  of	  autonomy.	  	  These	  hierarchical	  accounts	  share	   the	   same	   core	   feature;	   that	   a	   person	   is	   autonomous	   when	   their	   act	   is	  motivated	  by	  a	  first-­‐order	  desire	  that	  is	  endorsed	  by	  a	  second-­‐order	  desire.	  	  	  	  There	  is	  much	  to	  recommend	  the	  simplicity	  of	  this	  approach	  when	  considering	  the	  notion	  of	  autonomy.	  	  First,	  it	  clearly	  captures	  the	  distinguishing	  feature	  of	  persons	  and	   their	   capacity	   for	   self-­‐reflection	  and	  endorsement	  of	  desires	  over	  and	  above	  animal	  response.	  Second,	  the	  focus	  on	  the	  reflective	  process	  is	  a	  move	  away	  from	  conflict	  of	  personal	  autonomy	  with	  metaphysical	  determinism.	  Third8,	  it	  is	  content	  neutral,	  which	  allows	  the	  notion	  to	  be	  easily	  applied	  to	  the	  more	  empirical	  aspects	  of	  ethical	  debate,	  particularly	  where	   respect	   for	  autonomy	   is	  of	  primary	  concern	  and	  some	  means	  must	  be	  found	  to	  adjudicate	  between	  competing	  value	  claims.	  9	  	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  hierarchical	  notion	  of	  autonomy	  does	  not	  suffer	  from	  a	  number	   of	   theoretical	   difficulties.	   	   It	   is	   hoped	   by	   critically	   analysing	   these	  difficulties	  that	  we	  may	  gain	  a	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  what	  an	  adequate	  version	  of	  the	  hierarchical	  model	  might	  look	  like	  and	  see	  if	  it	  is	  suitable	  for	  our	  purposes.	  	  With	   this	   in	  mind	   it	   is	   contended	   that	   there	   are	   three	  main	   difficulties	  with	   the	  hierarchical	   approach	   to	   autonomy	   as	   proposed	   by	   the	   Frankfurt,	   Dworkin	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  I	   am	  going	   to	   concentrate	  on	  Frankfurt	   and	  Dworkin	   in	   this	  paper,	   as	   they	  have	  been	   the	  most	  influential.	  8	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  medical	  ethics.	  9	  Of	  particular	  relevance	  here	  would	  be	   the	  competing	  claims	  of	  patient,	  medic	  and	  perhaps	  even	  the	  NHS.	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Neely	  group.	  	  These	  are	  first,	  problems	  with	  manipulation;	  second,	  problems	  with	  regress	  and	  third,	  problems	  with	  authority.	  	  	  	  Let	   us	   first	   look	   at	   the	   hierarchical	   notion	   of	   autonomy,	  what	   values	   it	   seeks	   to	  accommodate	  and	  in	  what	  manner	  it	  addresses	  them.	  Then	  we	  will	  proceed	  to	  look	  at	  each	  of	  these	  objections	  in	  turn	  and	  how	  they	  may	  be	  addressed.	  	  
The	  Hierarchical	  Models	  of	  Autonomy	  According	  to	  Dworkin	  the	  notion	  of	  autonomy	  is	  a	  term	  of	  art.	  	  It	  is	  a	  term	  that	  has	  been	  used	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  a	  tangle	  of	  intuitions,	  conceptual	  and	  empirical	  issues	  and	  normative	  claims	  (Dworkin,	  1988).	  	  The	  model	  of	  autonomy	  that	  has	  resulted	  from	   Dworkin	   and	   Frankfurt’s	   work	   is	   a	   clear	   attempt	   to	   give	   some	   solidity	   to	  those	  intuitions.	  	  The	  question	  must	  be	  asked,	  however,	  what	  are	  the	  intuitions	  of	  which	  Dworkin	  speaks?	  	  	  	  On	   reflecting	   on	   the	   hierarchical	   model	   of	   autonomy	   developed	   by	   Frankfurt	  (1971)	   and	   Dworkin	   (1988)	   there	   is	   a	   clear	   purpose	   and	   shared	   essence	   in	   the	  issues	   that	   the	   model	   attempts	   to	   address.	   	   The	   founding	   core	   value	   must	   be	  viewed	  as	  the	  concept	  of	  self-­‐government.	  Indeed	  the	  main	  concept	  of	  the	  model	  is	  the	   notions	   of	   first	   and	   second-­‐order	   preferences	   as	   a	   form	   of	   self-­‐government.	  	  The	  theory	  of	  persons	  worked	  out	  by	  Frankfurt	  (1971)	  and	  the	  explicit	   theory	  of	  autonomy	  put	  forth	  by	  Dworkin	  (1988)	  build	  on	  this	  core	  essence;	  for	  them	  this	  is	  the	  capacity	  that	  distinguishes	  us	  from	  animals.	  	  However,	  to	  claim	  that	  this	  is	  the	  distinguishing	  feature	  of	  their	  hierarchical	  model	  would	  be	  to	  over	  simplify.	  	  After	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all,	  other	  models	  of	  autonomy	  could	  lay	  such	  a	  claim.	  	  Models	  that	  view	  autonomy	  as	  a	  form	  of	  personal	  sovereignty	  also	  require	  self-­‐government	  to	  be	  at	  their	  core.	  	  The	  hierarchical	  model	   approaches	   the	   concept	  of	   self-­‐government	   in	  a	  different	  manner.	   	   Whereas	   sovereign	   autonomy	   is	   contextual	   or	   conditional	   the	  hierarchical	  model	  tells	  us	  about	  what	  autonomy	  is	  as	  a	  capacity	  of	  persons.	   	  The	  hierarchical	  model	   goes	   further,	   it	   views	   autonomy	  as	   a	   capacity	   of	   persons	   and	  explains	   what	   the	   exercise	   of	   that	   capacity	   would	   involve.	   	   For	   Dworkin	   and	  Frankfurt	   it	   is	  not	   sufficient	   to	   say	   that	   ‘if	   I	   do	  what	   I	  want	   I	   am	  self-­‐governing’.	  	  Dworkin	   and	   Frankfurt	   propose	   a	   richer	   understanding	   of	   autonomy;	   for	   them	  self-­‐government	  means	  being	   in	   charge	   of	   your	  desires	   rather	   than	   your	  desires	  being	   in	   charge	   of	   you.	   	   It	   is	   this	   approach	   in	   Frankfurt’s	   theory	   of	   persons	   that	  enables	  him	  to	  distinguish	  us	  from	  animals.	  	  We	  are	  not	  mere	  slaves	  to	  our	  desires	  but	   able	   to	   create	   a	   policy	   of	   behaviour	   that	  may	   at	   times	   contradict	   instinctive	  desires	  but	  makes	  us	  masters	  not	  servants	  of	  our	  wants	  and	  needs.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  hierarchical	  models	   allows	  us	   to	   be	  more	   selective	   in	   our	   ascribing	   the	   ‘label’	   of	  autonomy	   to	   others.	   	   Unlike	   the	   sovereign	   model	   where	   all	   individuals	   are	  considered	   autonomous	   (other	   than	   when	   they	   cannot	   do	   what	   they	   want)	   the	  hierarchical	  model	  enables	  us	  to	  consider	  persons	  as	  not	  being	  autonomous	  either	  in	  certain	  situations	  or	  as	  a	  continual	  state	  of	  being.	  	  This	  emphasises	  the	  contrast	  between	  the	  hierarchical	  model	  and	  the	  sovereign	  models;	  autonomy	  is	  viewed	  as	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an	   internal	   process	   as	   compared	   to	   the	   sovereign	   model	   where	   autonomy	   is	  viewed	  externally10.	  	  Paradoxically,	  presuming	  a	  link	  is	  agreed	  between	  those	  who	  are	  autonomous	  and	  the	  bearing	  of	  moral	  responsibility,	   the	  hierarchical	  model	  supports	  the	  principle	  of	  ‘respect	  for	  persons’	  in	  a	  more	  empirically	  satisfying	  manner.	  	  We	  do	  not	  prima	  
facie	  presume	  autonomy	  exists	   in	  a	  person	  and	   therefore	  do	  not	  unfairly	  burden	  those	   who	   are	   not	   autonomous	   with	   responsibility.	   	   Further,	   the	   hierarchical	  model	  enables	  other	  individuals	  who	  are	  not	  autonomous	  to	  be	  supported	  whilst	  still	  maintaining	  autonomy	  as	  a	  supreme	  principle.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  we	  can	  agree	  that	  autonomy	  is	  a	  capacity	  and	  therefore	  not	  possessed	  by	  everyone	  at	  all	  times	  (in	  contrast	   to	  sovereign	  autonomy)	  we	  are	  then	  able	  to	  reconcile	   this	  view	  with	  other	   concepts	   such	   as	   beneficence	   and	   paternalism	   but	   still	   allow	   autonomy	   to	  form	   the	   underpinning	   of	   our	   ethical	   approach	   to	   respecting	   persons.	   Therefore	  for	  Dworkin	  and	  Frankfurt	  autonomy	  is	  a	  capacity	  to	  self-­‐govern	  not	  a	  prima-­‐facie	  right	  in	  of	  itself.	   	  We	  must	  now	  consider	  how	  Frankfurt	  and	  Dworkin	  constructed	  their	  model	  of	  hierarchical	  autonomy	  with	  this	  view	  of	  autonomy	  as	  a	  capacity	  at	  its	  core.	  	  	  
Understanding	  hierarchical	  models	  of	  autonomy	  One	   of	   the	   central	   themes	   shared	   by	   both	   Frankfurt’s	   and	   Dworkin’s	   notion	   of	  autonomy	  is	  that	  of	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  desires.	   	  It	   is	  this	  ordering	  and	  evaluation	  of	  desires	  that	  is	  the	  core	  feature	  of	  what	  constitutes	  their	  interpretation	  of	  personal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  sovereign	  model	  relates	  to	  how	  ‘we’	  treat	  people	  and	  can	  become	  confused	  with	   the	   idea	   of	   respect	   for	   person	   at	   the	   exclusion	   of	   other	   desirable	   values.	   	   Whereas,	   the	  hierarchical	  model	  relates	  to	  what	  we	  are	  able	  to	  do.	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autonomy.	   	   Frankfurt	   (1971),	   who	   first	   developed	   the	   concept	   of	   hierarchy	   of	  desires,	   did	   so	   to	   enable	   him	   to	   draw	   a	   clear	   distinction	   between	   animals	   and	  humans,	  believing	  that	  the	  distinction	  lay	  in	  the	  human	  will.	  	  Frankfurt	  noted	  that	  it	   is	   not	   a	   uniquely	   human	   characteristic	   to	   have	   wants11,	   desires	   or	   indeed	   to	  make	  choices.	  	  What	  is	  unique	  to	  humans,	  so	  Frankfurt	  contended,	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  form	   what	   he	   describes	   as	   second-­‐order	   desires:	   that	   men	   besides	   wanting	   or	  choosing	  or	  being	  moved	  to	  do	  this	  or	  that,	  can	  also	  want	  to	  have	  (or	  not	  to	  have)	  certain	  desires	  and	  motives.	  	  Many	  animals	  are	  capable	  of	  having	  what	  he	  referred	  to	  as	  first-­‐order	  desires	  that	  are	  simply	  a	  desire	  to	  do	  or	  not	  to	  do	  something.	  	  No	  other	  animal	  other	  than	  man,	  has	  the	  capacity	  for:	  “…reflective	   self-­‐evaluation	   that	   is	   manifested	   in	   the	   formation	   of	  second-­‐order	  desires.”	  (Frankfurt,	  1988,	  p.129)	  	  	  This	   could	   therefore	   lead	  us	   to	  conclude	   that	   if	  A	  wants	   to	  X	   and	  on	  reflection	  A	  wants	   (or	   does	   not	  want)	   to	   have	   the	   desire	   to	  X	   that	   as	   A	   has	   both	   a	   first	   and	  second-­‐order	  desire	   this	  must	  be	   sufficient	   to	  be	  viewed	  as	   a	  person	   (or	   for	  our	  purpose,	  be	  autonomous).	  	  Frankfurt	  did	  not	  feel	  however	  that	  this	  was	  sufficient,	  as	  it	  tells	  us	  little	  about	  A’s	  likely	  course	  of	  action	  and	  there	  are	  too	  many	  possible	  conflicts.	   	   Frankfurt	   proposed	   that	   the	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	   conditions	   for	  personhood	  would	  be	   that	  A	  wants	   to	  X,	  A	  wants	   (or	  does	  not	  want)	  X	   to	  be	  his	  first-­‐order	  desires	  (i.e.	  A	  has	  a	  second-­‐order	  desire)	  and	  A	  wants	  that	  X	  be	  his	  will	  that	  motivates	   him	   to	   act.	   	   Therefore	   someone	   can	   have	   a	   desire	   of	   the	   second-­‐order	  either	  when	  he	  wants	   simply	   to	  have	  a	   certain	  desire	  or	  when	  he	  wants	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Please	  note	  the	  term	  desire	  and	  want	  are	  used	  interchangeably	  here	  (as	  Frankfurt	  did)	  for	  ease	  of	  language	  although	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  want	  would	  more	  properly	  describe	  Frankfurt’s	  view.	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certain	   desire	   to	   be	   his	   will12.	   	   For	   Frankfurt,	   it	   is	   situations	   of	   the	   latter	   kind,	  which	   he	   referred	   to	   as	   second-­‐order	   volitions	   that	   he	   regarded	   as	   essential	   to	  being	  a	  person.	   	   It	   is	  possible,	   therefore,	   that	   there	  are	  beings	   that	  have	   second-­‐order	   desires	   but	   no	   second-­‐order	   volitions.	   	   Those	   beings	   in	   Frankfurt’s	   view	  could	   not	   be	   regarded	   as	   persons	   because	   despite	   having	   second-­‐order	   desires	  they	   do	   not	   care	   about	   their	   will.	   	   Frankfurt	   refers	   to	   these	   beings	   as	   wantons.	  	  Wantons’	  desires	  may	  move	  them	  to	  do	  certain	  things	  without	  it	  being	  true	  of	  them	  either	  that	  they	  want	  to	  be	  moved	  by	  those	  desires	  or	  that	  they	  prefer	  to	  be	  moved	  by	  other	  desires.	  	  	  	  It	  is	  this	  view	  of	  volitional	  endorsement	  where	  the	  link	  can	  be	  seen	  with	  Dworkin’s	  explicit	   theory	   of	   autonomy.	   For	   Frankfurt	   a	   person	   is	   autonomous	  where	   their	  motivation	   to	   act	   is	   volitionally	   endorsed13	  by	   a	   second-­‐order	   desire	   (Frankfurt,	  1988).	   	  Volitional	  endorsement14	  can	  be	  understood	  to	  mean	  that	  not	  only	  does	  a	  person	  have	  a	  second-­‐order	  desire	  but	  that	  also	  they	  want	  that	  desire	  to	  be	  their	  will	  (that	  motivates	  them	  to	  act).	  	  For	  example,	  a	  person	  is	  autonomous	  during	  the	  act	   of	   smoking	   a	   cigarette	   when	   the	   desire	   to	   smoke	   that	   cigarette	   has	   been	  endorsed	  by	  a	  further	  desire	  to	  be	  a	  smoker	  and	  that	  the	  person	  approves	  of	  that	  desire	  and	  wants	   it	   to	  become	  his	  will	  which	  motivates	  him	   to	  act.	   	   Similarly	   for	  Dworkin	  an	  autonomous	  person	  is	  one	  who:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Therefore	  an	  act	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  ‘volitionally	  endorsed’	  when	  it	  approved	  of	  by	  a	  second	  order	  desire	  that	  that	  desire	  should	  be	  comes	  ones	  will	  that	  motivates	  one	  to	  act.	  13	  Ibid	  footnote	  12.	  14	  Endorsement	  here	  refers	  to	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  first	  order	  desire	  by	  the	  second-­‐order	  volition.	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  “…does	  his	  own	  thing”	  where	  “the	  attitude	  that	  [the]	  person	  takes	  towards	  the	   influences	  motivating	   him…determines	  whether	   or	   not	   they	   are	   to	   be	  considered	  ‘his.”(Dworkin,	  1976,	  p.26)	  	  	  	  That	   is	   to	   say	   that	   following	   Dworkin’s	   notion,	   a	   person	   is	   autonomous	   if	   they	  endorse	  the	  desire	  that	  motivates	  them	  to	  act	  in	  a	  particular	  manner.	  	  	  	  Therefore	  on	  Dworkin	  and	  Frankfurt’s	   analysis	  of	   autonomy	  a	  person	  prejudices	  their	   autonomy	   where	   the	   desire	   that	   motivates	   them	   to	   act	   is	   not	   volitionally	  endorsed:	   that	   there	   is	   no	   second-­‐order	   volition	   that	   endorses	   their	   first-­‐order	  desire	  to	  act.	  	  This	  would	  seem	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it	  completely	  credible.	  	  Returning	  to	  our	   smoker;	   a	   person	   would	   not	   be	   acting	   autonomously	   when	   in	   the	   act	   of	  smoking	   a	   cigarette,	   where	   although	   there	   was	   a	   first-­‐order	   desire	   to	   smoke	   a	  cigarette	  there	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  second-­‐order	  desire	  to	  give	  up	  cigarettes	  and	  that	  they	  would	  want	  that	  desire	  to	  become	  their	  will	  that	  motivates	  them	  to	  act	  (or	  in	  this	  case	  not	  to	  act).	  	  Here	  the	  second-­‐order	  desire	  does	  not	  endorse	  the	  smoking	  of	  a	  cigarette.	  	  In	  this	  case	  some	  other	  motivation	  must	  be	  coming	  into	  play	  that	  results	  in	   the	   act	   of	   smoking	   rather	   than	   the	   exercise	   of	   personal	   autonomy	   (most	  obviously	  perhaps	  the	  addiction	  to	  nicotine).	  	  It	  could	  be	  said	  then	  that	  the	  desire	  to	   smoke	   is	   the	   result	   of	   an	   addiction	   and	   is	   not	   truly	   ‘his’	   in	   Dworkin’s	   sense.	  	  Further,	  where	  a	  smoker	  has	  a	  first-­‐order	  desire	  for	  a	  cigarette	  and	  a	  second-­‐order	  desire	   not	   to	   be	   a	   smoker	   and	   the	   person	   wants	   that	   second-­‐order	   desire	   to	  become	  their	  will	  that	  motivates	  them	  to	  inaction	  and	  that	  person	  does	  not	  smoke	  a	  cigarette	  but	  only	  because	  they	  have	  run	  out	  and	  no	  cigarettes	  are	  available	  it	  is	  not	  their	  will	   that	  motivates	  them	  to	  inaction	  but	  rather	  happy	  circumstance	  and	  therefore	   they	   would	   still	   not	   qualify	   (for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   inaction)	   as	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autonomous.	   	  This	   is	  because	   they	  have	  not	  made	   their	   choice	   ‘freely’	  but	   rather	  have	  been	  the	  victim	  of	  circumstance.	  	  This	  might	  help	  us	  to	  interpret	  our	  objection	  to	  deception	  in	  the	  case	  where	  a	  patient	  would	  have	  elected	  to	  private	  treatment	  anyway	  had	  they	  been	  given	  the	  choice.	   	  Even	  though	  the	  outcome	  forms	  part	  of	  their	  second-­‐order	  desire	  it	  fails	  to	  transform	  into	  a	  second-­‐order	  volition	  in	  that	  it	  is	   circumstance	   rather	   than	   the	   operation	   of	   will	   that	   informs	   the	   outcome.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  patient	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  be	  being	  treated	  privately	  as	  the	  operation	  of	   their	  autonomy,	   irrespective	  of	   the	   fact	   that	  private	   treatment	   is	   their	  second-­‐order	  preference.	  	  	  	  It	   is	   this	   view	   of	   the	   will	   that	   motivates	   one	   to	   act	   that	   allows	   Frankfurt’s	   and	  therefore	   Dworkin’s	   theory	   to	   move	   away	   from	   the	   difficulties	   that	   theories	   of	  autonomy	   have	   with	   metaphysical	   determinism.	   	   This	   is	   because	   Frankfurt’s	  conception	  of	  will	  and	  therefore	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  person,	  relates	  only	  to	  the	  process	  of	  reflection	  that	  a	  person	  goes	  through	  which	  eventually	  motivates	  them	  to	  act.	   	  The	  will	   then	   is	   the	  motivation	   that	   culminates	   in	  an	  action	   (or	   inaction)	  and	   has	   no	   relationship	   to	   the	   metaphysical	   at	   all.	   	   Free	   will	   for	   Frankfurt	   is	   a	  matter	   of	   an	   internal	   process	   largely	   irrespective	   of	   how	   desires	   come	   about,	  whether	  they	  are	  determined.	  	  This	  enables	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘freedom	  of	  will’	  to	  still	  form	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  person	  (and	  therefore	  autonomy)	  but	  to	  not	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  metaphysical	  debate.	  	  Frankfurt	   contends	   that	   some	   concepts	   of	   freedom	   of	   will	   are	   fundamentally	   a	  matter	  of	  doing	  what	  one	  wants	  but	  these	  only	  capture	  the	  concept	  of	  acting	  freely	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and	  miss	  entirely	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  agent	  whose	  will	  is	   free	  (Frankfurt,	  1971).	   	  To	  deprive	  someone	  of	  being	  able	  to	  act	  freely	  does	  not	  necessarily	  deprive	  him	  or	  her	  of	   free	   will.	   	   For	   example,	   where	   someone	   has	   their	   freedom	   restricted	   but	   is	  unaware	   of	   it	   (say	   a	   choice	   is	   removed	  without	   their	   knowledge)	   although	   their	  freedom	  to	  act	  is	  restricted	  their	  will	  remains	  as	  free	  as	  ever.	  	  Therefore,	  freedom	  of	   action	   is	   the	   freedom	   to	   do	   whatever	   one	   wants	   but	   freedom	   of	   will	   is	   the	  freedom	  to	  want	  what	  one	  wants	  (within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  hierarchical	  approach).	  	  Further,	  it	  is	  in	  the	  securing	  of	  conformity	  of	  his	  will	  to	  his	  second-­‐order	  volitions	  then	  that	  a	  person	  exercises	  freedom	  of	  will.	  	  And	  it	  is	  in	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  his	  will	  and	  his	  second-­‐order	  volitions,	  or	  in	  his	  awareness	  that	  their	  coincidence	  is	  not	   his	   own	  doing	   but	   only	   happy	   chance	   that	   a	   person	  who	   does	   not	   have	   this	  freedom	   feels	   the	   lack	   of	   it.	   	   The	   question	   of	   free	   will	   then	   for	   Frankfurt	   is	   a-­‐historical;	   it	   is	   not	   subject	   to	   questions	   about	  whether	   or	   not	   one’s	  will	   is	   one’s	  own	   or	   part	   of	   a	   determinist	   world.	   	   It	   is	   sufficient	   to	   say	   that	   free	   will	   is	   the	  product	  of	  an	  ordering	  of	  preferences	  and	  the	  freedom	  to	  want	  what	  one	  wants	  as	  an	  outcome	  of	  a	  second-­‐order	  volition.	  	  Using	  Frankfurt’s	  work	  on	  the	  theory	  of	  persons	  and	  his	  concept	  of	  freedom	  of	  will	  Dworkin	  moves	  on	   to	  develop	  his	   theory	  of	   autonomy.	   	  Dworkin	   recognises	   that	  whilst	  Frankfurt’s	   theory	  captures	   the	   intuitive	  essence	  of	  what	   it	  means	   to	  be	  a	  person	   it	   is	   insufficient	   for	   a	   theory	   of	   autonomy.	   	   This	   is	   because	   Frankfurt’s	  model	  does	  not	  seek	   to	  address	   the	   issue	  of	  values	  acquired	   through	   illegitimate	  means.	  	  This	  is	  of	  particular	  importance	  to	  us	  in	  relation	  to	  considering	  the	  matter	  of	  deception	  in	  our	  case	  studies.	  	  Frankfurt’s	  theory	  of	  persons	  takes	  an	  a-­‐historical	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approach	   in	   its	   recognition	   of	   personhood.	   	  Whilst	   this	   is	   a	   legitimate	   approach	  when	   trying	   to	   capture	   an	   internal	   process	   it	   allows	   desires	   adopted	   by,	   for	  example	  indoctrination,	  to	  still	  be	  viewed	  as	  second	  order	  volitions	  and	  to	  view	  the	  person	  who	  acts	  on	  them	  as	  fully	  free.	  	  For	  Dworkin	  this	  is	  insufficient	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  autonomy,	  it	  is	  counter-­‐intuitive	  that	  a	  person	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  autonomous	  simply	   because	   they	   have	   ordered	   preferences	   acquired	   by	   ‘brain-­‐washing’.	  	  Dworkin’s	  formula	  for	  autonomy	  then	  is	  the	  theory	  of	  authenticity15	  (as	  proposed	  by	  Frankfurt)	  plus	  procedural	  independence.	  “A	  person	  is	  autonomous	  if	  he	  identifies	  with	  his	  desires,	  goals,	  and	  values	  and	  such	  identification	  is	  not	  influenced	  in	  ways	  which	  make	  the	   process	   of	   identification	   in	   some	   way	   alien	   to	   the	   individual.	  	  Spelling	   out	   the	   conditions	   of	   procedural	   independence	   involves	  distinguishing	   those	   ways	   of	   influencing	   people’s	   reflective	   and	  critical	  faculties	  which	  subvert	  them	  from	  those	  which	  promote	  and	  improve	  them.”(Dworkin,	  1988,	  p.18)	  	  It	   is	   in	   this	   way	   that	   Dworkin	   hopes	   to	   capture	   the	   hierarchical	   sense	   of	   self-­‐government	  whilst	  recognising	  that	  some	  level	  of	  independence	  is	  necessary	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  autonomy.	  	  
Independence	  and	  autonomy	  Dworkin’s	  approach	  to	  the	  issue	  of	   independence	  is	  also	  a	  defining	  feature	  of	  the	  hierarchical	  model.	   	   Independence	   is	  divided	   into	  two	  categories,	  procedural	  and	  substantive	  independence.	  	  Procedural	  independence	  requires	  that	  a	  person	  is	  free	  from	   situational	   or	  personal	   interference	   that	   impacts	   on	   their	   ability	   to	  make	   a	  free	  choice.	  	  Therefore	  X	  could	  be	  said	  to	  have	  procedural	  independence	  if	  and	  only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  I.E.	  Second-­‐order	  volitions	  as	  previously	  described.	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if	   their	   desire	   to	   be	   moved	   to	   act	   has	   not	   been	   produced	   by	   manipulation,	  deception	   or	   the	   withholding	   of	   relevant	   information.	   	   That	   is	   to	   say	   that	  procedural	   independence	   is	   affected	   by	   external	   factors.	   	   Substantive	  independence	  may	  be	  deemed	  to	  exist	  where	  a	  person	  does	  not	  defer	  independent	  judgment	  (Dworkin,	  1988,	  p.22).	   	  Therefore	  substantive	   independence	  cannot	  be	  said	   to	   exist,	   for	   example,	   where	   a	   person	   has	   deferred	   judgment	   to	   the	   legal	  system,	  a	  moral	  authority	  or	  God,	  as	  they	  are	  required	  to	  retain	  control	  over	  their	  decisions	   and	   actions.	   	   X	   could	   be	   said	   to	   have	   substantive	   independence	   with	  regard	  to	  his	  motivations	  if	  and	  only	  if	  he	  does	  not	  renounce	  his	  independence	  of	  thought	   prior	   to	   developing	   them16.	   Substantive	   independence	   is	   forfeited	   by	  internal	  factors17	  (i.e.	  personal	  choice).	  	  For	   many	   theories	   of	   autonomy	   the	   existence	   of	   both	   of	   these	   types	   of	  independence	   are	   both	   sufficient	   and	   necessary	   conditions	   for	   the	   existence	   of	  autonomy.	   	   This	   is	   where	   the	   hierarchical	   model	   differs.	   	   For	   Frankfurt	   neither	  procedural	  nor	   substantive	   independence	  are	  necessary	  conditions	  of	  his	  notion.	  	  Frankfurt	   focuses	   purely	   on	   the	   internal	   process,	   considering	   the	   ordering	   of	  preferences	  in	  relation	  to	  any	  given	  issues	  as	  the	  only	  criteria	  to	  take	  into	  account.	  	  This	  a-­‐historical	  approach	  has	  its	  attractions.	  	  It	  reinforces	  the	  intuitive	  belief	  that	  autonomy	  is	  a	  feature	  and	  capacity	  of	  persons	  not	  a	  situational	  one.	  	  By	  rejecting	  or	  refusing	  to	  consider	  either	  type	  of	  independence	  the	  focus	  of	  analysis	  remains	  on	  the	  internal	  process	  of	  the	  person	  rather	  than	  any	  context	  that	  a	  person	  might	  find	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  I.E.	  Prior	  to	  developing	  his	  motivations.	  17‘Internal	  factors’	  is	  not	  perhaps	  the	  best	  form	  of	  words	  here	  but	  is	  used	  to	  contrast	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘external	  factors’	  for	  procedural	  independence.	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themselves	  in.	  	  This	  also	  helps	  to	  retain	  focus	  on	  what	  we	  mean	  when	  we	  refer	  to	  autonomy	  rather	  than	  what	  context	  in	  which	  it	  can	  be	  said	  to	  exist,	  allowing	  us	  to	  get	   closer	   to	   a	   definition.	   	   There	   are	   of	   course	   difficulties	   with	   this	   approach.	  	  Although	   it	   allows	  us	   to	  get	   some	  kind	  of	  definition	  within	  our	   reach	   it	  makes	   it	  difficult	   to	  apply.	   	  The	  a-­‐historical	  approach	   is	  open	   to	  problems	  with	  deception.	  	  For	  Frankfurt,	  a	  person	  is	  still	  viewed	  as	  autonomous	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  second-­‐order	  desires	  even	  when	  they	  were	  acquired	  through	  some	  form	  of	  deception,	  for	  example,	   hypnosis.	   	   The	   problems	   with	   deception	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   greater	  detail	  later.	  	  Dworkin,	  whilst	  still	  maintaining	  the	  same	  focus	  of	  ‘internal	  process’	  as	  Frankfurt,	  acknowledges	   the	   theoretical	   difficulties	   with	   foregoing	   the	   requirement	   for	  procedural	   independence	   and	   re-­‐introduces	   this	   into	   his	   model.	   	   However	  Dworkin’s	  account	  merely	  requires	  that	  procedural	  independence	  exists;	  a	  person	  must	   come	   to	   have	   her	   desires	   by	   procedurally	   independent	   means.	   	   Dworkin	  avoids	   the	  deception	  problem	  resulting	   from	  the	  a-­‐historical	  approach	  simply	  by	  ruling	  ex	  cathedra	   that	  a	  person	   is	  not	  autonomous	  with	  respect	   to	   those	  desires	  that	  she	  has	  been	  deceived	   into	  possessing.	   	  Dworkin	  has	  been	  criticised	   for	   this	  approach	  (Taylor,	  2005).	  	  It	  is	  not	  theoretically	  satisfactory	  to	  simply	  list	  situations	  where	  it	  is	  intuitively	  plausible	  that	  a	  person	  would	  suffer	  from	  lack	  of	  autonomy	  but	  rather	  that	  an	  account	  must	  be	  provided	  of	  why	  a	  person’s	  autonomy	  would	  be	  thus	  undermined	  so	  that	  differing	   influences	  can	  be	  differentiated.	   	   It	  certainly	   is	  inadequate	  in	  helping	  us	  address	  our	  concerns	  with	  deception.	  	  This	  problem	  with	  deception	  will	  be	  covered	  in	  more	  detail	  later.	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It	   is	   perhaps	   Dworkin’s	   approach	   to	   substantive	   independence	   that	   is	   of	   most	  interest	   here	   in	   our	   attempt	   to	   gain	   a	   greater	   understanding	   of	   the	   hierarchical	  model.	   	   As	   part	   of	   Dworkin’s	   development	   of	  what	   he	   describes	   as	   a	   theory18	  of	  autonomy	  he	  proposes	   some	  criteria	   for	  his	   theory.	   	  One	  of	   those	  criteria	   is	   that	  any	  theory	  of	  autonomy	  should	  be	  consistent	  with	  other	  values.	  “I	  suggest	  that	  the	  theory	  not	  imply	  any	  logical	  incompatibility	  with	  other	  significant	  values,	   that	   is,	   that	   the	  autonomous	  person	  not	  be	  ruled	  out	  on	  conceptual	  grounds	   from	  manifesting	  other	  virtues	  or	  acting	  justly.”	  	  (Dworkin	  1988)	  	  	  For	   this	   reason,	   Dworkin	   argues	   that	   there	   is	   no	   place	   for	   substantive	  independence	  within	  his	  theory	  of	  autonomy.	  	  For	  Dworkin,	  a	  theory	  of	  autonomy	  should	  be	   consistent	  with	  other	   values	   such	   as	   ‘loyalty,	   objectivity,	   commitment,	  benevolence,	   and	   love’	   (Dworkin,	   1988,	   p.21).	   	   These	   values	   require	   a	   person	   to	  defer	   independent	   judgment	   subject	   to	   the	   commitment	   they	  made	   according	   to	  the	  value	  proposed	  thus	  limiting	  their	  freedom.	  	  It	  is	  this	  ‘deferring	  of	  independent	  judgement’	  that	  makes	  these	  values	  incompatible	  with	  substantive	  independence.	  Dworkin	  argues	  for	  other	  theorists	  values	  such	  as	  promise,	  worship,	  obedience	  to	  command	   or	   conformity	   to	   law	   are	   all	   inconsistent	   with	   autonomy	   (Downie	   &	  Telfer	   1971;	   Rachels,	   1971;	   Scanlon,	   1972;	   and	  Wolff	   1970).	   	   The	   reason	   being,	  that	   surely	   a	   person	   is	   not	   thinking	   or	   deciding	   for	   himself	   in	   accordance	   with	  preferences,	   tastes	   and	   belief	  when	  he	   adheres	   to	   these	   other	   values.	   	  He	   either	  does	  not	  form	  independent	  judgements	  about	  what	  he	  should	  do,	  or	  if	  he	  does,	  he	  does	   not	   act	   on	   them.	   	   To	   predict	   his	   actions	   (in	   that	   a	   person	   responds	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18I	   am	   using	   the	   term	   ‘theory’	   here	   as	   opposed	   to	   ‘notion’	   to	   reflect	   Dworkin’s	   own	   words:	   his	  intention	  to	  develop	  a	  theory	  rather	  than	  a	  definition	  of	  autonomy.	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automatically	   without	   reflection)	   we	   must	   know	   what	   the	   agency	   deferred	   to	  thinks	   he	   should	   do.	   	   It	   would	   seem	   then,	   for	   these	   theorists	   that	   autonomy	   is	  largely	  a	  question	  of	  substantive	  independence.	  	  	  “What	   is	   essential	   to	   the	  person’s	   remaining	  autonomous	  demands	  that	  a	  person	  is	  in	  any	  given	  case	  his	  mere	  recognition	  that	  a	  certain	  action	  is	  required	  by	  law	  does	  not	  settle	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  he	  will	  do	  it.”	  (Scanlon,	  1972,	  p.215)	  	  	  	  Dworkin	  counters,	  saying	  that	  knowing	  what	  an	  agency	  requires	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  predict	  a	  person’s	  actions.	   	  We	  must	  make	  reference	  to	  his	  desire	  to	  do	  what	  the	  agency	   requires	   of	   him.	   	   It	   is	   his	   decision,	   arrived	   at	   freely	   (without	   deception,	  manipulation	   or	   coercion,	   in	   a	   procedurally	   independent	   manner),	   backed	   by	  reasons,	   that	  makes	   the	   agency’s	  wishes	   effective	   in	   determining	   actions.	   	   He	   is	  doing	  what	  he	  wants	  and	  leading	  the	  kind	  of	   life	  he	  thinks	   is	  worth	   leading;	  how	  then	  can	  he	  not	  be	  autonomous?	  	  In	  this	  sense	  Dworkin	  contends	  that	  autonomy	  is	  still	   in	   existence	   as	   the	   restriction	   of	   the	   person	   is	   freely	   chosen	   according	   to	  certain	  values.	  	  For	  Dworkin	  the	  problem	  with	  substantive	  independence	  is	  that	  it	  cannot	  allow	  the	  transfer	  of	  authority	  and	  therefore	  precludes	  good	  as	  well	  as	  bad	  reasons	  for	  giving	  up	  independence.	  	  This	  approach	  is	  very	  individualistic	  and	  runs	  into	   problems	   when	   it	   is	   applied	   to	   relationships	   because	   it	   places	   such	   a	   high	  value	  on	  making	  decisions	  for	  oneself.	   	  Dworkin’s	  account	  agrees	  that	  it	  is	  indeed	  good	  to	  make	  decisions	   for	  oneself	  but	   there	   is	  no	  need	  to	  descend	   into	  absolute	  individualism	   and	   for	   this	   reason	   he	   rejects	   substantive	   independence	   as	   a	  requirement	  for	  his	  model	  of	  autonomy.	  	  Dworkin	   accepts	   that	   there	   are	   other	   ideals	   that	   also	   come	   into	   conflict	   with	  desirable	   values,	   in	  particular	   liberty.	   	   Liberty	   clearly	   conflicts	  with	  other	   values	  
93	  	  
that	  involve	  commitment	  such	  as	  love,	  loyalty	  or	  promises	  yet	  we	  do	  not	  deny	  that	  liberty	  is	  valuable	  or	  argue	  for	  a	  weaker	  conception.	  	  Dworkin	  contends	  that	  this	  is	  because	  there	  are	  perhaps	  differing	  kinds	  of	  liberty:	  liberty	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  contextual	   freedom	  (for	  example	  the	   freedom	  to	  go	  out	  on	  a	  Saturday	  night)	  and	  political	   liberty	   (the	   freedom	   to	   not	   have	   another’s	   wishes	   imposed	   upon	   our	  own).	  	  It	  is	  objections	  to	  the	  second	  kind	  of	  liberty	  that	  we	  raise	  and	  it	  is	  this	  kind	  of	  liberty	  to	  which	  we	  raise	  presumptions.	  	  Even	  if	  political	  liberty	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  other	  values	  (Dworkin	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  being	  free	  to	  use	  one’s	  talents	  to	  make	  as	  much	  money	  as	  one	  can)	  such	  as	  equality	   it	   is	  a	  contingent	   fact	   that	   the	  exercise	  of	  liberty	  may	  diminish	  liberty	  it	  is	  not	  liberty	  itself	  that	  is	  in	  conflict.	  	  The	  conflict	  of	  autonomy,	  considered	  as	  a	  substantive	  notion,	  with	  other	  values	  is	  not	  contingent	  but	  necessary.	  	  There	  is	  no	  possible	  situation	  where	  one	  could	  make	  a	  commitment	  to	  a	  friend	  and	  remain	  substantively	  independent.	  	  Dworkin	  asserts	  that	  despite	  arguing	  for	  a	  weaker	  conception	  of	  autonomy	  in	  this	  sense	  he	  is	  still	  able	  to	  argue	  for	  normative	  claims	  about	  authority.	   	  As	  he	  puts	  it,	  “in	  short,	  we	  don’t	  need	  it	  and	  it’s	  not	  a	  very	  good	  thing	  anyway”	  (Dworkin,	  1988,	  p.25).	   	  Dworkin	   contends	   that	   conceptions	  of	   autonomy	   that	   involve	   substantive	  independence	   lead	   to	   theoretical	   mistakes	   about	   political	   and	   moral	   authority.	  	  Consider	  Wolff’s	  use	  of	  the	  strong	  conception	  of	  autonomy	  to	  deny	  the	  legitimacy	  of	   any	   state	   (Wolff,	   1970,	   p.14).	   	   Dworkin’s	   criticism	   of	  Wolff’s	   argument	   is	   the	  overly	   strict	   interpretation	  of	   authority.	   	   Authority	   cannot	   be	   said	   to	   be	   obeying	  commands	   simply	   because	   they	   are	   commands,	   no	   one	   has	   ever	   argued	   for	   that	  concept	  of	  authority	  and	   therefore	   it	   cannot	  be	  rejected	  on	   that	  basis.	   	  However,	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even	  on	   a	  more	   reasonable	   view	  of	   authority	   explicit	   agreements	   to	   obey	  or	   the	  making	   of	   promise	   do	   forfeit	   substantive	   independence	   but	   why	   should	   these	  views	  also	  forfeit	  autonomy?	  	  Dworkin	  holds	  that	  it	  is	  the	  value	  of	  autonomy	  that	  the	  promises	  or	  commitments	  a	  person	  makes	  are	  his	  own,	  are	  part	  of	  the	  person	  he	  wants	  to	  be	  and	  define	  him	  as	  a	  person	  (Dworkin,	  1988,	  p.26).	  	  Dworkin	  asserts	  that	   if	   the	   autonomy	   that	   Wolff	   speaks	   of	   is	   inconsistent	   with	   commitment	   or	  promising	  then	  it	  has	  no	  claim	  to	  be	  the	  supreme	  value.	  	  One	  of	  the	  problems	  with	  relinquishing	  the	  need	  for	  substantive	  independence	  is	  the	   fear	   that	   the	   link	   with	   responsibility	   may	   be	   broken.	   	   A	   man	   cannot	   be	  responsible	  for	  acts	  that	  he	  committed	  whilst	  not	  substantively	  independent.	  	  Mill	  disagrees	  with	  this	  view;	  a	  man	  cannot	  escape	  responsibility	  for	  committing	  an	  act	  merely	   because	   it	   was	   required	   of	   him	   from	   a	   higher	   authority.	   	   He	   is	   then	  responsible	   for	  precisely	   that,	   forfeiting	  his	  autonomy	  without	  due	  consideration	  (Mill,	  1859,	  p.186).	   	   If	  we	  accept	   this	  as	   the	  case	   the	   link	  with	   responsibility	   can	  still	   be	   maintained	   in	   Dworkin’s	   theory	   and	   cannot	   be	   used	   as	   an	   argument	   to	  require	  the	  inclusion	  of	  substantive	  independence.	  	  Dworkin	   therefore	   argues	   that	   some	   level	   of	   independence	   is	   a	   necessary	  component	  of	  autonomy.	  	  This	  is	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  desires	  that	  may	  be	  acquired	  by	  illegitimate	  means	  such	  as	  deception.	  	  Although	  Frankfurt	  does	  give	  us	  an	  account	  of	  freedom	  of	  will	  in	  his	  theory	  of	  persons,	  thus	  acknowledging	  the	  importance	  of	  freedom	   at	   some	   level	   his	   a-­‐historical	   approach	   cannot	   account	   for	   desires	   that	  were	   illegitimately	   acquired	   before	   the	   critical	  moment	   in	   time.	   	   Dworkin	   in	   an	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attempt	  to	  counter	  this	  difficulty	  does	  require	  some	  independence	  but	   this	   is	   the	  weaker	  form	  of	  procedural	  independence.	  	  Dworkin	  explicitly	  rejects	  the	  need	  for	  substantive	   independence	   as	   part	   of	   his	   theory	   of	   autonomy	   as	   he	   feels	   that	   a	  theory	   of	   autonomy	   should	   be	   compatible	   with	   other	   desirable	   values	   which	  require	   some	   forfeit	   of	   substantive	   independence	   and	   that	   if	   independence	   is	  forfeited	  as	  part	  of	  an	  adherence	  to	  some	  personal	  policy	  then	  this	  does	  not	  pose	  a	  problem	  to	  the	  hierarchical	  model.	  	  Dworkin	   as	   part	   of	   his	   criteria	   for	   a	   satisfactory	   theory	   of	   autonomy	   insist	   that	  there	  should	  be	   ideological	  neutrality.	   	  The	  concept	  should	  be	  one	  that	  has	  value	  for	  different	  ideological	  outlooks.	  	  It	  should	  not	  be	  the	  case	  that	  only	  individualistic	  ideologies	   can	   value	   autonomy.	   	   However	   differing	   ideologies	   may	   differ	   in	   the	  weight	   that	   they	  ascribe	   to	  autonomy,	   the	  compromises	   that	  a	  different	   ideology	  might	   feel	   are	   reasonable,	  whether	   the	  value	  be	   intrinsic	  or	   instrumental	   and	   so	  forth.	  	  Whilst,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  there	  is	  much	  to	  commend	  the	  simplicity	  of	  this	  approach	  the	  hierarchical	  model	  of	  autonomy	  does	  suffer	  from	  some	  theoretical	  difficulties.	  	  The	   three	   main	   difficulties	   with	   Frankfurt	   and	   Dworkin’s	   hierarchical	   model	   of	  autonomy	  are	  the	  difficulty	  with	  deception,	  the	  threat	  of	  regress	  and	  the	  problem	  with	  authority.	   	  Each	  poses	  a	   significant	   threat	   to	   the	   success	  of	   the	  hierarchical	  model	  of	   autonomy.	   	   I	  will	   now	   turn	   to	   look	  at	   those	  problems	   in	  detail	   and	   the	  revisions	   that	  Frankfurt	  and	  Dworkin	  made	   to	   their	  original	  analyses	   in	  order	   to	  address	   these	   theoretical	   difficulties.	   	   It	   will	   be	   seen	   that	   Frankfurt	   mounts	   a	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detailed	  and	  somewhat	  although	  not	  entirely,	  successful	  response	  and	  defence.	  	  In	  contrast	  Dworkin	  takes	  a	  more	  lateral	  approach	  and	  shifts	  the	  supposed	  purpose	  of	  his	  model	  to	  avoid	  the	  criticism	  but	  without	  really	  providing	  any	  answers.	  	  I	  will	  then	   turn	   to	   look	   at	   how	   other	   theorists	   have	   dealt	   with	   the	   difficulties	   of	   the	  model	  and	  again	  to	  what	  extent	  they	  are	  successful.	  	  
Hierarchical	  models	  of	  autonomy:	  critique	  and	  response	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  
deception,	  regress	  and	  authority	  I	  wish	  to	  contend	  that	  whilst	  the	  three	  difficulties	  pose	  equal	  threats	  to	  the	  success	  of	   the	  model	   they	  differ	   from	  each	  other	   in	  one	  key	  way.	   	  The	  problems	  of	  both	  authority	  and	  regress	  are	  internal	  dilemmas	  which	  whilst	  they	  could	  be	  the	  cause	  of	   a	   theoretically	   unsatisfactory	   break-­‐down	   in	   the	   function	   of	   the	   hierarchical	  model	  do	  not	  pose	  a	  threat	  in	  themselves	  to	  the	  view	  that	  autonomy	  is	  a	  personal	  characteristic	   identified	   through	   an	   internal	   process	   because	   they	   are	   in	   of	  themselves	  internal	  problems.	   	  The	  problem	  of	  deception	  poses	  a	  different	  threat	  however.	   	   This	   is	   the	   difficulty	   that	   arises	   when	   an	   autonomous	   (or	   otherwise)	  person	   engages	  with	   others	   and	   is	   a	   difficulty	   not	  with	   the	   internal	   process	   but	  with	   the	   way	   in	   which	   people	   interact	   with	   each	   other.	   	   This	   is	   a	   relational	  challenge	  which,	  I	  contend,	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  address	  when	  focusing	  on	  autonomy	  as	   an	   internal	   process	   or	   personal	   characteristic.	   	   This	   is	   because	   if	   the	   whole	  question	  of	  autonomy	  rests	  on	  the	  success	  of	  an	  internal	  process	  or	  otherwise,	  it	  is	  the	   manner	   in	   which	   information	   is	   processed	   that	   indicates	   whether	   or	   not	   a	  person	   is	  autonomous.	   	  However,	  how	  that	   information	  was	  acquired	   in	   the	   first	  place	   must	   be	   of	   equal	   importance,	   if	   the	   information	   is	   false,	   deceptive	   or	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manipulative	   in	   any	  way	   then	   surely	   this	  must	   affect	   the	   individual’s	   autonomy?	  	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  most	  of	  the	  hierarchical	  theorists	  recognise	  this	  as	  a	  difficulty	  but	  attempt	   to	   solve	   it	   be	   refining	   the	   internal	   process	   rather	   than	   addressing	   the	  problem	  of	  deception	  externally.	   	  We	  will	   first	   look	  at	   each	  of	   these	  problems	   in	  turn	  and	  how	  Frankfurt	  and	  Dworkin	  sought	  to	  address	  them.	  	  I	  will	  then	  turn	  to	  look	   at	   more	   recent	   attempts	   to	   address	   these	   issues	   and	   assess	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  they	  have	  been	  successfully	  addressed.	  	  
Problems	  with	  deception	  We	  will	   first	   consider	   the	  difficulty	  with	  deception.	   	   It	   is	   counter-­‐intuitive	   that	   a	  person	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  being	  autonomous	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  desires	  where	  those	  desires	  have	  been	  acquired	  by	  some	  nefarious	  means,	  such	  as	  manipulation,	  indoctrination,	  deception	  or	   even	  hypnosis.	   	  This	  difficulty	  with	  deception	  arises	  for	   Frankfurt	   because	   he	   takes	   an	   a-­‐historical	   approach	   to	   autonomy.	   	   It	   is	  sufficient	   for	   Frankfurt’s	   account	   that	   the	   first	   order	   desire	   is	   endorsed	   by	   the	  second	   irrespective	   of	   the	   origin	   of	   the	   first	   order	   desire.	   	   The	   a-­‐historical	  approach	   does	   not	   require	   any	   assessment	   of	   how	   a	   particular	   desire	   was	  acquired,	   it	   merely	   focuses	   on	   the	   process	   required	   for	   autonomy	   at	   any	   given	  particular	  time.	  	  For	  Frankfurt	  the	  means	  by	  which	  a	  first	  or	  second-­‐order	  desire	  is	  acquired	   is	   irrelevant,	   it	   is	   merely	   the	   endorsement	   of	   first-­‐order	   desires	   by	  second-­‐order	   desires	   that	   is	   important;	   a	   ‘snapshot’	   in	   time	   so	   to	   speak.	   	   The	  difficulty	   with	   this	   approach	   is	   that	   a	   nefarious	   third	   party	   could	   in	   some	   way	  influence	   an	   individual	   into	   having	   a	   first-­‐order	   desire	   and	   also	   a	   second-­‐order	  desire	   that	  endorses	   it.	   	   For	  example,	   a	   schoolboy	   is	   introduced	   to	   smoking	  by	  a	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friend,	   the	  friend	  is	  very	  popular	  and	  the	  schoolboy	   is	  keen	  to	  emulate	  him.	   	  The	  schoolboy	  takes	  up	  smoking	  and	  smokes	  a	  cigarette	  he	  wants	  the	  cigarette	  and	  he	  endorses	   that	   desire	   because	   he	   believes	   smoking	   is	   cool	   as	   his	   friend	   does	   it.	  	  Following	  Frankfurt’s	  account	  of	  autonomy	  the	  school	  boy	  is	  acting	  autonomously	  in	  smoking	  the	  cigarette	  as	  he	  endorses	  that	  desire	  despite	  the	  fact	  the	  his	  second-­‐order	   endorsement	   is	   perhaps	   originally	   acquired	   through	   the	   illegitimate19	  influence	   of	   his	   friend.	   	   An	   objection	   to	   this	   must	   be	   raised.	   	   It	   is	   theoretically	  unsatisfactory	   to	   ignore	   the	  manner	   in	   which	   endorsements	   are	   acquired	   when	  constructing	  a	  notion	  of	  autonomy	  particularly	  where	  deception	  may	  threaten.	  	  	  	  Dworkin	   appears	   to	   have	   a	   response	   to	   this	   objection	   in	   that	   he	   requires	   the	  individual	  to	  have	  procedural	   independence.	   	  Therefore	  following	  our	  school	  boy	  smoker	  Dworkin’s	  account	  of	  autonomy	  would	  clearly	  block	   the	  school	  boy	   from	  claiming	   autonomy	   if	   his	   second-­‐order	   desire	   to	   be	   a	   smoker	   was	   the	   result	   of	  undue	   influence	   from	   his	   friend	   and	   the	   policy	   had	   been	   adopted	   to	   merely	  emulate	   another	   rather	   than	   it	   being	   a	   freely	   adopted	   policy.	   	   It	   would	   appear	  
prima	   facie	   then	   that	   Dworkin	   has	   solved	   the	   problems	   with	   Frankfurt’s	   a-­‐historical	  approach.	  	  It	  must	  be	  said	  however	  that	  Dworkin	  simply	  asserts	  without	  sufficient	  argument	  or	  explanation	  that	  any	  second	  order	  desire	  that	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  be	  procedurally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Illegitimate	  may	  perhaps	  be	  distinguished	  from	  legitimate	  in	  that	  legitimate	  influence	  is	  a	  case	  of	  helping	  someone	  to	  see	  something	  that	  they	  can	  then	  pass	  their	  own	  judgement	  on;	  illegitimate	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  is	  perhaps	  getting	  someone	  to	  do	  or	  think	  something	  whilst	  precluding	  them	  from	  passing	  their	  own	  judgment.	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independent	   cannot	   be	   said	   to	   be	   sufficient	   to	   support	   his	   notion	   of	   autonomy.	  	  Dworkin	  appears	   to	  have	  recognised	   the	  difficulty	  with	   the	  a-­‐historical	  approach	  but	  offers	  no	  real	  solution.	  	  It	  is	  contended,	  that	  it	  is	  not	  theoretically	  sufficient	  to	  list	  situations	  in	  which	  a	  person	  may	  not	  be	  autonomous	  but	  rather	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  an	  account	  of	  why	  that	  situation	  destabilizes	  autonomy.	  	  This	  would	  then	  enable	  us	   to	   distinguish	   situations	  where	   the	   influence	  might	   not	   undermine	   autonomy	  (for	   example	   education)	   from	   situations	   that	   do	   undermine	   it	   (for	   example	  indoctrination).	  	  
The	  problem	  of	  infinite	  regress	  Frankfurt’s	   (1971)	   and	   Dworkin’s	   (1988)	   analyses	   of	   autonomy	   also	   faced	   the	  problem	  of	   infinite	   regress.	   	   For	   the	  hierarchical	  model	   of	   autonomy	  a	  person	   is	  autonomous	   with	   respect	   to	   their	   desires	   if	   their	   effective	   first-­‐order	   desire	   is	  endorsed	   by	   a	   second-­‐order	   desire.	   	   This	   poses	   the	   question	   then,	   is	   a	   person	  autonomous	  with	  respect	  to	  that	  second-­‐order	  desire	  and	  if	  so,	  why?	  	  If	  the	  answer	  is,	  because	  the	  second-­‐order	  desire	  is	  in	  turn	  endorsed	  by	  a	  third-­‐order	  desire	  an	  infinite	  regress	  threatens;	  one	  must	  then	  ask	  if	  in	  fact	  that	  third-­‐order	  desire	  is	  so	  endorsed	  and	  so	  on	  ad	  infinitum.	   	  If	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  and	  a	  second-­‐order	  desire	  carries	  weight	  for	  reasons	  other	  than	  it	  is	  also	  endorsed	  by	  a	  higher-­‐order	  desire	  that	  would	  render	  the	  Frankfurt	  and	  Dworkin’s	  account	  of	  hierarchical	  models	  of	  autonomy	  incomplete.	  	  This	  argument	  could	  perhaps	  be	  countered	  by	  claiming	  that	  indeed	  a	  person	  is	  not	  autonomous	   with	   respect	   to	   their	   second-­‐order	   endorsing	   desires	   but	   is	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autonomous	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   first-­‐order	   desire	   that	   has	   been	   so	   endorsed,	  because	  autonomy	  is	  simply	  constituted	  from	  that	  endorsement.	  	  However,	  neither	  Frankfurt	  nor	  Dworkin	  use	  this	  defence,	  perhaps	  because	  this	  would	  lead	  them	  to	  the	  third	  objection,	  a	  problem	  with	  authority.	  	  
The	  problem	  with	  authority	  The	   problem	   with	   authority	   poses	   the	   question,	   how	   can	   one	   be	   viewed	   as	  autonomous	  with	  respect	  to	  desires	  that	  form	  part	  of	  a	  process	  during	  which	  one	  is	  not	  autonomous.	   	  That	   is	   to	  say	  why	  do	  second-­‐order	  desires	  hold	  any	  authority	  over	  first	  order	  desires?	  	  As	  Gary	  Watson	  points	  out:	  “Since	  second-­‐order	  volitions	  are	  themselves	  simply	  desires,	  to	  add	  them	   to	   the	   context	   of	   conflict	   is	   just	   to	   increase	   the	   number	   of	  contenders;	   it	   is	   not	   to	   give	   a	   special	   place	   to	   any	   of	   those	   in	  contention.”(Watson,	  1975,	  p.218)	  	  
The	  response	  Faced	   with	   these	   three	   difficulties	   both	   Frankfurt	   and	   Dworkin	   modified	   their	  original	   analyses.	   	   Frankfurt	   recognised	   that	   his	   theory	  was	   beset	   by	   a	   problem	  with	  deception	  (as	  well	  as	  difficulties	  with	  regress	  and	  authority)	  because	  it	  relied	  on	   the	   claim	   that	   a	   person	   is	   autonomous	   with	   regard	   to	   his	   or	   her	   desires	   by	  endorsing	   them	  through	  a	  deliberate	  psychic	  event.	   	  The	  problem	  being	   that	  one	  could	  always	  question	  a	  person’s	  autonomy	  with	  respect	  to	  that	  event.	  	  As	  a	  result	  Frankfurt	   modified	   his	   account	   to	   include	   a	   satisfaction	   based	   analysis	   of	  identification	   (Frankfurt	   1998,	   pp.98-­‐107).	   	   On	   this	   analysis	   a	   person	   does	   not	  need	   to	   engage	   in	   any	   ‘deliberate	   psychic	   event’	   for	   them	   to	   identify	   with	   their	  
101	  	  
desires.	   	   One	   could	   be	   viewed	   as	   being	   autonomous	  with	   regard	   to	   a	   particular	  desire	   if	   one	   accepts	   that	   desire	   as	   his	   own:	   it	   is	   a	   sufficient	   condition	   that	   the	  desire	   “indicates	   something	   about	   himself”(Frankfurt,	   2002,	   p.160).	   	   It	   is	  Frankfurt’s	  contention	  that	  a	  person,	  in	  accepting	  a	  desire,	  will	  reflect	  on	  it	  to	  see	  if	  it	   expresses	   something	   about	   themselves.	   	   It	   is	   this	   acceptance	   that	   constitutes	  their	  endorsement	  of	  it,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  might	  endorse	  the	  claim	  of	  a	  person	  that	  they	  have	  a	  certain	  quality	  without	  evaluating	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  person	  making	  that	  particular	  claim.	  	  Frankfurt,	  does	  not	  require	  that	  a	  person	  then	  endorses	  their	  endorsement	  as	  this	  would	  lead	  to	  regress;	   it	   is	  sufficient	  that	  she	  identifies	  with	  the	   first-­‐order	   desire	   by	   being	   satisfied	  with	   her	   second-­‐order	   attitude	   to	   it	   (i.e.	  endorsement).	  	  	  	  Despite	  Frankfurt’s	  modification	  however,	  this	  does	  not	  resolve	  the	  problem	  with	  deception.	   	   This	   is	   because	   a	   person	   could	   be	   unwittingly	   hypnotized	   or	  indoctrinated	  into	  possessing	  a	  first-­‐order	  desire	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  he	  believes	  it	  originates	  from	  within	  him.	  	  In	  this	  sense	  an	  individual	  would	  both	  endorse	  a	  first-­‐order	  desire	  and	  be	  satisfied	  with	  it	  for	  Frankfurt’s	  purposes.	  	  However,	  one	  could	  not	  possibly	  view	  them	  as	  being	  autonomous	  but	  rather	  heteronymous.	  	  Frankfurt	   also	   attempted	   to	   eliminate	   the	  problem	  with	   the	   threat	   of	   regress	   by	  claiming	   that	   a	   person’s	   decisive	   identification	   with	   one	   of	   his	   desire’s	   would	  eradicate	  it	  (Frankfurt,	  1988a,	  p.21).	  	  In	  Frankfurt’s	  later	  account	  he	  argued	  that	  a	  person	   is	   autonomous	   with	   respect	   to	   their	   first-­‐order	   desire	   if	   he	   decisively	  endorses	   it	   with	   a	   second-­‐order	   volition	   (Frankfurt,	   1988b).	   	   Frankfurt	   made	   a	  
102	  	  
direct	  response	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  regress	  problem,	  claiming	  that	  if	  a	  person	  endorses	  his	   effective	   first-­‐order	   desire	   “without	   reservation…in	   belief	   that	   no	   further	  accurate	  inquiry	  would	  require	  him	  to	  change	  his	  mind,”	  (Frankfurt,	  1998,	  pp.168-­‐169)	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  a	  person	  to	  then	  further	  consider	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  are	  indeed	   autonomous	  with	   respect	   to	   that	   desire.	   	   In	   addition,	   this	   approach	   also	  tackles	   the	   difficulty	   with	   the	   problem	   of	   authority	   in	   that	   through	   a	   person’s	  decisive	   identification	   with	   his	   endorsing	   second-­‐order	   volition	   the	   person	   in	  question	  will	  endow	  his	  volition	  with	  the	  authority	  that	  it	  previously	  lacked.	  	  Dworkin	   takes	   a	   rather	   different	   approach	   to	   modification	   of	   his	   hierarchical	  model	  of	  autonomy.	   	  Dworkin	  in	  his	  original	  work	  had	  already	  acknowledged	  the	  problem	  with	  deception	  when	  developing	  a	  full	  theory	  of	  autonomy.	  	  Dworkin	  had	  tackled	  this	  difficulty	  by	  ruling	  ex	  cathedra	   that	  a	  person	  is	  not	  autonomous	  with	  respect	   to	   desires	   that	   are	   the	   result	   of	   deception.	   	   As	   previously	   discussed	  however,	   this	   gives	   us	   little	   guidance	   on	   how	   to	   distinguish	   those	   who	   may	   be	  regarded	   as	   having	   been	   deceived	   from	   those	   who	   have	   not,	   for	   example	  distinguishing	   the	   difference	   between	   desires	   acquired	   through	   indoctrination	  (and	   therefore	   illegitimate	   means)	   and	   education	   (legitimate).	   	   Therefore	   this	  approach	  could	  be	  regarded	  as	  insufficient	  to	  be	  theoretically	  satisfactory.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  problematic	  in	  relation	  to	  our	  case	  studies.	  	  At	  what	  point	  does	  clinical	  advice	  or	  education	  or	  even	  indeed	  information	  become	  manipulation	  and	  undue	  influence?	   	   In	   response	   to	   this	   criticism	  Dworkin	   states	   that	  he	   attempts	  only	   to	  propose	  a	  global	  theory	  of	  autonomy	  in	  that	  “a	  second	  order	  capacity	  of	  persons	  is	  to	   reflect	   critically	   upon	   their	   first	   order	   preferences,	   desires,	   wishes	   and	   so	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forth”(Dworkin	   1988,	   p.20).	   	   Dworkin	   asserts	   that	   he	   is	   not	   concerned	  with	   the	  more	   local	  aspects	  of	  what	   conditions	  must	  be	  met	   for	  a	  person	   to	  be	  viewed	  as	  autonomous.	   	   Once	   this	   is	   understood,	   Dworkin	   contends,	   the	   problems	   with	  regress,	   authority	   and	   deception	   disappear.	   	   This	   is	   difficult	   to	   comprehend.	  	  Dworkin	   clearly	   feels	   the	   need	   to	   at	   least	   rule	   ex	   cathedra	   that	   deception	   is	   a	  confounding	   factor	   of	   autonomy	   but	   give	   no	   guidance	   on	   its	   identification.	   	   If	  indeed	  Dworkin	  wishes	  merely	  to	  promote	  the	  concept	  of	  autonomy	  as	  an	  ordering	  of	  preferences	  or	  hierarchy	  of	  desires	  why	  would	  he	  find	  it	  necessary	  to	  allude	  to	  this	   ‘local’	   concept?	   	   Further,	   by	   asserting	   that	  his	   theory	   is	   only	   to	  be	   seen	   in	   a	  more	   global	   concept	   Dworkin	   reduces	   its	   usefulness.	   	   This	   is	   because	   in	   many	  discussions	   about	   autonomy	   it	   is	   not	   the	   psychological	   capacities	   that	   a	   person	  must	  possess	  in	  order	  to	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  be	  autonomous	  that	  is	  at	  issue;	  many	  agree	   that	   some	   level	   of	   second-­‐order	   reflection	   is	   necessary	   (Bratman,	   2003b;	  Christman,	  1987).	  	  Rather	  it	  is	  the	  exercise	  of	  that	  capacity	  for	  reflection	  and	  how	  it	  results	   in	   a	   person	   being	   autonomous	   that	   is	   at	   issue.	   	   By	   taking	   a	  more	   global	  approach	  Dworkin	  is	  no	  longer	  offering	  a	  theory	  of	  autonomy	  that	  can	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  discussions	  where	  localized	  questions	  are	  posed	  as	  to	  a	  person’s	  autonomy	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  particular	  desire	  or	  a	  particular	  action.	  	  	  	  
Initial	  conclusions	  Despite	   the	   advantages	   of	   the	  hierarchical	   approach	   to	   autonomy	   it	  would	   seem	  that	   it	  still	  suffers	  from	  a	  number	  of	  theoretical	  difficulties.	   	   It	  would	  seem	  the	  a-­‐historical	  approach	  presents	  serious	  difficulties	  for	  the	  notion.	  	  Whilst	  focus	  on	  the	  process	  has	  it	  merits,	  the	  history	  of	  how	  second-­‐order	  desires	  were	  acquired	  must	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be	  viewed	  as	  significant.	  	  Although	  all	  three	  problems	  need	  to	  be	  tackled	  effectively	  to	   enable	   the	   hierarchical	   model	   to	   maintain	   credibility,	   it	   is	   contended	   in	   this	  chapter	   that	   the	   problem	  with	   deception	   poses	   the	   greatest	   threat.	   	   A	   theory	   of	  autonomy	  that	  is	  subject	  to	  problems	  with	  deception	  is	  self-­‐defeating	  since	  it	  fails	  to	  protect	  the	  one	  value	  that	  it	  intends	  to	  promote;	  some	  concept	  of	  independence	  of	  thought,	  mind	  or	  deed.	  	  	  	  
Some	  solutions	  A	   number	   of	   writers	   have	   gone	   on	   to	   develop	   a	   second-­‐generation	   of	   non-­‐hierarchical	   theories	   of	   autonomy.	   	   Using	   the	   Frankfurt-­‐Dworkin	   model	   as	   the	  origin	   of	   their	   views	   they	   have	   attempted	   to	   address	   some	   of	   the	   theoretical	  difficulties	   whilst	   retaining	   the	   spirit	   of	   their	   predecessor’s	   theory.	   	   Two	   of	   the	  most	  prominent	  theorists	  of	  this	  new	  generation	  are	  John	  Christman	  (1987;	  1993)	  and	   Michael	   Bratman	   (1999;	   2000).	   	   Other	   writers	   have	   used	   the	   Frankfurt-­‐Dworkin	  model	  as	  a	  springboard	  into	  an	  even	  more	  diverse	  approach,	  one	  example	  being	  the	  co-­‐herentist	  approach	  of	  Laura	  Waddell	  Ekstrom	  (1993).	  	  These	  writers	  have	  all	  attempted	  to	  solve	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  difficulties	  discussed	  above	  to	  some	  degree.	  	  We	  will	  now	  turn	  to	  consider	  how	  successful	  they	  have	  been.	  	  It	   would	   seem	   from	   the	   proceeding	   discussion	   that	   the	   hierarchical	   model	   of	  autonomy	  is	  doomed	  to	  failure	  because	  of	  the	  threat	  of	  deception.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  John	  Christman	  (1987;	  1993)	  has	  developed	  an	  historical	  approach	  to	  autonomy	  in	  an	   attempt	   to	   address	   this	   very	   objection	   when	   using	   a	   hierarchical	   approach.	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Christman	   contends	   that	   an	   agent	  P	   is	   autonomous	   in	  his	   desire	   at	   time	   t	   if	   and	  only	  if:	  i. 	  “P	  did	  not	  resist	  the	  development	  of	  the	  desire	  (prior	  to	  t)	  when	  attending	  to	   this	   process	   of	   development,	   or	   P	   would	   have	   not	   resisted	   that	  development	  had	  P	  attended	  to	  the	  process;	  ii. The	  lack	  of	  resistance	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  desire	  (prior	  to	  t)	  did	  not	  take	  place	  (or	  would	  not	  have)	  under	  the	  influence	  of	   factors	  that	   inhibit	  self-­‐reflection;	  iii. The	   self-­‐reflection	   involved	   in	   condition	   I	   is	   (minimally)	   rational	   and	  involves	  no	  self-­‐deception	  iv. The	   agent	   is	   minimally	   rational	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   desire	   at	   t	   (where	  minimal	   rationality	   demands	   that	   an	   agent	   experience	   no	   manifest	  conflicts	  or	  beliefs	  that	  significantly	  affect	   the	  agent’s	  behaviour	  and	  that	  are	   not	   subsumed	   under	   some	   otherwise	   rational	   plan	   of	   action).”	  (Christman,	  1993,	  p.288)	  	  The	   problem	   is	   that	   Christman’s	   historical	   analysis	   still	   fails	   to	   fully	   solve	   the	  danger	  of	  deception	  and	  enable	  a	  person	  to	  be	  fully	  autonomous	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  desires.	   	   Returning	   to	   our	   schoolboy	   smoker,	   imagine	   a	   situation	   where	   a	  schoolboy	  is	  forced	  to	  smoke	  by	  the	  school	  bully.	  	  Over	  time	  the	  boy	  comes	  to	  enjoy	  cigarettes	   and	   also	   his	   notoriety	   at	   school	   for	   being	   a	   smoker.	   	   The	   schoolboy	  discovers	   that	   in	   fact	   the	   school	   bully	   has	   done	   him	   a	   favour	   in	   forcing	   him	   to	  smoke;	   he	   is	   now	  a	   lot	  more	  popular	   at	   school	   and	  has	   a	  wider	   circle	   of	   friends	  (perhaps	   to	   the	  degree	   that	  his	   school	  work	  has	   improved	  due	   to	  his	  new	   found	  friends).	  	  He	  now	  agrees	  that	  smoking	  was	  ‘for	  the	  best’	  even	  though	  he	  rejects	  the	  manner	   in	   which	   he	   was	   initially	   forced	   to	   smoke.	   	   Therefore	   at	   time	   t1	   he	  discovers	   that	   smoking	   is	   a	   good	   thing	   and	   despite	   his	   rejection	   of	   the	   process	  from	  time	  t1	  onwards	  he	  is	  fully	  autonomous	  with	  respect	  to	  his	  desire	  to	  smoke.	  	  Imagine	  this	  in	  relation	  to	  our	  concerns	  about	  cosmetic	  dentistry.	   	  For	  example	  a	  dentist	  offers	  a	  patient	  an	  orthodontic	  appliance.	  	  The	  patient	  at	  the	  time	  does	  not	  feel	  that	  there	  is	  anything	  wrong	  with	  the	  appearance	  of	  their	  teeth	  but	  agrees	  to	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the	   appliance	   as	   he	   views	   the	   dentist	   as	   the	   expert	  with	   his	   [the	   patient’s]	   best	  interests	  at	  heart.	  	  At	  first	  the	  patient	  finds	  the	  appliance	  very	  uncomfortable	  and	  expensive	  but	  over	  time	  comes	  to	  accept	  that	  as	  now	  all	  his	  friends	  have	  one	  and	  he	   is	   ‘one	   of	   the	   crowd’	   that	   it	   was	   ‘for	   the	   best’.	   	   Was	   that	   patient	   really	  autonomous	  in	  relation	  to	  agreeing	  to	  the	  orthodontic	  treatment?	  	  	  Again	  at	  time	  t1	  for	  Christman	  the	  patient	  now	  has	  acquired	  an	  autonomous	  desire	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  appliance.	  	  However,	  we	  might	  want	  to	  raise	  concerns	  about	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  that	   desire	  was	   originally	   acquired	   through	   the	   influence	   of	   dentist.	   	   It	   a	   seems	  counter-­‐intuitive	  that	  we	  would	  be	  satisfied	  with	  a	  model	  of	  autonomy,	  or	  indeed	  a	  principle,	  that	  allows	  what	  we	  might	  initially	  observe	  as	  a	  wrong-­‐doing,	  (that	  is	  to	  say	   the	   dentist	   using	   his	   clinical	   authority	   to	   persuade	   a	   patient	   against	   the	  patient’s	  current	  better	  judgment)	  to	  then	  legitimize	  it	  later	  when	  the	  patient	  has	  been	  overcome.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  problematic	  as	  it	  requires	  that	  we	  explain	  this	  satisfaction	  by	  relying	  on	  the	  same	  principle,	  autonomy,	  that	  we	  would	  have	  used	  to	  object	  to	  the	  deception	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  Christman	   also	   accepts	   that	   a	   person	   can	   be	   autonomous	   with	   respect	   to	   their	  desires	   even	   if	   that	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   adoption	   of	   such	   desires	   there	   was	   no	  possibility	   of	   self-­‐reflection	   so	   long	   as	   the	   context	   preventing	   self-­‐reflection	  was	  freely	  chosen.	  	  An	  example	  of	  this	  could	  be	  perhaps	  seen	  in	  a	  recruit	  freely	  joining	  an	   elite	   part	   of	   the	   army	  which	   requires	   that	   soldiers,	   by	   subjugating	   their	  will,	  unquestioningly	   follow	   the	   orders	   of	   the	   commander.	   	   The	   soldier	   has	  autonomously	  chosen	  to	  subjugate	  himself	  to	  the	  wishes	  of	  his	  commander	  but	  is	  precluded	  from	  the	  opportunity	  for	  self-­‐reflection.	  	  The	  soldier	  still	  however	  meets	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Christman’s	  criteria	  for	  autonomy	  because	  at	  time	  t1	  he	  has	  autonomously	  chosen	  to	  subjugate	  his	  will.	  	  This	  is	  because	  he	  would	  not	  have	  resisted	  the	  development	  of	  desires	  at	  t1	  had	  he	  attended	  to	  the	  process,	  he	  is	  minimally	  rational	  and	  is	  not	  self-­‐deceiving.	  	  	  However	  he	  only	  has	  the	  desires	  that	  the	  commander	  instructs	  him	  to	  have	  and	   therefore	   this	   cannot	  be	   sufficient	   for	  him	   to	  qualify	  as	  autonomous	  but	   rather	   heteronomous.	   	   Therefore,	   Christman’s	   account	   sadly,	   does	   not	  effectively	  deal	  with	  the	  problems	  with	  deception.	  	  Bratman	   (1999;	   2000)	   developed	   a	   reason-­‐based	   approach	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	  autonomy	  after	  what	  he	  believed	  to	  be	  fatal	  objections	  to	  Frankfurt’s	  satisfaction	  based	  approach20.	  	  Bratman	  argues	  that	  Frankfurt’s	  (1998)	  account	  of	  deception	  is	  unsatisfactory	   because	   it	   does	   not	   require	   that	   a	   person	   endorse	   those	   of	   his	  desires	   that	  he	   is	  said	   to	   identify	  with	   (Frankfurt	  1998).	   	  Owing	  to	   this,	  Bratman	  contends,	  a	  person	  might	  meet	  Frankfurt’s	  criterion	  for	  him	  to	  be	  satisfied	  with	  a	  desire	  (in	  so	  far	  as	  he	  identifies	  with	  it)	  simply	  because	  he	  has	  not	  yet	  rejected	  it	  and	   yet	   the	   mere	   failure	   to	   reject	   an	   idea	   does	   not	   mean	   one	   identifies	   with	   it	  (Bratman	  1999).	  	  	  On	   Bratman’s	   account,	   a	   person	   is	   autonomous	   with	   respect	   to	   a	   desire	   if	   they	  decide	   to	   treat	   it	   as	   reason	   giving	   (that	   is	   to	   say	   end-­‐setting)	   in	   the	   relevant	  circumstances.	  	  However	  Bratman	  acknowledges	  that	  a	  person’s	  decision	  to	  treat	  a	  desire	   as	   reason-­‐giving	   is	   not	   sufficient	   as	   to	   regard	   them	   as	   autonomous	   with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  This	   is	   because	   a	   person	   could	   identify	   with	   a	   reason	   and	   for	   Frankfurt’s	   theory	   is	   therefore	  ‘satisfied	  with	  it’	  merely	  because	  one	  has	  not	  yet	  rejected	  it.	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respect	  to	  it.	  	  This	  is	  because,	  using	  our	  smoker,	  an	  unwilling	  addict	  may	  decide	  to	  give	  into	  a	  craving	  because	  it	  is	  too	  painful	  to	  resist	  it	  (Bratman	  2000)21.	  	  Here	  the	  smoker	   decides	   to	   treat	   the	   desire	   for	   a	   cigarette	   as	   reason	   giving	   in	   Bratman’s	  sense	  of	  end-­‐setting	  but	  is	  not	  autonomous	  with	  respect	  to	  it.	  	  The	  reason,	  Bratman	  contends,	   that	   the	   smoker	   is	   not	   autonomous	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   desire	   for	   a	  cigarette	   is	   that	   the	   desire	   is	   incompatible	   with	   the	   agent’s	   other	   standing	  decisions	  or	  policies	  concerning	  what	  to	  treat	  as	  reason	  giving	  (Bratman	  1999).	  	  In	  order	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  autonomous	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  desire	  one	  must	  not	  only	  treat	  it	   as	   reason	  giving	  but	  must	   also	  be	   satisfied	  with	   the	  desire.	   	   For	  Bratman,	   this	  satisfaction	  means	  one	  not	  having:	  “reached	   and	   retained	   a	   conflicting	   decision,	   intention	   or	   policy	  concerning	   the	   treatment	   of	   one’s	   desires	   as	   reason-­‐giving.”	  	  (Bratman,	  1999,	  p.44)	  	  This	   enables	   Bratman	   to	   avoid	   the	   threat	   of	   regress	   and	   the	   problem	   with	  authority.	   	   This	   is	   because	   he	   bases	   his	   account	   of	   what	   constitutes	   a	   person’s	  standing	   decisions,	   intentions,	   and	   policies	   by	   reference	   to	   his	   broadly	   Lockean	  account	  of	  personal	  identity,	  on	  which	  an	  agent	  helps:	  	  “…ensure	   appropriate	   psychological	   continuities	   and	   connections	  [to	   retain	   her	   identity	   over	   time]	   by	   sticking	   with	   and	   executing	  [her]	   prior	   plans	   and	   policies,	   and	   by	   monitoring	   and	   regulating	  [her]	   motivational	   structures	   in	   favour,	   say,	   of	   [her]	   continued	  commitment	  to	  philosophy.”	  (Bratman,	  2000,	  p.45)	  	  This	   means	   that	   as	   a	   person’s	   standing	   decisions,	   intentions	   and	   policies	   are	  constitutive	   of	   themselves	   they	   then	   possess	   the	   authority	   (enabling	   Bratman’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Bratman	   uses	   the	   example	   of	   a	   drug	   addict	   but	   continuity	   the	   example	   of	   smoker	   has	   been	  substituted	  for	  that	  of	  drug	  addict.	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account)	  to	  assess	  which	  first-­‐order	  desire	  they	  are	  then	  autonomous	  with	  respect	  to	  and	  which	  they	  are	  not.	  	  Indeed,	  this	  account	  also	  precludes	  the	  need	  to	  question	  a	   person’s	   autonomy	   with	   regard	   to	   their	   standing	   decisions,	   intentions	   and	  policies.	   	   This	   is	   because	   these	   values	   form	   what	   Noggle	   (2005,	   pp.87-­‐88)	  describes	  as	  the	  authentic-­‐self	  and	  therefore	  the	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  one	  is	  autonomous	  in	  relation	  to	  them	  does	  not	  arise,	  as	  they	  are,	  so	  to	  speak,	  us;	  our	  inner-­‐self.	  	  Although	  this	  approach	  is	  invaluable	  in	  addressing	  two	  of	  the	  three	  difficulties	  that	  Frankfurt	   and	  Dworkin’s	   approaches	  pose,	   those	  of	   regress	   and	  authority,	   it	   still	  fails	   to	   solve	   the	   problem	  of	   deception.	   	   This	   can	   be	   seen	  when	   considering	   our	  example	  of	  hypnosis	  again.	  	  Consider	  that	  a	  person	  has	  been	  hypnotised	  into	  both	  having	  desires	  and	  accepting	  those	  desires	  as	  her	  own.	  	  Just	  as	  that	  person	  satisfies	  Frankfurt’s	  criteria	  so	  too	  does	  he	  also	  meet	  Bratman’s.	   	  This	  is	  owing	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  hypnosis,	  this	  person	  treats	  their	  desire	  as	  being	  reason-­‐giving	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  end-­‐setting	  and	  they	  do	  not	  conflict	  with	  any	  of	  his	  other	  policies	  because	   he	   has	   not	   formed	   any	   views	   about	   the	   status	   of	   desires	   acquired	   via	  hypnosis.	   	   As	   has	   previously	   been	   stated	   however,	   desires	   acquired	   this	   way	  cannot	  be	  viewed	  as	  being	  legitimate	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  establishing	  autonomy.	  	  It	  is	  suggested,	  however,	  that	  Bratman	  might	  respond	  to	  this	  criticism	  by	  contending	  that	   these	   desires	   do	   not	   flow	   from	   the	   person	   in	   the	   correct	   manner.	   	   In	   fact	  Bratman	  has	  stated	  explicitly	  that	  he	  has	  not	  yet	  tried	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  with	  deception	   (Bratman	   2003a,	   pp.175-­‐176).	   	   Bratman	   has	   suggested	   that	   he	   could	  perhaps	  strengthen	  his	  criterion	  that	  a	  person’s	  decision	  to	  treat	  a	  desire	  as	  reason	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giving	  not	  conflict	  with	  other	  policies	  and	  also	  add	  a	  historical	  component	  to	  block	  any	  revised	  versions	  of	   the	  problem	  with	  manipulation	  but	  he	  has	  yet	   to	  explore	  this	  in	  detail	  (Bratman	  2003b,	  p.106).	  	  It	   seems	   therefore	   that	   the	   problem	   with	   deception	   is	   very	   difficult	   to	   avoid.	  	  However,	  Ekstrom’s	  (1993)	  coherentist	  approach	  seems	  that	   it	  might	  be	  immune	  to	  this	  objection.	  	  Ekstrom	  uses	  the	  same	  starting	  point	  as	  Frankfurt	  and	  Dworkin:	  that	  a	  person	  is	  autonomous	  with	  respect	  to	  those	   ‘desires’	  that	  move	  one	  to	  act.	  	  Ekstrom	  departs	  from	  previous	  work,	  however,	  by	  focusing	  on	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  autonomous	   with	   respect	   to	   ones	   preferences	   rather	   than	   ones	   desires.	   	   For	  Ekstrom	  a	  preference	  is	  a	  very	  particular	  sort	  of	  desire.	  	  It	  is	  one:	  	  (i) “for	  a	  certain	  first-­‐order	  desire	  to	  be	  effective	  in	  action,	  when	  or	  if	  one’s	  acts,	  and;	  (ii) 	  that	   is	   formed	   in	   the	   search	   for	   what	   is	   good.”	   (Ekstrom	   1993,	  p.603)	  	  	  	  This	   approach	   replicates	   that	   of	   Frankfurt	   and	   his	   second-­‐order	   volition	   except	  that	   for	   Ekstrom	   a	   person	   forms	   a	   first-­‐order	   preference	   because	   they	   find	   that	  first-­‐order	  preference	  to	  be	  good	  whereas	  for	  Frankfurt	  it	  may	  be	  for	  any	  reason	  at	  all.	  	  One	  of	   the	  core	   features	  of	  Ekstrom’s	  analysis	  of	  autonomy	   is	   the	  distinction	  she	  draws	  between	   ‘self’	   and	   ‘true	  or	  most	   central	   self’.	   	   For	  Ekstrom	  a	  person’s	   self	  consists	  of	  her	  character	  together	  with	  the	  power	  for	  ‘fashioning	  and	  re-­‐fashioning’	  that	  character,	  where	  a	  person	  S’s	  character	  at	  time	  t	  is	  constituted	  by	  “the	  set	  of	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propositions	   that	   S	   accepts	   at	   t	   and	   the	   preferences	   of	   S	   at	   t”	   (Ekstrom	   1993,	  p.606).	   	  A	  person’s	   ‘true	  or	  most	   central	   self’	   consists	  of	   a	   subset	  of	   acceptances	  and	   preferences	   that	   cohere.	   	   Ekstrom	   gives	   three	   reasons	   why	   these	   cohering	  preferences	  and	  acceptances	  should	   form	  the	  central	  self.	   	  First	  because	  they	  are	  long-­‐lasting	   guides	   for	   action	   as	   they	   are	   well	   supported	   by	   reason.	   	   Second,	  attitudes	  that	  constitute	  the	  central	  self	  are	  defensible	  against	  external	  challenges;	  they	   are	   the	   attitudes	   that	   are	   entrenched	   in	   our	  minds	   over	   time.	   Third,	   those	  preferences	  are	  elements	  of	  one’s	  central	  self	  that	  we	  are	  at	  ease	  with	  owning	  and	  are	   ones	   we	   can	   act	   on	   wholeheartedly.	   	   Therefore,	   for	   Ekstrom,	   a	   person	   is	  autonomous	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  preferences	  “when	  they	  cohere	  with	  their	  other	  preferences	   and	   acceptances”	   (Ekstrom,	   1993,	   pp.	   611-­‐612)	   and	   thus	   can	   be	  recognized	  as	  members	  of	  their	  central	  self.	  	  The	  benefit	  of	  this	  contends	  Ekstrom	  is	  that	  when	  a	  person	  acts	  autonomously	  they	  will	  not	  only	  be	  able	  to	  give	  reasons	  for	  their	  actions	  but	  they	  will	  be	  acting	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  characteristic	  of	  them.	  	  It	   is	   by	   taking	   this	   approach	   that	   Ekstrom	   appears	   to	   successfully	   deal	  with	   the	  problem	  of	  deception.	  	  This	  is	  because	  Ekstrom	  requires	  that	  in	  order	  for	  a	  person	  to	   be	   viewed	   as	   being	   autonomous	   with	   regard	   to	   their	   preference	   it	   must	   be	  justifiable	   with	   regard	   to	   their	   core	   preferences.	   	   Core	   preferences	   on	   Ekstrom	  view	   are	   constitutive	   of	   the	   agent	   so	   therefore	   any	  deception	   in	   relation	   to	   core	  preferences	  would	  result	   in	  a	  new	  agent	  but	  not	   in	  a	   loss	  of	  autonomy.	   	  Ekstrom	  avoids	  the	  problem	  of	  deception	  by	  requiring	  that	  a	  preference	  originates	  with	  that	  person’s	   self	   in	   a	   particular	   and	   objective	  way.	   	   However	  where	   situations	   arise	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deceive	   is	   a	   person’s	   autonomy	   although	   perhaps	   unaffected	   perhaps	   fatally	   not	  respected?	  	  For	  example,	  a	  clinician	  proposes	  a	  treatment	  option	  to	  a	  patient	  that	  is	  both	   in	   the	   patient’s	   best	   interest	   and	   also	   in	   the	   best	   interests	   of	   the	   clinician,	  perhaps	   because	   it	   gives	   him	   some	   kind	   of	   financial	   reward	   or	   increased	   status.	  	  The	   clinician	   proposes	   the	   treatment	   predominantly	   because	   it	   is	   in	   his	   best	  interests	  rather	  than	  the	  patient’s.	  	  The	  patient	  consents	  to	  the	  treatment	  believing	  that	  it	  is	  in	  his	  best	  interests	  which	  conforms	  to	  his	  core	  preferences	  (and	  indeed	  it	  is	   in	   his	   best	   interests).	   	   Following	   Ekstom’s	   account	   the	   patient	   is	   surely	  autonomous	   they	   have	   after	   all	  made	   their	   decision	   based	   on	   the	   correct	   set	   of	  facts	   in	   line	  with	  their	  own	  freely	  adopted	  policy	  but	  still	   there	  seems	  something	  amiss.	  	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  because	  the	  hierarchical	  approach	  and	  the	  view	  that	  autonomy	  is	   exclusively	   a	   personal	   characteristic	   misses	   something	   important	   about	  autonomy.	  	  That	  autonomy	  is	  an	  internal	  process	  but	  that	  it	  does	  not	  operate	  in	  a	  vacuum.	   	  We	  must	  intuitively	  recognise	  that	  where	  autonomy	  is	  operating	  on	  the	  correct	  facts	  but	  is	  clearly	  not	  being	  respected	  it	  is	  in	  some	  way	  diminished	  by	  the	  deception	  that	  is	  going	  on.	  	  For	  this	  reason	  it	  may	  be	  that	  Ekstrom	  has	  successfully	  dealt	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  deception	  but	  not	  to	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  those	  who	  would	  use	  the	  model	  to	  help	  people	  assert	  their	  position	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  relationship.	  	  It	   is	   the	  same	  coherentist	  approach	   that	  also	  assists	  Ekstrom	   in	  dealing	  with	   the	  problems	   of	   regress	   and	   authority	   in	   that	   if	   a	   person	   is	   to	   be	   regarded	   as	  autonomous	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  particular	  preference	  that	  preference	  must	  originate	  from	  that	  person’s	  self	  in	  a	  particular,	  objective	  way.	  	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  Bratman’s	  approach	   in	   his	   reason-­‐based	   account	   of	   autonomy	   although	   he	   does	   not	   take	   a	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coherentist	  approach.	  	  That	  this	  problem	  may	  be	  solved	  by	  other	  approaches	  does	  not	  reduce	  the	  appeal	  of	  Ekstrom’s	  approach.	  	  However,	  it	  may	  be	  undermined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  provides	  insufficient	  conditions	  whereby	  a	  person	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  being	  autonomous	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  preferences.	  	  Consider	  our	  diligent	  soldier	  example	  once	  more.	  	  It	  could	  still	  be	  contended	  that	  there	  may	  be	  situations	  where	  a	  person	  who	  subjugates	  his	  will	  to	  a	  third	  party	  allows	  the	  will	  of	  that	  third	  party	  to	  cohere	  to	  the	  person’s	  ‘true	  or	  most	  central	  self’.	  	  This	  would	  then	  mean	  that	  any	  preferences	   they	   acted	   on	   would	   still	   for	   Ekstrom’s	   account	   be	   autonomous.	  	  However,	   the	   solidity	   of	  Ekstrom’s	   claim	  here	  would	   rely	   on	  our	   construction	  of	  autonomy	   and	   whether	   it	   be	   broad	   or	   narrow.	   	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   a	   narrow	  construction	   the	   property	   of	   autonomy	   could	   be	   said	   to	   apply	   to	   a	   person	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  desires	  and	  actions	   if	   they	  meet	  some	  criterion	  plus	  the	  negative	  criterion	   that	   they	   are	   not	   alienated	   from	   them.	   	   In	   this	   case	   although	  we	   could	  perhaps	  accept	  the	  claim	  that	  our	  soldier	  acts	  authentically	  he	  does	  not,	  as	  Ekstrom	  claims,	  act	  autonomously.	  	  However,	  on	  a	  broader	  construction	  where	  the	  property	  of	  autonomy	  could	  be	  said	  to	  be	  that	  a	  person	  is	  autonomous	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  desires	  if	  she	  is	  not	  alienated	  from	  them	  then,	  following	  Ekstrom,	  we	  could	  agree	  that	  the	  soldier	  is	  indeed	  acting	  autonomously.	  	  The	  debate	  here	  must	  be	  then	  on	  what	  construction	  of	  autonomy	  we	  adopt	  rather	  than	  the	  success	  or	  otherwise	  of	  Ekstrom’s	  solution	  to	  the	  hierarchical	  problem	  with	  deception.	  	  It	   would	   seem	   that	   the	   difficulties	   with	   regress	   and	   authority	   are	   more	   easily	  solved	   within	   the	   confines	   of	   viewing	   autonomy	   as	   a	   personal	   characteristic	   by	  refining	  what	  we	  understand	   to	   be	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   internal	   process.	   	   In	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contrast	   the	   problem	   with	   deception	   is	   more	   difficult	   to	   address.	   	   For	   the	  hierarchical	   model	   the	   difficulty	   with	   deception	   is	   that	   in	   order	   to	   retain	   the	  integrity	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   autonomy	   as	   a	   quality	   of	   person	   one	   must	   try	   and	  address	   the	   problem	   by	   refining	   the	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	   conditions	   of	   the	  internal	  process.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  deception	  could	  be	  easily	  solved	  by	  accepting	  that	  doing	  something,	  (that	  it	  to	  say	  having	  a	  desire),	  that	  is	  the	  result	  of	  deception	  is	  a	  bad	  reason	  for	  doing	  so,	  but	   this	  approach	  would	  require	  the	  admission	  that	  autonomy	   is	   not	   totally	   about	   the	   internal	   process	   but	   does	   also	   have	   some	  relational	  aspects	  to	   it.	   	   It	  also	  opens	  the	  door	  to	  metaphysical	  debates	  about	  the	  various	  merits	   of	   good	   or	   bad	   reasoning,	   something	  which	   Frankfurt	   and	   others	  have	  studiously	  tried	  to	  avoid.	  	  
Case	  studies	  At	  first	  instance	  the	  hierarchical	  model	  may	  be	  well	  be	  useful	  in	  that	  it	  gives	  us	  a	  clear	   reference	   point	   where	   we	   can	   examine	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   a	   patient’s	   is	  adequately	   respected,	   the	   moment	   when	   they	   choose	   to	   act	   and	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   that	   action	   is	  volitionally	   endorsed	   (Frankfurt,	   1971)	   and	   is	   procedurally	  independent	  (Dworkin,	  1988).	  	  The	  point	  at	  which	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  wish	  to	  examine	  this	   volitional	   endorsement	   and	   procedural	   independence	   is	   at	   the	   point	   of	  consent	  to	  treatment,	  after	  all,	  this	  is	  the	  point	  where	  a	  patient’s	  will	  directs	  them	  to	  act	  (or	  not)	  and	  is	  the	  moment	  where	  a	  transaction	  between	  the	  dentist	  and	  the	  patient	  occurs.	  	  This	  is	  useful	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  can	  be	  clear	  about	  what	  aspect	  of	  the	   relationship	   we	   need	   to	   concentrate	   on	   when	   we	   are	   concerned	   with	  respecting	  patients	   and	   indeed	   is	   reflective	  of	   the	  approach	   taken	   in	   the	  Redfern	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Report	   (DoH,	   2001).	   	   Further,	   the	   fact	   that	   we	   can	   focus	   in	   this	   way	   and	   the	  richness	   and	   functionality	   of	   Frankfurt’s	   account	   enables	   clinicians	   to	   identify	  situations	   where	   patients	   lack	   autonomy	   and	   prevents	   overburdening	   patients	  incapable	  of	   such	   reflection.	   	   In	   addition,	   as	  we	  are	   concerned	  with	  patients	   and	  the	   conditions	   and	   internal	   processes	   that	   relate	   to	   their	   action	  of	   choosing	   the	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  we	  are	  better	  able	  to	  draw	  limits	  around	  the	  duties	  owed	  by	  a	  clinician.	  This	   is	  because	  for	  the	  hierarchical	  models,	  a	  patient’s	  autonomy	  only	  relates	   to	   the	   action	   of	   choosing	   and	   therefore	   a	   clinician’s	   duty	   to	   promote	  autonomy	  (if	  we	  agree	  that	  is	  their	  duty)	  only	  needs	  to	  consider	  the	  medical	  choice	  at	   hand	   and	   how	   best	   to	   support	   the	   self-­‐determination	   of	   the	   patient	   through	  information	  giving	  to	  satisfy	  this	  account.	  	  By	  returning	  to	  our	  case	  studies	  there	  are	  two	  concerns	  that	  we	  may	  want	  to	  raise	  when	   relying	  on	   a	   hierarchical	   account	   of	   autonomy	   in	  dentistry.	   	   The	   first	   is	   to	  consider	  our	  concerns	  with	  deception	  and	  how	  the	  model	  struggles	  to	  theoretically	  account	  for	  this.	  	  The	  second	  concern	  that	  we	  will	  consider	  is	  more	  practical.	   	  We	  will	  consider	  how	  the	  reliance	  on	  information	  giving	  leads	  us	  to	  be	  overly	  focused	  on	   the	   medical	   transaction	   and	   may	   distract	   us	   from	   prioritising	   patients’	  concerns.	  	  Our	   first	   case	   concerned	   the	   use	   of	   cosmetic	   treatment	   alongside	   therapeutic.	  	  There	   were	   three	   main	   areas	   of	   concern	   to	   consider,	   first	   the	   difficulty	   in	   the	  transition	   between	   cosmetic	   and	   NHS	   treatment;	   second,	   the	   subjective	  assessment	  of	  clinical	  need,	  and;	  third,	  that	  a	  dentist	  might	  reasonably	  want	  to	  do	  something	  nice	  for	  a	  patient.	   	  These	  three	  areas	  of	  concern	  serve	  to	  highlight	  the	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risk	   that	   a	   patient	  may	  well	   be	   deceived	   as	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	  relationship	  when	   the	   treatment	  being	  discussed	   is	   cosmetic.	   	  The	  result	  may	  be	  that	  a	  patient	  fails	  to	  apportion	  the	  correct	  weight	  to	  any	  advice	  that	  a	  dentist	  may	  give	  believing	  that	  the	  driver	  of	  the	  dentist’s	  advice	  is	  the	  duty	  of	  care	  relationship.	  	  In	  reality	  the	  dentist	  might	  quite	  reasonably,	  be	  considering	  their	  own	  commercial	  interests	  as	  well	  as,	  or	  even	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  patient’s.	   	  The	  consequence	  of	  this	   is	   that	  the	  patient	   is	  deceived.	   	  To	  what	  extent	  can	  our	  hierarchical	  accounts	  explain	  our	  concerns?	  	  	  Following	  Frankfurt’s	   initial	  account	  it	  would	  be	  sufficient	  to	  say	  that	  our	  patient	  in	  the	  cosmetic	  dentistry	  setting	  is	  autonomous	  so	  long	  as	  the	  treatment	  decision	  they	  make	  is	  the	  result	  of	  an	  internal	  reflective	  process;	  they	  want	  their	  decision	  to	  be	  their	  desire	  and	  they	  want	  that	  desire	  to	  motivate	  them	  to	  act.	  	  However	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  Frankfurt’s	  account	  is	  a-­‐historical	  so	  we	  are	  not	  able	  to	  account	  for	  how	  the	   patient	   may	   have	   acquired	   that	   desire	   in	   the	   first	   place	   (here	   through	   the	  influence	  of	  the	  dentist	  and	  the	  dental	  setting).	  	  Clearly	  this	  account	  is	  insufficient	  for	  us	  to	  adequately	  address	  our	  concerns.	  	  	  Perhaps	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  express	  our	  concerns	  in	  terms	  of	   lack	  of	  procedural	  independence;	   that	   the	   patient	   has	   the	   required	   reflective	   capacity	   and	   has	  exercised	  it	  but	  there	  is	  something	  wrong	  with	  the	  way	  they	  initially	  acquired	  that	  desire	  (here	  undue	  influence	  from	  the	  dentist)?	  	  Dworkin	  explains	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  volitional	  endorsement	  (as	  describe	  by	  Frankfurt)	  plus	  procedural	   independence.	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despite	   an	   adequate	   reflective	   process,	   the	   initial	   desire	   was	   acquired	  illegitimately.	   	   After	   all,	   procedural	   independence	   cannot	   be	   said	   to	   exist	   if	   the	  patient’s	   desire	   to	   have	   cosmetic	   treatment	   is	   the	   result	   of	   some	   form	   of	  manipulation	  or	  deception.	  	  This	  appears	  to	  be,	  prima	  facie,	  an	  attractive	  prospect,	  we	  have	  an	  explicit	  theory	  of	  autonomy	  that	  enables	  us	  to	  draw	  limits	  and	  detect	  where	   it	   is	   present	   plus	   we	   are	   attempting	   to	   account	   for	   (unlike	   Frankfurt’s	  account)	  circumstances	  where	  that	  autonomy	  is	  reduced	  or	  frustrated.	   	  However,	  in	   order	   for	   this	   construction	   to	   be	   useful	   it	   must	   be	   sufficiently	   theoretically	  sound	   for	   us	   to	   identify	   those	   situations	   where	   the	   issue	   of	   lack	   of	   procedural	  independence	  is	  clearly	  identifiable.	  	  According	  to	  Dworkin’s	  (1988)	  account	  this	  is	  merely	   a	   statement	   of	   fact.	   	   Dworkin	   simply	   rules	   ex	   cathedra	   that	   autonomy	  cannot	  exist	  where	  procedural	   independence	  is	  absent.	   	  This	  is	   insufficient	  for	  us	  to	   rely	   on	   in	   practical	   model.	   	   It	   is	   inadequate	   for	   us	   to	   say	   that	   a	   patient’s	  autonomy	  is	  adversely	  affected	  simply	  because	  we	  intuitively	  believe	  that	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  	  We	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  identify	  more	  clearly	  those	  instances	  where	  deception	  occurs	   from	   those	   instances	   that	   might	   better	   be	   described	   as,	   for	   example,	  education.	   	   Although	  we	   are	   close	   to	   a	   suitable	  model,	   Dworkin’s	   account	   is	   too	  vague	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  deception	  for	  our	  purposes.	  	  As	   we	   have	   seen	   there	   have	   been	   various	   attempts	   to	   address	   the	   issue	   of	  deception	   in	   a	   hierarchical	   context.	   	   Christman	   (1993)	   attempt	   to	   address	   this	  issue	  by	  using	  an	  historical	  approach.	  	  A	  patient	  can	  still	  be	  viewed	  as	  autonomous	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  desire	  should	  they	  come	  round	  to	  the	  dentist’s	  way	  on	  thinking	  in	  the	  end,	  despite	  having	  made	  the	  initial	  choice	  against	  their	  better	  judgement	  by	  
118	  	  
relying	  on	  the	  perceived	  expertise	  of	  the	  dentist.	  	  This	  again	  seems	  problematic,	  it	  is	   hard	   to	   ethically	   justify,	   especially	   through	   the	   use	   of	   autonomy,	   a	   situation	  where	  so	  long	  as	  the	  patient	  eventually	  sees	  things	  from	  the	  dentist’s	  perspective	  he	  is	  autonomous	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  clinical	  consent	  he	  gave	  that,	  at	  the	  time,	  was	  against	   his	   better	   judgement.	   	   Bratman’s	   (2000)	   approach	   similarly	   does	   not	  adequately	  defend	  against	  our	  concerns	  with	  deception	  in	  relation	  to	  our	  case.	  	  For	  Bratman,	   our	   patient	   would	   be	   autonomous	   in	   relation	   to	   their	   consent	   if	   they	  viewed	  it	  as	  ‘reason	  giving’.	  	  Bratman’s	  account	  again	  is	  problematic	  if	  the	  patient	  is	  not	  only	  persuaded	  into	  having	  a	  desire	  for	  straighter	  teeth	  but	  also	  accepts	  that	  desire	  as	  their	  own.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  patient	  treats	  their	  desire	  as	  reason	  giving	  (in	   the	   sense	   of	   end-­‐setting)	   and	   this	   desire	   does	   not	   conflict	   with	   their	   other	  desires	   as	   they	   (the	  patient)	  have	  yet	   to	   form	  an	  opinion	  on	  desires	   acquired	  as	  part	   of	   the	   clinical	   process.	   	   Just	   as	   this	   account	   would	   satisfy	   Frankfurt’s	  construction	  so	  too	  does	  it	  satisfy	  Bratman	  and	  fails	  to	  adequately	  defend	  against	  deception.	  	  At	  first	   instance	  Ekstrom’s	  (1993)	  proposal	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  solution.	   	  A	  patient	  could	   be	   viewed	   as	   not	   autonomous	   in	   relation	   to	   their	   consents	   where	   their	  preferences	  do	  not	  form	  part	  of	  and	  cohere	  with	  their	  true	  inner	  self;	  the	  self	  that	  marks	   out	   ones	   character.	   	   Preferences	   acquired	   through	   the	   persuasion	   of	   the	  dentist	  which	  do	  not	  form	  part	  of	  the	  inner	  self	  will	  not	  cohere	  with	  one’s	  overall	  character	  and	  for	  that	  reason	  cannot	  legitimately	  motivate	  one	  to	  act	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  characteristic	  (and	  therefore	  legitimate).	  	  However,	  for	  our	  purposes	  there	  is	   a	   fatal	   flaw	   that	   may	   concern	   us	   in	   a	   professional	   context.	   	   What	   Ekstrom’s	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theory	   cannot	   account	   for	   is	   where	   a	   patient’s	   internal	   and	   characteristic	  preferences	  serendipitously	  coincide	  with	  the	  dentist’s	  persuasion.	   	  This	  ought	  to	  concern	  us.	  	  It	  seems	  counter-­‐intuitive	  to	  regard	  a	  patient	  as	  acting	  autonomously	  and	   therefore	   conclude	   the	   dentist	   is	   respecting	   them	   when	   the	   clinician	   has	  persuaded	  the	  patient	  to	  consent	  to	  a	  treatment	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  (the	  dentist’s)	  self	  interest	  rather	  than	  the	  patient’s	  best	  interests.	   	  We	  must	  feel	  that	  a	  clinician	  ought	  not	   to	  be	   able	   to	  make	   the	   claim	   that	   they	   adequately	   respected	   a	  patient	  where,	   by	   sheer	   chance,	   their	   interests	   coincide	   but	   the	   dentist	   is	  motivated	   by	  something	  other	   than	  the	   interests	  of	   the	  patient.	   	  For	   this	  reason	   it	  would	  seem	  that	  the	  hierarchical	  accounts	  of	  autonomy	  fail	  to	  adequately	  address	  our	  concerns	  with	  deception.	  	  This	  leads	  us	  on	  to	  consider	  our	  second	  concern	  in	  the	  practical	  application	  of	  the	  hierarchical	  model.	  	  The	  use	  and	  claims	  made	  around	  information.	  	  This	  is	  perhaps	  best	  exemplified	  by	  our	  concern	  about	  the	  use	  of	  NHS	  and	  private	  practice	  in	  the	  same	  appointment	  as	  well	  as	  our	  concerns	  about	  the	  use	  of	  skill	  mix	  and	  a	  patient’s	  objections	  to	  it.	  	  Our	  concerns	  with	  those	  cases	  related	  to	  information	  that	  was	  not	  directly	   linked	   to	   the	   treatment	   in	   hand	   and	   potentially	   had	   no	   bearing	   on	   the	  success	  of	  the	  treatment	  but	  was	  of	  personal	  significance	  to	  the	  patient	  (here	  the	  eventual	  cost	  of	  the	  treatment	  in	  the	  NHS	  and	  private	  example	  and	  the	  status	  of	  the	  clinician	   in	   the	   skill	  mix	   example).	   	   The	   hierarchical	  models	   rely	   heavily	   on	   the	  
action	  of	  choosing	  to	  give	  us	  an	  adequate	  account	  of	  autonomy.	  	  	  This,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  has	  been	  interpreted	  and	  applied	  in	  the	  clinical	  context	  through	  the	  reliance	  on	  patient	   consent.	   	   The	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	   2001)	   goes	   further	   and	   augments	  
120	  	  
consent	  taking	  to	  mean	  a	  fully	  informed	  consent	  in	  response	  to	  concerns	  about	  the	  manner	   in	   which	   we	   respect	   patients.	   	   ‘Fully	   informed’	   however	   relates	   to	   the	  choice	   in	   front	  of	   the	  patient,	   that	   is	   to	  say,	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  opt	   for	  the	  clinical	  treatment	  on	  offer.	   	  A	  patient	  may	  well	  make	  a	  fully	  reflective	  decision	  about	  the	  treatment	   proposed	   and	   therefore	   for	   our	   purposes	   is	   autonomous	   and	   self-­‐determining.	   	   However	   this	  may	   fail	   to	   capture	   something	   of	   importance	   to	   the	  patient.	  	  Consider	  our	  NHS	  and	  private	  treatment	  examples	  and	  the	  use	  of	  skill	  mix.	  	  Neither	   of	   the	   concerns	  we	   raise	   in	   relation	   to	   these	   case	   studies	   relates	   to	   the	  direct	  medical	  choices	  the	  patient	  is	  faced	  with.	  	  In	  the	  NHS	  and	  private	  treatment	  the	  patient	  may	  well	  have	  consented	  to	  the	  treatment	  anyway	  but	  feels	  aggrieved	  the	  costs	  were	  not	  made	  clear	  from	  the	  start.	  	  In	  the	  skill	  mix	  case	  study	  the	  patient	  may	   well	   have	   got	   the	   treatment	   they	   wanted	   and	   needed	   and	   have	   readily	  consented	   to	   the	   treatment	   fully	   cognisant	  of	   the	   facts,	   none	   the	   less	   the	  patient	  feels	  deceived.	  	  This	  leads	  us	  to	  a	  practical	  concern	  about	  the	  hierarchical	  accounts.	  	  As	  the	  hierarchical	  account	  relies	  on	  the	  action	  of	  choosing	  it	  leads	  us	  to	  focus	  on	  what	  we	  perceive	  to	  be	  the	  choice	  in	  question;	  consenting	  to	  or	  declining	  consent	  for	  treatment.	  	  The	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  a	  very	  medicalized	  perspective	  on	  what	  might	   be	   necessary	   in	   order	   for	   a	   patient	   to	   make	   a	   reflective	   and	   therefore	  autonomous	   decision.	   	   As	   it	   is	   dependent	   on	   the	   clinician	   to	   provide	   the	  information	  in	  order	  that	  a	  patient’s	  preferences	  may	  be	  ordered	  and	  expressed,	  it	  naturally	   leads	   to	   the	   clinician	   prioritising	   what	   information	   is	   material	   to	   the	  decision	  before	  the	  patient	  (i.e.	  the	  treatment	  on	  offer).	  	  This	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  a	  very	  medicalized	   conception	   of	  what	   being	   ‘fully	   informed’	  means.	   	   The	  danger	   being	  that	   in	   a	   clinical	   context	  we	   consider	  we	  have	   respected	   the	  patient	   by	   enabling	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them	   to	   determine	   their	   own	   treatment	   choices	   but	   have	   failed	   to	   prioritise	  matters	   of	   importance	   to	   the	   patient	   such	   as,	   in	   our	   case	   study	   examples,	   the	  eventual	  cost	  of	  the	  treatment	  and	  the	  status	  clinician	  treating	  them.	   	  In	  fact,	  this	  information	  in	  relation	  to	  cost	  or	  clinical	  role	  may	  not	  be	  material	  to	  the	  patient’s	  decision	  making	   either	   but	   despite	   this	   the	   patient	   feels	   less	   respected	   by	   being	  kept	   in	   the	   dark.	   	   It	   seems	   difficult	   to	   satisfactorily	   claim	   that	   a	   patient	   has	   had	  their	  autonomy	  respected	  by	  giving	  them	  a	  choice	  over	  their	  treatment	  options	  but	  failing	   to	   recognise	   other	  matters	   of	   importance	   to	   them.	   	   This	  might	   lead	   us	   to	  consider	   that	   although	   the	   hierarchical	   accounts	   give	   a	   clear	   attempt	   at	   what	   it	  might	  mean	  to	  be	  autonomous	  they	  fall	  short	  of	  helping	  us	  respect	  autonomy.	  	  
Conclusions	  The	   hierarchical	   model	   has	   much	   to	   commend	   it.	   	   It	   makes	   a	   significant	  contribution	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   concept	   and	   gives	   a	   structure	   to	   our	  intuitions	  and	  beliefs	  about	   independence	  of	   thought	  and	  self-­‐determination	  and	  the	   distinction	   that	   we	   draw	   between	   ourselves	   and	   the	   animal	   kingdom.	  	  However,	   its	   application	   beyond	   the	   sense	   of	   individual	   analysis	   is	   problematic.	  	  Whilst	   ever	   the	   hierarchical	   model	   helps	   us	   analyse	   what	   may	   constitute	   an	  autonomous	  desire	  for	  the	  individual	  it	  has	  difficulty	  defending	  that	  process	  in	  the	  context	   of	   a	   relationship	   with	   others.	   	   This	   is	   a	   serious	   flaw.	   	   For	   a	   model	   of	  autonomy	  to	  be	  practically	  applicable	  it	  must	  be	  able	  to	  deal	  with	  situations	  where	  a	   person’s	   autonomy	   is	   under	   threat	   from	   outside	   influence	   and	   enable	   us	   to	  distinguish	  between	  situations	  where	  a	  person	  may	  have	  acquired	  views	  through	  an	  educative	  process	  from	  those	  where	  deception	  has	  occurred.	   	  The	  model	  must	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be	   capable	   of	   identifying	   difficulties	  with	   deception	   even	  when	   distant	   from	   the	  situation	  the	  individual	  currently	  finds	  themselves	  in.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  there	  is	  a	  divergence	  in	  what	  we	  need	  from	  our	  model	  of	  autonomy	  in	  order	   that	   it	   can	   adequately	   address	   the	  matters	   that	   concern	   us.	   	  We	   certainly	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  account	  for	  and	  identify	  situations	  where	  deception	  occurs.	  	  The	  hierarchical	  model	   is	  effective	  at	  helping	  us	  do	   that	  because	  we	  are	  able	   to	   trace	  the	   authority	   of	   action	   from	   first	   and	   second-­‐order	   preferences	   to	   culminate	   in	  volitional	   endorsement	   of	   that	   act.	   	   This	   enables	   us	   to	   comprehend	   the	  problem	  with	  deceit	  not	  simply	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  outcome	  was	  what	  the	  patient	  wanted	  but	   rather	   on	   the	   more	   subtle	   basis	   that	   it	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	   desire	   the	   same	  outcome,	   a	  patient	  must	  be	   free	   to	   come	  and	   to	  move	   towards	   that	  end	  on	   their	  own	  account	  in	  order	  that	  their	  autonomy	  be	  preserved.	  	  Deception	  seems	  more	  difficult	  to	  address	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  one	  of	  the	  features	  of	  deception	   is	   that	   (here	   the	  patient)	  we	  acquire	   the	  desire	  at	   some	   level	   to	  act	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  manipulators	  agenda.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  deception	  where	  we	  find	   ourselves	   acting	   on	   a	   falsely	   based	   premise	   and	   that	   way	   our	   choices	   and	  therefore	  autonomy	  are	  impeded	  externally.	  	  Deception	  is	  problematic	  because	  we	  adopt	   the	   desires	   to	   act	   in	   a	   certain	  manner	   and	   therefore	   the	   deception	   occurs	  internally.	  	  It	  is	  hard	  therefore	  for	  a	  model	  of	  autonomy	  to	  account	  for	  our	  acting	  in	  a	  way	  that	  after	  all	  forms	  part	  of	  our	  set	  of	  desires	  even	  if	  we	  might	  be	  concerned	  as	   to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   we	   acquired	   them.	   	   We	   have	   seen	   various	   attempts	   to	  account	   for	   the	   problem	   with	   deception	   but	   none	   have	   been	   able	   to	   account	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successfully	   for	   our	   difficulties.	   	   It	   seems	   as	  we	   have	   discussed	   earlier	   that	   this	  relates	  to	  the	  hierarchical	  model’s	  individualistic	  approach.	   	  Indeed	  the	  two	  main	  criticisms	   of	   autonomy	   as	   a	   principle	   from	  both	   feminist	   and	   communitarians	   is	  that	  it	   is	  too	  narrowly	  atomistic	  and	  second	  that	  a	  narrow	  concern	  with	  patient’s	  rights	   neglects	   social	   dimensions	   of	   healthcare.	   	   Communitarian’s	   for	   example	  argue	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘self’	  that	  has	  developed	  since	  Kant	  is	  one	  that	  views	  the	  self	  as	   cut	   off	   from	   others	   (Kuczewski	   2000),	   lacking	   in	   its	   appreciation	   of	   social	  dimensions	  of	  identity.	  	  	  “The	  Communitarian	  view	  of	  the	  person	  sees	  the	  self	  as	  constituted	  by	   social	   roles,	   communal	   practices,	   and	   shared	   deliberative	  exchanges	  .”(Kuczewski,	  2000,	  p.182)	  	  Similarly,	   feminist	   writers	   such	   as	   Carol	   Gilligan	   and	   Virginia	   Held	   have	   argued	  that	  the	  dominant	  understanding	  of	  ‘self’	  is	  based	  in	  autonomy	  and	  furthermore	  is	  a	   masculine	   conception,	   while	   feminine	   paradigms	   emphasize	   relationships	  (Gudorf,	   1994).	   	   Susan	   Wolf	   describes	   this	   feminist	   critique	   of	   contemporary	  bioethics	   as	   related	   to	   liberal	   individualism:	   	   Feminism,	   states	  Wolf,	   often	   views	  liberal	   individualism	  as	   impoverished,	  encouraging	  disregard	  of	  relational	  bonds.	  	  Thus,	  states	  Wolf,	  “[T]here	   is	   some	   overlap	   between	   non-­‐feminist	   communitarian	  critiques	   of	   autonomy	   in	   bioethics	   and	   feminist	   cautions	   against	  mistaking	  autonomy’s	  sufficiency.”	  (Wolf,	  1996,	  p.17)	  	  John	  Hardwig,	  responding	  to	  these	  criticisms,	  argues	  that	  the	  paradigm	  of	  medical	  decision	  making	  should	  be	  shifted	  away	  from	  one	  that	  places	  sole	  locus	  of	  medical	  decision	   making	   on	   an	   individual’s	   values	   and	   rights	   toward	   a	   paradigm	   that	  incorporates	   the	   values	   of	   the	   family	   and	   others	   whose	   interests	   are	   affected.	  	  Hardwig	  states:	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“I	   am	  a	  husband,	  a	   father,	   and	  still	   a	   son,	  and	  no	  one	  would	  argue	   that	   I	  should	  or	  even	  responsibly	  could	  take	  a	  sabbatical,	  another	  job	  or	  even	  a	  weekend	   trip	   solely	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   what	   I	   want	   for	   myself.”	   (Hardwig,	  1990,	  p.8)	  	  These	   are	   very	   plausible	   criticisms	   of	   autonomy	   and	  we	   have	   already	   seen	   that	  there	  are	  problems	  with	  the	  individualistic	  nature	  of	  the	  notion,	  in	  that	  autonomy	  finds	   it	   difficult	   to	   account	   for	   challenges	   that	   fall	   outside	   that	   individualised	  sphere.	  	  However	  we	  must	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  more	  relational	  approach	  that	  lent	   less	   emphasis	   to	   autonomy	   and	   the	   right	   or	   desire	   of	   oneself	   to	   be	   self	  governing	  would	  go	  any	  way	  to	  addressing	  the	  matters	  raised	  by	  our	  case	  studies	  and	  in	  particular	  our	  concerns	  with	  manipulation	  and	  deception.	  	  Could	  it	  be	  that	  these	   two	  concerns	  could	  be	  better	  addressed	  by	  a	  model	   that	  depended	   less	  on	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  individualised	  voice,	  that	  they	  are	  legitimate	  parts	  of	  a	  clinical	  relationship	   as	   long	   as	   they	   are	   tempered	   by	   other	   principles	   such	   as	   best	  interests?	  	  Or	  indeed	  that	  autonomy	  still	  has	  a	  role	  to	  play	  but	  may	  not	  be	  the	  only	  principle	   to	   which	   we	   appeal?	   	   For	   that	   reason	   I	   will	   now	   turn	   to	   consider	   the	  concept	  of	  best	  interests.	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Chapter	  Four	  –	  Best	  Interests	  and	  Paternalism	  
We	  have	  considered	  in	  Chapter	  Three	  both	  the	  benefits	  and	  some	  of	  our	  concerns	  with	   the	   hierarchical	   account	   of	   autonomy.	   	   As	   we	   have	   seen	   the	   hierarchical	  accounts	  go	  some	  way	  to	  helping	  us	  give	  due	  ethical	  weight	  to	  the	  individual	  as	  it	  has	  a	  strong	  individualistic	  component.	   	  The	  hierarchical	  account	  also	  helps	  us	  to	  draw	   limits	   round	  our	  duty	   to	   respect	  patients	   through	   the	   lens	  of	   autonomy	  by	  defining	   occasions	   where	   autonomy	   is	   absent.	   	   However,	   we	   have	   also	   raised	  concerns.	   	  Our	   two	  most	  prominent	  concerns	  relate	   to	   the	   theoretical	  difficulties	  with	   defending	   against	   deception	   and,	   from	   a	   more	   practical	   perspective,	   the	  overly	  medicalized	  approach	  that	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  relying	  on	  a	  construction	  of	  autonomy	  that	  is	  based	  on	  the	  action	  of	  choosing	  causing	  us	  to	  lose	  sight	  of	  other	  matters	  of	  concern	  to	  the	  patient.	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  we	  will	  consider	   if	  an	  alternative	  way	  of	  considering	  the	  patient’s	  interests	   might	   in	   fact	   be	   more	   appropriate	   from	   both	   an	   ethical	   and	   practical	  perspective.	  	  By	  considering	  what	  is	  in	  the	  patient’s	  best	  interests	  perhaps	  we	  can	  widen	  the	  area	  that	  is	  of	  concern	  and	  not	  attempt	  to	  discharge	  our	  ethical	  duty	  to	  the	  patient	  largely	  through	  the	  consent	  process.	  	  	  I	  will	  consider	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  concept	   of	   best	   interest	   might	   address	   the	   concerns	   in	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	  relationship	  we	  have	   raised	   earlier.	   	   This	   concept	  will	   be	   considered	  both	  on	   its	  own	  merits	  as	  well	   as	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   it	  might	  be	   compatible	  with	  a	  weaker	  account	  of	  autonomy.	  	  By	  using	  and	  relying	  on	  two	  principles	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  address	   some	   of	   the	   concerns	   raised	   in	   chapter	   three	   in	   relation	   to	   hierarchical	  accounts	   whilst	   maintain	   the	   attraction	   to	   individualized	   way	   of	   respecting	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patients	   and	   their	   right	   or	   ability	   to	  be	   self-­‐determining.	   	   In	   order	   to	   assess	   this	  effectively	  we	  will	   first	  consider	  the	  roots	  of	  paternalism	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  best	  interests	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  principle	  of	  beneficence.	  	  We	  will	  then	  go	  on	  to	  consider	  the	  link	  between	  beneficence	  and	  paternalism	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  merits	  of	  how	  paternalism	  operates.	  	  We	  will	  consider	  various	  interpretations	  of	  paternalism	  and	  the	   extent	   to	  which	   differing	   accounts	  may	   go	   some	  way	   to	   helping	   us	  with	   the	  concerns	   raised	   in	   preceding	   chapter.	   	   Finally	   we	   will	   review	   the	   possibility	   of	  paternalism	  being	  used	   in	   a	   complementary	  manner	   to	  moderate	  our	   account	  of	  autonomy	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  that	  is	  successful.	  	  Paternalism	  has	  a	   long	  established	  history	  as	  a	  moral	  point	   for	   reference	   for	   the	  doctor-­‐patient	   relationship,	   starting	   with	   the	   religio-­‐scientific	   cult	   of	  Pythagoreanism	  and	  the	  Hippocratic	  Oath	  to	  the	  present	  day	  where	  clinicians	  still	  commit	  to	  a	  version	  of	  that	  Oath.	  	  In	  more	  recent	  times	  however,	  paternalism	  has	  been	   subject	   to	   criticism.	   	   Changes	   in	   patient	   expectations,	   a	   culture	   of	   patient	  rights	   and	   a	   move	   to	   greater	   patient	   autonomy	   have	   brought	   challenges	   to	   the	  medical	   profession	   and	  prompted	   a	   re-­‐evaluation	   of	   the	  paternalistic	   position	   of	  clinicians.	  	  We	  will	  first	  consider	  whether	  or	  not	  paternalism	  can	  continue	  to	  offer	  a	   complete	   moral	   rationale	   for	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship.	   	   In	   order	   to	   go	  some	  way	  towards	  answering	  this	  question,	  this	  discussion	  will	  trace	  the	  roots	  of	  paternalism	  through	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  beneficence	  that	  provides	  paternalism’s	  moral	  underpinning	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  various	  models	  of	  paternalism	  and	   their	   deficiencies	   and	   benefits	   ending	   with	   a	   conclusion	   as	   to	   the	   value	   of	  paternalism	  in	  the	  clinician-­‐patient	  relationship.	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  Since	   paternalism	   is	   at	   its	   simplest,	   defined	   as	   benefiting	   others	   against	   their	  wishes	   choices	   and	   actions	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   first	   consider	   the	   principle	   of	  beneficence	   that	   generates	   paternalism	   and	   provides	   its	   moral	   rationale.	   	   It	   is	  hoped	  by	  doing	   this	   that	  we	  can	  not	  only	  establish	   the	   link	  between	  paternalism	  and	  beneficence	  but	   also	  by	   increasing	  our	  understanding	  of	  beneficence	  and	   its	  deficiencies	   it	  will	   give	  us	  greater	   insight	   into	   the	  various	  models	  of	  paternalism	  later	  on	  in	  this	  discussion.	  	  
Beneficence	  In	  the	  vernacular	  the	  term	  beneficence	  is	  associated	  with	  acts	  of	  mercy,	  kindness	  and	  charity.	  	  The	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  defines	  beneficence	  as	  “the	  act	  of	  doing	  kindness;	  a	  charitable	  act	  or	  gift”	  (OED,	  2005).	  	  This	  is	  a	  rather	  narrow	  definition	  of	  beneficence	  and	  relates	  only	  to	  one	  aspect	  of	  the	  principle,	  the	  act	  of	  doing	  good.	  	  There	   are,	   however,	   for	   our	   purposes	   both	   broad	   and	   narrow	   definitions	   of	  beneficence.	   	  How	  do	  we	   then	  define	  beneficence?	   	  Our	  starting	  point	  could	  be	  a	  quote	  from	  Alison	  Luthrie’s	  character	  in	  The	  War	  between	  the	  Tates:	  “I	  was	  less	  morally	  ambitious	  than	  you;	  I	  didn’t	  aspire	  to	  do	  good.	  	  I	  only	  wanted	  to	  do	  no	  harm.”(Luthrie,	  1975,	  p.271)	  	  Commonly,	   we	   intuitively	   distinguish	   between	   doing	   good	   and	   not	   doing	   harm.	  	  Philosophers	  use	  beneficence	  to	  refer	  to	  doing	  good	  and	  non-­‐maleficence	  to	  refer	  to	   not	   doing	   harm.	   	   However,	   a	   broad	   definition	   of	   beneficence	   actually	  incorporates	   the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐maleficence.	   	  There	   is	   some	  warrant	   to	  do	   this	  because	  anyone	  who	  is	  said	  to	  be	  acting	  beneficently	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense;	  acting	  to	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promote	  good,	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  have	  discharged	  their	  beneficent	  duty	  if	  they	  have	  violated	  the	  duty	  of	  non-­‐maleficence	  (Frankena,	  1973).	  	  The	  case	  could	  however	  be	  made	   for	   a	   narrower	   definition	   where	   a	   necessary	   distinction	   is	   made	   between	  beneficence,	  and	  non-­‐maleficence.	  	  Beneficent	  euthanasia	  is	  an	  example	  of	  this,	  in	  that	  if	  death	  is	  always	  a	  harm	  (there	  could	  be	  some	  debate	  as	  to	  whether	  this	  is	  the	  case)	  does	   the	  benefits	   of	   elimination	  of	   pain	   and	   suffering	  outweigh	   this	   harm?	  	  Clearly	   a	   narrow	   definition	   might	   be	   useful	   where	   the	   two	   principles	   conflict	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  same	  person.	  	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  our	  understanding	  of	  paternalism	  however,	  a	  broader	  definition	  may	  be	  a	  more	  attractive	  proposition.	  	  This	   is	   because	  we	   are	   not	   trying	   to	   attribute	   or	  mediate	   between	   the	  merits	   of	  various	   possible	   acts	   but	   rather	   have	   a	   broader	   understanding	   of	  what	   duties	   a	  doctor	   might	   owe	   to	   a	   patient	   by	   relying	   on	   that	   principle	   via	   a	   model	   of	  paternalism.	   	  If	  we	  therefore	  accept	  that	  in	  order	  for	  a	  doctor	  to	  have	  discharged	  his	   duty	   of	   beneficence	   toward	   a	   patient	   he	   must	   also	   act	   non-­‐maleficently	   a	  broader	   definition	   incorporating	   both	   the	   requirement	   to	   do	   no	   harm	   (non-­‐maleficence)	  and	  the	  requirement	  to	  positively	  promote	  good	  (beneficence)	  seems	  the	  most	  morally	   robust.	   	   This	   is	   particularly	   the	   case	   as	   a	   narrow	   definition	   of	  beneficence	  relies	  only	  on	  the	  requirement	   to	  positively	  promote	  good	  and	  not	  a	  requirement	  to	  do	  no	  harm.	  	  Whether	  we	  adopt	  a	  broad	  or	  narrow	  definition	  of	  beneficence	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  examine	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  duties	  or	  obligations	  arising	  from	  such	  a	  principle.	   	  If	  our	   model	   of	   paternalism	   relies	   on	   the	   principle	   of	   beneficence,	   what	   does	   it	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require	  of	  a	  physician	  in	  order	  that	  he	  or	  she	  may	  claim	  to	  have	  discharged	  their	  duty?	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  what	  are	  the	  limits	  to	  the	  obligation	  to	  act	  beneficently?	  Following	  a	  broad	  definition,	  Frankena	  distinguishes	  four	  elements:	  “(1)	  One	  ought	  not	  to	  inflict	  evil	  or	  harm	  (what	  is	  bad);	  (2)	  One	  ought	  to	  prevent	  evil	  or	  harm;	  	  (3)	  One	  ought	  to	  remove	  evil,	  and;	  (4)	  One	  ought	  to	  do	  or	  promote	  good.”	  (Frankena,	  1973,	  p.47)	  	  Frankena	  arranged	  these	  elements	  in	  order	  of	  priority	  stating	  that	  the	  last	  may	  be	  an	   ideal	   rather	   than	   an	   obligation.	   	   Although	   not	   explicit	   Frankena	   has	  distinguished	  between	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  do	  no	  harm	  (point	  1)	  and	  a	  requirement	  to	  positively	  act.	   	  Frankena	  admits	   to	  considering	  point	  (1)	  as	  an	  absolute	  duty	  and	  the	   further	   points	   as	   those	   actions	   that	   might	   be	   required	   of	   us	   in	   certain	  circumstances	  (points	  2-­‐4).	  	  Following	  Frankena’s	  definition	  then	  for	  an	  individual	  to	  describe	  themselves	  as	  acting	  beneficently	  it	  would	  be	  sufficient	  for	  them	  to	  do	  no	   harm	   with	   acts	   positively	   promoting	   good	   being	   only	   an	   ideal	   not	   a	  requirement.	   	  The	  requirement	  on	  an	  individual	  to	  actively	  promote	  good	  then	  is	  quite	  weak.	  	  Childress	   (1982)	   taking	   Frankena’s	   definition	   categorises	   these	   elements	   of	  beneficence	  further	  dividing	  them	  more	  explicitly	  into	  two	  categories:	  “Non-­‐maleficence:	   1.	  One	  ought	  not	  to	  inflict	  evil	  or	  harm	  (what	  is	  bad)	  	  	  Beneficence:	  	   2.	  One	  ought	  to	  prevent	  evil	  or	  harm	  	   	   	   	   3.	  One	  ought	  to	  remove	  evil	  	   	   	   	   4.	  One	  ought	  to	  do	  or	  promote	  good.”	  	  	  (Childress,	  1982,	  p.29)	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Beneficence	   then	   for	   both	   Childress	   and	   Frankena	   is	   a	   combination	   of	   both	   a	  strong	  duty	  to	  do	  no	  harm	  and	  a	  weaker	  requirement	  to	  positively	  promote	  good.	  	  For	   our	   purposes	   in	   that	  we	   are	   principally	   interested	   in	  medical	   paternalism	   it	  seems	  that	  the	  weaker	  requirement	  might	  need	  further	  clarification.	  	  Are	  there	  any	  occasions	  where	  a	  requirement	  to	  actively	  promote	  good	  might	  be	  stronger?	  	  What	  limits	  might	  there	  be	  to	  this	  requirement?	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  toward	  whom	  and	  under	  what	   conditions	   does	   an	   agent	   owe	   a	   duty	   of	   beneficence	   rather	   than	   an	   ideal?	  	  This	   is	   particularly	   important	   in	   that	   if	   paternalism	   relies	   on	   the	   principle	   of	  beneficence	  as	   its	  rationale	  and	  one	  wishes	  to	   invoke	  paternalism	  as	  a	   justifiable	  model	  of	  behaviour	  one	  must	  be	  aware	  of	   the	   limits	  of	  beneficence.	   	  Perhaps	  the	  answer	  lies	  in	  the	  relational	  aspect	  of	  the	  clinician-­‐patient	  relationship?	  	  It	   is	   reasonable	   to	   assert	   that	   our	   duty	   of	   beneficence	   presupposes	   roles	   and	  relationships.	   Mill	   (1859,	   pp.304-­‐306)	   noted	   that	   the	   duty	   of	   beneficence	   is	   an	  imperfect	  duty	  because	  we	  are	   free	   to	  practice	   it	   toward	  various	   individuals;	  we	  have	  discretion	  in	  its	  application	  because	  no	  other	  party	  has	  a	  correlative	  right	  to	  it.	   	   Nevertheless,	   some	   philosophers	   have	   argued	   that	   there	   is	   an	   obligation	   of	  beneficence	   to	   specific	   individuals	   in	   certain	   circumstances.	   	   D’Arcy	   for	   example	  describes	  it	  as:	  “A	  has	  a	  duty	  of	  beneficence	  to	  do	  X	  for	  P	  when:	  1. When	  P	   is	   at	   risk	   of	   significant	   loss	   or	   damage	   (such	   as	   severe	  injury	  or	  death);	  2. When	  A’s	  action	  is	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  this	  loss	  or	  damage;	  3. When	  A’s	  actions	  would	  probably	  prevent	  it;	  4. When	  the	  likely	  harms	  to	  A	  are	  minimal;	  5. When	  the	  benefit	   that	  P	  will	  probably	  gain	  outweighs	   the	   likely	  harm	  to	  A.”	  	  (D’Arcy,	  1963,	  pp.56-­‐57)	  	  
131	  	  
It	  is	  these	  conditions,	  according	  to	  D’Arcy	  (1963)	  that	  remove	  A’s	  discretion	  about	  acting	   beneficently	   toward	   P.	   	   This	   then	   gives	   a	   further	   interpretation	   to	   the	  definition	   to	   the	   principle	   of	   beneficence.	   	   Following	   a	   broad	   definition	   of	  beneficence	  the	  requirement	  to	  positively	  promote	  good	  is	  somewhat	  weaker	  than	  the	  duty	  to	  do	  no	  harm	  therefore	  in	  a	  basic	  or	  general	  sense	  even	  if	  one	  is	  relying	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  beneficence	  to	  justify	  the	  morality	  of	  their	  act	  they	  may	  be	  able	  to	   do	   so	   at	   different	   levels.	   	   Generally,	   to	   realise	   a	   level	   of	   beneficence	   that	  incorporates	  the	  act	  of	  positively	  promoting	  good	  may	  be	  praiseworthy	  but	  to	  fail	  to	  do	  so	  would	  not	  give	  rise	  to	  blame.	  	  However,	  there	  may	  be	  certain	  occasions	  or	  relationships	  where	   the	   ideal	   of	   actively	   promoting	   good	   transforms	   and	   carries	  greater	  obligation.	  	  Following	  D’Arcy’s	  analysis,	  a	  medical	  relationship	  would	  seem	  to	  qualify	  under	  these	  criteria	  resulting	  in	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  duty	  owed	  to	  the	  patient	  in	  order	  that	  one	  could	  be	  said	  to	  have	  satisfied	  the	  obligations	  arising	  from	  the	  principle	  of	  beneficence.	  	  If	  we	  are	  satisfied	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  any	  model	   of	   paternalism	   within	   this	   context	   which	   is	   relying	   on	   the	   principle	   of	  beneficence	   would	   require	   the	   physician	   not	   only	   to	   do	   no	   harm,	   but	   also	   to	  positively	  promote	  good.	  	  There	  are	  further	  discussions	  to	  be	  had	  as	  to	  what	  extent	  one	   would	   be	   required	   to	   promote	   good	   and	   how	  we	   limit	   this	   obligation.	   It	   is	  suggested	   that	   D’Arcy’s	   first	   criteria,	   “[When	   P	   is	   at	   risk	   of	   significant	   loss	   or	  damage	  (such	  as	  severe	  injury	  or	  death)]”	  might	  be	  useful	  in	  assessing	  those	  limits	  and	  at	  what	  point	  when	  those	  limits	  are	  reached	  that	  the	  duties	  required	  in	  order	  that	   one	   could	   rely	   on	   beneficence	   then	   reduce	   back	   to	   one	   of	   simple	   non-­‐maleficence.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  discussion	  to	  explore	  and	  set	  those	  limits.	  	  What	  is	  of	  interest	  for	  our	  purposes	  is	  that	  if	  we	  are	  contending	  that	  there	  is	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a	  requirement	  to	  positively	  promote	  good,	  how	  do	  we	  define	  what	  good	  (that	  is	  to	  say,	  benefit)	  is?	  	  
Defining	  benefit	  –	  the	  link	  with	  paternalism	  Therefore	   the	   final	   question	   about	   beneficence	   is	   what	   is	   a	   benefit	   and	   who	  determines	   what	   counts	   as	   a	   benefit?	   	   What	   we	   have	   discussed	   so	   far	   is	   very	  focused	  on	  the	  actor,	  what	  is	  required	  of	  them	  and	  little	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  the	   recipient	   of	   the	   beneficence.	   	   It	   is	   at	   this	   point	   that	   the	   link	   between	  paternalism	   and	   beneficence	   becomes	  most	   clear.	   	   An	   understanding	   of	   how	  we	  define	   benefit	   and	   therefore	   who	   determines	   that	   definition	   is	   the	   key	   to	  understanding	   paternalism.	   	   	   When	   considering	   the	   definition	   of	   benefit	   and	  determining	  who	  is	  the	  arbiter,	  Feinberg	  uses	  this	  example:	  “Suppose	  a	  stranger	  approaches	  me	  on	  a	  street	  corner	  and	  politely	  asks	  me	  for	  a	  match.	   	  Ought	  I	  to	  give	  him	  one?	  	  I	  think	  most	  people	  would	  agree	  that	  I	  should,	  and	  that	  any	  reasonable	  man	  of	  good	  will	  would	   offer	   the	   stranger	   a	   match.	   	   Perhaps	   a	   truly	   virtuous	   man	  would	  do	  more	  than	  that.	  	  He	  would	  be	  friendly,	  reply	  with	  a	  cheerful	  smile,	   and	   might	   even	   volunteer	   to	   light	   the	   stranger’s	   cigarette.”	  (Feinberg,	  1984,	  p.392)	  	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  analysis	  whether	  Feinburg’s	  ought	  is	  interpreted	  as	  a	  duty	  or	  obligation	  or	  as	  an	  ideal	  or	  virtue	  is	  of	  no	  account.	  	  The	  question	  here	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  the	  stranger’s	  wishes	  that	  I	  refer	  to	  when	  considering	  whether	  or	  not	  I	  have	   fulfilled	   my	   duty	   or	   ideal	   of	   beneficence.	   	   For	   example,	   perhaps	   I	   could	  convince	  myself	   that	  what	  the	  stranger	  needs,	   in	  contrast	  to	  what	  he	  wishes,	   is	  a	  refusal	  and	  a	  lecture	  on	  the	  dangers	  of	  smoking,	  would	  that	  not	  indeed	  mean	  I	  am	  promoting	  good?	  	  When	  there	  is	  a	  conflict	  between	  the	  recipient	  and	  the	  actor	  as	  to	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the	  benefit	  derived	  whose	  voice	  is	  authoritative?	  	  This	  is	  a	  concept	  we	  will	  return	  to	  as	  part	  of	  our	  discussion	  about	  paternalism	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  best	  interest	  as	  it	  is	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  controversy	  about	  paternalism	  but	  it	  is	  a	  question	  raised	  by	  the	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  beneficence.	  	  Kant	  held	  that	  the	  recipient	  should	  define	  beneficence	  as:	  	   “I	   cannot	  do	  good	   to	  anyone	  according	   to	  my	  concept	  of	  happiness	  (except	  to	  young	  children	  and	  the	  insane),	  but	  only	  according	  to	  that	  of	  the	  one	  I	  intend	  to	  benefit;	  and	  I	  am	  not	  really	  being	  kind	  if	  I	  force	  a	  gift	  on	  him.”	  	  (Kant,	  1999,	  p.122)	  	  However,	  not	  all	  interpretations	  of	  beneficence	  are	  non-­‐paternalistic.	  	  Many	  focus	  on	  needs	  rather	  than	  desires	  and	  preferences.	  	  How	  do	  we	  then	  determine	  for	  our	  purposes	  how	  the	  benefit	  is	  defined	  within	  dentistry?	  	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this	  we	  need	  to	  return	  to	  the	  Hippocratic	  Oath.	  	  	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  medicine	  (in	  the	  broadest	  sense)	  the	  principle	  of	  beneficence	  has	  provided	   the	   basis	   for	   what	   we	   might	   describe	   as	   an	   ethically	   acceptable	  healthcare	  system	  that	  focuses	  on	  “…the	  prevention	  and	  damage	  to	  persons,	  and	  to	  support	  their	  survival,	  health	  and	  capacities	  for	  action.”	  (O’Neill,	  2002a,	  p.151)	  	  Following	  the	  Hippocratic	  tradition	  benefit	  has	  traditionally	  been	  interpreted	  on	  a	  need	  rather	  than	  a	  desire	  or	  preference	  basis.	  	  This	  is	  perhaps	  borne	  out	  of	  a	  belief	  that	  in	  any	  healthcare	  relationship	  the	  clinician	  is	  the	  expert;	  the	  holder	  of	  the	  key	  information	   that	   forms	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   reason	   for	   this	   encounter	   and	   as	   such	   is	  therefore	   best	   placed	   to	   make	   decisions	   that	   will	   most	   effectively	   solve	   the	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presenting	  problem	  and	  provide	   the	  best	   outcome	   for	   the	  patient.	   	   The	   result	   of	  this	  is,	  as	  O’Neill	  points	  out	  that:	  	  “Any	   healthcare	   system	   with	   these	   aims	   will,	   inevitably	   concentrate	   a	  great	  deal	  of	  power	  and	  knowledge	   in	   the	  hands	  of	   its	  practitioners	  who	  could	   therefore	   coerce,	   deceive	   or	   exercise	   undue	   influence	   on	   patients	  and	  their	  relatives.”	  (O’Neill,	  2002a,	  p.151)	  	  For	   many	   years	   clinicians	   have	   relied	   almost	   exclusively	   on	   their	   own	   views,	  experience	   and	   judgement	   in	   order	   to	   determine	   what	   is	   in	   a	   patient’s	   best	  interests	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  treatment,	  information	  and	  consultation.	  	  This	  can	  be	  seen	   clearly	   in	   the	   Hippocratic	   Oath	   which	   is	   still	   taken	   today	   on	   entry	   to	   the	  profession.	  	  	  The	  Hippocratic	   tradition	   is	   clearly	  benefit	  orientated.	   	  Considering	   the	  example	  below	  we	  can	  better	  assess	  the	  language	  of	  the	  Hippocratic	  Oath.	  	  It	  is	  the	  ‘benefit	  of	   the	   sick’	   that	   serves	   as	   a	   justifying	   reason	   for	   the	   Hippocratic	   physician’s	  conduct	  and	  shows	  the	  link	  and	  reliance	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  beneficence:	  	   “I	  will	  apply	  dietetic	  measures	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  sick	  according	  to	  
my	  ability	  and	  judgement;	  I	  will	  keep	  them	  from	  harm	  or	  injustice.	  	  I	  will	   neither	   give	   deadly	   drug	   to	   anybody	   if	   asked	   for	   it,	   nor	  will	   I	  make	   suggestions	   as	   to	   this	   effect.	   	   Similarly	   I	   will	   not	   give	   to	   a	  woman	  abortive	   remedy…Whatever	  houses	   I	  may	  visit,	   I	  will	   come	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  sick,	  remaining	  free	  of	  all	  intentional	  injustice,	  of	  all	   mischief	   and	   in	   particular	   of	   sexual	   relations	   with	   both	   female	  and	  male	  persons,	  be	  they	  free	  or	  slaves.”	  	  (Hippocrates,	  400BCE	  as	  cited	  in	  Edlestein,	  1967,	  p.165)	  	  Additionally	  another	  summary	  of	  the	  Hippocratic	  tradition	  is:	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  “…as	  to	  disease,	  make	  a	  habit	  of	  two	  things	  –	  to	  help,	  or	  at	  least	  to	  do	  no	  harm.”	  	  (Hippocrates,	  400BCE	  cited	  in	  Edlestein,	  1967,	  p.165)	  	  It	  is	  this	  Hippocratic	  tradition	  that	  provides	  the	  clear	  link	  between	  beneficence	  and	  paternalism	  within	  medicine	  and	  dentistry.	  	  Paternalism	  is	  clearly	  implied	  by	  this	  benefit-­‐orientated	   ethic.	   	   A	  Hippocratic	   doctor	   or	  dentist	   promises	   to	   act	   for	   the	  benefit	  of	  the	  sick	  according	  to	  their	  own	  ability	  and	  judgement.	  	  When	  considering	  the	  text	  and	  context,	  Edelstein	  concludes	  that	  the	  physician:	  	   “…promises	   to	   guard	   his	   patients	   against	   the	   evil	   which	   they	  may	  suffer	   through	   themselves.	   	  That	  men	  by	  nature	  are	   liable	   to	   inflict	  upon	   themselves	   injustice	   and	   mischief	   and	   that	   this	   tendency	  becomes	  apparent	  in	  all	  matters	  concerned	  with	  their	  regiment,	  this	  is	   indeed	   an	   axiom	   of	   Pythagorean	   dietetics…The	   physician	   must	  protect	   the	   patient	   from	   the	   mischief	   and	   injustice	   which	   he	   may	  inflict	   upon	   himself	   if	   his	   diet	   is	   not	   properly	   chosen.”	   (Edlestein,	  1967,	  pp.23-­‐25)	  	  If	   we	   follow	   Edelstien’s	   interpretation	   of	   the	   oath	   the	   physician	   has	   a	   duty	   to	  protect	   the	   patient	   even	   from	   him	   or	   herself.	   	   Paternalism	   can	   also	   be	   seen	   to	  emerge	  elsewhere	  from	  the	  oath.	  	  As	  Konald	  notes:	  	   “The	  paternalism	  implicit	  in	  the	  Oath’s	  instruction	  that	  the	  physician	  refuses	   the	   patient’s	   requests	   in	   some	   cases	   and	   judge	   what	  confidences	   to	   keep	   is	   an	   important	   element	   of	   its	   legacy…	   This	  tradition	  honors	  the	  individuality	  of	  the	  doctor-­‐patient	  relationship,	  professional	   secrecy,	   and	   the	   physician’s	   duty	   to	   promote	   the	  patient’s	  welfare.	  	  In	  these	  and	  other	  matters,	  ethical	  formulations	  by	  the	   physicians	   have	   been	   paternalistic,	   making	   the	   physician	   the	  dominant	  part	  in	  determining	  what	  action	  will	  best	  advance	  both	  the	  doctor’s	  and	  the	  patient’s	  interests.”	  (Konald,	  1962,	  pp.164-­‐170)	  	  Following	   the	  Hippocratic	   tradition	   enables	   us	   to	   draw	   a	   clear	   link	   between	   the	  principle	  of	  beneficence	  and	  the	  paternalistic	  concept	  of	  best	  interests.	  	  The	  benefit	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derived	   for	   the	  patient	   is	  one	   that	   is	  determined	  on	  a	  needs	  rather	   than	  a	  desire	  basis.	  	  Need	  is	  assessed	  medically	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  expertise	  and	  abilities	  of	  the	  doctor	  (or	  dentist).	  	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  that	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  preferences	  and	  desires	   of	   a	   patient	   carry	   no	   weight	   at	   all	   but	   following	   this	   approach	   it	   is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  it	  is	  the	  doctor’s	  voice	  that	  carries	  authority	  and	  not	  that	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  	  	  
Paternalism	  Paternalism	   has	   been	   a	   recognised	   model	   since	   at	   least	   the	   time	   of	   Kant,	   who	  denounced	   paternalistic	   government	   for	   benevolently	   restricting	   the	   lives	   of	   its	  subjects.	  	  Kant's	  concern	  was	  that	  government	  “cancels	  freedom”.	  	  However,	  Kant	  never	   considered	   the	   kind	   of	   paternalism	   that	   we	   would	   associate	   with	   the	  parental	  relationship	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  state	  where	  the	  state	  cares	  for	  its	  subjects	  like	  a	  parent	  does	   for	   their	  child.	   	  Similarly	  Mill	   (1859)	  did	  not	  consider	  types	  of	  paternalism	  that	  might	  apply	  to	  those	  who	  have	  limited	  or	  no	  personal	  autonomy.	  	  However,	  despite	   the	   lack	  of	  anticipation	  on	   their	  part	  clearly	  we	  are	  all	   familiar	  today	  with	   relationships	   that	  warrant	   intervention	   by	   one	   party	   in	   a	   life	   that	   is	  substantially	   non-­‐autonomous	   and	   this	   remains	   a	   widely	   accepted	   model	   of	  justified	  paternalism.	  	  This	  form	  of	  paternalism	  starts	  with	  incompetent	  children	  in	  need	   of	   parental	   supervision	   and	   extends	   to	   other	   incompetents	   in	   need	   of	   care	  analogous	  to	  beneficent	  parental	  guidance.	  	  As	   we	   have	   seen	   however,	   in	   recent	   times	   paternalism	   has	   become	   a	   more	  controversial	  model	  of	  moral	  interaction.	  	  It	  has	  faced	  challenges	  from	  other	  values	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in	  particular	  autonomy	  and	  especially	  in	  the	  field	  of	  medical	  paternalism.	  	  In	  order	  to	   consider	   these	   challenges	   we	   will	   first	   need	   to	   look	   at	   how	   paternalism	   is	  defined	   and	   what	   differing	   interpretations	   might	   offer	   in	   answer	   to	   any	   of	   our	  criticisms.	  	  The	   Oxford	   English	   Dictionary	   dates	   the	   term	   paternalism	   from	   the	   1880s	   long	  after	   Kant	   and	   Mill,	   it	   gives	   its	   root	   meaning	   as	   “the	   principle	   and	   practice	   of	  paternal	  administration;	  government	  as	  by	  a	  father;	  the	  claim	  or	  attempt	  to	  supply	  the	  needs	   or	   to	   regulate	   life	   of	   a	   nation	  or	   community	   in	   the	   same	  way	   a	   father	  does	  his	  children.”	   (OED,	  2009)	   	  The	  allusion	   to	   father	  seems	   to	  presuppose	   two	  features	  of	  the	  paternal	  role:	  first	  that	  a	  father	  acts	  beneficently	  and	  second	  that	  he	  makes	  all	  or	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  decisions	  relating	  to	  his	  children's	  welfare	  rather	  than	   letting	   them	  make	   those	   decisions.	   	   As	  we	  have	   seen	   in	   our	   analysis	   of	   the	  Hippocratic	  Oath	  in	  healthcare	  this	  analogy	  is	  taken	  further:	  as	  a	  professional	  has	  superior	  training	  and	  knowledge	  this	  places	  the	  physician	  in	  a	  more	  authoritative	  position	  in	  order	  that	  he	  or	  she	  may	  decide	  what	  a	  patient	  needs.	  This	  is	  of	  course	  based	   on	   an	   interpretation	   of	   beneficence	   (the	   moral	   rational	   for	   paternalism)	  being	  defined	  on	  a	  need	  rather	  than	  preference	  basis.	  	  	  	  Paternalism	  always	  involves	  some	  form	  of	  interference	  with	  or	  refusal	  to	  conform	  to	  another	  person's	  preferences	  regarding	  their	  own	  good.	   	  Paternalistic	  acts	  can	  involve	   force,	   coercion	   or	   even	   deception,	   lying	  manipulation	   of	   information,	   or	  nondisclosure	   of	   information.	   	   This	   seems	   a	   somewhat	   inauspicious	   start	   for	   a	  model	  of	  moral	  behaviour	  based	  on	  a	  principle	  of	  promoting	  good.	   	  One	   can	   see	  
138	  	  
already	  that	   if	   these	  behaviours	  are	   justified	  within	  the	  model	  of	  paternalism	  the	  focus	   of	   this	   model	   must	   be	   the	   outcome	   of	   beneficence	   and	   not	   the	   means.	  	  Certainly	  this	  seems	  to	  have	  the	  ring	  of	  utility	  about	  it	  and	  we	  shall	  consider	  this	  point	   later	   on.	   	   Although	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   literature	   considers	   that	   all	   actions	   of	  paternalism	   involve	   restricting	   autonomous	   choice	   a	   wider	   definition	   might	   be	  more	   helpful	   here.	   	   A	   wider	   definition	   would	   involve	   including	   all	   non-­‐acquiescence	  or	   intervention	   in	  another	  person's	  preferences,	  desires,	   or	   actions	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  either	  avoiding	  harm	  or	  providing	  a	  benefit.	   	  In	  this	  way	  we	  are	   to	   consider	   that	   some	   forms	   of	   paternalism	   may	   be	   desirable	   where	   they	  provide	   a	  model	   of	   beneficence	   for	   those	  who	   act	   on	   behalf	   of	   non-­‐autonomous	  beings.	   	   In	   this	  way,	   if	  we	  were	   to	   consider	   autonomy	   as	   a	   principle	   of	   primary	  importance	  (despite	  our	  concerns	  with	  the	  current	  model)	  we	  would	  still	  be	  able	  to	   provide	   an	   alternative	  moral	  model	   for	   those	  who	  might	   for	   some	   reason	   be	  unable	  to	  satisfy	  an	  autonomy	  threshold.	  	  For	  our	  purposes	  then	  we	  may	  be	  said	  to	  follow	  a	  broad	  definition	  of	   paternalism	   similar	   to	   that	   proposed	  by	  Beauchamp	  and	  Childress.	   	   “Paternalism...is	   the	   intentional	  overriding	  of	  one	  person's	  known	  preferences	   or	   actions	   by	   another	   person,	   where	   the	   person	   who	   overrides	  justifies	  the	  action	  by	  the	  goal	  of	  benefiting	  or	  avoiding	  harm	  to	  the	  person	  whose	  preferences	  or	  actions	  are	  overridden.”	  (Beauchamp	  and	  Childress,	  2001,	  p.178)	  	  This	  definition	  is	  useful	  in	  that	  it	  is	  normatively	  neutral.	  	  Although	  it	  presumes	  an	  act	  of	  beneficence	  it	  does	  not	  consider	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  beneficence	  or	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  is	  defined	  carries	  any	  moral	  weight.	  	  In	  this	  way	  we	  can	  see	  clearly	  what	  is	   required	   to	   identify	   a	   situation	   as	  paternalistic	  without	   at	   this	   stage	  making	   a	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normative	   judgment.	   	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   this	   definition	   cannot	   enable	   us	   to	  identify	  situations	  that	  appear	  to	  be	  paternalistic	  but	  in	  fact	  are	  not.	  	  One	  example	  of	  this	  appeared	  in	  biomedical	  research	  on	  prisoners.	   	  The	  National	  Commission	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Subjects	  of	  Biomedical	  and	  Behavioural	  Research	   reported	   that	   the	   close	   nature	   of	   prison	   environments	   creates	   the	  potential	   for	   abuse	   of	   authority	   and	   as	   a	   result	   coercion	   and	   exploitation	   of	  prisoners	   (Levine	   et	   al.,	   2004).	   	   Although	   prisoners	   disagreed	   the	   Commission	  found	  that	  the	  coercive	  environment	  of	  prisons	  was	  sufficient	  to	  prevent	  prisoners	  taking	  part	  in	  research.	  	  At	   first	   glance	   this	   would	   appear	   to	   a	   clear	   case	   of	   paternalism	   but	   further	  consideration	   shows	   that	   it	   is	   not.	   	   The	   commission	   maintained	   that	   if	   prisons	  were	   shown	   not	   to	   be	   coercive	   environments	   then	   prisoners	   could	   indeed	   take	  part.	   	   Therefore	   the	   Commission’s	   justifying	   ground	   was	   in	   fact	   that	   we	   cannot	  predict	   whether	   or	   not	   prisoners	   will	   be	   exploited	   when	   they	   are	   in	   an	  environment	  which	  makes	  them	  vulnerable	  and	  that	  we	  should	  prohibit	  research	  to	  which	  prisoners	  might	  validly	  consent	  because	  we	  cannot	  successfully	  monitor	  as	   to	   whether	   or	   not	   that	   is	   the	   case.	   	   A	   simple	   non-­‐normative	   definition	   then	  allows	  us	  to	  identify	  situations	  of	  paternalism	  without	  being	  drawn	  into	  a	  debate	  about	   the	   various	  merits	   of	   paternalism	   itself.	   	   However	  we	  must	   now	   consider	  some	  of	  the	  finer	  points	  of	  paternalism	  and	  how	  it	  operates.	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Paternalism	  –	  refining	  the	  definition	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  beneficence,	  it	  is	  this	  principle	  that	  has	  provided	  the	  basis	  of	  paternalistic	  actions	  towards	  patients.	  	  For	  example,	  traditionally	  physicians	  have	  taken	  the	  view	  that	  if	  disclosing	  certain	  information	  to	   patients	   could	   cause	   them	   harm	   [the	   patient]	   then	   they	   are	   justified	   and	  obligated	  to	  withhold	  that	  information.	  	  Beauchamp	  and	  Childress	  exemplify	  this	  point	  by	  considering	  a	  case	  where	  a	  man	  brings	  his	  father,	  who	  is	  in	  his	  late	  sixties;	  to	  his	  physician	  because	  he	  suspects	  his	  father's	   daily	   problems	   of	   recall	   and	   reasoning	   may	   be	   Alzheimer's	   disease	  (Beauchamp	   and	   Childress,	   2001,	   p.180).	   	   The	  man	   also	  makes	   an	   impassioned	  plea	  to	   the	  physician	  not	   to	   tell	  his	   father	   if	   the	  tests	   indicate	  Alzheimer's.	   	  Tests	  subsequently	   indicate	   that	   the	   father	   probably	   does	   have	   the	   disease.	   	   The	  physician	  now	  faces	  a	  dilemma	  because	  of	  his	  conflict	  between	  demands	  of	  respect	  for	  autonomy	  and	  demands	  of	  beneficence.	   	  The	  physician	  considers	  his	  patient's	  right	  to	  know	  but	  is	  concerned	  about	  the	  supposition	  that	  the	  diagnosis	  is	  accurate	  [which	   this	   is	   not]	   and	   that	   apparent	   lack	   of	   competence	   of	   the	   patient.	   	   The	  physician	   feels	   that	   because	   of	   this	   he	   is	   compelled	   to	   rely	   on	   the	   principle	   of	  beneficence	  and	  therefore	  withholds	  the	  diagnosis.	  	  	  	  In	  this	  case	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  there	  is	  little	  to	  find	  fault	  with.	  	  The	  physician	  has	  after	  all	  first	  considered	  and	  respected	  his	  patient's	  autonomy	  and	  being	  unable	  to	  view	   the	   patient	   as	   autonomous	   has	   then	   proceeded	   to	   invoke	   the	   principle	   of	  beneficence	  has	  acted	  paternalistically.	  	  Would	  we,	  however,	  view	  this	  case	  in	  the	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same	  way	  if,	  again	  the	  information	  might	  cause	  harm	  but	  the	  diagnosis	  was	  more	  reliable,	  say	  of	  terminal	  cancer	  and	  the	  patient	  was	  indeed	  competent?	  	  Mill	  (1859)	  despite	   being	   opposed	   to	   paternalism	   considered	   temporary	   beneficent	  interventions	   in	  a	  person's	  actions	   to	  be	   justified	  on	  some	  occasions.	   	  He	  argued	  that	   a	   person	   who	   is	   ignorant	   of	   a	   significant	   risk	   –	   for	   example	   crossing	   a	  dangerous	  bridge	  –	  may	  justifiably	  be	  restrained	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  are	  acting	  intentionally	  and	  with	  adequate	  knowledge	  of	  the	  likely	  consequences.	  Once	  warned,	   the	  person	   should	  be	   free	   to	   choose	  whatever	   course	  he	  or	   she	  desires.	  	  Mill	  (1859)	  did	  not	  consider	  this	  temporary	  intervention	  as	  a	  real	  infringement	  of	  liberty	  and	  therefore	  he	  did	  not	  consider	  this	  paternalistic.	  	  It	  is	  not	  contentious	  to	  suggest	   then	   that	  paternalistic	   intervention	  might	  be	   justified	   in	  cases	  where	   the	  subject	   of	   moral	   concern	   is	   non-­‐autonomous	   and	   perhaps	   even	   temporarily	   in	  cases	  where	   the	   subject	   is	   autonomous	   in	   the	   name	   of	   beneficence	   on	   rare	   and	  temporary	  occasions	  as	  Mill	  describes.	  	  The	  real	  problem	  comes	  for	  paternalism	  in	  attempting	   to	   justify	   overriding	   autonomous	   choice	   in	   an	   environment	   where	  patient	  autonomy	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  understand	  respecting	  patient.	  	  Feinburg	  (1984)	  attempted	  to	  address	  these	  issues	  by	  further	  defining	  paternalism	  into	  both	   strong	  and	  weak	   categories	  which	  he	   later	  modifies	   into	  hard	  and	   soft	  paternalism.	  	  In	  his	  account,	  cases	  where	  an	  agent	  is	  required	  to	  intervene	  on	  the	  ground	   of	   beneficence	   only	   to	   prevent	   “substantially	   non-­‐voluntary	   conduct”	   to	  protect	   the	   persons	   against	   their	   own	   substantially	   non-­‐autonomous	   actions	   is	  defined	   as	   weak	   paternalism	   (1984,	   pp.113	   and	   116).	   	   Examples	   of	   this	   might	  include	   cases	   where	   a	   consent	   or	   refusal	   is	   inadequately	   informed,	   severe	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depression	   or	   pain	   that	   prevents	   rational	   deliberation	   or	   addiction	   all	   of	   which	  bear	  the	  element	  of	  lack	  of	  free	  choice.	  	  Weak	  paternalism	  would	  then	  require	  that	  a	  person’s	  competency	  to	  be	  compromised.	  	  Strong	  paternalism	  occurs	  where	   a	   person’s	   risky	   or	   unwise	   choice	   is	   externally	  overridden	  despite	   them	  being	  substantially	  autonomous.	   	   It	   is	  only	   then	   that	  by	  overriding	  that	  autonomous	  choice	  in	  the	  person’s	  best	  interest	  that	  one	  could	  be	  described	  as	  relying	  on	  strong	  paternalism.	  	  According	  to	  Feinburg	  (1989)	  in	  order	  for	  the	  action	  to	  be	  described	  as	  strong	  paternalism	  the	  subject	  whose	  autonomy	  is	  being	  overridden	  need	  not	  be	   fully	   informed	  or	   indeed	  completely	  voluntary	  but	  must	  nonetheless	  but	  acting	  in	  a	  substantially	  autonomous	  manner.	  	  Feinburg	  (1989,	  p.14)	  concedes	  that	  in	  fact	  it	  “may	  be	  rather	  misleading	  to	  think	  of	  weak	  paternalism	  as	  any	  form	  of	  paternalism	  at	  all”.	   	  This	  is	  because	  it	  is	  not	  this	  weak	  form	  of	  paternalism	  that	  causes	  any	  real	  problems.	   	   It	   is	  not	  contentious	  to	  argue	   that	   an	   individual	   may	   need	   protection	   from	   harm	   in	   situations	   that	   are	  completely	   beyond	   their	   control.	   	   The	   difficulties	   with	   paternalism	   arise	   in	  connection	  with	  what	  conditions	  we	  should	  consider	  and	  protect	  others	  from	  self-­‐harm.	  	  Any	  defence	  of	  paternalism	  and	  assessment	  of	   it	   justification	   is	  normally	  divided	  into	   three	  main	  positions.	   	   These	   are	   anti-­‐paternalism,	   justified	  paternalism	   that	  relies	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  respect	   for	  persons	  and	  justified	  paternalism	  that	  relies	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  beneficence.	  	  All	  three	  positions	  agree	  that	  some	  form	  of	  weak	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paternalism	  as	  outlined	  by	  Fienberg	  (1989)	   is	   justified.	   	  This	   is	   the	  case	  even	  for	  anti-­‐paternalists	   mainly	   because	   in	   the	   case	   of	   weak	   paternalism	   substantially	  autonomous	  actions	  are	  not	  at	  stake.	  	  Anti-­‐paternalists	   reject	   strong	   paternalistic	   actions	   because	   they	   believe	   such	  actions	  violate	  individual	  rights	  and	  conflict	  with	  free	  choice.	  	  One	  of	  the	  criticisms	  of	  paternalism	  from	  the	  anti-­‐paternalist	  stance	  is	  that	  to	  give	  paternalism	  to	  a	  state	  or	  class	  of	  persons	  such	  as	  physicians	  is	  undesirable.	  	  More	  persuasively	  they	  also	  object	  to	  paternalism	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  authority	  for	  any	  action	  should	  rest	  with	   the	   individual	   concerned.	   	   This	   may	   be	   interpreted	   as	   strong	   paternalistic	  actions	  are	  indicative	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  respect	  for	  autonomous	  agents	  and	  does	  not	  treat	  these	  individuals	  as	  moral	  equals.	  	  The	  result	  of	  which	  is	  that	  they	  are	  considered	  by	   the	   paternalist	   as	   “less	   than	   independent	   determiners	   of	   their	   own	   good”	  (Beauchamp	  and	  Childress,	  2001,	  p.182).	  	  As	  both	  Dworkin	  and	  Childress	  contend,	  when	   others	   impose	   their	   conception	   of	   good	   on	   us	   they	   preclude	   us	   from	  receiving	  the	  respect	  to	  which	  we	  are	  entitled.	   	  This	  is	  problematic	  even	  if	  we	  do	  receive	  a	  benefit	  and	  their	  assessment	  as	  to	  what	  was	  good	  for	  us	  exceeds	  our	  own	  evaluation	  (Dworkin	  1978;	  Childress	  1998).	  	  	  Anti-­‐paternalists	  also	  criticise	  paternalism	  standards	  as	  being	   too	  wide-­‐reaching.	  	  This	  then,	  they	  contend,	  enables	  paternalism	  to	  become	  entrenched	  in	  institutions	  if	   it	  provides	  the	  basis	  of	  policy	  and	  allows	  for	  far	  too	  much	  intervention.	   	  Harris	  considers	   that	   in	   principle	   this	   would	   allow	   “…the	   imposition	   of	   a	   Spartan-­‐like	  regimen	   requiring	   rigorous	   physical	   exercise	   and	   abstention	   from	   smoking,	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drinking,	   and	   hazardous	   pastimes	   subject	   to	   the	   threat	   of	   criminal	   sanctions.”	  (Harris,	  1967,	  p.585).	  	  Clearly	   though	   this	   argument	   at	   best	   only	   provides	   a	   rebuttable	   presumption	  against	   paternalism.	   	   However,	   anti-­‐paternalists	   argue	   that	   paternalism	   as	   an	  institutional	   concept	   allows	   for	   potential	   abuse.	   	   Further	   it	   is	   contended	   that	  because	  of	  paternalism's	   focus	  and	  reliance	  on	   the	  concept	  of	  beneficence,	   it	   can	  preclude	   other	   virtues	   and	   values	   that	   we	   may	   consider	   desirable.	   	   Suppose	   a	  father	   is	   considering	  making	   a	   live	   organ	   donation	   to	   save	   his	   son.	   	   Donating	   a	  kidney	   will	   clearly	   be	   of	   no	   medical	   benefit	   to	   him	   yet	   do	   we	   not	   admire	   his	  sacrifice	   and	   think	   this	   is	   a	   virtuous	   thing	   to	   do?	   	   A	   strong	   paternalist	   however	  might	  be	  required	  to	  stop	  him	  considering	  or	  indeed	  following	  this	  course	  of	  action	  to	  prevent	  the	  father	  doing	  harm	  to	  himself.	  	  Paternalism	  might	  in	  this	  situation	  be	  able	  to	  support	  the	  father's	  course	  of	  action	  by	  allowing	  for	  no	  intervening	  in	  this	  situation	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  benefit	  derived	   is	  one	  of	  social	  or	  emotional	  merit	  that	  outweighs	  the	  medical	  harm?	  	  However,	  this	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  be	  the	  case	  in	  all	  situations.	  	  Would	  a	  paternalist	  be	  able	  to	  mount	  the	  same	  defence	  were	  he	  or	  she	   to	   be	   required	   to	   consider	   a	   situation	   where	   the	   donation	   was	   to	   be	   made	  anonymously?	  	  Again	  a	  paternalist	  might	  try	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  action	  based	  on	  a	  less	  definable	  concept	  of	  benefit.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  donor	  gains	  some	  general	  social	  benefit	  or	   a	   large	   degree	   of	   self-­‐satisfaction	   that	   can	   be	   shown	   to	   outweigh	   again	   any	  harm?	   	   The	   assessment	   then	   of	   the	   moral	   value	   of	   such	   a	   situation	   for	   an	  autonomist	   would	   be	   that	   the	   donor	   is	   being	   allowed	   to	   exercise	   his	   autonomy	  without	  interference	  whereas	  for	  a	  paternalist	  it	  might	  be	  assessed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	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benefit	   derived	   be	   that	  medical,	   emotional,	   social	   or	   a	   combination	   of	   all	   three.	  	  One	  challenge	  for	  that	  paternalist	  might	  arise	  in	  the	  form	  of	  self-­‐sacrifice	  where	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  claim	  that	  any	  benefit	  for	  the	  subject	  of	  moral	  concern	  is	  derived	  at	  all:	  	  for	  example	  where	  a	  donor	  makes	  a	  donation	  that	  results	  in	  his	  or	  her	  own	  death.	  	  This	  may	  be	  a	  situation	  where	  we	  greatly	  admire	   the	  courage	  and	  heroism	  of	  an	  individual	  but	  cannot	  seem	  to	   find	  any	  benefit	  at	  all.	   	  Would	  not	  a	  paternalist	  be	  required	   to	   intervene	   in	   these	   circumstances?	   	   Does	   strong	   paternalism	   then	  preclude	  more	  extreme	  examples	  of	  heroism?	  	  One	  of	  the	  examples	  that	  most	  anti-­‐paternalist	  literature	  relies	  upon	  is	  involuntary	  hospitalization.	  	  One	  example	  of	  this	  was	  the	  case	  of	  Catherine	  Lake.	  	  Lake	  suffered	  from	   arteriosclerosis	   which	   on	   occasion	   could	   leave	   her	   with	   memory	   loss	   and	  periods	   of	  mild	   confusion.	   	   At	   other	   times	   Lake	  was	   alert	   and	   completely	   lucid.	  	  Lake	  never	  presented	  a	  threat	  to	  anyone	  else	  and	  whilst	  at	  her	  trial	  was	  apparently	  completely	  rational.	   	  However	  Lake	  was	  committed	  to	  a	  mental	  institution	  on	  the	  basis	   that	   she	   was	   considered	   confused	   and	   defenceless.	   	   The	   court	   considered	  however	   that	   she	  was	   “mentally	   ill”,	   a	   “danger	   to	  herself”	  and	   “not	   competent	   to	  care	   for	   herself”	   (Katz,	   Goldstein	   and	   Dershowitz,	   1967,	   pp.552-­‐554).	   	   Anti-­‐paternalists	   argued	   that	   since	   Lake	   was	   not	   a	   danger	   to	   others	   and	   perfectly	  understood	   the	   risks	   involved	   she	   should	   not	   have	   been	   detained.	   	   Beneficence	  therefore	  for	  the	  anti-­‐paternalistic	  does	  not	  have	  authority	  over	  autonomy.	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Paternalism	  moderated	  to	  work	  with	  autonomy	  Other	  supporters	  of	  paternalism	  consider	  that	  paternalism	  is	  justified	  not	  only	  by	  benefit	  but	  also	  by	  consent.	  	  For	  them	  paternalism	  can	  be	  justified	  if:	  1. “the	   harms	   prevented	   from	   occurring	   or	   the	   benefits	   provided	   to	  the	   person	   outweigh	   the	   loss	   of	   independence	   and	   the	   sense	   of	  invasion	  the	  intervention	  causes;	  2. the	  person's	  condition	  seriously	  limits	  his	  or	  her	  ability	  to	  make	  an	  autonomous	  choice;	  3. the	   intervention	   is	   universally	   justified	   under	   relevantly	   similar	  circumstances,	  and;	  4. the	   beneficiary	   of	   the	   paternalistic	   actions	   has	   considered,	   will	  consent,	  or	  would,	  if	  rational,	  consent	  to	  those	  actions	  on	  his	  or	  her	  behalf.”	  (Beauchamp	  and	  Childress,	  2001,	  p.183)	  	  Browning-­‐Hoffman	  claims	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  we	  ought	  to	  consider	  that	  individuals	  are	  deserving	  of	  our	  help,	  even	  if	  their	  routine	  life	  seems	  a	  rational	  one.	  	  Browning-­‐Hoffman	  exemplifies	  this	  by	  considering	  where	  a	  man	  owing	  to	  his	  religious	  beliefs	  frequently	  engages	  in	  self-­‐mutilation	  on	  the	  basis	  that,	  in	  his	  role	  as	  a	  true	  prophet	  of	  God,	  it	  is	  better	  for	  him	  to	  sacrifice	  a	  body	  part	  rather	  than	  the	  present	  course	  of	  the	  World	  that	  would	  result	  in	  greater	  loss	  of	  life.	  	  (Browning-­‐Hoffman	  as	  cited	  in	  Beauchamp	  and	  Childress,	  2001,	  p.184).	  	  His	  capacities	  are	  too	  diminished	  and	  the	  danger	  he	  presents	  to	  himself	  too	  severe	  to	  allow	  him	  complete	  independence.	  	  In	  order	  for	  a	  strong	  model	  of	  paternalism	  to	  be	  justified	  it	  needs	  some	  limitations,	  particularly	  to	  avoid	  the	  criticisms	  of	  the	  anti-­‐paternalists.	   	  Several	  theories	  have	  attempted	   to	   limit	   paternalism	   by	   appealing	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   consent.	   	   Gerald	  Dworkin	  appealed	  to	  this	  principle,	  he	  considered	  that	  “the	  basic	  notion	  of	  consent	  is	  important	  and	  seems	  to	  me	  the	  only	  acceptable	  way	  to	  try	  to	  delimit	  an	  area	  of	  justified	  paternalism”	  (Dworkin,	  1972,	  p.67).	  	  This	  was	  also	  the	  approach	  taken	  by	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Carter	  who	  argues	   that	  consent	  plays	  a	  central	  role	   in	   justifying	  paternalism	  and	  contends	   that	   no	   other	   concepts	   are	   relevant	   (Carter,	   1977,	   p.32).	   	   VanDe	   Veer	  agrees	   contending	   that	   “acting	   in	   a	   seriously	   encumbered	   manner	   [where]	   it	   is	  highly	  probable	  that	  they	  would	  give	  consent	  to	  the	  intervention	  if	  the	  opportunity	  were	  available.”	  	  (VanDe	  Veer,	  1986,	  p.424)	  	  The	   basic	   supposition	   of	   the	   consent-­‐based	   theory	   is	   that	   any	   rational	   person	  would	   give	   their	   consent	   to	   a	   paternalistic	   intervention	   based	   on	   the	   theory	   of	  beneficence	   in	   order	   to	   protect	   themselves	   from	   harm	   (Dworkin,	   1972).	   	   The	  further	   premise	   being	   that	   any	   right-­‐minded	   person	   is	   prone	   to	   be	   tempted	   to	  make	   choices	   that	   may	   have	   consequences	   beyond	   their	   imagining	   that	   are	  consequently	   irreversible.	   	   In	   addition,	   it	   is	   suggested,	  most	   right-­‐minded	   people	  may	  also	  acknowledge	  that	  at	  times	  social	  pressure	  or	  plain	  temptation	  may	  cause	  them	  to	  engage	  in	  activities	  that	  are	  clearly	  not	  in	  their	  best	  interests	  when	  other	  factors	  such	  as	  pride	  interfere	  with	  their	  decision	  making.	  	  Further,	  in	  other	  cases	  individuals	  may	  mistakenly	  believe	   that	   they	  are	   fully	  cognisant	  of	   the	  necessary	  facts	  where	  as	  in	  actual	  fact	  an	  important	  part	  of	  their	  knowledge	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  decision	   is	  missing	  say	   for	  example	   that	  smoking	  causes	  heart	  disease	  as	  well	  as	  lung	  cancer	  or	  that	  the	  bungee	  rope	  they	  are	  about	  to	  rely	  on	  has	  in	  fact	  not	  been	  checked	   in	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   they	   thought.	   	   It	   is	  by	  using	  consent	   in	   this	  way	  that	   its	   proponents	   believe	   the	   bounds	   of	   paternalism	  would	   be	   limited.	   	   Those	  wishing	  to	  engage	  in	  paternalism	  could	  only	  do	  so	  if	  they	  could	  contend	  that	  they	  would	  have	  consent	  from	  the	  individual	  of	  moral	  concern	  had	  they	  [the	  subject	  of	  moral	   concern]	   been	   similarly	   in	   the	   position	   of	   the	   paternalist.	   	   This	   could	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perhaps	  help	  us	  with	  the	  difficulties	  with	  the	  organ	  donor	  in	  that	  a	  consent	  basis	  of	  paternalism	   perhaps	   could	   take	   account	   of	   situations	   where	   we	   still	   wish	   to	  promote	   values	   such	   as	   heroisms.	   	   If	   it	   could	   be	   shown	   that	   no	   implicit	   consent	  could	   exist	   in	   certain	   circumstances	   this	   might	   enable	   other	   values	   to	   take	  precedence	  over	  paternalism	  when	  appropriate.	  	  Rawls	   (1999)	   and	   Dworkin	   (1972)	   both	   believed	   that	   a	   form	   of	   justified	  paternalism	   could	   be	   supported	   based	   on	   the	   belief	   that	   rational	   agents	   would	  consent	  to	  paternalism	  and	  even	  to	  sanctions	  to	  help	  them	  avoid	  actions	  that	  might	  have	  unpleasant	  consequences.	   	  An	  example	  of	   this	  would	  be	   the	  requirement	   to	  wear	  a	  motorcycle	  helmet	  and	  a	  fine	  for	  not	  doing	  so.	  	  However	  according	  to	  their	  theory	  it	  is	  those	  with	  defective	  autonomy	  who	  would	  otherwise	  give	  their	  consent	  if	   that	   defect	   were	   removed	   who	   are	   intended	   to	   be	   covered	   by	   this	   justified	  paternalism	  not	  those	  who	  are	  completely	  autonomous	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  question	  at	  hand.	  	   	  At	  first	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  there	  is	  a	  presumption	  that	  the	  paternalist	  has	  to	  envisage	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  moral	  concern	  has	  some	  specific	  autonomy	   deficiency	   and	   therefore	   is	   required	   to	   step	   in.	   	   However,	   Rawls	   and	  Dworkin	   contend	   that	   this	   predicative	   model	   is	   not	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   theory.	  	  Rather	   that	   they	  are	  relying	  on	  a	  Kantian	  concept	  of	  what	   the	  autonomous	  agent	  would	  have	   consented	   to	   in	   the	  hypothetical	   circumstances	  of	   consent	   (Dworkin	  1972;	  Rawls	  1999).	  	  This	   appears	   to	   be	   an	   attractive	   proposition	   as	   not	   only	   would	   it	   possibly	   not	  preclude	   other	   values	   such	   as	   self-­‐sacrifice	   and	   heroism	   but	   also	   would	   be	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compatible	   with	   autonomy	   itself.	   	   Further	   it	   would	   bring	   together	   both	   the	  principles	  of	  beneficence	  and	  autonomy	  so	  that	  paternalism	  would	  respect	  rather	  than	  override	  autonomy.	  	  The	  difficulty	  that	  arises	  relates	  to	  our	  concern	  about	  the	  apparent,	  though	  disputed,	  predictive	  aspect	  of	  the	  theory.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  this	  model	  does	  not	   require	   the	   individual’s	  actual	   consent.	   	   It	  would	  be	  argued	  here	  that	  despite	  Rawls	  (1999)	  and	  Dworkin's	  (1972)	  contention	  that	  this	  form	  would	  limit	   the	   bounds	   of	   paternalism	   it	   could	   still	   potentially	   incorporate	   more	  circumstances	  of	  justified	  paternalism	  than	  its	  proponents	  first	  envisaged.	  	  	  	  Although	   rationalising	   and	   bringing	   together	   paternalism	   and	   consent	   is	   an	  attractive	   ideal	   it	   is	  contended	  here	  that	   in	  reality	   they	  are	  the	  antithesis	  of	  each	  other.	  	  The	  foundation	  of	  paternalism	  is	  beneficence	  alone	  and	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  see	  it	  in	   those	   terms	   and	   consider	   its	   merits	   without	   attempting	   to	   justify	   it	   on	   the	  grounds	  that	  the	  subject	  of	  moral	  concern	  in	  some	  way	  metaphysically	  consented	  to	  the	  act	  of	  paternalism	  all	  along.	  	  Consent	  or	  lack	  thereof	  relates	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  control	   one’s	   life	   and	   paternalistic	   actions	   limit	   that	   control.	   	   The	   value	   of	  paternalism	  or	  otherwise	  relates	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  limitations	  of	  that	  control	  are	  useful	   and	   justified.	   	   To	   imply	   that	   somehow	   the	   subject	   of	   moral	   concern	   has	  control	   or	  would	   have	   agreed	   to	   relinquish	   control	   had	   they	   been	   in	   a	   different	  position	  is	  an	  anathema.	  	  For	  this	  discussion	  is	  it	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  apportioning	  the	  correct	  weight	  to	  beneficence	  and	  autonomy	  in	  order	  to	  help	  us	  decide	  which	  should	  have	  the	  authoritative	  voice	  in	  situations	  of	  conflict.	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Passive	  paternalism	  As	   we	   have	   seen	   when	   considering	   Feinburg's	   distinction	   of	   strong	   and	   weak	  paternalism	  there	  are	  cases	  where	  paternalism	  may	  be	  easily	   justified	  as	  there	  is	  no	  substantial	  overriding	  of	  autonomy.	  	  Further,	  following	  Mill's	  (1859)	  example	  of	  the	   man	   on	   the	   dangerous	   bridge	   it	   may	   also	   be	   relatively	   straight	   forward	   to	  justify	  strong	  paternalism	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  intervention	  is	  for	  a	  relatively	  short	  period	  of	   time	  without	  a	   substantial	   reduction	   in	   the	   subject's	   ability	   to	  exercise	  their	  free	  will.	   	  Such	  minor	  all	  be	  they	  strong	  paternalistic	  measures	  are	  common	  in	  hospitals.	   	  For	  example	  protecting	  someone	  from	  a	  fall	  out	  of	  bed	  even	  though	  they	  don't	  want	  the	  side	  up	  on	  the	  bed	  or	  not	  giving	  bad	  news	  immediately	  as	  the	  diagnosis	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  confirmed	  by	  further	  tests.	  	  Beauchamp	  and	  Childress	  (2001)	  contend	  that	  these	  forms	  of	  strong	  paternalism	  are	  justified	  only	  if:	  	   1. “A	  patient	  is	  at	  risk	  of	  a	  significant,	  preventable	  harm;	  2. The	  paternalistic	  action	  will	  probably	  prevent	  the	  harm;	  3. The	   projected	   benefits	   to	   the	   patient	   of	   the	   paternalistic	   action	  outweigh	  its	  risk	  to	  the	  patient;	  4. The	   least	   autonomy-­‐restrictive	   alternative	   that	   will	   secure	   the	  benefits	   and	   reduce	   the	   risks	   is	   adopted.”	   (Beauchamp	   and	  Childress,	  2001,	  p.186)	  	  How	   do	   we	   then	   address	   situations	   where	   patients	   request	   procedures	   that	  clinicians	  do	  not	  believe	  to	  be	  beneficial	  perhaps	  on	  grounds	  of	  futility	  or	  potential	  harm	  caused?	  	  How	  do	  we	  then	  mediate	  in	  these	  circumstances?	  	  This	  leads	  us	  to	  consider	  one	  of	  the	  less	  discussed	  areas	  of	  paternalism,	  passive	  paternalism.	  	  The	   usual	   aspects	   of	   paternalism	  discussed	  with	   vigour	   typically	   focus	   on	   active	  paternalistic	  interventions.	  	  Passive	  paternalism	  however,	  particularly	  in	  medicine	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is	  an	  area	  of	  specific	  concern.	  	  Passive	  paternalism	  occurs	  when	  a	  physician	  simply	  refuses	   to	   carry	   out	   a	   patient's	   preference	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   patient	   focused	  beneficence	   (Childress,	   1982;	   Quill	   and	   Brody,	   1996).	   Common	   examples	   often	  involve	  the	  sterilization	  of	  otherwise	  healthy	  women.	  	  Sterilization	  is	  often	  refused	  for	  women	  of	  child-­‐bearing	  age	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  is	  not	  in	  their	  best	  interest	  despite	   their	  apparent	  competency	  and	  strongly	  held	  desire	  not	   to	  have	  children	  (Basson,	  1981,	  pp.135-­‐136).	  	  Passive	  paternalism	  is	  also	  central	  to	  debates	  on	  medical	   futility.	   	  Hospitals	  often	  apply	  to	  turn	  off	  ventilators	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  is	  non-­‐beneficial	  to	  patients	  in	  a	  persistent	  vegetative	  state	  in	  that	  it	  will	  not	  heal	  their	  lungs	  or	  other	  failing	  organs.	  	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  if	  indeed	  support	  for	  such	  patients	  is	  futile	  then	  denying	  patients	  and	  their	  representatives’	  requests	  for	  treatment	  could	  be	  justified	  under	  passive	  paternalism.	   	  Even	  restrictions	   for	  withholding	  treatment	   for	  severely	  premature	  babies	  on	  the	  grounds	  it	  is	  virtually	  futile	  are	  supported.	  	  It	  is	  justified	  not	  on	  the	  basis	   that	   it	   is	  harmful	   to	   the	  patient	  but	   that	   treatment	  will	  not	  bring	  about	   the	  benefit	  sought	  either	  to	  the	  patient.	   	  Therefore,	  a	  proven	  claim	  of	  medical	   futility	  here	   effectively	   cancels	   the	   physician’s	   duty	   to	   provide	   a	   medical	   procedure.	  	  Perhaps	   because	   the	  medical	   element	   of	   the	   relationship	   has	   been	   removed	   for	  reasons	  of	  futility	  it	  means	  that	  a	  physician’s	  duty	  to	  act	  beneficently	  is	  reduced	  to	  non-­‐maleficence,	  to	  do	  no	  harm	  rather	  than	  to	  actively	  promote	  good.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  returns	   their	   relationship	   to	   one	   of	   common	   humanity	   rather	   than	   a	   special	  relationship	  of	  doctor	  and	  patient.	   	  Criticisms	  of	  some	  of	  this	  discussion	  however	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centre	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  futility	  could	  be	  considered	  a	  question	  of	  wasted	  resources	  and	  general	  utility	  rather	  than	  one	  of	  truly	  passive	  paternalism.	  	  As	  Lantos	  et	  al.	  (1989)	  point	  out	  medical	  futility	  is	  often	  regarded	  as:	  1. “the	   procedure	   cannot	   be	   performed	   because	   of	   a	   patient's	  biological	  condition;	  2. the	  procedure	  cannot	  produce	  the	  intended	  psychological	  effect;	  3. the	   procedure	   cannot	   reasonably	   be	   expected	   to	   produce	   the	  benefit	  that	  is	  sought;	  4. The	  procedure's	  burdens,	  harms	  and	  costs	  outweigh	   its	  anticipate	  benefits.”	  (Lantos,	  et	  al.,1989,	  p.82).	  	  Really	   only	   the	   first	   three	   criteria	   can	   truly	   be	   regarded	   as	   medical	   futility.	  	  Criterion	   four	   merely	   reflects	   the	   restrictions	   and	   application	   of	   healthcare	  rationing.	   	   To	   take	   account	   of	   criterion	   four	   would	   mean	   adopting	   a	   normative	  stance	   on	   a	   person's	   right	   to	   treatment	   and	   would	   cloud	   our	   argument	   by	  introducing	  a	  subjective	  element.	  	  
Conclusions	  Returning	   then	   to	   the	   issues	   raised	   in	   Chapter	   One	   that	   we	   wish	   to	   address;	  respecting	   the	   individual,	   being	   able	   to	   draw	   limits,	   prioritising	   patient’s	  reasonable	   wishes	   and	   assuring	   the	   process	   by	   avoiding	   deception	   and	  manipulation,	  how	  far	  does	  paternalism	  go	  toward	  addressing	  these	  needs?	  	  At	  first	  instance	  paternalism	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  suitable	  for	  our	  needs	  in	  that	  it	  bears	  a	  strong	  individualistic	  component;	  that	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  Not	  only	  that,	  but	  paternalism	  also	  requires	  of	  the	  actor	  (here	  the	  dentist)	  that	  he	  or	  she	  actively	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promotes	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  Respect	  for	  persons	  here	  then	  would	  be	  adequately	  served	  in	  two	  senses.	  	  One	  that	  the	  individual	  is	  prima	  facie	  recognized	  as	   being	   of	   value	   and	   two	   that	   there	   is	   a	   requirement	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	  paternalistic	   dentist	   to	   promote	   the	   interests	   of	   the	  patient.	   	   For	   this	   aspect	   our	  needs	  are	  met.	  	  We	  may	   now	   turn	   to	   our	   second	   requirement,	   that	   the	   clinician	   is	   able	   to	   draw	  limits	   around	   his	   or	   her	   obligations	   to	   the	   patient.	   	   As	  we	   have	   considered	   one	  important	   aspect	   of	   any	   account	   of	   paternalism	   requires	   that	   the	   actor	   believes	  that	  our	  understanding	  of	  our	  beneficent	  duty	  also	  enables	  us	  to	  draw	  reasonable	  limits	  around	  what	  might	  be	  expected	  of	  a	  clinician	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  patient.	  	  As	  we	  have	   seen	   earlier	   although	   I	   wish	   to	   claim	   that	   a	  model	   of	  medical	   paternalism	  strengthens	  the	  duty	  of	  beneficence	  from	  a	  weak	  requirement	  overall	  to	  a	  stronger	  duty	  as	  a	   result	  of	   the	  special	   relationship	  between	  clinician	  and	  patient	   I	  would	  argue	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	   this	   that	   the	  duty	  owed	   is	  also	  quite	  clearly	   limited	  to	  the	  boundaries	  of	  that	  clinical	  relationship.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  a	  patient	  subject	  to	  a	  paternalistic	  model	  might	   reasonably	   expect	   a	   clinician	   to	  offer	   them	   the	  best	  of	  dental	  care	  (subject	  to	  the	  practical	  constraints	  of	  resources	  and	  skill)	  but	  should	  not	   expect	   the	   dentist	   to	   offer	   them	   a	   lift	   home	   afterwards	   as	   clearly	   this	   falls	  outside	  the	  special	  relationship	  and	  the	  duty	  then	  to	  act	  beneficently	  is	  reduced	  to	  the	  weaker	  conception	  of	  more	  incidental	  or	  ordinary	  relationships.	   	  In	  summary	  the	   duty	   for	   the	   clinician	   is	   limited.	   	   It	   operates	   only	  within	   the	   confines	   of	   the	  special	   relationship	   and	   only	   those	   ‘best	   interests’	   of	   the	   patient	   that	   fall	  within	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that	  special	  relationship	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  duty	  that	  the	  dentist	  needs	  to	  discharge.	  	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  for	  this	  aspect	  paternalism	  meets	  our	  aim.	  	  Our	   third	   requirement,	   that	   we	   prioritise	   the	   patient’s	   reasonable	   wishes	   may	  become	   more	   problematic.	   	   We	   have	   considered	   earlier	   that	   traditionally	   ‘best	  interests’,	  in	  the	  clinical	  setting,	  has	  been	  interpreted	  to	  mean	  clinical	  need.	  As	  the	  business	   in	  hand	   is	  medical	   in	  nature	  and	   the	  beneficent	  duty	  on	   the	  part	  of	   the	  practitioner	  is	  established	  owing	  to	  the	  medical	  business	  at	  hand	  from	  a	  practical	  perspective	   at	   least	   it	   would	   seem	   difficult	   to	   expand	   this	   definition	   to	   include	  matters	  beyond	  the	  clinical.	  	  After	  all	  a	  broader	  definition	  of	  need	  to	  include	  desire	  or	   wishes	  may	   inadvertently	   reduce	   the	   duty	   on	   the	   clinician	   to	   promote	   those	  interests	  at	  least	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  Further,	  as	  paternalistic	  models	  rely	  heavily	  on	  the	  position	  of	  actor	  (here	  the	  dentist)	  rather	  than	  that	  of	  the	  patient	  this	  necessarily	  reduces	   or	   calls	   into	  question	   the	   authoritative	   voice	   of	   the	  patient.	   	   If	   a	   patient	  cannot	  make	  his	   voice	  authoritative	  nor	   can	  he	   require	   the	  dentist	   to	   consider	  a	  duty	   of	   beneficence	   on	  matters	   that	   falls	   outside	   the	  medicalized	   relationship	   it	  would	   seem	  difficult	   for	  us	   to	   claim	   that	  we	  can	  prioritise	  a	  patient’s	   reasonable	  wishes	   adequately.	   	   I	  would	  wish	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   is	   a	   practical	   rather	   than	  theoretical	  concern	  in	  that	  one	  could	  attempt	  to	  claim	  that	  as	  we	  also	  wish	  to	  argue	  for	  a	  more	  healthcare	  focused	  rather	  than	  treatment	  focused	  approach	  this	  might	  broaden	   the	   remit	   of	   a	   dentist	   and	   cause	  him	   to	   consider	   other	   aspects	   that	   are	  likely	   to	   be	   of	   concern	   to	   a	   patient.	   	   However	   problems	   may	   arise	   where	  presumptions	   are	  made	   (from	   a	   paternalistic	   stance)	   as	   to	   precisely	  what	   those	  concerns	   are.	   	   After	   all	   some	   patients	   may	   be	   very	   concerned	   about	   cost	   for	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instance	  whereas	  others	  may	   find	   cost	   of	   no	  moment	  whatsoever.	   	   The	  problem	  arise	  because	  the	  dentist	  is	  able	  to	  work	  from	  his	  assessment	  of	  what	  is	  of	  concern	  (after	   all	   he	  believes	  he	   is	   best	   placed	   to	  decide)	   rather	   than	   actually	   asking	   the	  patient	   and	   for	   that	   reason	   I	   would	   claim	   that	   we	   have	   been	   unsuccessful	   in	  meeting	  our	  third	  requirement.	  	  Finally	  we	  may	  wish	  to	  consider	  our	  last	  requirement	  that	  we	  wish	  to	  assure	  the	  process	  by	  avoiding	  manipulation	  and	  deception	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  claim	  our	  duty	  discharged	   by	   analysing	   only	   the	   success	   of	   outcome.	   	   Again	   it	  would	   seem	   that	  paternalism	   is	   unable	   to	   meet	   our	   requirements	   here	   adequately.	   	   As	   we	   have	  considered	  earlier	  coercion	  or	  even	  deception,	   lying	  manipulation	  of	  information,	  or	   nondisclosure	   of	   information	   are	   all	   permissible	   if	   they	   aid	   the	   actor	   to	  discharge	  his	  best	   interests	  duty.	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  action	  relies	  on	  what	  the	  actor	  (dentist)	   deems	   to	   be	   in	   the	   best	   interests	   of	   the	   patient	   that	   is	   to	   say	   the	   best	  outcome.	   Therefore	   (perhaps	   with	   some	   constraint)	   the	   best	   interest	   aim,	   for	  instance	  successful	  care,	  may	  well	  justify	  the	  means.	  	  	  	  
Summary	  It	  would	  seem	  then	  that	  although	  paternalism	  has	  some	  aspects	  to	  recommend	  it	  as	  a	   theoretical	  model	   it	   is	  unable	   to	  adequately	  meet	   the	  aims	  we	  considered	   in	  Chapter	  One.	   	  Our	   concerns	  with	   the	  process	  of	  healthcare	  and	   the	  desire	   in	   the	  primary	  dental	  care	  setting	  to	  assure	  the	  quality	  of	  a	  patient’s	  experience	  as	  well	  as	  their	   treatment	   outcome	   struggle	   to	   be	   delivered	   or	   assured	   by	   relying	   on	   a	  paternalistic	  model	   of	   patient	   dentist	   interaction.	   	   For	   that	   reason	   it	   seems	   that	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paternalism	  struggles	  to	  operate	  effectively	  as	  a	  principle	  on	  its	  own	  in	  the	  clinical	  context	  where	  a	  patient	  is	  viewed	  to	  continue	  to	  have	  their	  own	  autonomy.	  	  There	  is	  strong	  resistance	  to	  a	  position	  where	  an	  individual	  is	  able	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  for	  themselves	   but	   is	   precluded	   from	   doing	   so	   in	   the	   belief	   that	   another	   is	   better	  placed	  and	  as	  such	  has	  an	  authoritative	  voice.	   	  This	  is	  partly	  because	  paternalism	  draws	  its	  moral	  benefit	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  ‘outcome’	  of	  the	  interaction.	   	  However	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  One	  in	  our	  example	  of	  skill	  mix	  where	  patients	  express	  concern	   that	   they	   do	   not	   know	   the	   professional	   identity	   of	   the	   person	   treating	  them	  ‘outcome’	  is	  not	  the	  only	  measure	  of	  how	  we	  adequately	  respect	  patients.	  	  It	  is	  the	  utilitarian	  aspect	  of	  paternalism	  here	  that	  causes	  us	  difficulties	  as	  we	  cannot	  use	   an	   outcome	   focussed	  model	   to	   prompt	   us	   to	   divulge	   information	   that	   is	   not	  linked	  to	  the	  ‘outcome’	  of	  the	  interaction	  (the	  treatment).	  	  	  	  Further	   difficulties	   with	   paternalism	   are,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	   reliance	   on	   the	  principle	  of	  beneficence	  in	  that	  a	  patient	  is	  prevented	  from	  making	  a	  free	  choice	  if	  it	   is	  not	   the	   ‘best’	   choice.	   	  Even	   if	  we	  did	  not	  wish	   to	  express	   the	  desire	   for	   free	  choice	   in	   terms	   of	   autonomy	  we	   need	   to	   be	   able	   to	   express	   this	   desire	   for	   free	  choice	   by	   appealing	   to	   an	   adequate	   account	   of	   some	   kind.	   	   If	   we	   consider	   the	  example	  of	  the	  use	  of	  private	  alongside	  NHS	  treatment	  we	  raised	  concerns	  about	  a	  patient’s	  right	  to	  make	  that	  choice	  even	  in	  circumstance	  where	  the	  benefit	  derived	  might	  not	  be	  as	  great	  (for	  example	  the	  NHS	  treatment	  is	  not	  as	  good	  as	  the	  private	  one	  on	  offer).	  	  Choosing	  the	  ‘best’	  treatment	  option	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  patient	  has	  two	  consequences,	   first	   in	  order	  for	  us	  the	  claim	  that	   it	   is	   indeed	  the	   ‘best’	   it	  must	  be	  treatment	  focussed,	  a	  clinician	  might	  struggle	  to	  maintain	  a	  legitimate	  paternalistic	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stance	  if	   they	  claim	  expertise	  or	  knowledge	  of	  the	  patient	  outside	  those	  confines.	  	  Second	  (a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  the	  first	  point),	  if	  we	  are	  to	  take	  a	  patient-­‐centred	  approach	  rather	  than	  treatment	  focused	  then	  the	  private	  option	  may	  not	  indeed	  be	  the	   ‘best’	   because	   invariably	   it	   will	   be	  more	   expensive	   and	   as	   such	  may	   not	   be	  ‘best’	   for	   the	  patient.	   	  There	   is	  nothing	   in	   the	   theory	  that	  requires	  us	   to	  consider	  that	  broader	  definition	  of	   ‘best	   interests’	  and	  therefore	  we	  are	  unable	   to	  address	  the	  concerns	  raised	  in	  relation	  to	  NHS	  and	  private	  treatment.	  	  It	   seems	   that	  paternalism	  either	  on	   its	   own	  account	  or	   attempts	   to	   rationalise	   it	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  autonomy	  cannot	  satisfactorily	  address	  the	  concerns	  we	  raised	  in	  relation	  to	  our	  case	  studies	  in	  Chapter	  One.	  	  Paternalism	  causes	  us	  to	  continue	  to	  be	  too	  treatment	  focused	  in	  that	  this	  is	  where	  the	  benefit	  and	  authority	  for	  action	  are	  seen	  to	  arise.	  	  Benefit	  is	  also	  outcome	  focussed	  and	  as	  such	  fails	  to	  force	  us	  to	  consider	  the	  merits	  and	  dignity	  of	  process	  that	  we	  wish	  to	  develop	  as	  part	  of	  our	  case	   studies.	   	   Further	   as	   I	   wish	   to	   assert	   that	   paternalism	   does	   really	   rely	   on	  beneficence	  and	  that	  it	  is	  counter-­‐intuitive	  to	  believe	  that	  consent	  	  could	  act	  as	  it’s	  underpinning.	  	  As	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  that	  we	  cannot	  adequately	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  compatible	  with	  autonomy.	  	  This	  makes	  it	  theoretically	  difficult	  to	  ‘fix’	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  with	  both	  theories	  by	  reliance	  on	  each	  other	  and	  may	  cause	  us	   to	   look	  elsewhere	  for	  a	  suitable	  model	  of	  interaction	  for	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationship.	  	  However	  a	  reliance	  on	  medical	  expertise	  as	  one	  of	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  the	  clinical	  relationship	  operates	  may	  not	  be	  altogether	  redundant.	  	  O’Neill	  (2002a)	  has	  gone	  on	  to	  consider	  a	  relationship	  that	  is	  underpinned	  or	  supported	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	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concept	  of	  principled	  autonomy	  and	  it	  is	  now	  that	  I	  turn	  to	  consider	  whether	  this	  approach	   may	   be	   of	   use	   in	   developing	   an	   adequate	   framework	   for	   the	   dental	  relationship.	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Chapter	  Five	  –	  Principled	  Autonomy	  and	  Trust	  
We	  have	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  Three	  some	  of	  the	  concerns	  we	  have	  raised	  in	  relation	  to	  our	   current	   reliance	  on	  hierarchical	   accounts	  of	   autonomy.	   	  We	  have	   considered	  how	   our	   current	   construction	   of	   autonomy	   leaves	   us	   with	   a	   model	   of	   medical	  interaction	  that	  is	  both	  extremely	  complex,	  difficult	  to	  apply	  effectively,	  and	  overly	  medicalized.	  	  This	  has	  led	  us	  to	  contemplate	  alternatives	  and	  we	  have	  considered	  in	  Chapter	  Four	  both	   the	  benefits	   and	   some	  of	  our	   concerns	  with	   the	   concept	  of	  best	  interests	  and	  medical	  paternalism.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  best	  interest	  account	  does	  go	  some	  way	  to	  helping	  us	  give	  due	  ethical	  weight	  to	  the	  individual.	  	  The	  best	  interest	  account	  also	  helps	  us	  to	  draw	  limits	  round	  our	  duty	  to	  respect	  patients	  by	  confining	   that	   duty	   to	   the	  matters	   over	   which	   a	   clinician	   can	   legitimately	   claim	  expertise;	  the	  medical	  business	  at	  hand.	   	  However,	  we	  have	  also	  raised	  concerns.	  	  What	   the	  best	   interest	   account	   cannot	   legitimately	  provide,	   that	   is	   of	   concern	   to	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	   relationship,	   is	   a	  broader	  account	  of	  health	  care	   as	  defined	   in	  Chapter	  One	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  a	  patient’s	  wider	  reasonable	  wishes.	  	  Further,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  best	  interest	  account	  cannot	  deal	  effectively	  with	  our	  concerns	  with	   deception.	   	   Lying,	   deception	   and	  manipulation	   are	   all	   perfectly	   permissible	  features	  of	  this	  model	  so	  long	  as	  the	  principle	  of	  best	   interests	  is	  met.	   	  Therefore	  this	  makes	  the	  model	  unable	  to	  adequately	  address	  the	  concerns	  raised	  in	  Chapter	  One.	  	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  consider	  if,	  by	  taking	  a	  different	  approach	  and	  looking	  at	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationship	  rather	  than	  the	  patient	  in	  isolation	  we	  might	  be	  better	   able	   to	   respect	   patients	   and	   create	   a	  more	   ethically	   robust	   and	   equitable	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clinical	   relationship.	   	   This	   chapter	   will	   explore	   these	   ideas	   by	   first	   considering	  O’Neill’s	   concerns	   and	   her	   starting	   point	   for	   proposing	   a	   different	   model	   of	  clinician-­‐patient	  interaction.	  	  We	  will	  then	  move	  on	  to	  look	  at	  O’Neill’s	  alternative	  
principled	   approach	   to	   autonomy	   and	   how	   this	   differs	   from	   the	   current	  individualized	   stance.	   	   	   As	   O’Neill	   is	   taking	   an	   applied	   approach	   we	   will	   also	  consider	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   principled	   approach	   on	   the	   clinical	   relationship.	   	   It	   is	  worth	  noting	  that	  as	  a	  consequence	  O’Neill’s	  proposals	  are	  much	  less	  detailed	  than	  preceding	   accounts.	   	   O’Neill	   states	   that	   she	   wishes	   her	   account	   to	   be	   more	  practically	   digestible	   whilst	   remaining	   theoretically	   robust.	   	   Central	   to	   O’Neill’s	  proposed	   principled	   autonomy	   is	   the	   consequent	   duty,	   on	   clinicians,	   to	   be	  trustworthy.	   	   This	   chapter	   will	   consider	   more	   specifically	   to	   what	   extent	   this	  obligation	  to	  be	  trustworthy	  addresses	  our	  concerns	  with	  deception	  and	  an	  overly	  medicalized	  approach.	   	  Finally	  we	  will	  re-­‐visit	   the	  hypothetical	  case-­‐studies	   from	  Chapter	  One	  to	   judge	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  O’Neill’s	  propositions	  address	  some	  or	  all	  of	  our	  concerns	  in	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationship.	  	  
O’Neill’s	  concerns	  with	  the	  individualistic	  account	  of	  autonomy	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  earlier	  we	  live	  in	  a	  “time	  of	  triumph	  of	  autonomy	  in	  bioethics	  in	  which	   the	   law	   and	   ethics	   of	   medicine	   are	   dominated	   by	   one	   paradigm	   –	   the	  autonomy	   of	   the	   patient”	   (Schneider,	   1998,	   p.xi).	   	   In	   a	   post	   world	   war	   society,	  Manson	   and	  O’Neill	   argue	   this	   is	   a	   not	   at	   all	   surprising	   and	   is	   a	   rejection	  of	   and	  reaction	  to	  Second	  World	  War	  atrocities	  and	  totalitarianism	  (Manson	  and	  O’Neill,	  2007,	  p.1).	   	  Others	  have	  argued	  that	  this	   ‘autonomy	  dominance’	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  strong	  need	  for	  an	  individualistic	  account	  of	  respecting	  patients	  as	  a	  means	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of	  overturning	  the	  historical	  difficulties	  with	  medical	  paternalism	  (Stirrat	  and	  Gill,	  2004,	  p.127).	  	  Fox	  (1990)	  describes	  this	  as	  “the	  conceptional	  framework	  [that]	  has	  accorded	   paramount	   status	   to	   the	   value-­‐complex	   of	   individualism,	   underscoring	  the	   principles	   of	   individual	   rights,	   autonomy,	   self-­‐determination	   and	   their	   legal	  expression	  in	  the	  jurisprudential	  notion	  of	  privacy”	  (Fox,	  1990,	  p.206).	  	  Nonetheless	   there	   has	   been	   growing	   concern	   with	   this	   highly	   individualized	  approach	  for	  respecting	  patients.	  	  This	  concern	  particularly	  relates	  to	  what	  O’Neill	  asserts	  is	  a	  corrosive	  effect	  on	  the	  clinician-­‐patient	  relationship.	  O’Neill	  begins	  her	  criticism	   by	   pointing	   out	   that	   our	   current	   individualised	   interpretation	   of	   the	  meaning	  of	   autonomy	   is	   very	  distant	   from	   the	  principles	   original	   proponents	   on	  which	  we	  claim	  to	  rely.	   	  O’Neill	   recalls	   that	   John	  Stuart	  Mill	   rarely	  used	  the	   term	  autonomy	   and	   when	   he	   did	   use	   it,	   it	   was	   with	   reference	   to	   states	   rather	   than	  individuals.	   	   Mill,	   O’Neill	   claims,	   “sees	   individuals	   not	   merely	   as	   choosing	   to	  implement	   whatever	   desire	   they	   happen	   to	   have	   at	   any	   given	   moment,	   but	   as	  taking	   charge	   of	   those	   desires,	   as	   reflecting	   on	   and	   selecting	   among	   them	   in	  distinctive	  ways”	   (O’Neill,	  2002a,	  p.83-­‐84).	   	  O’Neill	   further	  asserts	   that	  Kant	  also	  did	  not	  adhere	   to	  a	  highly	   individualised	  account	  of	  autonomy.	   	  For	  Kant,	  O’Neill	  asserts,	   “autonomy	   is	   not	   [equated]	   with	   any	   distinctive	   form	   of	   personal	  independence	   or	   self-­‐expression.	   	   Kantian	   autonomy	   is	   manifested	   in	   a	   life	   in	  which	  duties	  are	  met,	  in	  which	  there	  is	  respect	  for	  others	  and	  their	  rights”	  (O’Neill,	  2002a,	   pp.83-­‐85).	   	   So	   for	   O’Neill	   Kantian	   autonomy	   is	   not	   a	   form	   of	   personal	  expression	   but	   rather	   “a	   matter	   of	   acting	   on	   certain	   sorts	   of	   principles,	   and	  specifically	   on	   principles	   of	   obligation”	   (O’Neill,	   2002a,	   pp.83-­‐84).	   	   For	   Kant	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freedom	  of	  expression	  cannot	  operate	  legitimately	  if	  it	  does	  not	  have	  reference	  to	  the	   needs	   and	   rights	   of	   other	   individuals.	   	   Autonomy,	   then,	   is	   to	   some	   degree	  
earned	  rather	  than	  presumed.	  Indeed	  “there	  can	  be	  no	  possibility	  for	  freedom	  for	  any	  one	  individual	  if	  that	  person	  acts	  without	  reference	  to	  all	  other	  moral	  agents”	  (Campbell,	   1995,	   p.14).	   	   O’Neill	   refers	   to	   this	   earned	   autonomy	   as	   principled	  autonomy.	   	  Jennings	  is	  also	  supportive	  of	  this	  view	  claiming	  that	  Kant	  and	  others	  established	  that	  “morality	  requires	  a	  person	  to	  assume	  responsibility	  for	  his	  or	  her	  choice,	   actions	   and	   decisions	   and	   to	   act	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   informed	   reason	   and	  autonomously	   held	   principled	   commitments.	   	   Others	   in	   turn	   must	   respect	   the	  moral	  agency	  and	  reasonable	  commitments	  of	  the	  person	  in	  this	  sense”	  (Jennings,	  2002,	   p.69).	   	   In	   summary	   unlike	   an	   individualistic	   account	   of	   autonomy	   then	   a	  principled	  account	  claims	  that	  there	  cannot	  be	  any	  autonomy	  without	  a	  correlative	  value	  of	  morality.	  	  I	  would	  wish	  to	  claim	  as	  part	  of	  that	  principled	  account	  there	  is	  also	  an	  implied	  necessary	  condition	  of	  freedom	  (as	  there	  is	  with	  other	  accounts	  of	  autonomy).	   	   That	   is	   to	   say	   that	   a	   principled	   autonomous	   agent	   must	   be	   in	   a	  position	  of	  free	  choice	  or	  free	  self-­‐determination	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  acting	  within	  the	  principled	  account.	  	  After	  all	  without	  this	  liberty	  (freedom)	  it	  would	  be	  unethical	  to	  make	  someone	  responsible	  for	  actions	  over	  which	  they	  have	  reduced	  control.	  	  	  	  Perhaps	   it	  might	  be	  useful	   to	  note	   that	   individualistic	  accounts	  of	  autonomy	  also	  have	  a	  long	  tradition	  with	  roots	  in	  the	  Enlightenment	  and	  the	  struggle	  from	  which	  modern	  Western	   democracies	   sprang.	   	   This,	   Stirrat	   and	   Gill	   (2005,	   p.128)	   claim	  has	   led	   to	   a	   modern	   interpretation	   that	   each	   individual	   carries	   his	   or	   her	   own	  “quantum”	  of	  ethics.	   	  That	   is	  to	  say	  each	  of	  us	   is	  an	  island	  of	  our	  own	  values	  and	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beliefs	  that	  no	  other	  may	  legitimately	  invade.	  	  The	  concern	  is	  that	  this	  represents	  an	  adoption	  of	  a	  number	  of	  powerful	  rights	  of	   independence	  without	  any	  related	  obligations.	  	  This	  lack	  of	  reciprocity	  means	  that	  “rights	  are	  multiplied	  assumed	  or	  attributed	  where	  they	  do	  not	  exist,	   replacing	  the	   language	  of	  duties	  which	  oblige	  even	  where	   there	   are	  no	   rights”	   (Dunstan,	   1994,	   p.3).	   	  We	  have	   seen	   in	  Chapter	  Two	  evidence	  of	  this	  account.	  	  As	  Schneider	  points	  out	  “the	  overwhelming	  weight	  of	  bioethical	  opinion	  endorses	  not	  just	  the	  autonomy	  principle	  but	  a	  potent	  version	  of	   it”.	   	   This	   is	   perhaps	   erroneously	   based	   on	   “the	   assumption	   that	   autonomy	   is	  what	  people	  primarily	  and	  pervasively	  want	  and	  need”.	  	  Thus,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  over	   whelming	   view	   of	   individualistic	   autonomy	   in	   current	   biomedical	   ethics	   is	  one	   that	   confers	   “a	   right	   to	   act	   on	   one’s	   own	   judgment	   about	   matters	   affecting	  one’s	  life,	  without	  the	  interference	  of	  others”	  (Dunstan,	  1994,	  p.3).	  	  O’Neill’s	  belief	  is	   that	   this	   approach	   is	   fundamentally	   flawed	   and	   that	   autonomy	   ought	   more	  rightly	   to	   be	   set	   in	   context	   with	   due	   reference	   to	   relationships	   and	   community.	  	  O’Neill	   proposes	   that	   “conceptions	   of	   individual	   autonomy	   cannot	   provide	   a	  sufficient	  and	  convincing	  starting	  point	  for	  bioethics,	  even	  for	  medical	  ethics…The	  supposed	   triumph	   of	   individual	   autonomy	   over	   other	   principles	   –	   is	   an	  unsustainable	  illusion”	  (O’Neill,	  2002a,	  p.73).	  	  One	   of	   the	   key	   concerns	   of	   O’Neill	   and	   others	   is	   the	   corrosive	   effect	   that	   the	  individualistic	   account	   has	   on	   the	   clinical	   relationship.	   	   Schneider	   (1998)	   claims	  that	  we	  can	  currently	  observe	   there	  are	   two	   types	  of	   autonomy	  operating	   in	   the	  clinical	  relationship	  those	  being	  optional	  and	  mandatory.	  	  Brock	  (1993)	  views	  the	  former	  as	  “entitling	  but	  not	  requiring	  the	  patient	  to	  take	  an	  active	  role	  in	  decision	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making	   regarding	   treatment”	   (Brock,	   1993,	   p.33).	   	   In	   the	   latter	   model	   “it	   is	  practically	   unwise	   and	  morally	   objectionable	   for	   a	   patient	   to	   forswear	  making	   a	  medical	  decision	  personally”	  (Brock	  1993,	  p.33).	   	  Both	  of	   these	  approaches	  seem	  morally	  problematic	  and	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  O’Neill	  and	  others	  raise	  objections	  to	  them.	  	  Prima	  facie	  it	  would	  appear	  not	  at	  all	  equitable	  that	  a	  patient	  may	  assume	  rights	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  element	  of	  their	  care	  but	  assumes	  no	  responsibility	   to	  do	  so.	   	  This	   leaves	   the	  clinician	   in	  a	  position	  where	   they	  do	  not	  have	  full	  authority	  for	  decision-­‐making	  yet	  may	  well	  be	  burdened	  with	  doing	  so	  as	  a	   default.	   	   The	   latter	   mandatory	   example	   fares	   no	   better.	   	   It	   also	   seems	  unsatisfactory	  to	  force	  decisions	  onto	  patients	  and	  presume	  a	  form	  of	  moral	  value	  in	   self-­‐determination	   to	   a	   perhaps	   tyrannical	   extent	   reminiscent	   of	   the	   very	  paternalism	  we	  wish	  to	  avoid.	  	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  disagree	  with	  such	  concerns.	  	  However,	  I	  would	  wish	   to	  add	   that	   there	  appears	   to	  be	  a	  background	  here	  of	  presuming	  a	  certain	  equality	  of	  position	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  clinician	  and	  patient.	  	  This	  presumed	   equality	   is	   at	   the	   root	   of	   concerns	   raised	   as	   well	   as	   the	   proposed	  substitution	  of	   an	   individualistic	   account	  of	   autonomy	  with	  a	  principled	  one.	   	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  earlier	  chapters	  it	  is	  commonly	  recognized	  that	  there	  exist	  a	  duty	  of	  care	  relationship	  between	  clinician	  and	  patient.	  	  This	  duty	  of	  care	  relationship	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  recognition	  that	  the	  relationship	  is	  unequal.	  	  No	  matter	  how	  informed	   a	   patient	   or	   how	   well	   qualified	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   imagine	   how	   one	   might	  successfully	   argue	   that	   the	   patient	   has	   the	   overriding	   authoritative	   voice.	   	   The	  patient	  may	  well	  have	  the	  right	  to	  consent	  but	  does	  not	  choose	  to	  be	  ill	  or	  in	  need	  of	  treatment	  or	  decide	  on	  the	  diagnosis	  or	  appropriate	  courses	  of	  treatment.	  	  This,	  some	   may	   claim,	   is	   an	   objective	   process	   and	   the	   options	   are	   not	   part	   of	   the	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clinician	   exercising	   power	   but	   rather	  what	   is	   clinically	   indicated.	   	   Although	   this	  may	   be	   the	   case	   in	   some	   instances	   often	   the	   options	   presented	   are	   part	   of	   the	  
judgment	  of	  the	  clinician	  and	  I	  would	  wish	  to	  argue,	  this	  imbues	  the	  clinician	  with	  rather	  more	   authority	   in	   the	  decision-­‐making	  process	   than	  might	   appear	   at	   first	  glance.	  	  For	  this	  reason	  I	  would	  wish	  to	  raise	  an	  initial	  doubt	  concerning	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  reciprocity	  in	  the	  clinical	  relationship	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  an	  individualized	  approach.	  	  We	  will	  however	  consider	  this	  in	  more	  detail	  later	  on	  in	  the	  chapter	  in	  relation	  to	  our	  hypothetical	  case	  studies.	  	  
Principled	  Autonomy	  O’Neill’s	   solution,	   to	   her	   objections	   to	   an	   individualized	   account	   of	   autonomy,	  results	  in	  her	  principled	  account.	  	  For	  O’Neill	  autonomy	  is	  not	  a	  feature	  of	  person	  in	  that	  it	  is	  neither	  an	  inalienable	  right	  nor	  an	  ability	  to	  make	  personal	  decisions	  in	  a	   particular	   reflective	   way.	   	   Rather	   principled	   autonomy	   is	   a	   commitment	   to	   a	  certain	  set	  of	  assumed	  obligations	  that	  we	  can	  will	  as	  universal	  laws.	  	  It	  is	  O’Neill’s	  aim	   to	   ground	   human	   rights	   in	   human	   obligation	   rather	   than	   the	   individualized	  accounts	  of	  human	  good	  (O’Neill,	  2002a,	  p.78).	   	  O’Neill	  argues	  that	   this	  approach	  has	  five	  main	  advantages:	  “First…that	   obligations	   are	   structurally	   connected	   to	   rights;	   second	   that	  their	   connection	   to	   action	   can	   be	   well	   articulated;	   the	   third	   and	  consequential	  advantage	  is	  that	  obligations	  are	  more	  readily	  distinguished	  and	   individuated	   than	   are	   rights;	   the	   fourth	   is	   that	   the	   approach	   is	   less	  individualistic	   than	   rights-­‐based	   approaches.	   	   Finally…we	   can	   find	   better	  routes	  to	  the	  justification	  of	  obligations,	  and	  hence	  rights,	  than	  we	  can	  find	  to	  the	  justification	  of	  rights,	  and	  hence	  of	  obligations.”	  (O’Neill,	  2002a,	  p.78)	  	  
166	  	  
For	  O’Neill	  the	  first	  important	  benefit	  of	  principled	  autonomy	  is	  that	  it	  focuses	  on	  obligations	   rather	   than	   rights.	   	  O’Neill	   points	   out	   that	   this	   is	   a	  more	   satisfactory	  solution	   in	   that	   if	   we	   focus	   on	   delivering	   obligations	   there	   is	   a	   correlative	  connection	   to	   rights.	   	  A	   right	   then	  would	  position	   itself	  as	  a	   consequence	   (in	   the	  sense	   of	   action)	   of	   an	   obligation	   rather	   than	   the	   reverse.	   	   The	   attraction	   to	   this	  approach,	  O’Neill	   asserts,	   is	   that	  we	  often	  claim	  rights	   in	  a	  proleptic	   sense.	   	  This	  can	  be	  somewhat	  self-­‐defeating	  as	  rights	  require	  due	  recognition	  in	  order	  to	  exist.	  	  Where	  we	   anticipate	   rights	  where	   there	   is	   no	   correlative	   duty	   the	   right	   itself	   is	  undeliverable.	  	  O’Neill	  uses	  of	  the	  example	  of	  ‘right	  to	  health’.	  	  O’Neill	  claims	  that	  in	  her	  view	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  provide	  health	  for	  all,	  so	  there	  can	  be	  no	  correlative	  obligation	  to	  do	  so.	   	  This’	  O’Neill	  asserts	   is	  self-­‐defeating	  because	  to	  claim	  a	  right	  where	  there	   is	  no	  corresponding	  duty	   is	  to	  claim	  not	  right	  at	  all.	   	   	  Obligations	  on	  the	   other	   hand,	   at	   least	   require	   action	   from	   the	   individual	   or	   organisation	  therefore	   an	   obligation	   to	   provide	   health	   for	   all	   is	   much	  more	   effective	   than	   to	  claim	  a	  right	  to	  it.	  	  Second,	   the	   duty	   to	   meet	   certain	   obligations	   is	   what	   O’Neill	   describes	   as	   the	  “business	  end”	  of	  ethics.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  because	  (unlike	  rights)	  obligations	  are	  more	  closely	  linked	  to	  action.	  	  As	  with	  O’Neill’s	  first	  point	  if	  no	  one	  carries	  out	  their	   obligations	   then	   no	   one’s	   rights	   will	   be	  met.	   	   This	   view	   of	   the	   position	   of	  obligations	  is	  one	  also	  expressed	  by	  Weil:	  “The	  notion	  of	  obligations	  comes	  before	  that	  of	  rights,	  which	  is	  subordinate	  and	   relative	   to	   the	   former:	   A	   rights	   is	   not	   effectual	   by	   itself,	   but	   only	   in	  relation	   to	   obligation	   to	   which	   it	   corresponds,	   the	   effective	   exercise	   of	   a	  right	   springing	   not	   from	   the	   individual	   who	   possesses	   it,	   but	   from	   other	  men	  who	  consider	   themselves	  as	  being	  under	  certain	  obligations	   towards	  him.”	  (Weil,	  1949,	  p.3)	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Although	  O’Neill	  does	  not	  go	  so	  far	  to	  claim	  that	  obligations	  are	  a	  priority	  to	  rights	  she	   does	   assert	   that	   an	   observance	   of	   obligations	   does	   predate	   the	  more	   recent	  reliance	  on	  rights.	  	  O’Neill	  wishes	  to	  return	  to	  at	  least	  a	  position	  where	  obligations	  and	  rights	  cannot	  be	  separated;	  that	  both	  principles	  are	  mutually	  determining.	  	  The	   third	   advantage	   that	   O’Neill	   claims	  with	   principled	   autonomy	   is	   obligations	  are	  described	  using	  the	  “language	  of	  action”	  (O’Neill,	  2002a,	  p.81).	  	  This	  means	  that	  we	  can	  more	  readily	  distinguish	  obligations	  than	  we	  can	  rights.	  	  This	  is	  certainly	  an	  attractive	   proposition	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   for	   an	   applied	   approach	   (in	   the	   clinical	  context)	  it	  is	  much	  easier	  for	  the	  dentist	  to	  discern	  what	  is	  required	  of	  him	  or	  her	  if	  those	   requirements	   are	   an	   obligation	   to	   “to	   do	  or	   to	   desist,	   to	   act	  or	   to	   refrain”	  (O’Neill,	  2002a,	  p.81).	  	  Whereas	  when	  considering	  rights	  such	  as	  a	  ‘right	  to	  life	  ‘or	  ‘a	  right	  to	  choose’	  what	  is	  actually	  required	  of	  the	  dentist	  is	  much	  less	  obvious.	  	  It	  may	   be	   considered	   though	   as	   to	   what	   is	   lost	   with	   these	   more	   practical	   calls	   to	  action?	   	  After	  all	  a	  right	  to	  life,	   is	  a	  much	  more	  complex	  and	  difficult	  concept	  that	  requires	   far	  more	   consideration	   than	   a	   narrow	   duty	   to	  maintain	   confidentiality.	  	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  no	  room	  for	  academic	  debate	  around	  any	  duty	  (after	  all	   one	   may	   need	   to	   consider	   when	   it	   is	   appropriate,	   if	   ever,	   to	   breach	  confidentiality)	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  duty	  in	  the	  clinical	  setting	  as	  a	  call	  to	  action	   is	  surely	   met	   if	   the	   action	   is	   followed	   through.	   	   There	   is	   perhaps	   less	   practical	  impetus	   to	   consider	   the	   finer	   points	   of	   a	   duty	   because	   you	   can	  prove	   at	   least	   in	  your	  own	  mind	  that	  it	  is	  met	  whereas	  one	  is	  forced	  to	  consider	  and	  reflect	  on	  ones	  actions	  and	  motivations	  when	  claiming	  to	  have	  respected	  a	  right.	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The	   fourth	   advantage	   is	   one	   that	   in	   describing	   autonomy	   as	   a	   set	   of	   obligations	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  set	  of	  rights	  we	  rightly	  (in	  her	  view)	  move	  away	  from	  the	  highly	  individualized	   accounts	   to	   one	   that	   looks	   at	   the	   bearers	   of	   obligations	   and	   the	  holders	   of	   rights.	   	   O’Neill’s	   view	   is	   that	  when	  we	   talk	   about	   rights	  we	   naturally	  focus	  solely	  on	  the	  bearer	  of	  those	  rights	  rather	  than	  the	  individual	  or	  institution	  that	  might	  be	  called	  upon	  to	  deliver	  them.	  	  The	  consequence	  of	  this,	  O’Neill	  claims	  is	   that	  at	   times	  the	  bearer	  of	  rights	  bears	  them	  in	  a	  vacuum	  where	   it	   is	  not	  clear	  where	  or	  against	  whom	  those	  rights	  should	  be	  claimed.	  	  In	  contrast	  when	  we	  talk	  of	   obligations	  we	  have	   to	   focus	  on	   the	   relationship	   and	   therefore	  have	   a	  natural	  structure	   around	   which	   obligations	   and	   correlative	   rights	   are	   set.	   	   This	   means,	  particularly	   for	   the	  patient	   their	   rights	   are,	  O’Neill	   claims,	  more	   likely	   to	   be	  met	  because	   there	   is	   a	   specified	   agent	   (the	   dentist)	   to	   who	   the	   corresponding	   duty	  settles	  on.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  clear	  from	  O’Neill’s	  account	  that	  we	  are	  not	  starting	  with	  rights	   and	   then	   attaching	   a	   corresponding	   duty,	   in	   fact	   quite	   the	   opposite.	   	   The	  duty	  is	  on	  the	  clinician	  to	  perform	  his	  or	  her	  obligation	  which	  is	   linked	  to	  a	  right	  held	  by	  the	  patient.	  	  We	  will	  look	  later	  on	  at	  one	  particular	  duty	  the	  clinician	  must	  adopt	  according	  to	  O’Neill’s	  account,	  trust.	  	  For	  now	  however	  I	  would	  like	  to	  point	  out	   that	   the	   consequence	  of	  obligation	   setting	  by	   the	  dentist	  may	  cause	  us	   to	  be	  somewhat	   concerned	   about	   the	  patient’s	   ability	   to	   set	   any	  kind	  of	   agenda	   in	   the	  clinical	  encounter	  despite	  the	  encounter	  generally	  being	  thought	  as	   for	  their	  [the	  patient’s]	  benefit.	  	  	  	  Finally,	  O’Neill	  claims	  that	  there	  is	  a	  better	  route	  of	  justification	  where	  obligations	  come,	  so	   to	  speak,	  before	  rights.	   	  This	  again	  relates	   to	   the	  need	   for	  an	  obligation	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based	   approach	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   relationship	   (because	   it	   relies	   on	   action)	   rather	  than	  the	  individual.	  	  After	  all,	  O’Neill	  points	  out,	  we	  cannot	  fulfil	  our	  obligations	  if	  we	   do	   not	   know	   to	   whom	  we	   owe	   our	   duties.	   	   In	   some	   cases	   agents	  may	   have	  obligations	  to	  all	  others	  for	  example	  not	  to	  enslave	  but	  in	  other	  cases	  that	  may	  be	  confined	  to	  individuals	  such	  as	  the	  duty	  to	  maintain	  a	  confidence.	  	  O’Neill’s	   proposal	   therefore	   is	   based	   on	   entrenching	   obligations	   in	   the	   clinical	  relationship	  rather	  than	  trying	  to	  negotiate	  the	  individual	  autonomy	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  However,	  in	  order	  for	  the	  entrenching	  of	  obligations	  over	  and	  above	  rights	  would	  only	  be	  persuasive	  (despite	  some	  of	  our	  reservations)	  if	  there	  is	  a	  good	  argument	  for	   central	   human	   obligations.	   	   This	   concept	   relates	  most	   closely	   to	   the	   Kantian	  approach	  of	  universal	  law.	  	  Kant’s	  premise	  rests	  on	  the	  notion	  for	  a	  principle	  (law)	  to	  be	  ethically	  justifiable	  that	  law	  must	  be	  universal.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  law	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  all	  people	  at	  all	  times.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
O’Neill	  and	  the	  clinical	  relationship	  So	   far	   O’Neill	   has	   argued	   for	   a	   replacement	   of	   an	   individualised	   account	   of	  autonomy	  for	  a	  principled	  one	  on	  the	  basis	   that	  a	  principled	  account	  has	  greater	  moral	   authority.	   	   The	   basis	   for	   this	   claim	   rests	   on	  O’Neill’s	   belief	  with	   all	   rights	  there	   ought	   to	   be	   correlative	   duties.	   	   This	   is	   coupled	   with	   a	   rejection	   of	   the	  individualized	   account	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   it	   has	   less	   moral	   authority	   and	   it	   is	  corrosive	   to	   the	  medical	   relationship.	   	  As	  part	   of	  making	   this	  principled	   account	  operationally	  possible,	  which	   is	   one	  of	  O’Neill’s	   key	   concerns,	   she	   appeals	   to	   the	  concept	  of	  trust.	  	  Trust	  is,	  O’Neill	  asserts,	  a	  key	  component	  of	  any	  relationship.	  	  It	  is	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important	  to	  note	  though	  that	  O’Neill’s	  account	  of	  trust	  is	  one	  of,	  (as	  is	  her	  account	  of	  autonomy)	  a	  consequence	  of	  good	  behaviour	  rather	  than	  a	  blind	  faith	  decision.	  	  We	  will	  now	  look	  at	  how	  those	  two	  propositions	  translate	  into	  clinical	  practice.	  	  	  	  	  The	   clinical	   relationship	   has,	   historically,	   been	   one	   that	   is	   covenantal	   in	   nature	  rather	   than	   contractual.	   	   A	   covenantal	   relationship	   is	   defined	   by	   an	   implied	  agreement	  between	  the	  parties	  to	  a	  number	  of	  duties	  and	  obligations	  (May,	  1983).	  	  As	   the	   relationship	   is	   also	   subject	   to	   the	   auspices	   of	   ‘duty	   of	   care’	   to	   reflect	   the	  inequality	   between	   patient	   and	   clinician,	   this	   has	   meant	   the	   majority	   of	   formal	  duties	  are	  adopted	  by	   the	  clinician	  rather	   than	  by	   the	  patient.	   	   	  As	  O’Neill	  points	  out	  (2002,	  p.119),	  mutual	  trust	  has	  been	  eroded	  in	  recent	  years	  in	  what	  she	  calls	  the	  “after	  glow”	  (2002,	  p.118)	  of	  medical	  paternalism	  and	  some	  very	  high	  profile	  cases	   of	   poor	   and	   unethical	   medical	   practice	   (Consider	   Chapter	   Two	   and	   the	  
Redfern	   Report,	   (DoH,	   2001)	   as	   an	   example).	   This,	   she	   suggests,	   has	   lead	   to	   an	  implicit	  breakdown	  of	  the	  clinician-­‐patient	  relationship.	  	  Further	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  rise	  of	  managerial	  ethics	  in	  health	  care,	  although	  individual	  clinicians	  tends	  to	  be	  patient	   focused,	   the	   dominantly	   consequentialist	   model	   of	   managerial	   ethics	  ultimately	   determines	   the	   health	   care	   that	   patients	   receive	   (consider	   the	   use	   of	  NICE	  as	  an	  example	  of	  this	  approach),	  (Jennings,	  2002).	  	  To	  some	  extent	  this	  new	  managerial	   style	   may	   well	   be	   understood.	   	   The	   big	   decisions	   that	   affect	   a	  population	   are	   too	   important	   to	   be	   left	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   individual	   clinicians	  particularly	   in	   the	   context	   of	   an	   institution	   such	   as	   the	   NHS	   and	   its	   associated	  public	  funding.	  	  The	  temptation,	  it	  is	  considered,	  would	  be	  too	  great	  to	  promote	  the	  needs	   of	   the	   individual	   patient	   without	   due	   consideration	   to	   the	   greater	   good.	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However,	   Illingworth	   asserts,	   this	   managerial	   approach	   is	   “antithetical”	   to	   the	  patient	   experience	   as	   it	   is	   at	   this	   patient-­‐clinician	   level	   that	   trust	   is	   gained	   and	  bestowed.	  	  This	  managed	  approach	  has	  damaged	  the	  patient-­‐clinician	  relationship	  (Illingworth,	  2002,	  pp.31-­‐46).	  	  This	  is	  because	  although	  the	  government	  in	  the	  UK	  has	   great	   influence	   in	   determining	   the	   type,	   scope	   and	   quality	   of	   caring	  environment	  they	  are	  not	  ultimately	  responsible	  for	  the	  ill	  individual.	  	  In	   this	   traditional	  covenantal	  relationship	   the	  “central	  obligations	  of	   the	  clinician	  are	   competence,	   compassion,	   care	   and	   good	   communication”	   (Stirrat	   and	   Gill,	  2004,	   p.129).	   	   Respect	   for	   autonomy	   currently	   means	   that	   the	   patient	   must	   be	  “treated	   with	   respect,	   be	   properly	   informed,	   be	   listened	   to,	   give	   their	   consent	  voluntarily,	   without	   coercion,	   and	   have	   their	   confidentiality	   fully	   respected”	  (Stirrat	   and	  Gill,	   2004,	  p.129).	   	   This	   could	  perhaps	  be	   summarized	  as	   seeing	   the	  patient	   as	   a	   person	   rather	   than	   simply	   a	   presenting	   patient,	   an	   obligation	   to	  empathize	  with	  the	  individual.	  	  Atkins	  (2000)	  goes	  further	  than	  this	  and	  argues	  for	  an	  attempt	  to	  imagine	  what	  the	  clinical	  experience	  is	  actually	  like	  for	  that	  patient	  rather	   than	  a	  broader	   attempt	  at	   empathizing	  with	  a	  hypothetical	  patient	   in	   any	  given	  situation.	  	  This	  is	  of	  concern	  though	  for	  ethicists	  such	  as	  Draper	  and	  Sorrell	  (2002).	  	  Their	  view	  is	  that	  this	  is	  rather	  one	  sided	  as	  the	  patient	  does	  not	  adopt	  any	  correlative	   duties	   and	   that	   such	   an	   approach	   “dwells	   on	   the	   obligations	   of	   the	  doctors	   to	   the	   exclusion	   of	   the	   patients”	   (2002,	   p.335).	   	   Draper	   and	   Sorrell	  continue:	  	  “Traditionally	   medical	   ethics	   has	   asserted	   that,	   as	   autonomous	   agents,	  competent	  patients	  must	  be	  allowed	  to	  decide	  for	  themselves	  the	  course	  of	  their	  medical	  treatment…it	   is	   for	  the	  doctor	  to	  communicate	  effectively	  all	  the	   relevant	   information,	   assess	   the	   patient’s	   competence,	   persuade	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without	  coercing,	  and	  abide	  by	  whatever	  decision	  the	  patient	  makes.	  	  Little	  or	  nothing	  is	  said	  about	  what	  kinds	  of	  decisions	  the	  patient	  ought	  to	  make”	  (Draper	  and	  Sorrell,	  2002,	  p.349).	  	  The	  way	  in	  which	  we	  might	  wish	  to	  judge	  the	  ‘quality’	  of	  a	  patient	  decision	  is	  only	  assessed	  by	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  decision	  originates	  from	  the	  patient.	   	  Draper	  and	   Sorrell	   feel	   that	   this	   account	   is	   inadequate	   and	   that	   a	   patient	   taking	  responsibility	   for	   their	  decision	   is	   an	   intrinsic	  part	  of	   exercising	   their	  autonomy.	  	  Draper	  and	  Sorrell	  suggest	  that	   in	  practice	  their	  view	  has	  two	  effects.	   	  First,	   they	  claim,	   from	   a	   practical	   perspective	   a	   decision	   for	   which	   one	   has	   to	   take	  responsibility	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  complied	  with	  although	  this	  is	  phrased	  as	  ‘more	  effective’	  rather	  than	  compliance.	   	  The	  example	  used	  is	   to	  claim	  that	  one	   is	  more	  likely	   to	   successfully	   give	  up	   smoking	   in	   a	   situation	  where	  one	  has	   come	   to	   that	  decision	   oneself	   rather	   than	   being	   found	   in	   a	   predicament	  where	   cigarettes	   are	  banned.	   	  This	   claim	  seems	   to	  be	   somewhat	   tenuous	   in	   that	   a	  decision	  made	   in	  a	  highly	  individualized	  account	  bears	  the	  same	  qualities	  of	  being	  one’s	  own	  decision	  as	   this	   more	   principled	   account	   proposed	   by	   Draper	   and	   Sorrell.	   	   From	   this	  perspective	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  in	  what	  way	  an	  individualized	  decision	  does	  not	  bear	  the	  same	  consequence.	  	  It	  is	  agreed	  that	  the	  responsibility	  is	  not	  directly	  linked	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  Draper	  and	  Sorrell	  wish	  to	  see	  to	  the	  situation	  one	  finds	  oneself	  in	  as	  a	  patient	  would	  be	  the	  same	  surely	  if	  one	  had	  made	  the	  decision	  under	  either	  account	  of	  autonomy?	   	  They	  go	  on	   the	  claim	  that	   if	  one	   freely	  chooses	  an	  option	  that	   carries	   a	   specific	   risk	   and	   the	   worst	   happens	   one	   is	   responsible	   for	   that	  decision.	   	   It	   is	   difficult	   to	   see	   in	   what	   way	   this	   claim	   differs	   from	   the	   current	  situation.	  	  After	  all	  if	  a	  patient	  currently	  makes	  an	  informed	  decision	  and	  a	  known	  risk	  of	  the	  procedure	  unfortunately	  occurs,	  the	  patient	  is	  not	  entitled	  to	  any	  legal	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redress	   (Bolam	   v	   Friern	   Hospital	   Management	   Committee,	   (1957).	   	   If	   a	   person	  chooses	  a	  curry	  that	  is	  described	  on	  the	  menu	  ‘spicy’	  and	  they	  make	  that	  choice	  in	  an	   individualized	  way	  this	  does	  not	  afford	  them	  a	  route	  of	  complaint	   if	   the	  curry	  turns	  out	  to	  not	  be	  to	  their	   liking.	   	  The	  only	  difference	  in	  the	  accounts	  is	  that	  the	  initial	   choice	   is	   not	   underpinned	   by	   responsibility	   in	   an	   individualized	   account;	  responsibility	  here	  is	  merely	  a	  consequence	  of	  choosing.	  	  This	  implies	  that	  we	  are	  then	   trying	   to	   examine	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   choice	   by	   adding	   in	   a	   responsibility	  element	   that	   for	   the	   most	   part	   seems	   to	   be	   there	   already;	   the	   patient	   cannot	  separate	  themselves	  from	  their	  decision	  nor	  blame	  anyone	  else	  when	  their	  choice	  does	  not	  ‘roll	  out’	  as	  they	  would	  have	  envisaged.	  	  One	  way	  or	  another	  they	  have	  to	  live	   with	   that	   decision.	   	   Further	   there	   is	   also	   a	   presumption	   implied	   here	   of	  rationality,	  that	  a	  decision	  ought	  to	  have	  a	  rational	  component	  to	  be	  of	  value.	  	  After	  all	  if	  we	  talk	  of	  quality	  of	  decision	  there	  must	  be	  decisions	  that	  lack	  quality.	  Where	  does	   this	   leave	   the	   competent	   patient	   when	   or	   if	   they	   make	   an	   unwise	   choice?	  	  Does	   that	   choice,	   because	   it	   lacks	   quality,	   fail	   to	   be	   autonomous	   in	   Draper	   and	  Sorrell’s	  account?	  	  Would	  this	  mean	  that	  the	  clinician	  then	  became	  responsible	  by	  default	  in	  the	  same	  way	  where	  a	  patient	  lacks	  capacity?	  	  	  The	  second	  claim	  of	  Draper	  and	  Sorrell	  relates	  to	  the	  situation	  a	  patient	  finds	  him	  or	   herself	   in.	   	   That	   is	   to	   say	   to	  what	   extent	   should	   a	   patient,	   as	   an	   autonomous	  agent,	  take	  on	  responsibility	  for	  their	  own	  ill	  health.	  	  It	  is	  not	  the	  intention	  here	  to	  start	   an	   account	   of	   the	   social	   determinants	   of	   health	   but	   this	   seems	   to	   be	   an	  unsupportable	   extension	   of	   the	   term	   responsibility.	   	   We	  might	   want	   to	   at	   least	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consider	   from	   an	   ethical	   perspective	   that	   one	   cannot	   be	   held	   responsible	   for	  situations	  over	  which	  one	  has	  no	  control.	  	  
O’Neill	  and	  Trust	  O’Neill	   clearly	   is	   raising	   concerns	  about	   the	   individualized	   form	  of	  autonomy	  we	  currently	  observe	  and	  proposing	  that	  we	  appeal	  to	  a	  principled	  form	  of	  autonomy	  that	  attached	  duties	  to	  it	  as	  well	  as	  rights.	  	  O’Neill’s	  intention	  here	  however	  is	  one	  of	   practical	   application	   she	   is	   concerned	   with	   making	   the	   clinical	   relationship	  function	  effectively	  and	  ethically.	  	  	  For	  that	  reason	  her	  concerns	  and	  re-­‐thinking	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  principled	  account	  of	  autonomy	  prompts	  her	  to	  consider	  the	  concept	  of	  trust	  as	  one	  of	  her	  universal	  obligations.	  	  O’Neill	  asserts	  that	  in	  any	  relationship	  trust	   is	  an	  essential	  component.	   	  O’Neill	   in	  her	  Reith	  Lectures	  (2002b)	  remind	  us	  that	   Confucius	   considered	   that	   three	   things	   are	   essential	   for	   sound	   government	  those	  being	  weapons,	   food	   and	   trust.	   	  Of	   those	   three	   essential	   components	   trust	  must	   never	   be	   surrendered	   because	   without	   trust	   we	   cannot	   stand	   (O’Neill,	  2002b).	   	  O’Neill	  contends	   that	   this	  applies	  universally	  whether	  we	  are	  viewed	  as	  individuals	  or	  operating	  in	  a	  community	  or	  profession.	  	  This	  is	  because	  “we	  have	  to	  be	  able	   to	   rely	  on	  others	  acting	  on	  what	   they	  say	   that	   they	  will,	   and	  because	  we	  need	  others	  to	  accept	  that	  we	  act	  as	  we	  say	  we	  will”	  (O’Neill,	  2002a).	  	  Trust,	  O’Neill	  argues,	   is	   also	   fundamental	   to	   a	   moral	   community	   (O’Neill,	   2002a)	   and	   “the	  fundamental	  virtue	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  being	  a	  good	  doctor”.	  	  Illingworth	  has	  described	  this	   as	   “the	   scarcest	   of	   medical	   resources”	   which	   for	   O’Neill	   needs	   to	   be	   re-­‐established	  as	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  clinical	  relationship	  (Illingworth,	  2002).	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O’Neill’s	  construction	  of	  trust	  is	  not	  a	  complex	  philosophical	  one	  in	  this	  regard	  and	  this	   is	  deliberate.	   	  Her	   attraction	   to	   trust	   is	   one	  of	  using	   the	  vernacular	   to	  make	  something	  meaningful	  and	  a	  deliverable	  action	   in	   the	  clinical	   setting.	   	   It	   is	  also	  a	  call	   to	   action	   and	   (perhaps	   importantly)	   does	   not	   require	   patients	   to	   trust	  clinicians	   but	   rather	   is	   a	   call	   to	   action	   to	   clinicians	   to	   behave	   in	   ways	   that	  encourage	  and	  support	  trust	  from	  patients.	  	  Clinicians	  must	  be	  trustworthy	  agents.	  	  	  	  For	  O’Neill	  we	  need	  trust	  however,	  not	  as	  insurance	  against	  what	  we	  suppose	  will	  be	   the	   future	   actions	   of	   others	   but	   rather	   because	   of	   the	   uncertainty	   as	   to	   the	  future	  actions	  of	  others.	   	  There	   is	   certainly	  an	  element	  of	   risk	   in	  putting	   trust	   in	  someone	  or	   something	  over	  which	   you	  have	  no	   real	   control	   and	   it	   consequently	  introduces	  an	  element	  of	  vulnerability	  into	  the	  relationship.	  	  Although	  trust	  may	  be	  considered	  as	  a	   ‘leap	  of	   faith’	   in	   that	  you	  are	  committing	   to	   something	  unknown	  that	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	   that	   trust	   should	  be	  blind.	   	  O’Neill	   proposes	   that	  trust	  ought	  only	  to	  be	  placed	  in	  those	  individuals	  or	  institutions	  that	  have	  shown	  themselves	  with	  clear	  evidence	  to	  be	  trustworthy.	  	  In	  this	  sense	  then	  trust	  for	  the	  clinical	  relationship,	  for	  O’Neill,	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  presumption	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  authority	  of	   the	  clinician;	   trust	   is	  acquired	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	   the	  clinician’s	  actions	  or	  deeds.	   	  This	   is	  how	  O’Neill	  distinguishes	  her	  form	  of	  trust	   from	  that	  of	  faith.	   	   As	   Yancey	   contends,	   “a	   person	   who	   lives	   in	   faith	   must	   proceed	   on	  incomplete	   evidence,	   trusting	   in	   advance	   what	   they	   can	   only	   make	   sense	   of	   in	  reverse”	  (Yancey,	  2000,	  p.95)	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For	  O’Neill	  then	  there	  are	  two	  necessary	  components	  to	  trust.	  	  The	  first	  is	  that	  one	  must	  first	  show	  oneself	  to	  be	  trustworthy	  through	  one’s	  behaviour	  (by	  our	  deeds	  let	  us	  be	  known).	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  demonstrable	  competence	  to	  carry	  out	  the	   tasks	   that	  are	  subject	   to	   trust.	   	  The	  second	   is	   that	   the	  competence	  claimed	   is	  achieved	   through	   legitimate	   and	   reliable	   means.	   	   This	   could	   be	   interpreted	   for	  medicine	   and	   dentistry	   as	   the	   evidence	   that	   the	   means	   by	   which	   dentists	   or	  doctors	  are	  trained	  and	  regulated	  are	  adequate	  and,	  of	  course,	  that	  the	  individual	  clinician	  concerned	  has	  appropriately	  submitted	  to	  that	  process.	  	  This	   is	   an	   attractive	   proposition	   but	   where	   does	   it	   leave	   us	   in	   relation	   to	   our	  concerns	  about	  deception?	  	  The	  type	  of	  trust	  that	  O’Neill	  concerns	  herself	  might	  be	  best	  described	  as	  breaches	  of	  the	  clinical	  relationship.	  	  Perhaps	  we	  can	  understand	  this	  where	  the	  clinician	  falls	  short	  of	  the	  reasonable	  standard	  expected	  of	  him	  or	  her.	   	   There	   are	   two	   concerns	   with	   this.	   	   First,	   to	   some	   extent	   O’Neill’s	   account	  causes	  us	  to	  consider	  breach	  of	  trust	  as	  some	  kind	  of	  bad	  behaviour	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  clinician.	  	  After	  all	  O’Neill	  requires	  that	  trust	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  blindly	  placed	  and	  that	  the	  trust	  we	  place	  in	  clinicians	  is	  a	  consequence	  or	  ought	  only	  to	  extend	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  clinicians	  behave	  in	  a	  trust	  worthy	  way.	   	  This	  is	  problematic	  at	  a	  micro	   level.	   	   A	   patient,	   who	   may	   not	   have	   had	   any	   personal	   dealings	   with	   a	  particular	   clinician	   can	   only	  make	   a	   judgment	   on	   the	   trustworthy	   nature	   of	   the	  clinician	   treating	   them	  based	  on	  a	  very	  basic	  assessment	  of	   clinicians	   in	  general.	  	  This,	  to	  some	  extent,	  puts	  them	  in	  a	  position	  of	  blind	  trust	  (or	  no	  treatment).	  	  It	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  this	  might	  be	  assuaged	  to	  some	  degree	  with	  Manson	  and	  O’Neill’s	  claims	  about	  the	  role	  of	  information	  in	  the	  consent	  process	  (that	  it	  might	  reassure	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a	   patient	   someone	   is	   trustworthy	   by	   dint	   of	   the	   fact	   they	   are	   explicit	   about	   the	  treatment	  proposed).	  	  	  	  
Principled	  autonomy,	  deception	  and	  trust	  One	   of	   the	   features	   of	   trust	   as	   an	   obligation	   as	   proposed	   by	   O’Neill	   is	   its	  relationship	  with	  deception.	  As	  part	  of	  O’Neill’s	  proposition	   to	  rely	  on	  principled	  autonomy	  as	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  we	  understand	  the	  clinician-­‐patient	  relationship	  O’Neill	   categorically	   rejects	   both	   coercion	   and	   deception.	   	   O’Neill	   initially	  understands	   this	   rejection	   in	   terms	   of	   referring	   to	   consent.	   	   As	   O’Neill	   states,	  “action	   that	   either	   coerces	   or	   deceives	   others	   stands	   in	   the	   way	   of	   free	   and	  informed	   consent;	   conversely	   where	   free	   and	   informed	   consent	   is	   given,	   agents	  will	  have	  a	  measure	  of	  protection	  against	  coercion	  and	  deception”	  (O’Neill,	  2002a,	  p.97).	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  no	  consent	  process	  ought	  to	  have	  coercion	  or	  deception	  as	  a	  feature	  if	   it	   is	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  ethical.	   	  O’Neill	  takes	  this	  concern	  further	  and	  links	   it	   closely	   to	  her	  desire	   to	  establish	   trust	  as	  part	  of	   the	   clinical	   relationship.	  	  The	   rejection	   of	   deception	   as	   a	   feature	   of	   the	   clinical	   relationship	   provides	   a	  context	  in	  which	  the	  very	  rejection	  of	  deception	  and	  coercion	  gives	  rise	  to	  trust	  as	  a	   consequence.	   	   O’Neill	   claims	   that	   whilst	   individual	   autonomy	   is	   constantly	   in	  tension	  with	  trust	  principled	  autonomy	  provides	  the	  basis	  for	  relations	  of	  trust.	  	  O’Neill	  states	  that	  relations	  of	  trust	  naturally	  require	  us	  to	  reject	  deception.	   	  This	  rejection	   is	   particularly	   important	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   deception	   can	   often	   be	   a	  tempting	   and	   useful	   strategy.	   	   O’Neill’s	   deception	   is	   a	   “covert	   way	   of	   obtaining	  advantage	  or	  avoiding	  detriment;	  it	  is	  not	  always	  difficult;	  it	  is	  not	  always	  detected	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even	  when	  it	  is	  detected	  it	  is	  often	  another	  day	  and	  the	  advantage	  has	  been	  gained”	  (O’Neill,	  2002a,	  p.97).	   It	   is	   fundamental	   to	  O’Neill’s	  proposition	   for	  a	  new	  clinical	  relationship	  that	  we	  reject	  deception	  because	  it	  is	  this	  “obligation	  that	  provides	  the	  basis	   for	   trustworthy	   action;	   and	   trustworthy	   action	   can	   provide	   important	  evidence	  for	  anyone	  seeking	  to	  place	  trust”	  (O’Neill,	  2002a,	  p.97).	  	  	  	  How	   then	  does	   this	   relate	   to	  O’Neill’s	   claim	   that	  we	  ought	   to	   rely	   on	   a	  model	   of	  principled	   autonomy	   as	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   clinical	   relationship?	   	   O’Neill’s	   basic	  argument	  for	  an	  “obligation	  to	  reject	  deception”	  (O’Neill,	  2002a,	  p.98)	  is	  based	  on	  the	   claim	   that	   no	   one	   who	   is	   committed	   to	   principled	   autonomy	   can	   make	   the	  deception	  of	  others	  the	  foundation	  of	  his	  or	  her	   life	  because	  we	  cannot	  make	  the	  principle	  of	  deception	  universal	   for	  all.	   	  O’Neill	   claims	   that	   the	  reason	  we	  cannot	  make	   deception	   a	   universal	   principle	   is	   because	   once	   deception	   became	   an	  endemic	   feature	   of	   relationships	   there	   would	   be	   catastrophic	   damage	   to	   trust.	  	  Furthermore,	   deception	   cannot	   be	   made	   universal	   because	   to	   do	   so	   would	   be	  practically	   ineffective.	   	   Deception	   requires	   trust	   from	   one	   of	   the	   parties	   in	   a	  relationship	   in	  order	   for	   them	   to	  be	  deceived.	   	   If	   one	  party	  already	  distrusts	   the	  other	  the	  attempt	  to	  use	  deception	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  futile	  as	  the	  party	  will	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  advice	  or	  actions	  of	  the	  attempting	  deceiver.	  	  If	  trust	  is	  severely	  damaged	  it	  is	  difficult	   for	   deception	   to	   operate.	   	   Deception	   therefore	   “cannot	   be	   a	   principled	  action	  for	  all”	  (O’Neill,	  2002a,	  p.98).	  	  	  	  Rejection	   of	   deception,	   O’Neill	   proposes,	   has	  wide-­‐ranging	   consequences	   for	   the	  clinical	  relationship.	   	  Rejection	  of	  deception	  would	  then	  require	  a	  commitment	  to	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avoid	   lying,	   false	   promising,	   promise-­‐breaking,	  misrepresentation,	  manipulation,	  theft,	   fraud,	   corruption,	   passing	   off	   and	  many	   other	  ways	   of	  misleading	   (O’Neill,	  2002a,	  p.98).	  	  However,	  O’Neill	  wishes	  to	  express	  this	  more	  positively	  and	  usefully	  points	   out	   that	   through	   truthful	   and	   careful	   communication,	   through	   simplicity	  and	   explicitness,	   through	   honesty	   and	   avoidance	   of	   exaggeration;	   in	   summary	  through	   trustworthiness	   the	   commitment	   to	   the	   rejection	   of	   deception	   may	   be	  clearly	  expressed.	  	  In	  a	  departure	  for	  O’Neill’s	  Kantian	  approach	  she	  does	  on	  go	  to	  make	  clear	  that	  she	  is	  not	  wishing	  the	  case	  to	  make	  this	  an	  absolute	  obligation.	   	  Just,	  she	  argues,	  as	  it	  may	  be	  necessary	  for	  the	  police	  force	  or	  tax	  system	  to	  sometimes	  employ	  coercion	  where	   in	   general	   there	   is	   a	   prima	   facie	   commitment	   to	   reject	   such	  behaviour	   so	  must	  we	   accept	   that	   some	   deception	  may	   be	   justifiable	   in	   or	   accepted	   by	   those	  whose	  fundamental	  belief	  is	  to	  reject	  it.	  	  	  	  Does	  account	  of	  trust,	  in	  that	  it	  rejects	  the	  use	  of	  deception	  make	  it	  suitable	  for	  our	  purposes?	  Our	  first	  concern	  relates	  to	  O’Neill’s	  reliance	  on	  consent	  to	  explain	  some	  of	  her	  concerns	  surrounding	  deception.	  	  O’Neill	  claims	  that	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  she	  rejects	  the	  use	  of	  deception	  is	  that	  it	  interferes	  in	  the	  consent	  process	  by	  standing	  in	  the	  way	  of	  free	  choice.	  	  Free	  choice	  however	  relates	  here	  to	  choice	  over	  medical	  treatment.	  	  So	  for	  O’Neill	  a	  patient	  is	  deceived	  when	  the	  ‘facts’	  they	  are	  considering	  for	  treatment	  choice	  are	  manipulated	  in	  some	  way.	  	  I	  wish	  to	  claim	  that	  there	  are	  two	   important	   consequences	   to	   this	   approach.	   	   First	   that	   it	   places	   a	   narrow	  definition	  of	  deception	  on	  the	  consent	   transaction	   in	   that,	   for	  O’Neill,	  a	  patient	   is	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deceived	  by	  a	  deliberate	  act	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  clinician.	  	  This	  is	  perhaps	  shown	  by	  her	   understanding	   of	   deception	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   gain	   “advantage	   or	   avoid	  detriment”	   (O’Neill,	   2002a,	   p.97)	   implying	   that	   there	   is	   intent	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	  deceiver	   (dentist).	   This	   is	   a	   much	   narrower	   definition	   of	   deception	   than	   the	  definition	  we	  considered	   in	  Chapter	  Two.	   	  For	  our	  purposes	  a	  patient	   is	  not	  only	  deceived	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  deliberate	  act	  but	  also	  and	  crucially	  where	  they	  did	  not	  know	  of	  something	  important	  to	  them	  [the	  patient]	  that	  they	  feel	  they	  ought	  to	  have	  regardless	  of	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  clinician.	  	  Further,	  as	  O’Neill	  here	  is	  relying	  on	  avoiding	  deception	  via	  an	  obligation	  (and	   therefore	  action)	  on	   the	  part	  of	   the	  dentist	   the	   consequence	   is	   that	   we	   cannot	   broaden	   the	   definition	   to	   suit	   our	  purposes.	   	  This	   is	  because	  of	   the	  practical	  difficult	   of	  obliging	   someone	   to	   either	  not	   do	   something	   they	   never	   intended	   or	   not	   do	   an	   act	   committed	   by	   another	  party.	   	   Second,	   that	   the	   importance	   placed	   on	   deception	   understood	   from	   the	  consent	   process	   naturally	   leads	   us	   to	   a	   very	   medicalized	   interpretation	   of	   the	  exchange.	   	   That	   is	   to	   say	   if	   we	   understand	   deception	   in	   terms	   of	   medical	  information	   the	   patient	   did	   not	   know	   but	   ought	   to	   have	   (on	   the	   clinician’s	  assessment	  of	  ‘ought	  to	  have’	  rather	  than	  the	  patient’s)	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  we	  can	  successfully	  incorporate	  a	  wider	  view	  of	  respecting	  patients’	  reasonable	  wishes	  to	  know	  information	  that	  falls	  outside	  the	  currently	  understood	  consent	  process	  (that	  is	  to	  say	  highly	  detailed	  information	  on	  the	  proposed	  procedure	  and	  little	  else).	  	  	  More	   worryingly	   perhaps,	   when	   thinking	   about	   deception,	   one	   of	   our	   key	  concerns,	   trust	   provides	   little	   defence.	   	   It	   again	   may	   be	   reasonable	   to	   claim	   in	  general	  terms	  that	  deception	  is	  a	  breach	  of	  trust	  and	  therefore	  ought	  not	  to	  form	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part	   of	   the	   clinical	   relationship.	   	   However	   this	   seems	   a	   rather	   convoluted	   and	  obtuse	  way	  of	  understanding	  any	  problem	  with	  deception.	  	  After	  all	  one	  could	  ask	  why	  should	  deception	  (where	  no	  personal	  benefit	  for	  the	  clinician	  is	  found	  and	  is	  done	  with	  the	  best	  of	  intentions)	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  breach	  of	  trust?	  	  To	  claim	  that	  this	  is	   just	   not	   a	   feature	   that	   patients	   would	   deem	   to	   form	   part	   of	   a	   discerning	  trustworthy	  relationships	  seems	  to	  skim	  over	  the	  arguments.	  	  It	  is	  suggested	  that	  it	  is	  far	  more	  insightful	  to	  understand	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  deception	  interfering	  with	  the	  ability	   for	   a	   patient	   to	   make	   an	   unencumbered	   exercise	   of	   their	   own	   personal	  autonomy.	  	  A	  decision	  cannot	  be	  one’s	  own	  if	  it	  is	  made	  on	  a	  misapprehension.	  	  	  	  This	  is	  not	  the	  only	  area	  of	  concern.	   	  Let	  us	  suppose	  that	  the	  clinician	  is	  perfectly	  trustworthy	  but	  the	  deception	  comes	  from	  outside	  the	  relationship.	   	  For	  example	  that	   a	   patient	   is	   erroneously	   under	   the	  misapprehension	   that	   having	   his	   or	   her	  teeth	  whitened	  will	  encourage	  their	  partner	  to	  be	  more	  faithful.	   	  Nothing	  that	  the	  clinician	  has	  done	  or	  not	  done	  can	  give	  rise	  to	  our	  concerns	  that	  the	  patient	  is	  not	  making	   an	   independent	   choice.	   	   The	   clinician	   is	   not	   responsible	   for	   the	  misapprehension	   and	   the	   deception	   cannot	   be	   identified	   via	   a	   route	   of	   lack	   of	  trustworthy	   behaviour	   in	   the	   clinical	   setting.	   	  With	   an	   individualized	   account	   of	  some	   kind	   however;	   we	   are	   looking	   to	   the	   patient	   and	   the	   way	   in	   which	   their	  decision	  is	  made	  as	  the	  key	  towards	  authenticating	  their	  decision.	  	  This	   leads	  on	  to	  another	   important	  consideration.	   	  We	  have	  concerned	  ourselves	  earlier	  with	  the	  overly	  medicalized	  way	  in	  which	  we	  currently	  respect	  patients.	  	  As	  we	  can	  recall	  from	  Chapter	  Two	  one	  of	  the	  key	  criticisms	  of	  the	  Redfern	  Report	  was	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its	  failure	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  matters	  of	  real	  concern	  to	  the	  parents	  of	  the	  Alder	  Hey	  patients.	  	  In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  an	  augmented	  consent	  process	  leads	  one	  to	  overly	  focus	  on	  the	  proposed	  treatment	  so	  does	  the	  proposition	  of	  trust	  forming	  a	  pivotal	  part	  of	  the	  clinical	  relationship.	  	  Whatever	  our	  view	  on	  autonomy,	  whether	  that	  be	  principled	   or	   individualized	   the	   main	   aim	   must	   be	   to	   respect	   patients	   in	   an	  authentic	   way.	   	   The	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   approaches	   relates	   not	   to	   a	  disagreement	   that	   the	   patient	   has	   individual	   value	   but	   rather	   what	   duties	   one	  ought	  to	  adopt	  as	  part	  of	   that	  process.	   	   If	   this	   is	   the	  case	  then	  the	  position	  of	  the	  individual	   patient	   must	   carry	   some	   importance	   and	   form	   a	   part	   of	   setting	   the	  agenda	  in	  the	  clinical	  setting.	  	  The	  obligation	  as	  proposed	  by	  O’Neill	  on	  clinicians	  to	  be	  trustworthy,	  I	  wish	  to	  contend,	  has	  a	  potential	  unintended	  consequence	  in	  that	  it	   reiterates	   some	   of	   the	   concerns	   we	   expressed	   earlier	   regarding	   the	   use	   of	  medical	  information	  as	  a	  way	  of	  augmenting	  patient	  autonomy.	  	  If	  we	  are	  focusing	  on	   the	   actions	   of	   clinicians	   and	   merely	   assessing	   the	   relationship	   based	   on	   the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  clinician	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  trustworthy	  manner	  (with	  the	  patient	  as	  reactive	  rather	  than	  proactive)	  this,	  I	  wish	  to	  argue,	  naturally	  sets	  a	  very	  clinical	  agenda.	  	  After	  all,	  it	  is	  perfectly	  reasonable	  for	  clinicians	  only	  be	  expected	  to	  extend	  their	  trustworthiness	  to	  areas	  of	  their	  own	  expertise,	  that	  being	  communication	  of	  clinical	   information	   (at	   best)	   and	   treatment.	   	   Even	   if	   we	   tried	   to	   claim	   that	   a	  trustworthy	  clinician	  must	  also	  consider	  the	  patient’s	  wider	  welfare	   in	  his	  or	  her	  behaviour	  this	  still	  leaves	  the	  clinician	  in	  control	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  the	  patient,	  at	  best,	  the	  lucky	  recipient	  but	  not	  the	  driver.	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Despite	  O’Neill’s	  wish	  that	  patients	  take	  on	  more	  duties	  alongside	  their	  rights	  this	  seems	   difficult	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   use	   of	   trust.	   	   The	   mere	   fact	   that	   a	   patient	   is	  required	   to	   trust	   a	   clinician	   no	   matter	   how	   discerning	   their	   choice	   sets	   a	  medicalized	   agenda	   that,	   although	   quite	   rightly	   relates	   to	   the	   business	   at	   hand,	  does	   not	   require	   the	   wider	   needs	   of	   the	   patient	   to	   be	   considered.	   	   Although	  admittedly	  we	  could	  incorporate	  wider	  values	  to	  the	  call	  for	  ‘trustworthiness’	  this	  seems	  rather	  unnecessary,	  despite	  the	  short-­‐comings	  of	  autonomy	  a	  general	  belief	  that	   the	   patient’s	   voice	   is	   best	   placed	   to	   make	   their	   needs	   heard	   seems	   more	  effective	   and	   reliable	   than	   an	   attempt	   to	   press	   clinicians	   to	   ‘guess’	   what	   extra	  behaviour	  they	  need	  to	  show	  to	  be	  deemed	  worthy	  of	  trust.	  	  
Case	  studies	  Although	  I	  have	  raised	  some	  concerns	  about	  O’Neill’s	  proposals,	   the	   fact	  remains	  that	  O’Neill	  has	  proposed	  a	  practical	  applicable	  model,	  which	  proposes	  an	  applied	  approach	  for	  the	  clinical	  setting	  which	  is	  worthy	  of	  consideration	  in	  relation	  to	  our	  hypothetical	  case	  studies.	  	  	  	  In	  our	  first	  hypothetical	  case	  we	  raised	  concerns	  about	  patients’	  awareness	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  private	  and	  NHS	  treatment	  particularly	  when	   it	   is	  sometimes	  offered	  as	  part	  of	   the	  same	  appointment.	   	  Perhaps	  as	  we	  have	  outlined	  trust	  and	  adequate	  information	  could	  address	  this	  concern?	  	  At	  first	  instance	  and	  according	  to	   O’Neill’s	   account	   we	   could	   attempt	   to	   argue	   that	   deceiving	   a	   patient	   by	   not	  explicitly	  spelling	  out	  the	  moment	  when	  treatment	  becomes	  private,	  or	  indeed	  any	  fluctuations	   between	   both	   clinical	   settings	   could	   be	   viewed	   as	   untrustworthy.	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This	  would	  seem	  reasonable;	  a	   clinician	  ought	   to	   identify	   situations	  where	  he	  or	  she	  is	  personally	  benefitting	  from	  a	  change	  in	  treatment	  setting	  and	  those	  who	  do	  not	  would	  easily	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  breaching	  trust	  by	  not	  giving	  adequate	  information.	  	  That	   is	   to	   say	   that	   deception	   of	   this	   kind	   might	   be	   viewed	   as	   untrustworthy	  behaviour.	  	  	  	  However,	   I	  would	  still	  wish	   to	  raise	  a	  concern	  here	  about	   the	  about	   the	   focus	  on	  the	  clinical	  encounter.	  	  Even	  if	  a	  clinician	  is	  explicit	  about	  the	  change	  of	  setting	  in	  the	  appointment	  the	  appeal	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  trust	  provides	  insufficient	  drivers	  to	  consider	  wider	  concerns	  (such	  as	  cost	  to	  the	  patient).	  	  More	  worryingly	  as	  O’Neill	  requires	  the	  dentist	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  trustworthy	  way	  rather	  than	  the	  patient	  to	  trust	  the	   clinician	   how	   will	   a	   dentist	   identify	   what	   the	   features	   of	   behaving	   in	   a	  trustworthy	  way	  are?	  	  Some	  instances	  may	  be	  intuitive	  but	  when	  the	  dentist	  with	  the	  absolute	  best	  of	   intentions	  wants	   to	  do	  what	   is	  best	   for	   the	  patient	  how	  can	  they	   reconcile	   that	   with	   the	   need	   to	   behave	   in	   a	   trustworthy	   way?	   Put	   in	   an	  alternative	  manner	  in	  what	  way	  when	  a	  clinician	  believes	  that	  the	  private	  option	  is	  in	   the	   patient’s	   best	   interests	   does	   this	   alert	   them	   to	   being	   in	   danger	   of	   being	  untrustworthy?	   This	   is	   a	   particularly	   acute	   concern	   when	   information	   is	   not	  necessarily	  based	  on	  promoting	  a	  patient’s	  autonomy	  but	  rather	  a	  way	  in	  which	  a	  patient	   can	   trust	   the	   clinician.	   	   What	   would	   drive	   the	   clinician	   to	   give	   specific	  pieces	  of	  information	  that	  add	  nothing	  to	  the	  clinicians	  view	  of	  best	  interests	  (and	  therefore	  their	  practical	  assessment	  of	  trustworthiness)	  and	  where	  there	  is	  no	  real	  requirement	  to	  provide	  information	  as	  a	  basis	  of	  promoting	  autonomy	  via	  consent.	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Further	  concerns	  must	  be	  raised	  in	  relation	  to	  our	  cosmetic	  dentistry	  case	  study.	  	  This	   rests	   on	   the	   distinction	   we	   might	   wish	   to	   draw	   between	   treatment	   and	  enhancement.	   	   As	  we	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   One	   drawing	   such	   a	   distinction	  may	  cause	  us	   to	  consider	  a	  shift	   in	   the	  relationship	   from	  one	   that	   is	  based	  on	  duty	  of	  care	  to	  one	  that	  is	  contractual	  and	  commercial	  in	  nature.	  	  Our	  main	  concern	  rested	  with	  a	  patient’s	  ability	  to	  realistically	  discern	  the	  difference	  between	  advice	  given	  by	  a	  dentist	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  duty	  of	  care	  from	  advice	  given	  under	  the	  auspice	  of	  commerce.	   	  Our	  main	  worry	  being	   that	  dentist	  could,	  quite	   innocently,	  unduly	  influence	   a	   patient	   into	   agreeing	   to	   a	   cosmetic	   procedure	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   the	  patient	  gives	  more	  weight	   to	   the	  dentists	  advice	   than	  they	  ought	   to.	   	  The	  patient	  believing	   that	   the	  dentist	   still	   retains	   some	  element	  of	  duty	  of	   care	   to	  his	  or	  her	  advice.	  	  The	  question	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  posed	  here	  relates	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  trust	  that	  O’Neill	   envisages.	   Is	   trust	   only	   a	   feature	   of	   a	   duty	   of	   care	   relationship?	   	   If	   trust	  extends	   beyond	   the	   duty	   of	   care	   relationship	   how	   can	   trust	   address	   this	   more	  contractual	  or	  business	  based	  relationship?	  	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  trust	  has	  its	  limits.	  	  It	   is	   in	  direct	  opposition	   to	  how	  we	  might	  understand	  a	  commercial	   relationship	  where	  an	  important	  feature	  is	  the	  ‘hard	  sell’.	  	  We	  might	  wish	  to	  consider	  if	  trust	  is	  underpinned	  by	  O’Neill’s	  principled	  autonomy	  where	  might	  that	  preclude	  this	  kind	  of	   commercial	   deception?	   	   It	   is	   difficult	   to	   see	   how	   that	   might	   be	   the	   case.	   	   As	  information	  giving	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  key	  component	  of	  the	  clinical	  exchange	  (in	  order	  to	   promote	   autonomy)	   information	   is	   only	   necessary	   as	   evidence	   of	  trustworthiness	   and	   as	   such	   a	   clinician	   is	   no	   longer	   obliged	   to	   think	   of	   patient	  autonomy	   in	   relation	   to	   information	   but	   merely	   behaviour	   that	   creates	   an	  atmosphere	  of	  trust.	   	  If	  trust	  however	  were	  not	  part	  of	  a	  commercial	  relationship	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what	  would	  drive	   a	   clinician	   to	  disclosure	  and	  preclude	  him	  or	  her	   from	  deceit?	  	  Worse	  still,	  as	  O’Neill’s	  proposal	  suggest	  that	  a	  patient	  takes	  on	  responsibility	  for	  their	   decision	   as	   well	   as	   rights,	   would	   a	   bad	   decision	   in	   relation	   to	   cosmetic	  treatment	  become	  their	  fault	  despite	  the	  clinicians	  well	  intentioned	  deception?	  	  It	  seems	  that	  there	  are	  some	  fatal	  flaws	  in	  O’Neill’s	  proposal	  for	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  dental	  setting.	  	  Finally	   in	   our	   skill	   mix	   case	   we	   must	   consider	   if	   a	   patient	   is	   not	   aware	   of	   the	  clinician’s	  qualification	  status	  is	  the	  clinician	  doing	  anything	  ‘untrustworthy’	  here?	  If	   a	   clinician	   were	   doing	   the	   best	   treatment	   to	   an	   agreed	   and	   consented	  prescription	  what	  element	  of	  trust	  would	  make	  this	  information	  important?	  	  After	  all,	   as	  we	  have	   seen,	   the	  patient	   knows	  what	   is	   happening	   to	   them	  and	   they	   are	  getting	  what	  they	  need	  what	  would	  cause	  us	  to	  believe	  that	  this	  is	  still	  a	  situation	  devoid	  of	  trust?	  	  Although	  we	  could	  attempt	  to	  argue	  that	  full	  and	  frank	  disclosure	  would	   address	   this	   concern	  why	  would	   full	   and	   frank	   disclosure	   be	   a	   necessary	  condition	  of	  trust?	  	  We	  really	  need	  to	  be	  sure	  to	  what	  end	  disclosure	  is	  to	  be	  put	  in	  order	  for	  us	  to	  be	  sure	  what	  the	  limits	  of	   full	  disclosure	  might	  be.	   	  This	  sounds	  a	  little	   like	  tautology	  but	  I	  am	  working	  from	  a	  definition	  of	  disclosure	  that	  perhaps	  might	  better	  be	  described	  as	  adequate	  for	  trust	  from	  the	  patient	  perspective.	  	  How	  will	   the	   clinician	   calculate	  what	   is	   adequate	   to	   claim	   trust	   has	   been	   established.	  	  After	  all	  there	  is	  no	  real	  reason	  to	  drive	  the	  clinician	  to	  ask	  the	  patient	  what	  they	  want	  to	  know	  although	  that	  admittedly	  might	  be	  the	  best	  solution.	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Conclusions	  When	  we	  set	  out	   to	   re-­‐define	   the	  ethical	  basis	  of	   the	  dentist-­‐patient	   relationship	  some	  of	  our	  key	  concerns	  related	  to	  a	  deliverable	  model	  with	  clear	  limits	  and	  one	  that	   respected	   the	   patient	   adequately	   whilst	   protecting	   against	   the	   dangers	   of	  deception.	   	  O’Neill	   has	  proposed	  an	  alternative	  account	  where	  patient	   autonomy	  imposes	  obligations	  as	  well	  as	  conferring	  rights.	  	  O’Neill	  is	  also	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  current	   individualized	   account	   of	   autonomy	   claiming	   it	   corrodes	   trust	   in	   the	  clinical	   relationship.	   	   As	   part	   of	   her	   re-­‐modelling	   the	   clinical	   relationship	  O’Neill	  requires	   trust	   to	  become	  a	   central	   element.	   	  Trust	  however	   is	  delivered	   through	  trustworthy	  behaviour	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  clinician	  and	  not	  blind	  faith	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  The	  consequences	  of	  viewing	  trust	  in	  such	  a	  way,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  is	  that	  this	  may	  lead	  to	  an	  overly	  medicalized	  focus	  with	  the	  clinician	  continuing	  to	  set	  the	  agenda	  of	  the	  medical	  exchange	  doing	  little	  to	  rest	  power	  from	  the	  clinician	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  We	  have	  also	  raised	  concerns	  about	  the	  responsibility	  patients	  are	  expected	  to	  take	  on	  both	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  own	  situation	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  their	  decision.	   	   	   	  Further	  still	  although	  at	   first	   instance	   trust	  would	  seem	  to	   intuitively	  defend	  against	  general	  deception	  (where	  someone	  sets	  out	  to	  deceive	  the	  other),	  it	  struggles	   to	   cope	  adequately	  with	   the	  particular	   type	  of	  deception	   that	   concerns	  us.	   	  As	   the	  clinician	   is	   tasked	  with	  behaving	   in	  a	   trustworthy	  manner	   in	  O’Neill’s	  proposition	  and	  they	  are	  considering	  the	  patient’s	  best	  interests	  a	  clash	  can	  occur	  where	  deception	  unintentionally	  occurs.	  	  After	  all	  if	  deception	  is	  unintentional	  but	  linked	  to	  the	  clinician’s	  obligations	  how	  do	  we	  help	  the	  clinician	  identify	  it?	  	  That	  is	  to	   say	   that	   there	   is	   nothing	   in	   the	   trust	   account	   that	  would	   cause	   a	   clinician	   to	  consider	  that	  they	  acting	  in	  a	  deceitful	  way,	  after	  all	  if	  you	  are	  acting	  on	  a	  duty	  of	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care	  basis	  in	  a	  patient’s	  best	  interests	  you	  must	  surely	  be	  acting	  in	  a	  trustworthy	  manner	  even	  if	  the	  patient	  is	  deceived.	  	  It	  would	  seem	   then	   that	  O’Neill’s	  proposition	   just	   cannot	  address	  adequately	   the	  concerns	  we	  raise.	  	  Dentistry	  has	  its	  own	  challenges	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  and	  we	  need	  a	   differing	   model	   than	   can	   address	   the	   complexities	   of	   the	   dental	   primary	   care	  setting.	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Chapter	  Six	  –	  Analysis	  and	  Conclusions	  
In	  earlier	  chapters	  I	  have	  already	  argued	  for	  a	  more	  clinically	  specific	  theoretical	  model	  in	  the	  belief	  that	  this	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  adequately	  address	  the	  challenges	  of	  dentistry.	   	   I	   have	   considered	   alternatives	   to	   individual	   autonomy	   and	   to	   what	  extent	   they	   might	   provide	   solutions	   to	   the	   issues	   raised	   in	   Chapter	   One	   by	  respecting	  patients	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  ethically	  robust.	  	  In	  this	  final	  chapter	  I	  will	  now	  return	  to	  re-­‐consider	  autonomy	  as	  a	  concept.	   	   I	  wish	  to	  make	  my	  contribution	  to	  the	  debate	  about	  respect	  for	  patients	  by	  first	  claiming	  that	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  seek	  to	   promote	   good	   (generally	   increased	   autonomy)	   by	   augmenting	   the	   consent	  process	  or	  transactional	  aspects	  of	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationship.	  	  I	  wish	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  act	  of	  restoring	  health	  is	  the	  appropriate	  forum	  within	  which	  to	  consider	  the	   promotion	   of	   good	   as	   part	   of	   a	   healthcare	   endeavour.	   	   In	   addition,	   the	  transaction	   between	   patient	   and	   clinician	   [consent]	   is	   a	   functional	   reflection	   of	  that	  endeavour	  which	  only	  need	  seek	   to	  safeguard	   the	  position	  of	   the	  patient,	  as	  the	  weaker	  party.	   	   I	  will	   then	  go	  on	   to	   claim	   that	   the	  attraction	   in	  attempting	   to	  promote	   autonomy	   at	   the	   transactional	   level	   through	   consent	   is	   beset	   with	  problems	  and	  to	  a	  greater	  extent	  can	  be	  self-­‐defeating.	  	  This	  puts	  clinicians	  at	  risk	  of	  not	  discharging	  their	  ethical	  duties	  and	  indeed	  failing	  to	  respect	  patients	  in	  the	  right	  way.	   	  This	  will	   lead	  me	  to	  consider	  other	  models	  of	  patient	   interaction	  that	  seek	  largely	  to	  protect	  the	  patient’s	  right	  to	  self	  determination	  rather	  than	  promote	  it,	  as	  autonomy	  is	  promoted	  elsewhere	  and	  merely	  needs	  to	  be	  protected	  as	  part	  of	  the	   clinical	   interaction	   process.	   	   I	   will	   propose	   a	   change	   in	   the	   way	   we	   respect	  patients	   by	   relying	   on	   a	  model	   that	   is	   reflective	   of	   that	   approach	   and	   show	   the	  degree	  to	  which	  it	  better	  addresses	  the	  concerns	  I	  raised.	  	  Finally,	  by	  appealing	  to	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this	   model,	   I	   will	   address	   our	   concerns	   relating	   to	   the	   specific	   challenges	   of	  dentistry	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  problem	  with	  deception.	   	  First	  I	  wish	  to	  claim	  that	  healthcare	  overall	  is	  an	  ethical	  endeavour	  to	  promote	  good	  through	  the	  restoration	  or	   preservation	   of	   health.	   	   In	   doing	   so	   this	   should	   enable	   us	   to	   claim	   that	   we	  actively	   promote	   good	   through	   the	   restoration	   of	   health	   whilst	   avoiding	   the	  difficulties	  of	  trying	  to	  promote	  good	  through	  the	  clinical	  relationship.	  	  
The	  ethical	  endeavour	  of	  healthcare	  First	  I	  wish	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  action	  of	  restoring	  health	  is	  one	  of	  promoting	  ‘good’.	  	  Kottow	  asserts	  that	  the	  practice	  of	  medicine	  has	  two	  main	  areas	  of	  moral	  concern;	  that	   of	   the	   ‘quest	   of	   medicine’	   to	   be	   of	   help,	   to	   exercise	   some	   form	   of	   ethical	  benevolence	   and	   the	   more	   technical	   aspect	   of	   the	   therapeutic	   and	   the	   ethical	  limitations	   to	   which	   that	   must	   be	   subject	   (Kottow,	   1999).	   	   Seedhouse	   would	  disagree,	   however,	   he	   argues	   that	   these	   two	   activities	   are	   inextricably	   linked	  (Seedhouse,	  1988).	  	  Nonetheless,	  both	  agree	  that	  healthcare	  consists	  of	  more	  than	  the	   delivery	   of	   a	   medical	   service:	   healthcare	   has	   an	   ethical	   significance	   that	  extends	  beyond	  mere	  treatment.	   	   It	  has	  been	  asserted	  that	  healthcare	  forms,	   in	  a	  practical	  sense	  by	  restoring	  health,	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  addressing	  social	  inequality	  and	  carries	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  ethical	  imperative	  to	  address	  inequality	  (MacGibbon,	  Etowa	  and	  McPhearson,	  2008).	  	  Further,	  however	  we	  wish	  to	  define	  it,	  there	  is	  an	  inextricable	   and	  widely	   acknowledged	   link	   between	   body	   and	   self	   which	  makes	  activity	  that	  involves	  the	  body	  specially	  linked	  to	  the	  concepts	  of	  self	  or	  the	  person	  as	  an	  individual	  (Gadow,	  1980).	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  through	  the	  wide	  assertion	  of	  the	  link	   between	   body	   and	   self,	   this	   naturally	   leads	   us	   to	   consider	   if	  we	   accept	   that	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healthcare	   as	   an	   endeavour	   has	   special	   ethical	   significance.	   	   One	   of	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  we	  might	  wish	   to	   see	   this	   reflected	   is	   through	   the	  effect	  on	   the	   individual	  and	   in	   turn	   how	   we	   reflect	   this	   professionally.	   	   We	   may	   conclude	   then	   that	  healthcare	  as	  an	  endeavour	  carries	  ethical	  weight	  and	  is	  widely	  seen	  as	  an	  ethical	  ‘good’.	   	  Therefore	   it	   is	   relatively	  straight-­‐forward	   to	  attach	  a	  claim	  of	   ‘promoting	  good’	  to	  the	  action	  of	  restoring	  health.	  	  However,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  previously	  it	  is	  not	  ethical	  satisfactory	  to	  claim	  that,	  simply	  by	  promoting	  a	  good	  one	  is	  behaving	  in	  an	  ethically	  robust	  manner	  and	  we	  will	  consider	  that	  point	  in	  a	  moment.	  	  Firstly	  we	  will	  consider	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  aim	  and	  the	  action	  of	  restoring	  health	  in	  order	  to	  focus	  our	  attention	  in	  the	  right	  place	  when	  claiming	  to	  promote	  good.	  	  It	   seems	   that	   there	   is	   a	   distinction	   between	   the	   aim	   of	   healthcare	   as	   an	   ethical	  endeavour	   and	   the	   simple	   action	   of	   delivery	   of	   treatment.	   	   Healthcare	   as	   the	  overarching	  term	  is	  about	  a	  great	  deal	  more	  than	  efficient	  treatment	  as	  it	  seeks	  to	  deliver	  ethical	  goods	  through	  the	  action	  of	  treatment.	  	  If	  we	  assert	  that	  healthcare	  has	   an	   ethical	   aspect	   that	   relates	   to	   its	   very	   existence	   this	   might	   lead	   us	   to	  conclude	   that	   treatment	   is	  merely	   the	   function	   of	   the	   endeavour	   rather	   than	   the	  
aim.	   	   If	   then	  we	   define	   treatment	   as	   the	   action	   rather	   than	   the	   aim	   this	   should	  prompt	  us	  to	  put	  treatment	  in	  its	  proper	  place	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  our	  ethical	  values	   are	   formed.	   	   We	   might	   wish	   to	   ensure	   that	   our	   models	   of	   professional	  behaviour	  are	  led	  by	  the	  overall	  ethical	  endeavour	  (aim)	  that	  healthcare	  seeks	  to	  deliver,	  rather	  than	  measuring	  ourselves	  against	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  our	  treatment	  or	   indeed	   the	   competence	   of	   our	   transactions	   (actions).	   	   This	   does	   not	   mean	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however	   that	   the	   process	   [action	   of	   treatment]	   has	   no	   ethical	   significance	   but	  rather	  that	  we	  may	  not	  wish	  to	  make	  too	  many	  claims	  about	  how	  much	  ‘good’	  the	  process	   promotes	   or	   indeed	   seeks	   to	   promote	   through	   that	   function.	   In	   other	  words,	   to	   view	   treatment	   as	   an	   institutional	   and	  professional	   constraint	   and	   the	  instrument	  of	  our	  overall	  aim	  to	  be	  of	  help,	  or	  simply	  to	  claim	  to	  ‘promote	  good’.	  	  	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  treatment	  is	  delivered	  is	  not	  significant	  or	  bears	   no	   examination.	   	   If	   we	   are	   to	   claim	   that	   the	   individual	   has	   an	   ethical	  significance	   and	   value	   ascribed	   to	   them,	   then	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   they	   engage	  with	  the	  profession	  must	  be	  considered	  carefully.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  One	  patients	  express	  concerns	  about	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  are	  treated	  even	  if	  the	  end	  is	  the	  same.	  	  From	  a	  patient’s	  view	  the	  end	  does	  not	  always	  justify	  the	  means	  (Dyer	  and	  Robinson,	  (2008a;	  2008b).	   	   It	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  terms	  of	  acute	  need	  (see	  the	  case	  of	  Dax	  Cowart,	  Knapp	  van	  Bogaert,	  D.,	  and	  Ogunbanjo,	  G.A.,	  2010	  22)	  but	  for	  most,	  their	  experience	  of	  health	  care	  does	  not	  fall	  into	  the	  category	  of	  what	  we	  may	  wish	  to	  term	  ‘emergency	  medicine’.	  	  Nor	  do	  the	  social	  endeavours	  of	  health	  as	  claimed	  by	  MacGibbon,	  Etowa	  and	  McPhearson,	  (2008).	   	   For	   the	  vast	  majority	   (in	   the	  UK)	   the	   restoration	  of	  health	   in	   a	  primary	  care	  setting	  relates	  to	  aiding	  people	  to	  function	  better	  and	  thus	  reduce	  inequality	  in	  health	  status.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  intention	  here	  to	  consider	  health	  and	  social	  justice	  per	  
se	  as	  this	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  discussion.	  	  Simply	  I	  wish	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  fact	  we	  wish	   to	   address	   inequality	   at	   all	   leads	   us	   to	   surmise	   that	   the	   individual	   has	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Dax	  Cowart,	  who	  now	  lectures	  on	  the	  right	  to	  die,	  was	  a	  victim	  of	  severe	  burns	  who	  claims	  that	  despite	  his	  recovery	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  is	  no	  longer	  in	  pain	  the	  treatment	  he	  endured	  at	  the	  time	  of	  his	  injury	  was	  not	  worth	  the	  recovery	  he	  now	  enjoys.	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some	  importance	  or	  value	  and	  that	  we	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  abandon	  individuals	  to	  the	  mantra	  of	   ‘survival	  of	   the	   fittest’.	   	  With	  recognition	  of	  an	   individual’s	   importance	  and	  value	  we	  are	  able	  to	  conclude	  that	  a	  good	  clinical	  outcome	  may	  not	  override	  or	  justify	  problematic	  or	  unsatisfactory	  experiences	  of	  the	  patient	   journey.	   	   If	  this	   is	  the	  case	  then,	  that	  the	  individual	  is	  valued,	  how	  do	  we	  recognise	  this?	  	  As	  we	  have	  considered	  before,	  autonomy	  has	  established	  itself	  as	  the	  model	  through	  which	  we	  recognise	  an	  individual’s	  value.	  	  We	  have	  considered	  a	  number	  of	  difficulties	  with	  this	  approach	  through	  the	  course	  of	  the	  preceding	  chapters	  but	  one	  thing	  we	  have	  learned	  is	  that	  the	  duty	  to	  respect	  persons	  in	  health	  care	  is	  not	  discharged	  simply	  by	   making	   patients	   better.	   	   The	   manner	   in	   which	   they	   are	   treated	   during	   that	  journey	  has,	  perhaps	  in	  some	  cases	  an	  equal,	  if	  not	  very	  significant	  part	  to	  play,	  in	  the	  ethical	  endeavour	  of	  healthcare.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  it	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  difficult	  for	  one	  to	  claim	  successfully	  that	  one	  had	  met	  the	  endeavour	  of	  healthcare	  simply	  by	  restoring	  health	  regardless	  of	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  was	  done.	  	  This	  of	  course	  challenges	   a	   very	   treatment	   focused	  model	   and	   the	   traditional	   tenets	   of	   the	  bio-­‐medical	  model	  of	  health23.	  	  One	  example	  of	  this	  claim	  we	  have	  already	  consider	  is	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  Redfern	  
Report	   (DoH,	   2001)	  where	   there	  was	   a	   strong	   imperative	   to	   recognise	   the	   value	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  The	  human	  body	  is	  likened	  to	  a	  machine	  to	  be	  restored	  to	  health	  through	  treatments	  of	  one	  sort	  or	  another	  that	  arrest,	  or	  reverse,	  the	  disease	  process	  The	   health	   of	   society	   is	   seen	   largely	   as	   dependant	   on	   a	   state	   of	   medical	   knowledge	   and	   the	  availability	  of	  medical	  resources.	  (Taylor	  and	  Field,	  1997).	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and	   rights	   of	   an	   individual,	   defined	   as	   the	   concept	   of	   respect	   for	   persons.	   	   The	  manner	  in	  which	  patients	  and	  their	  deceased	  children	  were	  treated	  was	  of	  central	  importance.	  	  The	  end	  result	  of	  the	  medical	  treatment	  (and	  sadly	  its	  lack	  of	  success)	  was	  of	  little	  or	  no	  ethical	  significance	  in	  this	  case;	  simply,	  the	  interaction	  and	  lack	  of	  consultation	  and	  eventually	  lack	  of	  respect	  in	  relation	  to	  something	  of	  extreme	  significance	   to	   the	   parents	   (the	   organs	   of	   their	   children)	   was	   the	   issue	   under	  consideration.	   	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  steps	  have	  been	  taken	  to	  address	  this	   issue	  and	  prevent	   recurrence.	   	   The	  manner	   in	  which	   this	   has	   been	   done	   has	   largely	   been	  through	  improving	  the	  consent	  process	  by	  increasing	  information	  given	  to	  patients	  with	   a	   view	   to	   augmenting	   their	   autonomy	   through	   increased	   knowledge.	   	   This	  approach	  contends	  that	  better	  choosing	  is	  more	  informed	  choosing	  and	  therefore	  better	   autonomy.	   	   This	   then	   gives	   us	   three	  main	   components	   to	   consider	   when	  respecting	   patients;	   consent,	   choice	   and	   individualised	   autonomy.	   	   These	   three	  concepts	  each	  carry	  differing	  statuses	  and	  operate	  in	  different	  manners.	  	  Reliance	  on	   this	   construction	   has	   led	   to	   some	   difficulties	   in	   the	   way	   in	   which	   patient	  interests	  are	  prioritised	  and	  causes	  concern	   in	   the	  way	   that	  patient	   interests	  are	  interpreted	  in	  a	  limited	  and	  medicalized	  sphere.	  	  	  The	  manner	  in	  which	  respect	  for	  persons	  is	  observed	  through	  individualised	  autonomy	  fails	  to	  address	  some	  of	  the	  key	  components	  we	  considered	  in	  earlier	  chapters.	  	  In	  order	  to	  address	  this	  I	  will	  outline	   what	   the	   difficulties	   are	   with	   a	   focus	   on	   consent	   in	   order	   to	   help	   me	  propose	  key	  components	  for	  an	  alternative.	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Reviewing	  our	  current	  construction	  of	  autonomy	  in	  practice	  Individualised	  autonomy,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  is	  widely	  viewed	  and	  claimed	  to	  be	  the	  underpinning	   of	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   we	   interpret	   respect	   for	   persons.	  	  Individualised	  autonomy	  promotes	  autonomy	  through	   the	   function	  of	  choice	  and	  the	  action	  of	  choosing.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  mere	  sheer	  choice	  and	  the	  effect	  that	  has	  on	  ones	  self-­‐determination	  (i.e.	  that	  it	  enables	  one	  to	  decide	  for	  oneself	  one’s	  own	  moral	   policy,	   action	   and	   direction).	   	   Individual	   choice	   therefore	   relies	   on	   our	  second	  component,	  choice	   itself,	   to	  operate	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  respect	   for	  persons.	   	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  there	  have	  been	  many	  criticisms	  of	  the	  ‘mere	  sheer	  choice’	  argument.	  	  It	   focuses	   too	   heavily	   on	   the	   action	   and	   ability	   of	   the	   individual	   making	   moral	  considerations	  secondary	  to	  the	  action	  itself.	  	  In	  some	  respects	  rational	  autonomy	  could	  be	   said	   to	  be	  an	  attempt	   to	  address	   that	   criticism.	   	  The	   rational	  autonomy	  that	  we	   have	   considered	   as	   proposed	   by	   Frankfurt	   (1971)	   and	   Dworkin	   (1988)	  and	  the	  later	  modification	  of	  others	  could	  be	  said	  to	  be	  an	  attempt	  to	  anchor	  more	  firmly	   the	  moral	   authority	   of	   individualised	   autonomy	  by	   looking	   to	   introduce	   a	  further	  element	  into	  the	  act	  of	  choosing	  for	  oneself;	  that	  of	  reflection.	   	  In	  Chapter	  Three	  we	  saw	  that	  not	  all	  choices	  that	  are	  made	  could	  claim	  to	  have	  the	  authority	  of	  an	  autonomous	  decision.	  	  Only	  choices	  and	  importantly	  actions	  that	  are	  part	  of	  a	  hierarchical	   thought	  process,	  an	  ordering	  of	  preferences	  and	  an	  action	  of	  willing,	  can	  claim	  to	  have	  the	  authority	  ascribed	  as	  an	  autonomous	  decision.	   	  As	  we	  have	  seen	   this	  proposition	   is	  problematic	   in	   that	   the	   rational	  model	  has	  difficulties	   in	  effectively	   accounting	   for	   reflective	   decisions	  made	   or	   born	   out	   of	  manipulation	  and	  or	  deception.	  	  Furthermore	  it	  is	  also	  not	  clear	  why	  a	  reflective	  decision	  would	  have	   greater	   moral	   weight	   than	   say	   a	   gut	   reaction	   to	   a	   particular	   situation,	   for	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example,	   the	  decision	   to	   jump	   into	  a	   lake	  and	  rescue	  a	  child.	   	  Would	  we	  want	   to	  give	  greater	  moral	  authority	   to	  standing	  on	   that	   shore	   line	  weighing	  up	  whether	  we	  want	  to	  ruin	  our	  shoes	  jumping	  into	  the	  lake	  rather	  than	  the	  decision	  to	  jump	  in	  immediately	  and	  not	  consider	  the	  consequence	  to	  our	  shoes	  at	  all?	  	  
The	  reliance	  on	  choice	  We	  have	  seen	  in	  earlier	  chapters	  that	  choice	  and	  the	  ability	  or	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  is	  made	   is	   also	   central	   to	  how	  we	   interpret	   the	   ethical	   foundation	  of	   the	   clinical	  relationship.	  	  Choice	  through	  the	  use	  of	  consent	  to	  treatment	  and	  enabling	  patients	  to	  make	   it	   [a	   choice]	   is	   largely	   seen	   as	   central	   and	   a	   defining	   action	   of	   how	  we	  respect	  patients.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  we	  respect	  patients	  by	  relying	  on	  a	  construction	  of	  individualised	   autonomy	   be	   that	   either	   rational	   or	   otherwise.	   	   In	   fact	   there	   are	  other	  well	   recognised	   areas	   of	   the	   clinical	   relationship	  which	   I	  will	   not	   cover	   in	  detail	   other	   than	   to	   mention	   here	   that	   they	   similarly	   rely	   on	   a	   choice	   centred	  approach,	  for	  example,	  the	  principle	  of	  patient	  confidentiality.	  	  	  	  I	   propose	   that	   the	   attraction	   to	   choice	   is	   closely	   linked	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	  autonomy	  as	  a	  right	  or	  ability	  to	  be	  self	  determining;	  that	  we	  promote	  our	  sense	  of	  individual	  value	  by	  making	   individualised	  decisions	  about	  what	  happens	  to	  us	  or	  what	  action	  we	  take.	  	  In	  a	  modern	  and	  increasingly	  commercialised	  society	  this	  is	  perhaps	   a	   familiar	   and	   reassuring	   concept.	   	   It	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   how	   choice	   and	  consent	   are	   the	   embodiment	   of	   those	   ideals.	   	   However,	   by	   valuing	   ourselves	  through	  self-­‐determination	  and	  choice	  alone	  we	  make	  the	  error	  of	  supposing	  that	  we	  have	  real	  control	  over	  every	  situation	  or	  indeed	  may	  try	  to	  claim	  that	  whatever	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situation	  we	  find	  ourselves	  in,	  no	  matter	  how	  restrictive,	  as	  long	  as	  we	  are	  able	  to	  make	   a	   choice	   and	  determine	  our	   fate,	  we	   are	   autonomous.	   	   This	   is	   problematic	  particularly	  for	  medicine	  and	  dentistry.	  	  After	  all	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  any	  patient	  has	  chosen	  to	  be	  ill	  or	  in	  need	  of	  treatment.	  	  It	  is	  doubtful	  that	  we	  can	  claim	  that	  we	  are	  respected	  as	  individuals	  by	  exercising	  choice	  in	  a	  clinical	  setting	  from	  a	  restricted	  range	  of	  options	  (especially	  where	  all	  options	  possible	  might	  not	  be	  available	   for	  financial	  or	   institutional	  reasons)	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  physical	   ‘problem’	  that	   is	  not	  of	  our	   choosing.	   	   I	   would	   wish	   to	   claim	   then	   that	   the	   reliance	   on	   choice	   is	  problematic.	   	   It	   is	   not	   clear	   in	   the	  hierarchical	   accounts	  why	  one	   choice	  has	   any	  real	  moral	  authority	  over	  another.	   	   Such	  accounts	   rely	  on	   the	  authenticity	  of	   the	  action	  of	  choosing	  rather	  than	  the	  moral	  authority	  of	   the	  choices	  made.	   	  Further,	  reliance	  on	  choice	  presupposes	   that	   the	  choice	  we	  make	   is	  an	   important	   form	  of	  self-­‐expression.	   	   However	   this	   position	   is	   difficult	   to	   maintain	   when	   we	   choose	  from	  a	  very	  limited	  sphere	  of	  options	  (treatment)	  in	  a	  situation	  not	  of	  our	  choosing	  (ill-­‐health).	  	  At	  most	  it	  is	  a	  very	  limited	  form	  self-­‐expression.	  	  
The	  reliance	  on	  information	  The	   current	   reliance	   on	   the	   three	   components	   of	   consent,	   choice	   and	  individualised	   autonomy	   also	   have	   another	   perhaps	   unexpected	   consequence	   in	  the	  clinical	  setting.	  	  If	  we	  rely	  on	  authorisation	  via	  consent	  and	  the	  use	  of	  choice	  to	  promote	   individual	   autonomy	  we	   necessarily	   reduce	   the	   clinical	   interaction	   to	   a	  matter	   of	  meeting	   treatment	  need.	   	   Treatment	  need	  might	   best	   be	  described	   for	  our	  purposes	  as	  the	  need	  identified	  by	  the	  clinician	  on	  examination	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  A	   clinician	   therefore	  might	  be	   able	   to	   legitimately	   claim	   that	   they	  had	  promoted	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their	   patient’s	   autonomy	   by	   offering	   them	   a	   choice	   of	   treatment	   thus	   enabling	  them	  to	  make	  a	  choice	  and	  then	  delivering	  the	  treatment.	  	  That	  choice	  also	  raises	  another	   matter.	   	   If	   choice	   and	   consent	   are	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   we	   promote	  autonomy	   and	   we	   wish	   people	   to	   make	   an	   informed	   (rational)	   choice	   as	   an	  autonomous	   individual	   then	  we	  must	  be	  required	   to	  promote	  autonomy	  through	  the	  delivery	  of	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  options	  proposed.	  	  This	  poses	  another	  practical	  but	  ethically	  significant	  problem,	  that	  of	  information.	  	  There	  has	  been	  much	  concern	  in	  clinical	  literature	  about	  the	  increasing	  burden	  on	  clinicians	  in	  relation	  to	  information	  giving.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	   2001)	   the	   response	   to	   concerns	   about	   effective	   promotion	   of	   individual	  autonomy	   and	   therefore	   adequate	   respect	   of	   persons	   has	   been	   to	   respond	   by	  making	   sure	   that	   greater	   and	   greater	   quantities	   of	   information	   are	   given.	   	   This	  clearly	  is	  an	  indication	  or	  implies	  that	  respect	  for	  persons	  in	  the	  clinical	  setting	  has	  developed	  from	  an	  individual	  construction	  of	  mere,	  sheer	  choice	  to	  one	  of	  rational	  autonomy	   that	   requires	   reflection	   from	   the	  patient,	   a	  weighing	   in	   the	  balance	  of	  the	  facts	  (Mental	  Capacity	  Act,	  2005)	  before	  an	  autonomous	  decision	  is	  made.	   	  In	  fact	  those	  patients	  that	  cannot	  ‘weigh	  in	  the	  balance’	  so	  to	  speak	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  incompetent	   (wanton,	   Frankfurt,	   1988b)	   and	   deprived	   of	   the	   right	   to	   be	  completely	   self-­‐determining.	   	   A	   model	   for	   respect	   for	   persons	   that	   has	   an	  individualised	   (rational)	   autonomy	   underpinning	   is	   inextricably	   linked	   to	   choice	  making.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  has	  been	  interpreted	  in	  medicine	  and	  dentistry	  into	  consent.	  	  Consent	  has	  evolved	  from	  a	  authorisation	  model	  or	  a	  simple	  ‘yes’	  or	  ‘no’	  to	  one	  that	  requires	   rational	   reflection	   (although	   paradoxically	   the	   decision	   need	   not	   be	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‘rational’	  to	  satisfy	  the	  Law).	  	  This	  model	  necessarily	  requires	  information	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  the	  reflective	  process	  or	  at	  least	  to	  improve	  it.	  	  A	  focus	  on	  information	  re-­‐enforces	   the	   treatment	   model	   simply	   because	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   a	   patient’s	  autonomy	  is	  promoted	  is	  via	  their	  right	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  about	  what	  is	  proposed	  by	  the	  doctor	  or	  dentist.	  	  I	  cannot	  help	  but	  think	  that	  this	  is	  somewhat	  futile.	  	  As	  we	  are	  attempting	  to	  promote	  autonomy,	  this	  seems	  a	  very	  restrictive	  way	  to	  do	  so.	  	  It	  is	  similar	  to	  claiming	  that	  you	  are	  promoting	  someone’s	   liberty	  by	  allowing	  them	  to	  choose	  whether	   they	  prefer	  cell	  a	  or	  b	   in	  a	  prison.	  As	  Berlin	  states,	   “the	  mere	  existence	  of	  alternatives	  is	  not,	  therefore,	  enough	  to	  make	  my	  action	  free	  although	  it	  may	  be	  voluntary”.	  (Berlin,	  1997,	  p127)	  	  	  We	   cannot	   claim	   that	   autonomy	   of	   any	   kind	   is	   promoted	   simply	   through	   choice	  particularly	  when	  that	  choice	  is	  in	  the	  context	  of	  someone	  finding	  themselves	  in	  a	  situation	  not	  of	  their	  choosing,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  ill	  health.	   	  I	  am	  not	  trying	  24	  to	  claim	  here	   that	   individualised	   autonomy	   is	   unworkable.	   	   I	   am	   claiming	   that	   because	  patients	  find	  themselves	  largely	  in	  a	  situation	  not	  of	  their	  choosing	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  the	   merit	   of	   underpinning	   our	   ethical	   values,	   at	   least	   operationally,	   through	   a	  reliance	  on	  choice	  and	  consent.	  	  This,	  I	  would	  argue,	  is	  in	  part	  a	  result	  of	  the	  close	  relationship	  between	  the	  physical	  person	  and	  the	  self.	  	  The	  physical	  person	  and	  the	  self	  are	   inextricably	   linked	  (as	  would	  Gadow,	  1980)	   in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  medical	  choices	   that	   relate	   to	   the	   physical	   person	   particularly	   significant	   to	   the	   self.	   	   I	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  I	   think	   this	   point	   even	   applies	   to	   cosmetic	   procedures	   after	   all	   we	   don’t	   choose	   to	   dislike	   the	  appearance	  of	  our	  teeth.	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contend	  that	  what	  happens	  to	  the	  physical	  person	  has	  a	  greater	  impact	  on	  how	  we	  might	  describe,	  feel	  or	  define	  the	  self	  than	  interactions	  that	  occur	  externally.	  	  Some	  recognition	  of	  this	  view	  may	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  Engle	  Case	  (Liggett	  Group,	  Inc.	  v.	  Engle,	  2003)	  	  where	  a	  duty	  of	  care	  relationship	  between	  tobacco	  companies	  and	  smokers	  was	   established	   (rather	   than	   a	   purely	   commercial	   or	  more	   properly	   contractual	  relationship)	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   the	   product	   purchase	   adversely	   affected	   the	  smokers’	  health.	  	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  develop	  this	  further	  here	  for	  fear	  of	  distracting	  from	   the	  main	   argument.	   	   I	  merely	  wish	   to	   claim	   that	  medical	   interaction	   has	   a	  special	   significance	   and	   this	   necessarily	   puts	   the	   patient	   in	   a	   differing	   position	  (lack	  of	   choice)	   than	  other	   commercial	   and	   social	   interactions.	   	  This	   leads	  me	   to	  question	  what	  value	  choice	  has	  as	  an	  ethical	  underpinning	  in	  the	  way	  it	  relates	  to	  rational	  autonomy	  in	  the	  clinical	  setting.	  	  	  
The	  value	  of	  choice	  We	   have	   seen	   that	   there	   are	   practical	   difficulties	   in	   helping	   patients	   make	  informed	   choices	   and	   indeed	   as	   O’Neill	   claims	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   many	   of	   the	  choices	   made	   by	   patients	   are	   individualised	   rather	   than	   rational,	   autonomous	  decisions	  (O’Neill,	  2002a).	   	  I	  would	  also	  wish	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  treatment	  focus	  of	  that	  choosing	  means	  that	  matters	  of	  a	  clinical	  nature	  are	  automatically	  prioritised	  possibly	  even	  at	   the	  expense	  of	   those	  matters	   that	   are	  of	   concern	   to	   the	  patient.	  	  This	   further	   reduces	   the	   sphere	   of	   choosing.	   	   The	   result	   is	   that	   patients	   are	  squashed	  into	  an	  autonomy	  ‘bubble’	  where	  they	  can	  choose	  on	  a	  take	  it	  or	  leave	  it	  basis	  but	  have	  no	  real	   influence	  over	  the	  priority	  of	   the	   information	  they	  receive	  nor	  over	  the	  situation	  they	  find	  themselves	  in.	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  In	  summary,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  matters	  of	  concern	  that	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  if	  we	  are	  to	  consider	  alternatives.	  	  These	  fall	  into	  three	  main	  groups.	  	  First,	  we	  have	  considered	   the	   difficulties	   with	   information	   giving;	   in	   a	   practical	   sense	   full	  disclosure	  to	  patients	  and	  the	  aim	  to	  make	  them	  what	  we	  might	  term	  ‘mini-­‐medics’	  is	   extremely	   onerous	   and	   may	   be	   increasingly	   difficult	   the	   more	   complex	   and	  specialised	  a	  treatment	  becomes.	  	  Ironically,	  this	  is	  also	  the	  time	  that	  patients	  may	  be	  making	  decisions	  of	  huge	  personal	  importance.	   	  The	  likelihood	  is	  that	  in	  some	  cases	   this	   matter	   is	   fudged	   and	   no	   real	   consent	   (according	   to	   our	   current	  understanding	  of	   the	  process)	   is	   gained	  which	   is	  both	   risky	   for	   the	   clinician	  and	  unsatisfactory	   for	   the	   patient.	   	   Second,	   an	   information-­‐reliant	   system	   that	  identifies	  clinical	  information	  as	  the	  key	  component	  to	  patient	  autonomy	  may	  fail	  to	   prioritise	  matters	   of	   reasonable	   importance	   to	   patients.	   	   It	   would	   be	   hard	   to	  claim	  that	   the	  current	  model	  has	  a	  component	  that	  necessarily	  requires	  patients’	  reasonable	  preference	  to	  be	  prioritised.	   	  Currently	  the	  model	  is	  about	  the	  patient	  engaging	   successfully	   on	   what	   is	   offered	   by	   medicine	   not	   medicine	   engaging	  successfully	  with	  the	  needs	  and	  reasonable	  preferences	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  Finally,	  the	  current	  model	  gives	  us	  a	  misleading	  sense	  that	  we	  are	  delivering	  something	  that	  is	  ethically	  robust.	  	  It	  gives	  us	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  are	  promoting	  a	  patient’s	  autonomy	  by	  involving	  or	  asking	  them	  to	  endorse	  what	  happens	  to	  them	  but	  does	  not	  require	  us	  to	  consider	  how	  this	  relates	  to	  the	  overall	  aim	  of	  health	  or	  make	  the	  important	  distinction	   between	   healthcare	   (the	   operative	   term	   being	   care)	   and	   delivery	  (action)	  of	   treatment.	   	   I	  would	   liken	   it	   to	  buying	  a	   friend	  a	  birthday	  gift.	   	  Can	  we	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really	  claim	  we	  did	  the	  job	  well	  if	  we	  bought	  them	  what	  we	  would	  like	  rather	  than	  something	  that	  was	  to	  their	  taste?	  
	  
The	  way	  forward	  –	  defining	  our	  needs	  We	  have	  considered	  various	  differing	  models	  for	  respecting	  patients	  as	  part	  of	  the	  clinical	   relationship	   and	   we	   have	   considered	   their	   shortcomings	   and	   found	   the	  alternatives	  also	  wanting.	  	  This	  leads	  us	  to	  consider	  then,	  what	  would	  be	  a	  suitable	  alternative?	   	   What	   qualities	   do	   we	   need	   to	   seek	   from	   a	   theoretical	   model	   that	  adequately	   addresses	   the	   concerns	   we	   have	   raised	   in	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	  relationship?	  First	  it	  is	  contended	  that	  the	  delivery	  of	  healthcare,	  naturally	  leads	  us	  to	   a	   personal	   construction	   of	   ethical	   interaction25.	   	   It	   may	   be	   the	   result	   of	  empiricism	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  as	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  an	  individual	  and	  our	  efforts	  are	   aimed	   at	   helping	   that	   individual	   we	   tend	   to	   construct	   the	   situation	   in	   an	  individualised	   manner.	   	   Indeed,	   as	   we	   have	   considered,	   what	   distinguishes	   the	  ethical	   challenges	   in	  dentistry	  often	  relates	   to	   the	  chair-­‐side	   interaction	  between	  patient	  and	  clinician.	  	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  we	  wish	  to	  lose	  sight	  of	  our	  overall	  aim	  when	   considering	   the	   finer	   detail	   of	   the	   dentist-­‐patient	   relationship.	   	   How	   we	  construct	   that	   relationship	   must	   be	   reflective	   of	   our	   overall	   aim	   (to	   actively	  promote	  good	  through	  healthcare)	  but	  what	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  is	  that	  we	  are	   not	   thinking	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   overall	   good	   (improved	   health)	   justifying	   a	  treatment	   focussed	  model	   that	  has	   little	   regard	   for	   the	  process	  of	   achieving	   that	  goal.	   	   It	  would	   not	   be	   contentious	   to	   argue	   that	   in	   terms	   of	   interacting	  with	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Where	   the	   concept	   individual	   has	   some	   ethical	   value/moral	   weight	   –	   as	   opposed	   to	   classic	  utilitarianism	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individual	   (for	   their	   own	   benefit)	   the	   means	   is	   rarely	   justified	   by	   the	   ends.	   	   In	  order	   to	   claim	   we	   have	   promoted	   good	   we	   are	   starting	   from	   the	   position	   of	  believing	  that	  the	  method	  or	  experience	  has	  a	  bearing	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  that	  duty	  was	  properly	  discharged.	  	  We	  would	  therefore	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  claim	  that	  we	  had	   discharged	   our	   healthcare	   duty	  whilst	   humiliating	   the	   patient	   or	   projecting	  our	  wishes	   onto	   them	   claiming	   that	   it	  was	   for	   their	   own	   good.	   	  We	   are	   already	  some	  way	   there	   in	   relation	   to	   recognising	   this	  key	  point,	  when	  we	  recognise	   the	  importance	  of	   a	   consented	  process	  of	   healthcare	   that	   enables	  patients	   to	   choose	  their	  route	  through	  the	  process.	   	   I	  am	  not	  proposing	  a	  sea	  change	   in	  that	  regard,	  but	  by	  relying	  on	  choice	  as	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  we	  mostly	  respect	  patients	  we	  are	  doomed	   to	   fail	   to	   discharge	   our	   duty	   in	   the	   right	   way.	   	   What	   then	   would	   any	  personal	  model	  need	  to	  account	  for	  in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  concerns	  I	  have	  raised?	  	  	  I	   have	   already	   contended	   above	   that	   it	   is	  my	   concern	   that	   our	   current	  model	   of	  patient	   autonomy	   and	   its	   hierarchical	   structure	   directs	   us	   to	   construct	   an	  interaction	   that	   relies	  heavily	  on	   the	  consent	  process	   for	  ethical	   justification.	   	  As	  we	   have	   seen	   this,	   in	   practical	   terms,	   leads	   to	   a	   general	   concern	   that	   an	   overly	  medicalized	  interaction	  that	  may	  fail	  to	  prioritise	  the	  needs	  and	  desires	  of	  patients	  despite	   claiming	   to	   promote	   their	   autonomy.	   	   Any	   new	  model	   most	   adequately	  account	  for	  these	  concerns.	  	  However,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  Chapter	  One	  dentistry	  also	  has	  specialised	   needs.	   	   These	   needs	   arise	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   differing	   structure	   of	  primary	   care	   dentistry	   from	   its	   medical	   counterparts,	   so	   any	   alternative	   model	  must	  also	  address	  these	  concerns.	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We	   considered	   in	   Chapter	   One	   the	   challenges	   presented	   by	   the	   delivery	   of	   both	  cosmetic	  care	  and	  therapeutic	  care	  in	  the	  same	  context.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  patients	  may	   well	   attend	   appointments	   for	   therapeutic	   treatment,	   make	   decisions	   and	  apportion	  weight	  to	  a	  clinician’s	  advice	  based	  on	  their	  perception	  of	  a	  professional	  healthcare	  relationship.	  	  This	  relationship	  is	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  dentist	  is	  duty	  bound	  to	  deliver	  treatment	  and	  advice	  according	  a	  strict	  code	  of	  practice	  and	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  patient’s	  welfare,	  as	  recognised	  by	  the	  special	   ‘duty	  of	  care’	  relationship.	   	  We	   have	   considered	   the	   dangers	   for	   patients	   and	   practitioners	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  potential	   for	  practitioners	  to	  use	  the	   ‘cloak	  of	  medicine’	   to	  unduly	  influence	  patients	   into	  opting	  for	  cosmetic	  treatments	  as	  a	  result	  of	  confusion	  on	  the	   patient’s	   part	   between	  necessary	   healthcare	   and	   social	   ideals	   or	   commercial	  interests.	  	  We	  have	  considered	  the	  concern	  that	  a	  patient’s	  choice	  or	  consent	  (and	  therefore	  autonomy)	  here	  might	  be	  legitimately	  considered	  to	  be	  reduced	  because	  they	  have	  been	  unduly	  influenced	  by	  the	  weight	  of	  clinical	  preference	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  cosmetic	  treatment	  that	  serves	  little	  purpose	  (from	  an	  ethical	  perspective	  as	  it	  is	  not	   healthcare).	   	   If	   a	   patient	   is	   influenced	   into	   a	   choice	   under	   the	   ‘cloak	   of	  medicine’	   surely	   they	   cannot	   be	   regarded	   as	   autonomous	   despite	   the	   consent	  process?	   	  The	  consequence	  of	   this	   is	   two-­‐fold,	   from	  a	  practical	  sense	   it	   shows	  us	  that	   the	   same	   level	   of	   patient	   relationship	   and	  duty	   of	   care	  necessarily	   needs	   to	  exist	  at	  any	  time	  during	  the	  clinical	  relationship.	  	  Second,	  this	  should	  not	  be	  simply	  confined	   to	   the	   delivery	   of	   therapeutic	   treatment	   because	   the	   context	   is	   too	  influential	   for	   patients	   to	   be	   able	   to	   make	   commercial	   as	   well	   as	   healthcare	  decisions.	  	  Second	  it	  shows	  us	  that	  we	  cannot	  refine	  our	  understanding	  of	  respect	  for	   persons	   to	   the	   right	   of	   patients	   to	   choose	   their	   treatment.	   	   A	   much	   more	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complex	   interaction	   exists	   where	   concerns	   must	   be	   expressed	   over	   a	   patient’s	  perception	  of	  the	  interaction	  and	  the	  roles	  each	  participant	  is	  playing	  as	  well	  as	  the	  outcome.	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  the	  locus	  of	  power	  might	  be	  said	  to	  move	  in	  relation	  to	  how	  we	  might	  claim	  to	  observe	  and	  promote	  autonomy	  in	  health.	  	  First,	  we	  need	  to	  be	  able	   to	  account	  adequately	   for	  any	  undue	   influence	  or	  manipulation	   that	  may	  interfere	  with	  an	  individual’s	  ability	  to	  choose	  legitimately.	  	  Second,	  we	  may	  wish	  to	   consider	   that	   reliance	  on	   choice	   in	   of	   itself	   presents	  problems.	   	  A	  move	   away	  from	  choice	  as	   the	  central	   tenet	  of	  autonomy	   in	  medicine	  could	  perhaps	  address	  these	  concerns.	  	  	  	  Similarly	  we	  have	  to	  consider	  the	  difficulties	  with	  the	  use	  of	  skill	  mix	  in	  dentistry	  and	  how	  this	  might	  be	  said	  to	  frustrate	  our	  intention	  to	  respect	  the	  individual.	  	  As	  we	   have	   seen	   the	   use	   of	   skill	  mix	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   knowledge	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	  patient	   has	   occasioned	   them	   to	   express	   concern	   about	   the	   role	   of	   the	   individual	  who	  is	  delivering	  the	  patient’s	  treatment.	  	  This	  again	  indicates	  that	  patients	  are	  not	  simply	  satisfied	  with	  getting	  what	  they	  need;	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  are	  treated	  and	   by	  whom	   also	   have	   relevance	   in	   relation	   to	   their	   overall	   satisfaction.	   	   If	  we	  continue	  to	  contend	  then	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  healthcare	   is	  to	  do	  good	  by	  helping	  patients	   and	  we	   subscribe	   to	   the	   view	   that	   we	   must	   respect	   the	   individual	   by	  promoting	  their	  autonomy	  (as	  we	  currently	  claim	  through	  the	  use	  of	   the	  consent	  process)	  it	  would	  seem	  a	  nonsense	  to	  claim	  that	  merely	  by	  being	  a	  patient	  getting	  what	  they	  need	  we	  have	  satisfied	  that	  goal.	   	  We	  cannot	  claim	  to	  have	  discharged	  our	  ethical	  duty	  to	  the	  patient	  whilst	  overriding	  their	  views.	  	  Perhaps	  this	  could	  be	  summarised	  as	  health	  as	  an	  endeavour	  to	  help	  patients	   through	  care	  rather	   than	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through	   treatment;	   care	   forming	   a	   significant	   part	   of	   how	   we	   might	   assess	   the	  extent	   to	   which	   that	   process	   has	   been	   successful.	   	   As	   we	   can	   see,	   however,	   the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  dental	  profession	  is	  structured26	  necessarily	  leads	  to	  a	  danger	  that	  this	  desire	  to	  offer	  care	  may	  be	  put	  at	  risk.	   	  Any	  model	  of	  ethical	   interaction	  must	  then	  be	  able	  to	  account	  for	  the	  dangers	  of	  deception.	  	  Finally,	   we	   have	   considered	   the	   challenges	   presented	   by	   private	   and	   NHS	   care	  being	   offered	   in	   potentially	   the	   same	   appointment.	   	   We	   have	   considered	   how	  difficult	   it	   is	   for	   patients	   to	   differentiate	   between	   the	   two	   schemes	   and	   the	  challenges	   for	   dentists	   who	   may	   find	   themselves	   under	   commercial	   as	   well	   as	  professional	   pressures.	   	   Again	   this	   is	   a	   problem	   that	   is	   easily	   identifiable	   as	  deception.	   	  Further,	   in	  a	  dentist’s	  desire	  to	  do	  the	  best	  for	  their	  patient	  they	  may	  wrongly	   assume	   that	   the	   patient	   wishes	   the	   ‘best’	   at	   any	   cost;	   thus	   prioritising	  treatment	   (after	   all	   the	   reason	   the	   patient	   is	   there)	   over	   and	   above	   other	  considerations.	  	  Other	  considerations	  however,	  such	  as	  cost,	  may	  be	  of	  paramount	  significance	   to	   the	  patient.	   	  One	  can	  see	  here	   the	  dangers	  of	  a	   treatment	   focused	  and	  consent	  model	  here	  as	  the	  treatment	  itself	  and	  consent	  for	  such	  (through	  full	  clinical	   information)	   may	   be	   viewed	   as	   obscuring	   the	   need	   to	   consider	   other	  factors	  such	  as	  cost.	   	  Further,	  even	  if	  a	  patient	  would	  have	  agreed	  to	  the	  cost	  had	  they	   known	   about	   it,	   conduct	   in	   this	   manner	   still	   seems	   ethically	   problematic	  because	   it	   deprives	   the	   patient	   of	   the	   right	   to	   be	   self-­‐determining	   and	  making	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Because	  primary	  care	  specialization	  is	  in	  its	  infancy	  the	  dentist	  currently	  acts	  as	  the	  prescriber	  for	  all	  care	  making	  it	  a	  presumption	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  patient	  that	  that	  is	  precisely	  who	  is	  treating	  them.	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choice	  based	  on	  what	  they	  deem	  to	  be	  of	  priority	  even	  if	  they	  coincidently	  happens	  to	  be	  the	  same	  as	  their	  dentist	  would	  have	  recommended.	  	  It	  seems	  then	  that	  there	  are	  two	  areas	  of	  concern.	  	  First,	  is	  the	  general	  concern	  that	  reliance	   on	   a	   treatment	   focused	   model	   cannot	   reliably	   prioritise	   the	   needs	   and	  reasonable	  preferences	  of	  the	  patient;	  this	  concern	  may	  apply	  equally	  across	  most	  aspects	  of	  primary	  care.	  	  Second,	  that	  dentistry,	  owing	  to	  its	  highly	  individualised	  nature	   and	   traditional	   professional	   structure	   can	   lead	   to	   difficulties	   with	  manipulation	  and	  deception.	  	  	  	  If	  we	  are	  not	  focused	  on	  promoting	  and	  protecting	  autonomy	  through	  the	  action	  of	  choosing	   but	  we	   still	   need	   an	   individualised	   account	   of	   respect	   for	   persons	   and	  have	  failed	  to	  find	  an	  adequate	  alternative	  I	  propose	  that	  this	  enables	  us	  to	  return	  to	  autonomy	  and	  consider	  an	  improved	  account	  of	  autonomy.	  	  This	  is	  because	  we	  still	   believe	   that	   the	   individual	   has	   some	   personal	   ethical	   significance	   and	   the	  process	   of	   medical	   treatment	   is	   of	   similar	   importance	   to	   them	   as	   the	   outcome.	  	  Therefore	  we	  cannot	  rely	  on	  theories	  that	  emphasise	  the	  end	  product	  of	  treatment	  and	   rely	  on	   that	   to	   claim	   that	   the	  duty	  of	  healthcare	  as	  an	  ethical	   endeavour	   (to	  promote	  good)	  has	  been	  discharged.	  	  Nor	  can	  we	  claim	  that	  increased	  or	  restored	  autonomy	  is	  achieved	  once	  the	  patient’s	  healthcare	   is	  complete	  whilst	  overriding	  the	  same	  during	  treatment	  is	  justified.	  	  As	  patients	  tell	  us	  that	  the	  care	  they	  receive	  is	   of	   significant	   importance	   it	   seems	   a	   nonsense	   to	  make	   such	   a	   claim.	   	  We	   also	  need	  for	  our	  dental	  purposes	  to	  satisfactorily	  address	  the	  matters	  of	  deception	  and	  manipulation	   because	  we	   are	   claiming	   that	   the	   treatment	   process	   has	   an	   ethical	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significance	   that	   is	   not	   outweighed	   by	   the	   end	   result.	   	   We	   are	   looking	   for	   an	  account	   that	   maintains	   a	   strong	   individualistic	   tone	   but	   can	   account	   for	   our	  deception	  and	  manipulation	  concerns.	  	  In	  order	  to	  address	  our	  concerns	  and	  make	  my	  contribution	  to	  the	  debate	  I	  would	  like	  to	  propose	  an	  alternative	  account	  of	  clinical	  interaction.	  	  The	  account	  will	  need	  to	   ascribe	   value	   to	   the	   individual	   and	   get	   away	   from	   the	   difficulties	   of	   trying	   to	  promote	  patient	  autonomy	  from	  within	  the	  dental	  relationship.	  	  The	  account	  I	  wish	  to	  propose	  for	  this	  is	  negative	  liberty.	  	  The	  basic	  premise	  of	  an	  account	  of	  negative	  liberty	   is	   that	   it	   crucially	   requires	   an	   environment	   within	   which	   an	   individual’s	  personal	  autonomy	  can	  flourish	  without	  any	  external	  obstacles.	  	  It	  is	  this	  principle	  of	  autonomy	  through	  freedom,	  that	  may	  help	  us	  to	  avoid	  some	  of	  the	  pitfalls	  with	  information	   giving	   and	   the	   concerns	   I	   have	   expressed	   about	   information	   and	  consent.	  	  However,	  we	  will	  need	  to	  be	  mindful	  that	  we	  must	  also	  be	  able	  to	  account	  for	   our	   specific	   dental	   concerns	  with	   deception	   and	  manipulation.	   	   In	   summary	  what	  I	  am	  proposing	  for	  the	  dental	  relationship	  is	  an	  account	  that	  protects	  (rather	  than	  promotes)	  the	  patient’s	  autonomy	  in	  the	  relationship	  whilst	  guarding	  against	  inauthentic	  desires	  that	  may	  be	  a	  consequence	  of	  deception.	  	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this	  we	  need	  to	  start	  by	  looking	  at	  an	  account	  of	  negative	  liberty	  and	  how	  it	  may	  need	  to	  be	  moderated	  to	  fully	  address	  our	  needs.	  
	  
Negative	  liberty	  –	  a	  solution	  Negative	  liberty	  is	  perhaps	  best	  defined	  by	  Berlin	  (2002)	  as	  the	  domain	  in	  which	  the	  question	  asked	  would	  be	   ‘to	  what	  extent	  am	   I	   free?’	   	   ‘What	  are	   the	   choices	   I	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have	   open	   to	   me?’	   	   	   It	   is	   a	   theory	   that	   relies	   on	   the	   absence	   of	   obstacles	   and	  therefore	  makes	  freedom	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  self-­‐determination,	  an	  external	  condition.	  	  We	  can	  conclude	   then	   that	  negative	   liberty	   is	   the	   “absence	  of	  external	  obstacles”	  (Taylor,	  1979,	  p.76).	  	  The	  obstructions	  must	  be	  qualified	  and	  moderated	  by	  being	  imposed	   by	   humans	  whether	   that	   be	   unintentional,	   intentional	   or	   as	   a	   result	   of	  institutional	   or	   professional	   constraint	   (Jahanbegloo,	   1991,	   p.40).	   	   Further	   they	  must	  concern	  “alterable	  human	  practices”	  (Berlin,	  p.xxxixf,	  1969).	  	  This	  moderates	  the	   concept	   of	   liberty	   and	   excludes	   those	   obstacles	   over	  which	  we	   have	   no	   real	  control	  or	  those	  imposed	  by	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  natural	  World;	  for	  instance	  our	  inability	  to	  become	  invisible.	  	  So	  for	  Berlin	  we	  are	  free	  autonomous	  agents	  so	  long	  as	  we	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  artificially	  imposed	  external	  obstacles.	  	  This	  wish	  to	  externalise	  the	  obstacles	  that	  prevent	  liberty	  forms	  the	  main	  objection	  that	  proponents	  of	  the	  ‘third	  way’	  propose	  to	  Berlin’s	  theory	  (Taylor,	  1979;	  Gray,	  1980;	  Baldwin,	  1984;	  Oppenheim,	  2004	  and	  Meskill,	  2013).	  	  They	  conclude,	  there	  is	   nothing	   in	   that	   which	   Berlin	   proposes	   that	   would	   prevent	   us	   considering	  internal	  obstacles	  in	  addition.	  	  Which	  we	  will	  see	  may	  be	  important	  for	  us	  later	  in	  relation	  to	  deception.	   	  Indeed,	  Kant	  also	  similarly	  views	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  aspects	  of	  freedom.	  	  According	  to	  Kant	  negative	  freedom	  was	  the	  “independency	  of	  alien	   causes”	   (Kant,	   1999),	   those	  desires	  or	   immediate	   reactions	   that	  distract	  us	  from	  our	  true	  duty.	  	  If	  a	  man	  is	  to	  be	  directed	  by	  his	  desires	  or	  immediate	  reactions	  rather	   than	  practical	   reason	  he	   is	  no	   longer	   in	  control	  of	  his	  actions	  and	  as	  such	  would	  become	  heteronomous.	  	  Berlin	  categorically	  avoids	  this	  lapse	  into	  the	  world	  of	   the	   internal.	   	   It	   is	  understandable	  why	  he	  chooses	  to	  do	  so.	   	  The	  danger	  being	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that	   this	   injects	   a	   positive	   liberty	   ideal	   into	   the	   world	   of	   the	   negative,	   the	   very	  thing	  Berlin	  is	  attempting	  to	  avoid.	  	  We	  could	  easily	  adjust	  our	  concept	  of	  positive	  liberty	  and	  attempt	  to	  express	  it	  in	  negative	  terms	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  could	  strive	  to	  liberate	  oneself	  from	  the	  lower	  self	  rather	  requiring	  one	  to	  strive	  for	  the	  higher	  self	  as	  proposed	  by	  Frankfurt	  and	  Dworkin	  (Frankfurt,	  1971	  and	  Dworkin,	  1988).	  	  Berlin	  concedes	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  his	  theory	  that	  prevents	  him	  from	  doing	  so.	  	  Significantly	  though,	  as	  we	  have	  considered	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  positive	  theories	  of	  liberty;	  negative	  theories	  are	  less	  prone	  to	  infinite	  regress,	  in	  that	  they	  require	  no	  ordering	   or	   prioritising	   or	   preferences.	   	   In	   this	   sense	   avoiding	   the	   internal	  circumvents	  the	  need	  to	  promote	  autonomy	  through	  external	  action	  (if	  we	  wish	  to	  promote	  good)	  and	  thus	  avoids	  all	  the	  associated	  difficulties	  we	  had	  with	  positive	  liberty	   accounts.	   	   	   	   We	   will	   consider	   this	   again	   later	   but	   for	   the	   moment	   I	   will	  attempt	  to	  expose	  some	  of	  the	  further	  distinctions	  between	  positive	  and	  negative	  liberty.	  	  MacCallum	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  positive	  and	  negative	  liberty	  is	  confused	  (MacCallum,	  1967).	  	  This	  is	  because	  negative	  liberty	  hides	  or	  obscures	  its	  structure	  by	  claiming	  that	  one	  is	  free	  if	  X	  is	  free	  from	  Y.	  	  MacCallum	  claims	  that	  this	  position	   is	   indefensible	   because	   the	   structure	   is	   necessarily	   more	   complex	   and	  actually	  requires	  the	  expression	  X	  is	  free	  from	  Y	  to	  do	  Z.	  	  Therefore,	  we	  see	  a	  fusion	  between	  the	  two	  concepts.	  	  Rather	  than	  claim	  that	  there	  are	  two	  distinct	  concepts,	  MacCallum	  asserts	  that	  the	  focus	  should	  rest	  on	  how	  these	  three	  components	  are	  apportioned	   significance	   and	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   they	   operate.	   	   The	   debate	  should	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  the	  liberties	  we	  seek	  to	  protect	  rather	  than	  the	  claims	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associated	   with	   the	   differing	   concepts.	   	   MacCallum	   (1967)	   argues	   this	   point	   by	  using	   his	   to/from	   proposition;	   that	   is	   to	   say	   that	   the	   main	   difference	   between	  negative	  and	  positive	  liberty	  is	  that	  negative	  liberty	  could	  be	  expressed	  as	  freedom	  
from	   something	   (the	   external	   obstacles	   as	   proposed	   by	  Berlin)	  whereas	   positive	  liberty	   could	   be	   expressed	   as	   freedom	   to	   do	   something	   (for	   example	   actions	   or	  conditions	   of	   character,	  MacCallum,	   1967,	   p.314).	   	   Baldwin	   (1984)	   however	   has	  disputed	  this	  view	  and	  claims	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  true	  distinction	  to	  draw.	  	  Baldwin	  (like	  other	  proponents	  of	  the	  ‘third	  way’)	  believes	  that	  negative	  liberty	  is	  an	   opportunity	   concept,	   that	   is	   to	   say	   that	   there	   is	   no	   requirement	   that	   the	  opportunities	  should	  be	  actioned.	  	  As	  Berlin	  himself	  describes,	  if	  a	  person	  sits	  on	  a	  chair	   and	   has	   the	   opportunity	   to	   stand-­‐up	   if	   he	   chooses	   not	   to	   do	   so	  we	   cannot	  claim	   that	   his	   liberty	   is	   impaired	   (Berlin,	   2002).	   	   This	   challenges	   the	   claim	  MacCallum	   wishes	   to	   make	   about	   the	   to/from	   distinction	   between	   the	   two	  theories.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  negative	  freedom	  is	  the	  freedom	  to	  do	  something	  but	  it	  is	   an	   important	   feature	   that	   the	   something	   is	   unspecified.	   	   Negative	   freedom	  therefore	  is	  a	  general	  or	  over-­‐arching	  approach:	  a	  state	  of	  being,	  whereas	  positive	  freedom	  becomes	  more	  reductionist	  and	  as	  such	  relates	  to	  something	  much	  more	  specific.	   	  Negative	   freedom	   then	   is	   almost	   simplistic	   in	   that	   the	  more	  doors	   that	  remain	  open	  for	  an	  individual,	  the	  more	  opportunity	  one	  has,	  the	  more	   ‘free’	  one	  becomes.	   	   However,	   there	   is	   no	   value	   attached	   to	   the	   freedoms	   that	   we	   might	  enjoy;	   no	   ranking	   or	   ordering	   of	   which	   freedoms	   carry	   more	   value	   and	   indeed	  more	  moral	  weight	  than	  any	  other.	  	  My	  freedom	  to	  ride	  my	  bike	  without	  being	  run	  over,	  dye	  my	  hair	  green	  or	  vote	   in	   the	  next	  election	  are	  not,	   according	   to	  Berlin,	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ranked	  in	  any	  order	  and	  as	  such	  cannot	  take	  us	  on	  any	  journey	  of	  self-­‐realization	  because	  we	  cannot	  discriminate	  between	  those	  freedoms	  that	  we	  highly	  value	  and	  those	  that	  are	  relatively	  worthless	  in	  that	  they	  are	  insignificant	  to	  our	  selves.	  	  If	  we	  are	   hoping	   that	   negative	   liberty	   is	   the	   model	   via	   which	   we	   can	   assert	   an	  authoritative	  voice	  in	  complex	  moral	  situations	  the	  most	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  claim	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  necessary	  pre-­‐requisite.	  	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  Three,	  positive	  liberty	  is	  constructed	  very	  differently	  and	   asks	   the	   question	   not	   ‘to	   what	   extent	   am	   I	   free’	   but	   rather	   ‘how	   am	   I	  controlled?’	   ‘What	  governs	  me?’	   	   	   	  The	  posing	  of	  this	  question	  necessarily	  implies	  that	   individuals	  would	  wish	   to	   govern	   themselves:	   to	   be	   in	   control	   of	   their	   own	  lives.	  	  	  
“I	  would	  wish	  my	   life	   and	  decisions	   to	  depend	  on	  myself,	   not	  on	  external	  forces	  of	  whatever	  kind.	  	  I	  wish	  to	  be	  the	  instrument	  of	  my	  own,	  not	  other	  men’s,	   acts	   of	  will.	   	   I	  wish	   to	   be	   a	   subject	   not	   an	   object;	   to	   be	  moved	   by	  reason,	   by	   conscious	   purposes,	   which	   are	   my	   own,	   not	   by	   causes	   which	  affect	  me,	  as	  it	  were,	  from	  outside.	  	  I	  wish	  to	  be	  somebody,	  not	  anybody;	  a	  doer	  –	  deciding,	  not	  being	  decided	  for,	  self-­‐directed	  and	  not	  acted	  upon	  by	  external	  nature	  or	  by	  other	  men	  as	  if	  I	  were	  a	  thing,	  or	  an	  animal,	  or	  a	  slave	  in	  capable	  of	  playing	  a	  human	  role,	  that	  is,	  of	  conceiving	  goals	  and	  policies	  of	  my	  own	  and	  realising	  them.”	  (Berlin,	  2002,	  p.178)	  As	  we	  can	  see	  this	  desire	  for	  autonomy	  is	  not	  too	  far	  removed	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  negative	  liberty,	  it	  shares	  the	  same	  characteristics	  (Berlin,	  2002.	  pp.35-­‐36).	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  that	  we	  wish	  to	  be	  free	  and	  not	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  others,	  as	  a	  result	  we	  need	  those	  conditions	  of	  freedom;	  the	  absence	  of	  external	  obstacles.	  	  Only	  then	  will	  we	  be	  able	  to	  choose	  our	  own	  pathway	  or	  act	  on	  (or	  choose	  not	  to	  act	  on)	  our	  own	  priorities.	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It	   is	  here	  that	  we	  see	  the	  distinctions	  between	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  theories	  start	  to	  establish	  themselves.	  	  Berlin,	  ironically,	  creates	  the	  environment	  in	  which	  the	   positive	   theories	   start	   to	   establish	   themselves	   by	   emphasising	   the	   political	  nature	   of	   the	   desire	   to	   be	   self-­‐governing	   which	   may	   be	   translated	   into	  participatory	  self-­‐government.	  	  This	  desire	  to	  be	  self-­‐governed	  is	  then	  augmented	  by	  others	  to	  draw	  a	  distinction	  between	  ones	  ‘true-­‐self’	  or	  ‘authentic	  self’.	  	  Here	  we	  see	  the	  seeds	  of	  the	  two-­‐step	  model	  we	  have	  considered	  in	  Chapter	  Three.	  	  This	  is	  not	  problematic	   to	  an	   individual’s	   freedom	  so	   long	  as	  he	   is	  able	   to	  overcome	  his	  own	  heteronomy	  and	  thus	  remain	  free.	  	  For	  example,	  as	  we	  considered	  in	  Chapter	  Three	   a	   smoker	  may	   be	   unable	   to	   overcome	   his	   own	   addiction	   to	   cigarettes	   yet	  there	   is	   no	   one	   (externally)	   that	   prevents	   him	   from	  doing	   so.	   	   As	   such,	   then,	   he	  remains	   free	   if	   we	   accept	   the	   negative	   account	   of	   liberty.	   	   Merely	   the	   smoker	  realises	  himself	   that	  he	   is	  unable	   to	  overcome	  his	  addiction	  and	   thereby	  achieve	  his	  goal	  to	  be	  a	  non-­‐smoker	  and	  he	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  frustration.	  
Positive	  and	  negative	  values	  only	  really	  establish	  themselves	  as	  separate	  theories	  once	   the	   second	   element	   is	   introduced.	   	   This	   is	   where	   the	   true	   self	   becomes	  externally	  assessable.	  	  This	  is	  where	  we	  see	  some	  of	  the	  individual’s	  desire,	  policies	  or	   preferences	   become	   inauthentic	   in	   that	   they	   contribute	   nothing	   to	   the	  realisation	   of	   the	   self	   at	   best	   and	   at	  worst	   frustrate	   the	   ability	   to	   do	   so	   (see	   for	  example	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  smoke	  in	  Chapter	  Three).	  	  Baldwin	  considers	  this	  to	  be	  a	  key	  factor	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  understand	  positive	  theories.	  	  He	  contends	  that	   positive	   theories	   construct	   liberty	   in	   a	   very	   specific	  manner	   and	   carry	  with	  them	   a	   strong	   normative	   element.	   	   As	   Baldwin	   states,	   “it	   is	   a	   typical	   feature	   of	  conceptions	  of	  positive	  freedom	  that	  an	  agent	  who	  is	  free	  does	  not	  merely	  have	  the	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opportunity	   for	   virtue,	   he	  must	   be	   virtuous”	   (Baldwin,	   1984,	   p.135).	   	   As	   Taylor	  considered,	   this	   may	   eventually	   result	   in	   the	   legitimate	   end	   of	   someone	   being	  
forced	  to	  be	  free.	  
Despite	  being	  aware	  of	   the	  dangers	  proponents	  of	   the	   ‘third	  way’	   contend	   that	  a	  negative	  account	  of	  liberty	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  address	  the	  matters	  of	  freedom	  (and	  the	  desire	  for	  autonomy	  (Taylor,	  1979	  and	  Meskill,	  2013).	  	  As	  they	  outline,	  whilst	  supporters	  of	  positive	  theories	  attempt	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  the	  concerns	  relating	  to	  enforced	  freedom,	  negative	  libertarians	  cling	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  liberty	  may	   be	   accounted	   for	   simply	   by	   the	   reliance	   on	   opportunity	   (externally).	  	  Oppenheim	   (1979,	   p.56)	   claims	   that	   the	   reason	   proponents	   of	   negative	   liberty	  continue	   to	   subscribe	   to	   that	   view	   is	   because	   it	   is	   both	   simple	   and	   safe;	   by	  measuring	   the	   quantity	   of	   opportunities	   available	   and	   only	   that,	   positive	  regression	   is	   prevented.	   	   Taylor	   (1979)	   argues	   however	   that	   the	   Maginot	   Line	  drawn	   by	   negative	   libertarians	   is	   simply	   untenable.	   	   There	   are	   three	   main	  components	  to	  this	  position.	  
One	  of	  the	  claims	  of	  the	  ‘third	  way’	  is	  that	  when	  we	  are	  considering	  opportunities	  we	   must	   also	   consider	   their	   value;	   clearly	   some	   opportunities	   are	   of	   more	  importance	  than	  others.	  	  We	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  distinguish	  between	  these	  matters	  of	  central	  importance	  and	  those	  that	  are	  merely	  peripheral	  to	  proceedings.	  	  Taylor	  (1979,	   p.218)	   uses	   the	   example	   of	   traffic	   lights.	   	   Strictly	   speaking	   traffic	   lights	  restrict	  our	  liberty	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  prevent	  us	  from	  proceeding	  on	  our	  journey	  whenever	  we	  see	  fit.	  	  However,	  as	  we	  benefit	  from	  the	  operation	  of	  traffic	  lights	  it	  is	   hard	   to	   legitimately	   conclude	   that	   traffic	   lights	   are	   a	   serious	   restriction	   on	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liberty.	   	  In	  fact,	  as	  we	  prefer	  safety	  over	  the	  speed	  of	  our	  journey	  (usually)	  traffic	  lights	  do	  not	  in	  fact	  restrict	  liberty	  at	  all.	  	  As	  Taylor	  goes	  on	  to	  say,	  if	  we	  indeed	  had	  a	   great	   multitude	   of	   traffic	   lights	   in	   London	   and	   no	   traffic	   lights	   at	   all	   in,	   say,	  Prague	  but	  in	  Prague	  we	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  worship	  on	  a	  Sunday	  would	  we	  claim	  that	  the	  multitude	  of	  traffic	  lights	  (as	  they	  reduce	  our	  opportunity	  on	  every	  street	  corner)	   makes	   us	   less	   free?	   	   Clearly,	   as	   Taylor	   contends,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case.	  	  Berlin’s	   account	  of	   freedom	   is	   too	   thin	   to	  give	  us	   the	  depth	  of	   explanation	  when	  talking	  about	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  freedom.	  	  We	  could	  take	  this	  further	  and	  say	  that	  traffic	  lights	  set	  us	  free	  in	  that	  they	  enable	  us	  to	  continue	  the	  journey	  we	  set	  out	  on	  in	  a	  safe	  and	  efficient	  manner.	  	  This	  could	  lead	  us	  to	  conclude	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  a	  loss	  of	  opportunity	  is	  an	  increase	  in	  liberty.	  
Clearly	   proponents	   of	   a	   negative	   theory	   could	   rebut	   this	   criticism	   and	   Taylor	  himself	  recognises	  this	  problem	  (Taylor,	  1979,	  p.219).	   	  The	  rebuttal	  comes	  in	  the	  form	  that	  negative	  libertarians	  would	  simply	  claim	  that	  any	  negative	  theory	  would	  acknowledge	   that	   some	   opportunities	   are	   more	   meaningful	   or	   valuable	   than	  others.	  	  Liberty	  still	  remains	  restricted	  if	  those	  opportunities	  are	  lost	  but	  they	  are	  of	  little	  consequence	  if	  the	  opportunity	  held	  no	  value	  (the	  loss	  is	  justified).	  	  Berlin	  also	   takes	   this	   view	   in	   that	   a	   hangman	   quite	   rightly	   ought	   to	   have	   his	   liberty	  restricted.	  	  This	  leads	  us	  to	  consider	  if	  context	  has	  some	  bearing	  on	  how	  we	  view	  restrictions?	   	  For	  instance	  would	  our	  view	  of	  the	  traffic	   lights	  change	  if,	  say,	  they	  were	   in	   our	   back	   garden,	   where	   there	   can	   be	   no	   real	   need	   for	   them?	   	   Taylor	  accords	  with	  this	  view	  in	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  value	  opportunities	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  context	  in	  which	  we	  experience	  them.	  	  This	  leads	  to	  difficulty	  in	  how	  we	  might	  view	   and	   assess	   contexts	   or	   alternatively	   puts	   us	   at	   risk	   of	  making	   assumptions	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about	   loss	   of	   opportunity	   (and	   therefore	   liberty	   in	   the	   negative	   sense);	   we	   can	  imagine	   this	   could	   be	   a	   particularly	   risky	   strategy	   for	   the	  medical	   environment.	  	  We	  shall	  return	  to	  this	  point	  later.	  
Connolly	  (1974,	  p.141)	  contends	  that	  there	  are	  also	  internal	  obstacles	  to	  freedom.	  	  Although	  we	  have	  considered	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  incorporate	  an	  ideal	  of	  true	  self	  into	  a	  negative	   theory	  we	  must	  also	  guard	   for	   the	   frustration	  of	   that	  by	  external	  action	  or	  inaction	  (as	  per	  the	  second	  step	  of	  positive	  accounts	  of	   liberty).	   	  This	  is	  not	  contrary	  to	  Taylor’s	  view,	  as	  we	  might	  hope,	  he	  is	  keen	  to	  address	  the	  concerns	  we	   might	   raise	   regarding	   inner	   obstacles	   because	   we	   intuitively	   recognise	   that	  these	  also	  may	  act	  as	  frustrations	  for	  self-­‐realization.	  	  As	  one	  example	  to	  highlight	  this	   case	   Taylor	   talks	   of	   a	   struggle	   with	   unreasonable	   spiteful	   feelings	   that	   are	  spoiling	  a	  relationship	  that	  is	  very	  important	  to	  him.	  	  As	  much	  as	  he	  tries	  he	  cannot	  prevent	  himself	   from	  saying	  and	  behaving	   in	  a	  spiteful	  way	  that	   is	   leading	  to	  the	  breakdown	  of	  his	   relationship.	   	   Further,	   he	   longs	   to	   rid	  himself	   of	   these	   feelings	  but	   cannot	   overcome	   the	   impulse	   to	   behave	   in	   that	   way	   (Taylor,	   1979,	   p.212).	  	  Because	  Taylor	   considers	   himself	   to	   be	   held	   back	   by	   feelings	  which	   he	   does	   not	  identify	   as	   his	   own,	   this	   prevents	   him	   from	  preserving	   the	   thing	   that	   is	   of	  most	  importance	  to	  him;	  this	  special	  relationship.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  his	  way	  is	  blocked	  from	  realising	   his	   desire	   (say	   to	   get	   married)	   from	   obstacles	   that	   originate	   from	   the	  inside.	   	  As	  Taylor	  is	  held	  back	  by	  feelings	  that	  he	  considers	  not	  to	  be	  his	  own	  his	  liberty	  is	  clearly	  curbed.	  	  	  
Negative	  theorists	  would	  respond	  to	  this	  by	  claiming	  that	  so	  long	  as	  one	  is	  aware	  of	  one’s	  frustration	  we	  avoid	  the	  danger	  of	  external	  usurpation	  as	  one	  remains	  the	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final	  arbiter	  of	  one’s	  inner	  feelings.	  	  Proponents	  of	  the	  ‘third	  way’	  have	  responded	  to	   this	   claim	   critically	   in	   that	   this	   undermines	   the	   very	   nature	   of	   the	   negative	  theorists’	   argument.	   	   In	   their	   view	  once	   a	   negative	   theorist	   admits	   that	   freedom	  needs	   closer	   assessment,	   once	   individuals	   must	   consider	   the	   value	   or	   relative	  worth	  of	  their	  desires	  against	  some	  form	  of	  context	  or	  background	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  prevent	  the	  practice	  of	  second-­‐guessing	  (Gray,	  1980,	  p.514).	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  might	  be	  a	  rank	  order	  for	  desires	  or	  indeed	  even	  a	  right	  or	  wrong	  desire	  necessarily	   implies	  that	  there	  must	  be	  a	  right	  or	  wrong.	   	  This	  expands	  the	  necessary	  context	   in	   that	   it	   reaches	  beyond	   the	   individual,	  a	   criteria	  of	   right	  and	  wrong	  that	  operates	  externally	  necessarily	  implies	  that	  the	  individual	  might	  not	  be	  the	   final	   arbiter	   on	   their	   own	   liberty.	   	   Further,	   there	   is	   no	   need	   to	   exclude	   the	  possibility	  of	  second-­‐guessing.	  
Returning	  to	  Taylor’s	  example	   then	  clearly	  his	   feelings	  of	  spite	  are	   inappropriate	  and,	  as	  he	  claims,	  irrational,	  his	  reaction	  and	  behaviour	  is	  out	  of	  proportion	  to	  the	  situation	  he	  finds	  himself	  in.	  	  Even	  if	  Taylor	  is	  aware	  of	  his	  frustrating	  behaviour	  it	  is	  clearly	  blocking	  his	  path	  to	  his	  overall	  aim	  and	  as	  such	  might	  require	  him	  to	  be	  forced	  to	  be	  free.	  	  Further	  though,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  key	  point	  in	  relation	  to	  those	  who	  have	  been	  manipulated;	  what	  if	  we	  don’t	  know	  we’re	  wrong?	  	  For	  instance	  perhaps	  we	  have	  acquired	  a	  desire	  to	  have	  the	  whitest	  teeth	  possible	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  we	  believe	  (wrongly)	  that	  it	  is	  good	  for	  our	  health	  and	  will	  make	  us	  more	  successful.	  	  We	  are	  now	  pursuing	  that	  goal	  but	  our	  dentist	  recognises	   that	  we	  have	  acquired	  this	   desire	   through	   reading	   various	   articles	   in	  Heat	  magazine	   as	   sponsored	  by	   a	  large	   pharmaceutical	   company	   and	   are	   grossly	   mistaken	   as	   to	   what	   tooth	  whitening	  can	  do	  for	  us.	  	  Taylor	  asserts	  that	  this	  is	  the	  point	  of	  strong	  evaluation	  in	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that	   it	   requires	   that	   the	   individual	   is	   pulled	   out	   of	   themselves.	   	   It	   enables	   us	   to	  recognise	   that	   there	  are	  boundaries	  and	  criteria	   that	  relate	   to	  authentic	   freedom	  but,	   unlike	   positive	   theories,	   which	   are	   internally	   authenticated,	   are	   externally	  validated.	  	  This,	  therefore,	  allows	  us	  to	  overrule	  direct	  and	  inauthentic	  desires.	  	  As	  Taylor	   states:	   “the	   subject	   himself	   cannot	   be	   the	   final	   authority	   on	   the	   question	  whether	  he	   is	   free;	   the	  subject	   is	  not	   the	   final	  authority	  on	  the	  question	  whether	  his	  desires	  are	  authentic,	  whether	  they	  do	  or	  do	  not	  frustrate	  his	  purpose.”	  (Taylor,	  1979,	  p.216)	  
This	  might	  be	   considered	  a	   serious	  blow	   for	  negative	   theorists	   in	   that	  once	   they	  have	   to	   relinquish	   the	  Maginot	  Line	  of	   sheer,	  mere,	  opportunity	   in	  need	  of	   some	  assessment	   and	   evaluation	   and	   that	   any	   internal	   obstacles	   must	   be	   assessed	  vigorously	   they	   may	   wish	   to	   return	   to	   their	   position	   of	   ‘half-­‐way’	   and	   all	   its	  difficulties	  with	  second	  guessing.	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  ‘third	  way’	  theorists	  swing	  into	  defence	  of	  positive	  theories	  and	  all	  the	  difficulties	  we	  have	  considered	  as	  part	  of	  Chapter	  Three.	   	  Rather,	  they	  seek	   to	   find	  a	  mid-­‐line	   that	   is	  more	   tenable	   than	   the	  one	   they	  criticises	  negative	  theorists	   for	  holding	  whilst	  avoiding	  some	  of	   the	  problems	  of	   the	  strong	  positive	  theories.	   	  Taylor	  starts	  by	  returning	  to	  the	  examples	  given	  where	  an	  individual	  is	  aware	  that	  he	  is	  blocked	  by	  his	  own	  desires.	  	  In	  that	  we	  all	  would	  acknowledge	  that	  from	  time	  to	  time	  we	  can	  be	  mistaken	  about	  our	  own	  motives	  or	  preferences.	  	  This	  is	   a	   complex	   legitimation	   of	   second	   guessing	   where	   the	   final	   aim	   is	   for	   the	  individual	  who	  was	  wrong	  to	  recognise	  their	  own	  mistake.	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If	  we	   return	   to	  our	   tooth	  whitening	  example;	   imagine	   that	  we	  attend	   the	  dentist	  who	  tells	  us	  that	  our	  desire	  to	  have	  our	  teeth	  whitened	  is	  an	  inauthentic	  desire	  in	  that	  we	   have	   acquired	   it	   through	   reading	   too	  much	  Heat	  magazine	   and	   that	   the	  procedure	  will	  not	  do	  what	  we	  wish	  it	  to	  do	  (augment	  health	  and	  makes	  us	  more	  successful).	  	  In	  fact	  the	  process	  is	  likely	  to	  do	  the	  opposite	  and	  potentially	  ruin	  our	  tooth	   enamel	   and	  by	  making	   it	  more	  porous	   and	   attract	  more	   stains	   in	   the	   long	  run.	   	  Whether	   or	   not	   the	   dentist	   has	   exposed	   the	   truth	   about	   ourselves	   (better	  health	  and	  a	  better	  job)	  depends	  on	  whether	  we	  can	  identify	  with	  the	  deeper	  self	  that	  he	  supposes	  he	  is	  appealing	  to.	  	  If	  the	  dentist	  fails	  to	  do	  and	  so	  the	  treatment	  fails	   then	  we	  shall	  be	  glad	  that	  he	  has	  no	   further	  power	  over	  us	   in	   that	  he	  might	  extinguish	  our	   immediate	  desire	   for	   the	   sake	  of	  promoting	   an	   inner	   self	   that	  we	  cannot	  identify	  with.	  
The	   key	   component	   of	   what	   ‘third	   way’	   theorists	   propose	   is	   that	   the	   individual	  should	  eventually	  identify	  with	  being	  wrong	  and	  as	  such	  that	  he	  was	  not	  himself.	  	  Therefore	  the	  strong	  evaluation	  that	  ‘third	  way’	  theorists	  propose	  appears	  to	  be	  in	  need	   of	   some	   personal	   affirmation	   by	   the	   individual	   concerned.	   	   This	   has	   been	  criticised	  by	  some	  as	  a	  “whispery	  shift”	  (Nys,	  2004)	  and	  is	  what	  Berlin	  might	  have	  termed	  the	  “mystical	  moment”	   in	  Rousseau	  where	  personal	   judgment	   is	  changed	  for	  third	  person	  authority	  (Berlin,	  2002,	  p.172).	   	  The	  difficulty	  remains	  then	  that	  whilst	  negative	  liberals	  find	  it	  hard	  to	  avoid	  second	  guessing	  positive	  liberals	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  resist	  the	  lapse	  into	  externalisation.	  
‘Third	  way’	  theorists	  attempt	  to	  address	  this	  difficulty	  of	  externalisation	  by	  relying	  on	  the	  concepts	  of	  community,	  strong	  evaluation	  and	  authenticity.	  	  Viewing	  the	  self	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as	   being	   shaped	  by	   the	   environment	   in	  which	   it	   is	   experienced	   and	  having	   fluid	  and	   legitimately	   malleable	   boundaries	   (Connolly,	   1974).	   	   Returning	   to	   Taylor’s	  (1979)	   examples	   of	   traffic	   lights	   we	  may	   observe	   that	   in	   our	   community	   traffic	  lights	  are	  not	  viewed	  as	  an	  infringement	  on	  our	  freedom;	  we	  see	  them	  as	  a	  sensible	  compromise	   between	   that	   of	   safety	   and	   convenience.	   	   In	   fact	   the	   compromise	  becomes	  so	  entrenched	  in	  our	  thinking	  (and	  the	  justification	  behind	  it	  prioritised)	  that	  the	  use	  of	  traffic	  lights	  ceases	  to	  be	  an	  infringement	  at	  all;	  our	  boundaries	  of	  self	  have	  shifted.	  	  Taylor	  asserts,	  that	  this	  changing	  and	  shaping	  of	  the	  boundaries	  of	   self	   is	  an	  organic	  process	   in	   the	  context	  of	   community	  and	   is	  not	   the	  result	  of	  something	  imposed	  on	  an	  individual.	  	  For	  ‘third	  way’	  theorists	  this	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	   contributors	   to	   society	   being	   able	   to	   recognize	   themselves	   as	   such	   (Meskill,	  2013).	  	  It	  is	  not	  hard	  to	  anticipate	  that	  ‘third	  way’	  theorists	  might	  experience	  some	  difficulties	  with	  this	  assertion	  if	  we	  consider	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  communities.	  	  	  
Berlin	  avoids	   this	  matter	  by	  subscribing	   to	  a	  pluralist	  approach	   tempered	  by	   the	  assertion	   that	   (1)	   negative	   freedom	   is	   not	   the	   only	   value	   (2)	   it	   is	   not	   even	   the	  
supreme	   value,	   hence	   (3)	   it	   should	   not	   be	  maximised	   (Berlin,	   1969,	   p.1vi-­‐1vii).	  	  Therefore	   Berlin	   wishes	   freedom	   to	   be	   curtailed	   by	   decent	   values	   but	   he	  categorically	   avoids	   incorporating	   these	   values	   into	   his	   definition	   of	   liberty.	   	   To	  summarise,	  perhaps	  we	  might	  wish	  to	  see	  negative	  liberty	  as	  a	  descriptive	  account	  with	   a	   normative	   claim	   that	   there	   should	   be	   non-­‐interference?	   	   How	   large	   this	  scope	   of	   non-­‐interference	   should	   be	   is	   a	   question	   of	   empirical	   fact	   and	   moral	  debate.	   	   Further	   the	   sacrifice	  of	   liberty	   (no	  matter	  how	  small	   [compare	  with	   the	  case	   of	   the	   traffic	   lights])	   is	   what	   should	   prompt	   us	   to	   consider	   the	   reasoning	  
221	  	  
behind	  it.	  	  “Freedom	  is	  what	  it	  is	  and	  should	  be	  equated	  with	  other	  values.”(Berlin,	  2002,	  p.178)	  
‘Third	  way’	   theorists	   perhaps	   oppose	   this	   view	  on	  one	   key	  point	   and	   that	   is	   the	  idea	  of	  authenticity.	  	  We	  have	  already	  considered	  the	  assertion	  that	  the	  individual	  cannot	   be	   the	   final	   arbiter	   in	   the	   regard	   of	   what	   is	   authentic	   and	   inauthentic.	  	  Therefore	  the	  restriction	  of	  inauthentic	  desires	  is	  not	  a	  restriction	  of	  liberty.	  	  How	  we	  discern	  authenticity	  is	  an	  external	  rather	  than	  internal	  process	  as	  proposed	  by	  the	   hierarchical	   models.	   	   In	   Taylor’s	   later	   work	   on	   authenticity,	   authenticity	   is	  described	  as	   “being	   true	   to	  one’s	  own	  originality.”	   (Taylor,	  1991,	  p29)	   	  However	  this	  is	  not	  a	  construction	  that	  is	  reflective	  of	  a	  detached	  view	  of	  self	  that	  operates	  in	  a	  vacuum	  of	  personal	  reflection	  but	  rather	  one	  that	  is	  connected	  to	  community	  and	  bears	  contextual	  examination.	   	  Further	  by	  being	  connected	  it	  goes	  some	  way	  to	   addressing	   common	   criticisms	   of	   autonomy	   as	   being	   too	   individualised	   and	  detached	   from	  context,	  or	  requiring	   too	  much	   from	  those	   tasked	  with	  promoting	  it27.	  	  	  
Taylor	  continues	  by	  showing	   that	  any	  moral	   consideration	  does	  not	  operate	   in	  a	  vacuum;	  the	  well-­‐known	  adage	  of	  “no	  man	  is	  an	  island”	  (Donne,	  1624).	  	  Similarly	  a	  person’s	  ‘self’	  is	  also	  shaped	  by	  the	  community	  in	  which	  they	  exist	  by	  the	  dialogue	  and	  exchange	  between	  them	  and	   ‘significant	  others’.	   	  The	   important	  claim	  is	  that	  they	   cannot	   simply	   decide	   what	   is	   significant	   but	   rather	   an	   individual	   must	  discover	   the	   changing	   limits	   of	   self	  with	   reference	   to	   their	   environment	   (Taylor,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  For	  example	  the	  beneficent	  role	  of	  medicine	  and	  the	  burden	  on	  clinicians	  in	  matters	  that	  relate	  to	  a	  patient’s	  autonomy.	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1979,	   P39).	   	   In	   contrast,	   classic	   individualism	   gives	   authority	   to	   options	  merely	  because	   they	   are	   chosen.	   	   This,	   however,	   denies	   the	   importance	   of	   individual-­‐transcending	  frameworks	  of	  significance.	  	  It	  could	  be	  claimed	  that	  individualism	  is	  the	  poor	  relation	  to	  authenticity	  in	  that	  it	  is	  ultimately	  self-­‐defeating.	  	  This	  can	  be	  a	  tricky	  concept	  and	  third	  way	  theorist	  admit	   that	   it	   is	  open	  to	  criticism	  (Bouillon,	  2003,	   p.2).	   	   After	   all	   how	   can	   someone	  who	   is	   trying	   to	   establish	   some	   form	   of	  legitimate	  individualism	  (liberty)	  conclude	  that	  meaning	  can	  only	  be	  found	  in	  the	  wider	  context.	  	  	  
I	  am	  not	  sure	  that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  address	  this	  in	  a	  completely	  satisfactory	  manner	  but	   it	   seems	   key	   to	   our	   concerns	   that	   the	   ‘third	   way’	   theorists	   are	   proposing	  something	  that	  rejects	   the	  moral	  authority	  of	  choosing;	  something	  cannot	  simply	  be	  of	  value	  because	  it	  is	  chosen,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  in	  the	  ‘right’	  way	  through	  a	  hierarchical	  process.	  	  The	  problem	  here	  is	  that	  the	  ‘third	  way’	  theorists’	  assertion	  relies	  heavily	  on	  community	  agreement;	  a	  single	  view	  point	  of	  authenticity.	  	  In	  general	  this	  might	  be	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   what	   the	   ‘third	   way’	   is	   proposing	   despite	   our	   intuitive	  approval.	  	  However	  perhaps	  there	  are	  particular	  situations	  where	  this	  construct	  is	  helpful;	  for	  instance	  the	  concept	  of	  dentist	  and	  patient.	  	  Perhaps	  in	  a	  very	  general	  sense	  we	   can	   attempt	   to	   claim	   that	   patients	   are	   all	   from	  one	   community	   and	   as	  such	  share	  the	  same	  vocabulary	  or	  indeed	  that	  patients	  and	  medics	  come	  from	  the	  community	  of	  medicine	   together	   (after	   all	   they	   are	   there	   for	   a	   shared	  purpose)?	  	  We	   will	   return	   to	   this	   point	   later.	   	   Further	   many	   of	   ‘third	   way’s’	   critics	   do	   not	  consider	   the	   possibility	   that	   it	   may	   be	   reasonable	   to	   authenticate	   a	   variety	   of	  views,	  even	  if	  they	  appear	  to	  be	  mutually	  exclusive.	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Clearly,	  as	  we	  have	  considered	  in	  Chapter	  Three,	  Frankfurt	  and	  Dworkin	  have	  been	  meticulous	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  avoid	  defining	  personal	  autonomy	  with	  a	  ‘second-­‐guessing’	  element	  or	  external	  authorisation	  (Frankfurt,	  1971	  and	  Dworkin	  1988).	  	  However,	  despite	  Frankfurt’s	  willingness	  to	  accept	  that	  their	  work	  does	  not	  defend	  effectively	   from	  manipulation,	  Frankfurt	  claims	  that	  this	   is	  a	  reasonable	  trade	  off	  against	  the	  dangers	  of	  second-­‐guessing	  which,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  might	  be	  endemic	  in	   a	   way	   that	   manipulation	   may	   not.	   	   Further	   both	   Frankfurt	   and	   Dworkin	  recognise	  that	  manipulation	  in-­‐authenticates	  any	  desire	  that	  it	  produces	  as	  it	  has	  not	  come	  about	   in	   the	  right	  way	  but	  nothing	   in	   their	  hierarchical	  model	   sets	  out	  how	  we	  might	  go	  about	  accounting	   for	   that	   in-­‐authenticity.	   	   If	  an	   individual	  now	  holds	  that	  manipulation	  as	  a	  first	  order	  desire	  then	  any	  action	  resulting	  from	  that	  desire	   would	   seem	   to	   satisfy	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   hierarchical	   model.	  Difficulties	  arise	  with	  relying	  on	  this	  approach	  where	  an	  individual	  is	  particularly	  at	   risk	   of	   manipulation	   and	   the	   effects	   of	   such	   would	   have	   particularly	   acute	  consequences28.	  	  Taylor	  has	  characterised	  this	  difference	  with	  Frankfurt	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	   ‘radical	   self-­‐determination’	   and	   ‘strong	   evaluation’.	   	   This	   could	  perhaps	  be	  interpreted	  as	  radical	  self	  determination	  rests	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  it	  is	  only	  up	  to	  the	   individual	  which	  way	   he	  wants	   to	   be	   autonomous	   and	   supposes	   that	   he	   can	  simply	  decide	  to	  be	  so.	  	  Interestingly	  according	  to	  Shoemaker	  (Shoemaker,	  2003),	  Frankfurt	  has	  gone	  on	  to	  emphasise	  the	  passive	  element	  of	  personal	  autonomy	  in	  later	  work.	  	  In	  his	  later	  view	  a	  person	  acts	  autonomously	  if	  he	  acts	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  For	  example	  to	  adversely	  affect	  ones	  health.	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reflective	  of	  what	  he	   cares	  about.	   	  The	  objects	  of	   the	   individuals	   care	  are	   clearly	  beyond	  his	  volitional	  control.	  	  Frankfurt	  would	  justify	  this	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  when	  a	  decision	  is	  upon	  an	  individual	  then	  he	  must	  reassess	  what	  is	  of	  importance	  to	  him.	  	  One	  cannot	  help	  but	   think	   that	   the	  use	  of	   the	   term	   ‘what	  we	  care	  about’	   is	  more	  closely	   related	   to	   the	   ‘third	   way’s’	   proposal	   than	   one	  might	   think;	   it	   suggests	   a	  certain	  sense	  of	  community.	  	  If	  we	  recall,	  the	  model	  we	  are	  looking	  for	  needs	  to	  serve	  two	  purposes,	  first	  to	  re-­‐focus	   the	   ethical	   locus	   of	   health	   care	   and	   its	   choice-­‐based	   claims	   in	   relation	   to	  patient	  autonomy	  and	  second	  to	  adequately	  account	  for	  the	  dangers	  in	  dentistry	  of	  deception	  and	  manipulation.	  	  Perhaps	  we	  could	  interpret	  this	  as	  a	  dual	  role;	  first	  to	  promote	  autonomy	  in	  the	  general	  sense	  through	  (a)	  the	  action	  of	  health	  care	  itself	  (improving	  health)	  and	  (b)	  by	  broadening	  the	  landscape	  of	  what	  we	  understand	  to	  be	   of	   importance	   (i.e.	   patient	   priorities	   versus	   a	   treatment	   focused	   model).	  	  Second,	  when	  patients	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  patient	  exchange	  with	  their	  clinician	  we	  may	   then	   wish	   to	   protect	   their	   autonomy	   (autonomy	   acting	   as	   a	   constraint).	   	   I	  would	   envisage	   these	   two	   ideals	   operating	   together	   to	   both	   constrain	   clinicians	  and	   enable	   them	   to	   promote	   autonomy;	   in	   practice	   they	   should	   both	   operate	  simultaneously	  and	  not	  contradict	  each	  other.	  	  Can	   the	   ‘third	   way’	   model	   then	   go	   some	   way	   towards	   addressing	   these	   needs?	  	  First	  we	  need	  to	  consider	  the	  move	  away	  from	  a	  consent	  based	  approach.	  	  For	  the	  moment	   I	   will	   just	   confirm	   that	   I	   am	   not	   proposing	   abolishing	   consent	   taking.	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Rather	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  see	  this	  as	  the	  only	  way	  to	  show	  that	  we	  have	  adequately	  respected	  a	  patient’s	  autonomy.	  	  I	   should	   perhaps	   summarise	   what	   I	   am	   attempting	   to	   achieve	   with	   the	   re-­‐evaluation	   of	   patient	   autonomy	   in	   the	   healthcare	   context.	   	   First	   I	  wish	   to	   better	  promote	  an	  individual’s	  autonomy.	  	  I	  would	  wish	  to	  do	  this	  perhaps	  by	  the	  aim	  of	  healthcare.	   	   That	   is	   to	   say	   that	   restoration	   of	   health	   does	   promote	   a	   patient’s	  autonomy	  because	  health	   is	  an	  ethical	   ‘good’	  but	   this	  must	  always	  be	  done	   in	  an	  ethical	  environment.	   	  This	   is	  an	   important	  element	   that	   I	  wish	   to	  emphasise;	   the	  process.	   	   The	   alternative	   models	   of	   respecting	   patients	   as	   suggested	   in	   the	  preceding	   chapters,	   fail	   to	   emphasise	   this	   sufficiently.	   	   Much	   of	   their	   claim	   to	  respect	  patients	  rests	  on	  the	  outcome	  for	  the	  patient	  and	  the	  patient	  getting	  what	  they	  ‘need’.	   	  The	  danger	  of	  this	  is	  two-­‐fold,	  it	  tends	  to	  ignore	  the	  process	  or	  gives	  much	   less	  weight	   to	   it	  which	  might	   enable	   us	   to	   justify	   practices	  which	  patients	  would	  wish	  to	  object	  to	  but	  are	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  give	  the	  ‘right’	  result	  and	   second	   (a	   point	   closely	   linked	   to	   the	   first)	   that	   it	   encourages	   us	   to	   be	  treatment	  focused	  rather	  than	  healthcare	  focused.	  	  A	  good	  outcome	  is	  the	  product	  of	  treatment,	  say	  a	  cure,	  rather	  than	  a	  satisfied	  ‘cared	  for’	  patient.	  	  This	  I	  do	  not	  think	  is	  a	  contentious	  claim.	  	  Although	  there	  are	  differing	  arguments	  as	  to	  how	  we	  might	  best	  define	  health,	   I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	   lapse	   into	  them	  here	  but	  rather	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  a	  satisfactory	  definition	  of	  health	  and	  the	  restoration	  of	  such	  would	   improve	   a	  patient’s	   autonomy	  because	  health	   is	   an	   ethical	   good	  and	  good	   health	   (however	   we	   might	   define	   that)	   is	   a	   pre-­‐requisite	   that	   enables	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individuals	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  other	  goods	  (such	  as	  education).	  	  Second,	  I	  need	  to	  adequately	  account	   for	   the	  needs	  of	  dentistry.	   	  As	  we	  have	  seen	   it	   is	  particularly	  vulnerable	   to	   the	  dangers	  of	  manipulation	  and	  deception	   therefore	  any	  model	  of	  autonomy	   that	   we	   wish	   to	   rely	   on	   necessarily	   needs	   to	   account	   adequately	   for	  those	  concerns.	  	  So	   what	   could	   a	   moderated	   negative	   account	   of	   autonomy	   do	   for	   us?	   I	   wish	   to	  claim	  that	  a	  moderated	  negative	  account	  of	  autonomy	  would	  enable	  us	  to	  re-­‐focus	  the	   locus	  of	   importance	  when	  trying	  to	  discharge	  our	  duty	  to	  help	  the	  patient	  by	  promoting	   his	   or	   her	   overall	   autonomy	   through	   the	   restoration	   of	   health.	   	   The	  benefits	  would	  be	  two	  fold;	  we	  would	  be	  able	  to	  reject	  the	  hierarchical	  models	  of	  autonomy	   and	  move	   away	   from	   the	   act	   of	   choosing	   as	   the	  method	  by	  which	  we	  recognise	   a	   patient’s	   autonomy.	   	   In	   doing	   so	   we	   need	   not	   look	   to	   the	   act	   of	  choosing	  a	  treatment	  as	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  autonomy	  is	  respected.	   	  Further	  by	  moving	   away	   from	   this	   form	   of	   ethical	   re-­‐enforcement	  we	  move	   away	   from	   the	  need	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  treatment	  focused	  model	  and	  are	  then	  better	  able	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  what	   is	   of	   importance	   to	   patients	   and	   therefore	  where	  we	   should	   be	   looking	   in	  order	  to	  claim	  that	  we	  have	  promoted	  their	  autonomy.	  	  	  	  As	   we	   have	   seen	   a	   negative	   account	   of	   autonomy	   or	   more	   properly	   described	  ‘liberty’	   (presuming	   that	  by	  being	   free	  at	   least	  provides	   the	  conditions	  necessary	  for	  us	   to	  be	  autonomous)	  relies	  on	  the	  opportunity	   to	  be	  self-­‐determining	  rather	  than	   the	   ability	   to	   authenticate	   desires.	   	   Berlin’s	   account	   sees	   liberty	   and	   hence	  autonomy	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  external	  obstacles.	  	  Obstacles	  being	  things	  put	  in	  place	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by	   other	   human	   beings	   –	   presumably	   on	   the	   premise	   that	   these	   are	   things	   over	  which	  we	  have	  practical	  and	  moral	  control.	   	  Already	  this	  seems	  like	  an	  attractive	  prospect.	   	  A	  patient	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	   free	   if	  obstacles	  are	  not	  put	   in	  his	  or	  her	  way	  by	  others.	  	  It	  would	  help	  us	  account	  for	  our	  concerns	  with	  treatment	  focus	  as	  Berlin	  sees	  autonomy	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  as	  anything	  that	  happens	  externally.	  	  In	  a	  negative	  sense	   then	  we	  may	  be	  able	   to	  account	  our	  concerns	  with	   too	  much	  focus	  on	  treatment	  as	  almost	  a	  double	  negative.	  	  We	  might	  be	  able	  to	  claim	  that	  a	  treatment	   focused	  model	  necessarily	   frustrates	  a	  patient’s	   reasonable	  preference	  to	   prioritise	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   he	   is	   treated.	   	   It	   is	   a	   restriction	   that	   happens	  outside	   the	   patient	   and	   is	   something	   that	   may	   prevent	   the	   patient	   having	   his	  primary	  concerns	  (for	  example	  cost	  or	  time	  off	  work)	  having	  the	  significance	  they	  deserve.	   	  After	  all	   it	   is	  his	  autonomy	  we	  are	   trying	   to	  promote	   through	   the	  right	  process;	  autonomy	  overall	  via	  health,	  and	  we	  accept	  that	  the	  process	  is	  significant	  in	  doing	  so	  we	  cannot	  take	  such	  a	  reductionist	  view	  of	  what	  the	  matters	  of	  concern	  are	   to	   the	   patient.	   	   A	   negative	   liberty	   model	   re-­‐sets	   the	   balance.	   	   It	   asks	   the	  question	   ‘what	   opportunities	   are	   open	   to	   me’,	   ‘what	   choices	   do	   I	   have’.	   	   The	  important	   factor	   here	   is	   that	   the	   question	   starts	   with	   the	   patient	   so	   the	  opportunities	   are	   naturally	   attached	   to	   the	   agenda	   set	   by	   the	   patient,	   not	   the	  agenda	   set	   by	   medical	   setting.	   	   Conversely,	   a	   hierarchical	   model	   naturally	  (practically)	   leads	   to	   the	  question	   ‘which	  one	  of	   these	  options	  would	  you	   like	   to	  choose	   (in	   the	   right	  way)?	   	   This	  means	   that	   the	   agenda	   is	   set	   by	   the	   profession	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  patient	  and	  quite	  reasonably	  tends	  to	  be	  reductionist	  in	  that	  it	  relates	   to	   the	  context	   the	  questioner	   is	  based	   in	   (clinical	   setting)	  rather	   than	   the	  environment	  the	  patient	  originates	  from.	  	  If	  we	  are	  to	  accept	  that	  the	  process	  does	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have	  a	  bearing	  on	  how	  successfully	  we	  might	  claim	  to	  have	  discharged	  our	  duty	  to	  the	  patient;	  to	  promote	  their	  autonomy	  through	  healthcare.	  	  Then	  this	  would	  lead	  us	  to	  reasonably	  suppose	  that	  questions	  that	  relate	  to	  the	  patient	  rather	  than	  the	  clinical	  context	  might	  have	  more	  ethical	  desirability.	  	  	  	  It	   is	  beginning	  to	  seem	  then	  that	  patient	  autonomy	  falls	  into	  two	  main	  areas;	  one	  the	   overall	   aim	   of	   healthcare	   to	   improve	   health	   and	   as	   a	   subsidiary	   aim,	   closely	  linked	  to	  the	  first,	  the	  need	  to	  protect	  autonomy	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  process.	  	  	  However	  we	  must	  not	  forget	  our	  second	  aim;	  to	  account	  for	  the	  specific	  concerns	  in	  relation	  to	  dentistry.	  We	  must	  consider	  if	  we	  can	  give	  a	  full	  account	  of	  what	  we	  view	  as	  autonomy	  by	  claiming	  that	  it	  is	  only	  related	  to	  mere	  opportunity.	  	  How	  will	  this	   account	   adequately	   for	   our	   concerns	   with	   manipulation?	   	   Berlin’s	   account	  does	  not	  differentiate	  between	  the	  quality	  of	  one	  opportunity	  from	  another.	   	   	   	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  from	  the	  traffic	  light	  example	  as	  proposed	  by	  Taylor,	  does	  this	  mean	  then	   that	  closing	  one	  opportunity	   to	  a	  patient	   is	  no	  more	  or	   less	  significant	   than	  another?	   	   This	  would	   seem	   to	   have	   both	   practical	   and	   ethical	   difficulties	   for	   us.	  	  From	  a	  practical	  perspective	  as	  we	  have	  considered	   in	  Chapter	  Two	  through	  our	  examination	  of	  the	  Redfern	  Report	  (DoH,	  2001),	  this	  would	  doom	  us	  to	  treating	  all	  procedures	   as	   the	   same;	   all	   must	   be	   treated	   with	   equal	   deference.	   	   Under	   our	  current	   construction	   this	   would	   mean	   giving	   the	   same	   amount	   of	   information	  about	   the	  use	  of	  a	  cancerous	  mole	  as	   it	  would	   for	   the	  disposal	  of	  a	  child’s	  organ.	  	  Negative	  libertarian’s	  would	  account	  for	  our	  concern	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  all	  obstacles	  amount	  to	  restriction	  of	  liberty	  but	  individuals	  may	  recognise	  themselves	  as	  some	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being	   more	   significant	   than	   others.	   	   This	   seems	   an	   unsatisfactory	   explanation.	  	  From	  an	  ethical	  perspective	  it	  would	  seem	  a	  rather	  thin	  account	  of	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  freedom	  and	  therefore	  autonomy.	  	  Perhaps	  it	  would	  be	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  Berlin’s	  account	   creates	   the	   necessary	   conditions	   in	   which	   we	   can	   strive	   for	   patient	  autonomy.	   	   It	   can	   help	   us	   change	   our	   terms	   of	   reference	   so	   that	   we	   look	  more	  broadly	   rather	   than	   be	   reduced	   to	   the	   point	   of	   consent	   and	   treatment.	   	   But	   we	  intuitively	   feel	  we	  need	  more;	   a	  distinction	  between	  priorities	   that	   is	   ordered	   in	  some	  way.	  	  This	  is	  where	  we	  need	  a	  middle	  way	  between	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  accounts.	  	  We	  shall	  now	  turn	  to	  deal	  with	  our	  concerns	  with	  deception.	  	  
Dealing	  with	  deception	  Hopefully	   we	   have	   addressed	   our	   re-­‐focusing	   attempts	   and	   are	   now	   in	   a	   better	  position	  to	  consider	  matters	  of	  relevance	  and	  importance	  to	  the	  patient.	  	  However,	  as	  I	  stated	  when	  we	  started	  out	  we	  also	  need	  to	  address	  those	  matters	  of	  specific	  concern	   to	   dentistry;	   that	   of	   deception.	   	   Let	   us	   first	   deal	  with	  what	  we	  may	   call	  
external	   deception.	   	   As	   I	   outlined	   earlier	   we	   are	   starting	   from	   the	   premise	   that	  external	  deception	  occurs	  where	  there	  is	  a	  misrepresentation	  or	  omission	  of	  a	  fact	  that	  is	  of	  significance	  to	  the	  patient.	  	  When	  we	  were	  concentrating	  on	  discharging	  our	  duty	  to	  the	  patient	  via	  the	  consent	  process	  we	  were	  concentrating	  on	  consent	  to	   treatment	   via	   full	   information.	   	   Full	   information,	   of	   course,	   relates	   to	   the	  prescription	  proposed	  and	  does	  not	  relate	  to	  wider	  issues	  that	  might	  be	  of	  concern	  to	  the	  patient,	  such	  as	  cost	  or	  the	  status	  of	  the	  clinician	  treating	  the	  patient.	   	  In	  a	  negative	  account	  because	  we	  are	  re-­‐centring	  our	  view	  of	  medical	  decision-­‐making	  by	   looking	   at	   the	   patient’s	   freedom,	   immediately	   deception	   becomes	   a	   problem	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because	  it	  prevents	  the	  patient	  being	  able	  to	  make	  a	  choice	  on	  the	  true	  facts	  that	  may	  be	  of	   importance	   to	   them.	   	  That	   is	   to	  say	   that	   the	  patient	   is	  prevented	   from	  being	   free	  and	   therefore	   the	   conditions	   for	   autonomy	  are	  destroyed	  because	   the	  patient	  is	  not	  free	  to	  decide	  on	  facts	  of	  relevance;	  he	  is	  prevented	  from	  seeing	  the	  whole	   picture.	   	  Whereas	   a	   hierarchical	  model	   only	   requires	   a	   patient	   to	  make	   a	  choice	  in	  the	  right	  way,	  a	  negative	  model	  requires	  the	  right	  conditions.	  	  This	  is	  the	  key	  to	  re-­‐focusing	  the	  consent	  exchange	  to	  better	  reflect	  what	  is	  of	  importance	  to	  the	  patient.	   	  The	  founding	  principle	  being	  that	  process	  has	  an	  ethical	  significance	  to	  the	  patient	  as	  well	  as	  outcome	  and	  further	  and	  that	  a	  good	  outcome	  is	  successful	  care	  not	  just	  successful	  treatment.	  	  It	  would	  seem	  then	  that	  a	  negative	  account	  can	  potentially	  account	  for	  our	  concerns	  regarding	  external	  deception.	  	  Internal	  deception	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  address	  if	  we	  can	  agree	  that	  manipulation	  is	  a	  more	  deeply	  entrenched	  or	  internal	  form	  of	  deception.	  	  A	  patient	  has	  taken	  on	  a	  view	  that	  may	  be	  true	  but	  in	  conflict	  with	  other	  aspects	  of	  themselves.	  	  It	  may	  also	  be	  false	  but	  nonetheless	  a	  deeply	  held	  belief	  rather	  than	  a	  poor	  decision	  based	  on	  incorrect	   facts.	   	   Consider	   the	   example	   that	   I	   have	   been	   convinced	   into	   believing	  that	   women	   are	   inferior	   to	   men	   even	   though	   I	   desperately	   want	   to	   be	   treated	  equally	   and	   believe	   that	   is	   the	   correct	   thing	   to	   do.	   	   This	   is	   unlike	   the	   situation	  where	   I	   have	   been	  mistakenly	   told	   I	   am	   pregnant	   and	   have	   decided	   to	   give	   up	  drinking	  as	  a	  result.	   	   In	   the	   first	  example	  clearly	  this	   is	  a	  matter	  of	   inner	  turmoil	  whereas	  in	  the	  latter	  is	  it	  clearly	  a	  mistake	  that	  can	  be	  easily	  rectified	  and	  happens	  externally.	  	  In	  the	  first	  I	  will	  need	  convincing	  I	  am	  mistaken	  in	  my	  belief	  and	  must	  come	   to	  believe	   that	   is	   the	   case.	   	  Whereas	   in	   the	   second	  example,	   I	  will	  need	  no	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convincing,	  merely	   I	  will	  need	  to	  know	  the	   facts	  so	   I	  can	  be	  self-­‐determining.	   	  At	  first	   glance	   it	   may	   seem	   that	   we	   need	   to	   authenticate	   our	   desires	   through	   an	  ordered	  set	  of	  preferences	  and	  this	  seems	  like	  a	  return	  to	  the	  hierarchical	  model.	  	  However,	  as	  we	  have	  also	  seen,	  the	  hierarchical	  model	  cannot	  help	  because	  it	  fails	  to	  account	  adequately	   for	  manipulation	  once	   that	  belief	   is	   taken	  on.	   	  There	   is	  no	  examination	   of	   the	   way	   in	   which	   a	   preference	   is	   acquired;	   an	   issue	   that	   is	   of	  paramount	   importance	   here.	   	   Taylor	   suggests	   a	   third	   way	   in	   which	   we	   may	  authenticate	   desires	   that	   gives	   us	   a	   richer	   account	   than	   Berlin	   but	   attempts	   to	  avoid	   the	   shortcomings	  of	  Frankfurt	   and	  Dworkin.	   	  Taylor	   and	  others	  do	   this	  by	  claiming	   that	   there	   are	   inner	   obstacles	   to	   freedom	   as	  well	   as	   external	   ones.	   	   An	  internal	   obstacle	   would	   be	   one	   that	   frustrates	   our	   true	   purpose;	   a	   feeling	   that	  holds	  us	  back	  from	  our	  true	  self.	   	  So	  for	  example	  my	  belief	  that	  men	  are	  superior	  holds	  me	  back	  from	  my	  desire	  to	  be	  treated	  equally.	  	  It	  is	  an	  internal	  obstacle	  and	  therefore	   my	   liberty	   is	   curtailed.	   	   My	   preferences	   are	   not	   ordered	   then,	   to	  authenticate	   them	   as	   in	   a	   truly	   positive	   account,	   but	   rather	   they	   must	   not	   be	  constrained	  by	   inner	  obstacle.	   	  So	   far	  so	  good	  but	   this	  would	  require	  us	   to	  know	  that	  we	  are	  wrong	  and	  overcome	  those	  feelings.	  	  With	  internal	  deception	  it	  is	  very	  unlikely	   that	  we	  will	  know	  that	  we	  are	  mistaken	   in	  our	  belief.	   	  This	   is	  where	  the	  ‘third	  way’s’	  requirement	  for	  strong	  evaluation	  comes	  in;	  we	  must	  recognise	  that	  there	   are	   boundaries	   that	   relate	   to	   authentic	   freedom	   and	   that	   rather	   than	   the	  internal	   validation	   of	   the	   hierarchical	   models	   this	   relies	   on	   external	   validation.	  	  This	  would	  allow	  us	   to	  overrule	   inauthentic	  desires.	   	   In	  an	  ethical	  sense	   this	   is	  a	  very	  attractive	  prospect	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  we	  can	  question	  the	  validity	  of	  someone’s	  claims	   that	   they	   are	   free	  when	  we	   are	   aware	   that	   although	   they	   are	   adamant	   in	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their	   commitment	   to	   their	   belief	   they	   have	   been	   brainwashed	   into	   believing	  something	  is	  the	  case.	  	  Further	  and	  importantly	  it	  empowers	  a	  clinician	  to	  say	  ‘no’	  when	   a	   patient	   requires	   something	   that	   is	   patently	   at	   odds	   with	   their	   overall	  health	  because	  it	  is	  an	  inauthentic	  desire	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  conflicts	  with	  their	  overall	  desire	   for	   good	   health.	   	   Therefore	   in	   our	   tooth	  whitening	   example	   a	   clinician	   is	  quite	   able	   to	   say	   ‘no’	   to	   the	   patient	  without	   being	   accused	   of	   not	   respecting	   the	  patient’s	   wishes.	   	   The	   key	   component	   here	   is	   that	   eventually	   the	   patient	   must	  identify	  with	  their	  own	  mistake.	  	  The	  strong	  evaluation	  proposed	  must	  have	  some	  personal	  affirmation	  in	  the	  end.	  	  Perhaps	  we	  can	  say	  here	  that	  this	  is	  how	  the	  ‘third	  way’	   avoids	   the	   ‘best	   interests’	   concerns.	   	   From	   a	   practical	   sense	  we	  would	   not	  want	   to	   get	   ourselves	   into	   a	   position	   where	   the	   clinician	   is	   able	   to	   dismiss	   our	  preferences	   on	   the	   basis	   that	  we	   are	  mistaken	   in	   our	   priorities.	   	   There	  must,	   at	  some	  stage,	  be	  an	  agreement	  that	  the	  patient	  was	  indeed	  mistaken	  as	  to	  their	  own	  belief	  otherwise	  we	  are	  in	  danger	  of	  a	  return	  to	  a	  paternalistic	  model.	  	  	  	  It	  would	  seem	  then	  that	  negative	  theorists	  have	  a	  lot	  to	  offer	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  we	  might	  promote	  and	  defend	  patient	  autonomy.	  	  Promotion	  of	  autonomy	  ought	  to	  be	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  free	  environment	  and	  negative	  liberty	  does	  require	  us	  to	   create	   that	   condition.	   	   The	   third	   way’s	   modifications	   however	   enable	   us	   to	  consider	   authenticity	   and	   properly	   prioritise	   preferences	   without	   a	   lapse	   into	  ordering.	   	  There	  are	  of	  course	  difficulties	  with	   this	  account,	  as	  proponents	   freely	  admits	  the	  idea	  of	  contextualising	  and	  externalising	  authenticity	  leaves	  us	  open	  to	  a	   contradiction	   in	   terms	   that	   we	   look	   to	   our	   community	   to	   promote	   our	   own	  individualism.	   	   However	   this	   may	   well	   be	   viewed	   as	   the	   starting	   point	   to	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developing	   a	   more	   authentic	   framework	   in	   which	   we	   can	   better	   promote	   and	  defend	  the	  rights	  and	  preferences	  of	  patients	  rather	  than	  teaching	  then	  to	  engage	  better	  with	  a	  pre-­‐set	  context,	   the	  clinical	  setting.	   	  We	  ought	  to	  change	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  engage	  with	  patients.	  	  We	  ought	  to	  reject	  the	  question	  we	  currently	  ask	  ‘how	  can	  we	  help	  the	  patient	  get	  what	  they	  want?’	  we	  ought	  to	  substitute	  this	  with	  the	  question	  ‘how	  can	  we	  help	  them	  choose	  better	  that	  which	  we	  offer?’	  	  Returning	  then	  to	  the	  four	  key	  components	  I	  set	  out	  in	  Chapter	  One	  as	  our	  aim;	  to	  respect	   the	   person	   through	   an	   individualised	   account,	   to	   enable	   the	   clinician	   to	  draw	  limits	  around	  their	  obligations,	  to	  prioritise	  a	  patient’s	  reasonable	  wishes,	  to	  assure	   the	   quality	   of	   process	   by	   protecting	   against	  manipulation	   and	   deception,	  how	  does	  the	  moderated	  account	  of	  negative	  liberty	  (third	  way)	  help	  us	  meet	  these	  aims?	  	  The	  account	  appears	   to	  go	  a	   long	  way	   toward	  addressing	  our	  concerns	   raised	   in	  Chapter	  One.	  	  Clearly	  the	  account	  is	  individualised	  in	  nature	  and	  fits	  closely	  to	  our	  aim	   to	   respect	   the	   individual.	   	   Further	   limits	   may	   be	   drawn	   around	   the	  relationship	  both	  in	  a	  practical	  and	  theoretical	  sense.	  	  Limits	  may	  be	  drawn	  owing	  to	  the	  separation	  between	  what	  we	  aim	  to	  do	  overall	  (promote	  autonomy	  through	  healthcare	   and	   protect	   it	   in	   the	   clinical	   setting)	   and	   what	   we	   aim	   to	   do	   by	   the	  chair-­‐side.	  	  By	  separating	  the	  two	  aims	  we	  naturally	  limit	  what	  is	  expected	  of	  our	  duty	  at	  the	  chair-­‐side.	  	  After	  all	  the	  chair	  side	  encounter	  only	  seeks	  to	  protect	  what	  is	   already	   there,	   the	   patient’s	   pre-­‐existing	   autonomy	   and	   this	   limits	   what	   is	  required	  of	  the	  clinician	  at	  that	  encounter.	  	  Promotion	  of	  autonomy	  is	  exercised	  by	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the	  action	  of	  restoring	  health	  as	  we	  have	  already	  seen.	  	  A	  clinician	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	   consent	   taking	   then	   need	   not	   attempt	   to	   deliver	   full	   information	   and	   thereby	  discharge	  a	  duty	  to	  promote	  his	  patient’s	  autonomy	  so	  they	  are	  enabled	  to	  make	  a	  fully	   informed	   (and	   therefore	   valid)	   consent.	   	   Rather	   a	   clinician	   is	   required	   to	  identify	  the	  matters	  of	  importance	  to	  a	  patient	  (by	  talking	  to	  them)	  and	  as	  such	  not	  infringe	  or	  fail	  to	  take	  account	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  concerns	  them	  be	  that	  the	  status	  of	  the	  clinician	  or	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  proposed	  treatment.	  	  	  	  This	  then	  leads	  us	  on	  to	  consider	  satisfying	  our	  third	  requirement	  that	  a	  patient’s	  wishes	  be	  reasonably	  prioritised.	  	  If	  we	  agree	  that	  the	  ‘third	  way’	  account	  requires	  us	  not	  to	  ignore	  matters	  of	  personal	  importance	  to	  the	  patient	  in	  a	  negative	  sense.	  	  This,	   I	   wish	   to	   claim,	   has	   the	   effect	   of	   making	   them	   central	   to	   the	   exchange	  between	  patient	  and	  clinician.	  	  A	  dentist	  for	  fear	  of	  overriding	  matters	  of	  concern	  to	  the	  patient,	  must	  be	  required	  to	  consider	  what	  those	  matters	  are	  because	  he	  is	  not	   trying	   to	   promote	   autonomy	   through	   better	   choosing	   but	   rather	   protect	   it	  through	  considering	  what	  is	  of	  importance	  to	  the	  patient.	  	  Finally	   as	  we	   have	   considered	   in	   detail	   that	   the	   ‘third	  way’	  model	   is	   potentially	  more	   effective	   at	   protecting	   against	   our	   concerns	   about	   manipulation	   and	  deception.	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  way	  that	  we	  may	  seek	  to	  avoid	  an	  overly	  treatment	  focused	  model	  as	  well	  as	  relying	  on	  the	  need	  to	  take	  account	  of	  patient’s	  views.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  that	  an	  objection	  to	  deception	  and	  manipulation,	  because	  it	   interferes	  with	  a	  patient’s	  autonomy,	  also	  helps	  us	  to	  adequately	  account	  for	  our	  claim	  that	  a	  good	  treatment	   outcome	   (the	   end)	   is	   not	   justified	  by	   a	   poor	  process	   (the	  means).	   	   By	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doing	  so	  and	  by	  taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  broader	  concerns	  of	  patients	  (as	  per	  our	  third	  requirement)	  we	  move	  away	  from	  a	  treatment	  focus	  and	  toward	  one	  that	  is	  more	  healthcare	  focused.	  	  What	  does	  this	  mean	  for	  the	  clinician	  in	  clinical	  practice?	  	  Although	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	   of	   this	   thesis	   to	   outline	   a	   comprehensive	   change	   to	   the	   consent	   process	  without	   further	  analysis	   I	  would	   like	   to	   identify	  some	  key	  aspects	  of	  change	   that	  are	   likely	   to	   result.	   	   First,	   I	   wish	   to	   claim	   that	   the	   action	   of	   restoring	   health	   or	  preserving	   it,	   that	   is	   to	   say	   the	   action	   of	   healthcare	   itself	   is	   the	   principle	   ethical	  endeavour	   at	   hand	   in	   that	   health	   as	   an	   ethical	   good	   necessarily	   means	   that	  restoration	  of	  such	  (and	  the	  action	  thereof)	  promotes	  good.	   	  Therefore	  the	  action	  of	  the	  dentist	  providing	  treatment	  is	  the	  good	  that	  he	  or	  she	  promotes.	  	  However,	  that	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  a	  clinician	  should	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  treatment	  focus.	  	  We	  have	  learnt	  through	  careful	  examination	  that	  a	  patient	  expects	  the	  process	  and	  care	  to	  carry	   key	   characteristics	   that	   are	   reflective	   of	   their	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	  (such	   as	   the	   absence	   of	   deception);	   any	   action	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   dentist	   must	  adequately	   reflect	   the	   concept	   of	   respect	   for	   persons.	  We	   cannot	   claim	  we	   have	  promoted	  good	  if	  the	  process	  is	  flawed.	  	  A	  clinician	  then	  must	  be	  required	  to	  have	  consideration	  for	  this	  when	  they	  interact	  with	  a	  patient,	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  consent	   to	   treatment.	   	   I	  would	  claim	  that	   to	  some	  degree	  a	  change	   in	   the	  way	   in	  which	   we	   view	   consent	   could	   be	   important	   in	   reflecting	   a	   move	   away	   from	   a	  treatment	  focused	  model	  by	  simply	  requiring	  the	  clinician	  to	  approach	  the	  process	  in	   a	   different	  manner.	   	   Rather	   than	   relying	   on	   increased	   information	   relating	   to	  treatment	   to	   claim	   that	   we	   have	   both	   protected	   and	   promoted	   a	   patient’s	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Chapter	  Seven	  -­‐	  Final	  Conclusion	  and	  Recommendations	  for	  Future	  Work	  
This	  thesis	  is	  a	  normative	  examination	  of	  the	  role	  of	  patient	  autonomy	  in	  dentistry.	  	  The	  intention	  has	  been	  to	  consider	  some	  of	  the	  failings	  of	  the	  process	  and	  manner	  in	   which	   we	   interact	   with	   patients.	   	   The	   aim	   of	   this	   examination	   has	   been	   to	  propose	  a	  theoretically	  robust	  method	  of	  respecting	  patients.	  	  The	  contribution	  of	  this	   thesis	   to	  dentistry	   is	   that	   it	  highlights	  the	  difficulties	  and	  complexities	  of	   the	  dentist-­‐patient	   relationship	  and	  proposes	  an	  alternative	  model	   that	  better	  meets	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  modern	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationship.	  	  This	  has	  been	  achieved	  through	   first	  considering	   three	  hypothetical	  case	  studies.	  	  In	  particular	  this	  has	  exposed	  both	  problems	  with	  a	  highly	  medicalized	  approach	  and	   the	  problem	  of	  deception.	   	  These	   two	   issues	  have	  proved	   to	  be	  problematic;	  the	  first,	  because	  a	  highly	  medicalized	  approach	  fails	  to	  recognise	  things	  of	  wider	  importance	   to	   the	  patient	   impacting	  on	  our	   claims	   relating	   to	  patient	   autonomy.	  	  The	   second,	   because	   both	   deliberate	   and	   accidental	   deception	   destroy	   the	  authenticity	   of	   consent,	   the	   very	   method	   by	   which	   we	   claim	   to	   largely	   respect	  patients.	  	  	  	  This	   is	   followed	   by	   an	   analysis	   of	   current	   accepted	   clinical	   practice.	   	   By	   careful	  consideration	   of	   the	   Redfern	   Report	   (DoH,	   2001)	   this	   thesis	   has	   exposed	   the	  current	   reliance	   on	   a	   particular	   type	   of	   individual	   autonomy,	   the	   hierarchical	  account.	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The	   thesis	   then	   proceeds	   to	   carefully	   examining	   the	   hierarchical	   accounts.	   	   We	  have	   concluded	   that	   such	   accounts	   do	   not	   adequately	   meet	   the	   needs	   of	   the	  modern	  dental	  relationship	  in	  two	  ways.	   	  First	  they	  lead	  to	  an	  overly	  medicalized	  view	  of	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationship	  and	  second	  they	  fail	  to	  adequately	  protect	  against	  deception.	  	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  thesis	  concludes	  the	  hierarchical	  account	  is	  an	  unsuitable	  model	  by	  which	  we	  might	  want	  to	  claim	  respect	  for	  patients.	  	  The	   thesis	   goes	   on	   to	   consider	   alternatives,	   first	   looking	   at	   the	   concept	   of	   best	  interests.	   	  This	   is	   again	   rejected	  because	  although	   it	  does	  give	   the	   individualised	  approach	  we	  want,	  the	  model	  fails	  to	  protect	  against	  deception	  and	  a	  medicalized	  agenda.	  	  The	  thesis	  then	  considers	  a	  second	  alternative;	  principled	  autonomy.	  	  This	  account	  although	  successful	  in	  avoiding	  some	  of	  the	  difficulties	  with	  a	  highly	  individualized	  hierarchical	  account	  also	  encounters	  problems.	  	  The	  approach	  is	  rejected	  because	  again	   it	   relies	   on	   agenda	   setting	   by	   the	   clinical	   profession	   (by	   adopting	   certain	  obligations)	   and	   runs	   the	   risk	   of	   a	   narrow	  medicalized	   approach.	   	   Although	   the	  model	   does	   attempt	   to	   deal	   with	   deception	   this	   chapter	   concludes	   that	   the	  definition	  is	  too	  narrow	  for	  the	  dental	  purposes	  that	  we	  highlighted	  earlier	  in	  the	  thesis.	  	  This	  model	  cannot	  therefore	  be	  expanded	  to	  meet	  our	  needs.	  	  Chapter	  six	  summaries	  the	  position	  so	  far	  and	  re-­‐visits	  some	  of	  the	  concerns	  raised	  in	   preceding	   chapters	   in	   detail.	   	   The	   chapter	   then	   goes	   one	   to	   propose	   an	  alternative,	  the	  moderated	  negative	  libertarian	  account,	  ‘the	  third	  way’.	  	  The	  thesis	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concludes	  that	  by	  relying	  on	  this	  account	  we	  can	  create	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  patient’s	   own	   authentic	   autonomy	   can	   flourish.	   	   The	   thesis	   concludes	   that	   a	  dentist’s	   role	   at	   the	   chair-­‐side	   ought	   to	   be	   one	   of	   protecting,	   through	   non-­‐interference	   a	   patient’s	   pre-­‐existing	   autonomy.	   	   Ethical	   good	   is	   confined	   to	   the	  action	  of	  restoring	  health	  rather	  than	  trying	  to	  augment	  autonomy	  (and	  therefore	  good)	  through	  the	  dentist-­‐patient	  relationship.	  	  Deception	  is	  defended	  against	  as	  it	  presents	   as	   an	   internal	   obstacle	   but	   one	   that	   must	   be	   externally	   authenticated	  allowing	  more	  deeply	  held	  inner	  desires	  as	  the	  result	  of	  coercion	  or	  deception	  to	  be	  rejected.	  	  The	  central	  contribution	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  that	  it	  provides	  a	  road	  map	  towards	  where	  a	  new	  account	  of	   patient	   autonomy	   in	  dentistry	  may	  be	   found.	   	   The	   thesis	  does,	  however,	  not	  claim	  to	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  a	  way	  to	  implement	  its	  central	  findings.	  	  	  
Limitations	  Although	  the	  thesis	  considers	  problems	  in	  dentistry	  and	  the	  clinical	  setting	  it	  does	  so	   from	   a	   remove.	   	   The	   thesis	   does	   not	   incorporate	   practical	   arguments	   or	  practical	  evidence	  in	  the	  main,	   from	  the	  profession.	   	  The	  thesis	   instead	  considers	  these	   problems	   from	   a	   philosophical	   perspective	   and	   one	   that	   is	   normative	   in	  nature.	  	  Despite	  dentistry	  being	  a	  practical	  discipline	  the	  approach	  has	  been	  chosen	  to	  give	  us	  vital	  critical	  distance.	  	  Normative	  theory	  and	  guidance	  are	  important	  as	  they	  are	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  ensuring	  our	  principles	  conform	  to	  rationality	  (Cox,	  2012,	  p.64).	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This	   approach	   allows	   us	   to	   legitimately	   avoid	   professional	   bias	   and	   to	   see	  problems	  and	  solutions	  for	  what	  they	  really	  are	  without	  (at	  this	  stage)	  moderating	  them	   to	   incorporate	   institutional	   or	   professional	   constraints.	   	   Normative	  approaches	  enable	  us	  to	  see	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  a	  matter	  and	  give	  us	  an	  in-­‐depth	  view	  of	  our	   current	  position	   that	   is	   stripped	  bare	  of	  operational	   aspects	  of	  behaviour.	  	  They	  seek	  to	  reveal	  the	  values	  beneath	  our	  claims	  and	  evaluate	  these	  on	  their	  own	  terms	  through	  rational	  exploration.	  	  It	  enables	  us	  to	  judge	  what	  we	  do	  practically	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  that	  conforms	  to	  our	  critical	  ideals.	  	  If	  we	  wish	  to	  strive	   for	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  autonomy	   in	  dentistry	   that	   is	  rational	  and	  coherent	  a	  normative	  analysis	  is	  a	  key	  component	  of	  that	  aim.	  	  	  	  
Recommendations	  Although	   this	   thesis	   takes	   a	   normative	   approach	   to	   identifying	   the	   issues	   of	  respecting	   patients	   in	   dentistry	   and	   proposes	   a	   new	   approach	   to	   doing	   so	   it	   is	  important	   to	   consider	   how	   these	   ideas	   might	   be	   implemented	   in	   practice.	  	  However,	   as	   there	   is	   currently	   little	   or	   no	   empirical	   evidence	   in	   dentistry	   that	  covers	  the	  areas	  of	  concern	  the	  thesis	  addresses	  the	  recommendations	  necessarily	  need	   to	   address	   that	   lack	   of	   evidence	   as	   well	   as	   considering	   how	   the	   specific	  findings	  of	  the	  thesis	  might	  be	  implemented.	  	  The	  following	  are	  proposed	  as	  initial	  steps	   in	   moving	   towards	   bringing	   the	   claims	   in	   this	   thesis	   to	   dentistry	   in	   an	  applied	  manner:	  
• PhD	   studentship	   –	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   this	   thesis	   a	   PhD	   studentship	   is	  being	   proposed	   to	   look	   at	   specific	   aspects	   of	   autonomy	   in	   relation	   to	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dentistry,	   specifically	   Gillick	   competence	   and	   children’s	   participation	   in	  decision	   making.	   	   The	   study	   will	   employ	   ethnography	   to	   explore	   dental	  clinician	   and	   DCP	   perspectives	   of	   Gillick	   competence	   and	   make	   detailed	  observations	  of	  the	  clinical	  context	  within	  which	  decisions	  are	  being	  made.	  	  The	   idea	   in	   this	   thesis	  will	   act	  as	  a	  normative	  backdrop	   through	  which	   to	  explore	  what	  we	  discover	  in	  our	  empirical	  analysis.	   	  This	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  extent	  and	  ways	  that	  children’s	  voices	  are	  heard	  in	  a	  dental	  clinical	  setting,	  and	   whether	   the	   current	   guidance	   around	   children’s	   participation	   is	  reflective	   of	   clinical	   practice.	   	   The	   aim	   is	   to	   provide	   an	   evidence	   base	   for	  dentistry	  where	  none	  exists.	  
• Empirical	   programme	   –	   A	   programme	   of	   empirical	   ethics	   would	   give	   us	  further	   practical	   insight	   into	   the	   issues	   this	   thesis	   has	   dealt	   with.	   	   The	  general	   approach	   to	   empirical	   ethics	   includes	   four	   key	   aims:	   description	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  actual	  conduct	  of	  the	  group;	  identification	  of	  the	  moral	  issues	  that	  have	  escaped	  ethicists	  but	  are	  context	  relevant;	  description	  and	  analysis	   of	   the	   cultural	   and	   institutional	   aspects	   of	   the	   context,	   and;	  description	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  actual	  moral	  opinions	  of	  the	  those	  involved	  (Musschenga,	  2005,	  p.469).	   	   	  A	  programme	  of	  this	  kind	  would	  provide	  the	  opportunity	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   “translations”	   of	   the	   thesis’s	   theoretical	  principles	  “into	  workable	  practice	  rules	  making	  them	  available	  for	  everyday	  judgements	   and	   decision.”	   (Birnbacher,	   1999,	   p.321)	   	   Although	   empirical	  ethics	   relies	   both	   on	   sociological	   and	   psychological	   techniques	   to	   gather	  data	   in	  order	  to	  meet	  these	  broader	  aims	  there	  are	  two	  major	  approaches	  that	  could	  be	  employed	  to	  take	  this	  work	  further;	  reflective	  equilibrium	  and	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or	  epistemic	  contextualism.	  	  Further	  work	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  identify	  the	  appropriate	  methods	  to	  employ.	  
• Descriptive	   ethics	   –	   Descriptive	   ethics	   is	   a	   form	   of	   empirical	   ethics	   that	  measures	  the	  attitudes	  of	  individuals	  or	  groups.	  	  One	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  this	  approach	   is	   that	   it	   seeks	   to	   measure	   current	   attitudes	   of	   patients.	   	   This	  approach	  would	  capture	  current	  patients’	  cultural	  viewpoints	  whilst	  being	  sensitive	   to	   generational	   shifts	   and	   hence	   can	   provide	   relevance	   to	   the	  implementation	  of	  theories	  in	  an	  applied	  setting.	  	  By	  doing	  so	  this	  approach	  could	  form	  an	  important	  part	  of	  moderating	  the	  prescriptive	  account	  of	  this	  thesis	  by	  comparing	  and	  contrasting	  the	  rational	  elements	  of	  the	  theoretical	  approach	  against	  the	  ‘grass	  roots’	  views	  of	  patients	  at	  the	  chair-­‐side.	  	  Again	  this	  approach	  relies	  on	  data	  collection	  methods	  from	  allied	  disciplines	  and	  further	   work	   will	   be	   necessary	   to	   identify	   the	   appropriate	   methods	   to	  employ.	  
• Consultation	  with	   the	   public	   –	   It	  would	   be	   counter-­‐intuitive	   to	   propose	   a	  model	   of	   respecting	  patients	   in	   the	  normative	   sense	  without	   expecting	   to	  actively	  consult	  with	  patients.	  	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  approaches	  that	  could	  be	   taken	   at	   this	   early	   stage	   and	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   an	   empirical	  programme.	   	   These	   could	   include	   consumerist	   approaches	   (polls	   and	  opinion	  surveys),	  traditional	  review	  of	  a	  written	  submission,	  forums	  (small	  group	  work	  with	  people	  with	  a	  shared	  interest).	  	  Alternatively	  rather	  newer	  approaches	  might	  be	   taken	  using	  consultative	  or	  deliberative	   innovations.	  	  Consultative	  methods	  would	  involve	  considering	  the	  matters	  put	  forward	  in	  the	  thesis	  via	  review	  using	  pre-­‐existing	  groups	  (such	  as	  patient	  groups)	  that	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will	   routinely	   consider	   a	   variety	   of	   matters	   and	   gathering	   their	   views.	  	  Deliberative	  innovations	  could	  be	  used	  to	  encourage	  participants	  to	  reflect	  on	   matters	   that	   affect	   them	   through	   a	   learning	   process	   where	   relevant	  expertise	  is	  made	  available	  to	  guide	  the	  learning	  and	  deliberative	  process.	  
• Consultation	  with	  the	  profession	  –	  Consultation	  with	  the	  professions	  would	  involve	   collaboration	   with	   the	   General	   Dental	   Council	   to	   develop	  professional	   guidelines	   and	   corporate	   bodies	   to	   develop	   corporate	  guidelines.	  	  Similarly	  to	  consultation	  with	  patients,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  gather	  the	   views	   and	   concerns	   of	   these	   bodies	   and	   the	   wider	   profession.	   	   Such	  bodies	  will	   invariably	   bear	   the	   burden	   of	   being	   subject	   to	   and	   delivering	  any	   new	   approach.	   	   Again	   a	   number	   of	   the	   preceding	   consultation	  approaches	  might	  be	  taken.	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